Concept
Obscenity and Child Pornography
Regulation of unprotected expression
Obscenity and Child Pornography
Sexually explicit speech sorts into three legal categories, and the category decides the case. Obscenity receives no First Amendment protection. Pornography, meaning sexually explicit speech that is not legally obscene, is protected.1 The line between the two is elusive, but it matters, because it often separates the criminal from the merely naughty.2 Child pornography is a third category, and the First Amendment does not protect it even when the material is not obscene.3
The Court placed obscenity outside the First Amendment in Roth v. United States, and it defended the holding with history. “[O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,” the Court declared, and it recognized that rejecting obscenity as “utterly without redeeming social importance” was implicit in the Amendment’s history.4 Early American law shows why. Thirteen of the 14 original states provided for prosecuting libel, every one of those thirteen made blasphemy or profanity, or both, a crime, and Massachusetts had made it criminal as early as 1712 to publish “any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon” imitating religious services.5 The Court added the “universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained,” which it found in the agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all 48 states, and in 20 federal obscenity statutes enacted between 1842 and 1956.6
Defining obscenity proved harder than excluding it. The Warren Court’s attempt in Roth spawned a “tortuous period of divided rulings” until the Burger Court agreed on a new definition in 1973 in Miller and Paris Adult, and the Miller test continues to define unprotected obscenity today.7
Child pornography rests on different reasoning. New York v. Ferber held that the government may prohibit the exhibition, sale, or distribution of child pornography even when the material fails the obscenity test.8 The Miller formulation is adjusted in this context because the state’s interest in protecting children from the physical and psychological harm of sexual exploitation is compelling.9
Expression that is sexually explicit but neither obscene nor child pornography stays within the First Amendment. A majority of the Court has never agreed to treat it as a formal “lower value” category, but the Court has upheld a number of restrictions on it through balancing analysis.10 It has allowed zoning ordinances that limit where adult bookstores and movie theaters may locate, and it has permitted a ban on nude dancing.11 Broadcasting is the setting where the Court has gone furthest, and the next section takes it up. The Court reasoned there that the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive presence in American life, and that patently offensive, indecent material on the airwaves confronts a person in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be let alone outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.12
An exam problem about explicit material therefore starts with sorting. Ask first whether the work meets the Miller definition, then whether it depicts children. If it does neither, treat it as protected and ask whether the setting justifies the regulation.
The Miller Definition
A state may punish a work as obscene only if the work satisfies every part of the test announced in Miller v. California. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion first confined regulation to works that depict or describe sexual conduct, and it required the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed, to define that conduct specifically.13 Within that boundary the trier of fact asks three questions: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, the sexual conduct the state law specifically defines; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.14 The state must win all three. A work that fails any one of them is pornography in the doctrinal sense, and it stays protected.15
Miller refined a standard that began in Roth. Roth rejected the English Hicklin test, which judged obscenity by the effect of isolated passages on the most susceptible persons, because that test might reach material that legitimately treats sex and so restricted speech and press unconstitutionally. Roth substituted a question about the average person: whether, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.16 The phrase “taken as a whole” survives in two of Miller’s three questions, and it keeps a few offensive passages from condemning a work that has a legitimate theme.
The first two questions belong to the community. Jurors apply contemporary community standards to decide whether a work appeals to the prurient interest and whether it is patently offensive, and because jurors apply those standards themselves, the prosecution need not offer expert evidence.17 The second question also depends on the statute. Miller illustrated what a statute may define: patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, and of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals.18 The list is not exhaustive, but an obscenity law must be written or judicially interpreted to be limited to such material, or it suffers from overbreadth.19
The third question differs from the first two in both its history and its yardstick. The earlier Memoirs formula treated a work as obscene only if it was “utterly without redeeming social value,” and Miller declined to adopt it because that concept had never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time.20 Chief Justice Burger added that the formula imposed “a burden virtually impossible to discharge” because it required proof of a negative, and the Court asked instead whether the work lacks “serious” literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.21 Unlike the first two questions, the value question appears to involve an increased judicial role and is not governed by open-ended community standards.22 Pope v. Illinois made the point explicit. Social value is judged by a national standard, meaning how the work would be appraised across the country, because the value of a work does not vary from community to community, and the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material.23 The third question therefore sets a floor under the other two. A small town’s jurors may find a novel offensive by their own standards, yet the book escapes the definition if a reasonable person would find serious literary value in it as a whole.
