440 U.S. 1 (1979)
The Texas Legislature enacted the Texas Optometry Act in 1969, repealing prior law and creating the Texas Optometry Board with authority to grant, renew, suspend, and revoke optometry licenses.1
Section 2.02 required that four of the six Board members be members of the Texas Optometric Association, while section 5.13(d) prohibited practicing optometry under an assumed name, trade name, or corporate name.2 Prior to 1967, the TOA dominated the State Board of Examiners.3 During that period, the State Board adopted the Professional Responsibility Rule for the regulation of the optometrical profession. Between 1967 and 1969, the commercial optometrists secured a majority on the State Board and took steps to repeal the Professional Responsibility Rule.4 This precipitated a legislative struggle between the commercial and professional optometrists which ended in the passage of the Act in 1969.
Rogers, a commercial optometrist and member of the Board who was ineligible for Texas Optometric Association membership, operated more than eighty offices under the name Texas State Optical.5 He filed suit against the other five Board members seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of both section 2.02 and section 5.13(d).6 He alleged that the Board-composition rule denied him equal protection and due process and that the trade-name ban denied equal protection because it did not apply to ophthalmologists.7 The Texas Optometric Association intervened as a defendant adopting the position of the original Board-member defendants, while the Texas Senior Citizens Association intervened on Rogers' behalf asserting rights to commercial information.8
A three-judge District Court convened in the Eastern District of Texas heard the case and, in a 1977 decision, upheld section 2.02 as rationally related to the state's interest in enforcing the Act while striking down section 5.13(d) as an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.9 The court found that the Texas State Optical name had come to communicate information about price, quality, and service availability and that the state's justifications did not outweigh the First Amendment interests.10 Rogers and the Texas Senior Citizens Association appealed the ruling sustaining section 2.02; the remaining Board members and the Texas Optometric Association appealed the ruling invalidating section 5.13(d).11
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1978.12 Earlier litigation had documented specific practices, including one commercial operator's use of at least ten different trade names across seventy-one offices, changes of names while keeping the same optometrists, continuation of former owners' names after purchase, and use of different names on nearby offices under common management to create an appearance of competition.13
Whether section 2.02 of the Texas Optometry Act, requiring that four of the six members of the Texas Optometry Board belong to the Texas Optometric Association, violates the Equal Protection Clause?14
When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations.15 Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.16
No. The history of the Act shows that section 2.02 is related reasonably to the State's legitimate purpose of securing a Board that will administer the Act faithfully.17 Prior to 1967, the TOA dominated the State Board of Examiners. During that period, the State Board adopted the Professional Responsibility Rule for the regulation of the optometrical profession. Between 1967 and 1969, the commercial optometrists secured a majority on the State Board and took steps to repeal the Professional Responsibility Rule. This precipitated a legislative struggle between the commercial and professional optometrists which ended in the passage of the Act in 1969.
At that time the legislature enacted into law, with modifications, the Professional Responsibility Rule long supported by the TOA, and created the Board to administer the Act.18 It was reasonable for the legislature to require that a majority of the Board be drawn from a professional organization that had demonstrated consistent support for the rules that the Board would be responsible for enforcing. Nor is there any constitutional basis for TSCA's due process claim that the legislature is required to place a representative of consumers on the Board.19
Section 2.02 of the Texas Optometry Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.20
Whether section 5.13(d) of the Texas Optometry Act, prohibiting the practice of optometry under a trade name, violates the First Amendment?21
Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.22 Restrictions on false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech are permissible.23 A trade name is a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic meaning.24 It can be used to mislead the public.25 The State's interest in protecting the public from the deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names is substantial and well demonstrated.26
No. A trade name is a significantly different form of commercial speech from that considered in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates.27 In those cases, the State had proscribed advertising that contained statements about the products or services offered and their prices.28 Here, a trade name conveys no information about the price and nature of the services offered by an optometrist until it acquires meaning over a period of time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the name and some standard of price or quality.29 Because these ill-defined associations of trade names with price and quality information can be manipulated by the users of trade names, there is a significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the public.30
The possibilities for deception are numerous.31 The trade name of an optometrical practice can remain unchanged despite changes in the staff of optometrists upon whose skill and care the public depends when it patronizes the practice.32 The concerns of the Texas Legislature about the deceptive and misleading uses of optometrical trade names were not speculative or hypothetical, but were based on experience in Texas with which the legislature was familiar when in 1969 it enacted section 5.13 (d).33 It is clear that the State's interest in protecting the public from the deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names is substantial and well demonstrated.
We are convinced that section 5.13 (d) is a constitutionally permissible state regulation in furtherance of this interest.34 The restriction on the use of trade names has only the most incidental effect on the content of the commercial speech of Texas optometrists.35
Section 5.13(d) of the Texas Optometry Act does not violate the First Amendment.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
I dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion and from its judgment of reversal with respect to Nos. 77-1163 and 77-1186 (the section 5.13 (d), or trade-name, issue).37 I do not agree with the Court's holding that the Texas Optometry Act's section 5.13 (d), which bans the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of optometry in the State, is constitutional.38 In my view, the Court's restricted analysis of the nature of a trade name overestimates the potential for deception and underestimates the harmful impact of the broad sweep of section 5.13 (d).39
The Court also ignores the fact that in Texas the practice of commercial optometry is legal.40 It has never been outlawed or made illegal.41 This inescapable conclusion is one of profound importance in the measure of the First Amendment rights that are asserted here.42 It follows, it seems to me, that Texas has abridged the First Amendment rights not only of Doctor Rogers but also of the members of the intervenor-plaintiff Texas Senior Citizens Association by absolutely prohibiting, without reasonable justification, the dissemination of truthful information about wholly legal commercial conduct.43