Failing any one step defeats the prosecution, because a work is obscene only if all three substantive questions come out the state’s way.
Jenkins v. Georgia shows the test at work, and it shows that a jury’s verdict is not the last word. The mainstream film Carnal Knowledge, with actors including Jack Nicholson and Ann-Margret, could not be found obscene, the Court held, because “[t]here is no exhibition whatever of the actors’ genitals, lewd or otherwise,” and “nudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene under the Miller standards.”28 The film “could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict sexual content in a patently offensive way,” and so it remained within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.29 Because the Court decided that question as a matter of law, a local jury’s sense of offense cannot carry a conviction for a film that falls outside the definition.
Unprotected status also stops at the front door. Stanley v. Georgia held that a state may not punish the private possession of obscene material, and the Court reached that result by distinguishing Roth.30 Roth had rejected any need to prove that exposure to obscene material creates a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, but Roth concerned public distribution, and distribution raises dangers that private possession does not: obscene material may fall into the hands of children, or it may intrude on the sensibilities or privacy of the general public.31 None of those dangers is present when an adult keeps the material at home.32 The government may therefore prohibit the sale, distribution, and exhibition of obscene material even to willing recipients. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton the Court said that states may make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in it, tends to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize the states’ right to maintain a decent society.33 The Court applied the same distribution rule to commercial exhibition in Paris Adult and to mailing in United States v. Reidel.
Child Pornography
New York v. Ferber holds that a state may punish the promotion of child pornography without proving that the material is obscene. The First Amendment does not protect that promotion even when the material fails the Miller test, because Miller is not a “constitutional straitjacket.”35 The category rests on a different premise from obscenity. Obscenity law asks how an audience would react to a work, while child pornography law asks how the work was made. As the Court later put it, Ferber’s judgment about child pornography “was based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.”36
New York’s § 263.15 prohibited promoting this material without an obscenity requirement, and the New York Court of Appeals held it unconstitutional. That court reasoned that because § 263.10 expressly included an obscenity standard, § 263.15 could not be read to include one, so the statute would prohibit promoting materials traditionally entitled to constitutional protection.37 The Supreme Court disagreed. Miller, it explained, was an accommodation between the state’s interest in protecting the “sensibilities of unwilling recipients” from pornographic material and the dangers of censorship inherent in content-based laws, and laws against child pornography run the same risk of letting the hand of the censor become unduly heavy.38 The interest on the state’s side of the scale changes when children are involved, and the change exposes how poorly the Miller questions fit. Whether a work appeals to the prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to whether a child was harmed in making it. A depiction need not be patently offensive to have required a child’s exploitation. A work with serious value taken as a whole may still embody the hardest core of child pornography.39
Because each Miller question measures something that varies independently of the harm, the Court adjusted the formulation in three respects. The trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person, the sexual conduct need not be portrayed in a patently offensive manner, and the material need not be considered as a whole.40 The category keeps two limits. Criminal responsibility requires some element of scienter on the part of the defendant, and the category is limited to visual material: descriptions and other depictions of sexual conduct that are not otherwise obscene, and that involve no live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of one, keep their First Amendment protection.41 New York’s statute listed the forbidden acts with precision, from actual or simulated sexual intercourse to lewd exhibition of the genitals, and these are acts that could render a work obscene if they were its theme.42
The Court gave five reasons for allowing the states this greater leeway:
- The state’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling, because “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.”43
- Distributing photographs and films of sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children, because the material is a permanent record whose circulation exacerbates the child’s harm and because the distribution network must be closed if production is to be controlled.44
- Advertising and selling child pornography supply an economic motive for producing it and so are an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.45
- The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.46
- Excluding the category fits earlier decisions, because a content-based classification may be accepted when, within the confines of the class, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests at stake that no case-by-case adjudication is required.47
The second and third reasons explain why the ban reaches sellers and advertisers and not only producers. Production is a low-profile, clandestine industry, while marketing the products requires a visible apparatus of distribution, so the most expeditious if not the only practical method of enforcement may be to dry up the market with severe criminal penalties on those who sell, advertise, or promote the product.48 The payment from sales supplies the motive to produce, and the Court invoked the principle that the freedoms of speech and press have rarely been thought to protect speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct violating a valid criminal statute.49 The Court also observed that if the laws against employing children in these films and photographs were fully effective, the First Amendment implications would be no greater than those of a ban on distribution, because enforceable production laws would leave no child pornography to be marketed.50 The fourth reason supplies the value side of the balance. The Court thought it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts would often be an important and necessary part of a literary, scientific, or educational work, since a performer over the statutory age who looked younger could be used, and simulation outside the statute’s prohibition offers another alternative.51
Read alone, the five reasons resemble the open-ended balancing of costs and benefits that the Court has refused to use for creating new categories of unprotected speech. A later decision answered that reading. Ferber did not rest on a balance of competing interests alone, the Court explained, because the market for child pornography is intrinsically related to the underlying abuse and is an integral part of producing the material, so Ferber grounded its analysis in a previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech.52 That reading makes harm in production the organizing idea of the category, and it predicts the category’s limits.
Ferber also challenged the statute for overbreadth, the claim that it forbids so much protected expression that it must fall on its face. The Court borrowed the standard of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, under which overbreadth “must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” and it held that the requirement applies to the publication of books and films as well as to picketing and campaign activity.53 The standard rests on a practical point. A sweeping statute can chill many speakers, but the deterrence of protected speech shrinks as the regulation’s reach shrinks.54 New York’s statute met the standard. The Court doubted that its arguably impermissible applications amounted to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within its reach, declined to assume that New York courts would widen the statute by reading “lewd exhibition[s] of the genitals” expansively, and left any remaining overbreadth to be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations in which the statute might not apply.55
Two concurrences show the question the majority left open, which is whether a depiction of a real child that has serious value may be punished. Justice O’Connor stressed that the Court did not hold that New York must except “material with serious literary, scientific, or educational value,” and that it held only that, even if the First Amendment shelters such material, the statute was not overbroad enough to support the facial attack.56 She reasoned that a 12-year-old photographed while masturbating suffers the same psychological harm whether the community calls the photograph “edifying” or “tasteless,” so the audience’s appreciation is irrelevant to the state’s interest.57 Justice Brennan, writing separately, saw the matter differently. The limited classes of speech whose suppression raises no serious First Amendment concern have two attributes, exceedingly slight social value and a compelling state interest in regulation, and in his view applying § 263.15 to depictions that themselves have serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medical value would violate the First Amendment.58
Stanley protected the home possession of obscene material, and Osborne v. Ohio confirms that child pornography is different. The Court has held that the government cannot punish private possession of obscene material, although it may outlaw private possession of child pornography.59 The contrast tracks the interests at stake. Obscenity law guards children from exposure and the public from intrusion, dangers Stanley found absent in the home, while child pornography law protects the children used to make the material, whose harm is “exacerbated by [the] circulation” of a permanent record.60
The same logic sets the outer limit of the category. Since Ferber, the Court has been clear that in order to be considered child pornography, the material must use children in its production.61 Congress’s efforts to regulate sexual speech have repeatedly drawn constitutional challenges. The Child Online Protection Act of 1998 fell in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004), and significant portions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 produced the next decision.62 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition the Court held that the Act could not rest on Ferber, because Ferber had as its focus the production of the work and not its content, and its judgment was “based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.”63 An image made without a real child, such as a computer-generated image, records no abuse, so Ferber’s justification does not reach it.
Congress then wrote a narrower statute aimed at the conduct around the material and not at the images themselves, and the Court sustained it in United States v. Williams. Justice Scalia described the law as prohibiting “offers to provide and requests to obtain child pornography.”64 Its focus, unlike that of its predecessors, is not the “underlying material” but the “collateral speech” that brings such material into the marketing and distribution of child pornography, and it is directed at anyone who “advertises, promotes, presents or distributes” it.65 In distinguishing Free Speech Coalition, Scalia pointed to the statute’s scienter requirement and to its concern with transactions, commercial transactions at that, although it was not limited to those.66 Free Speech Coalition struck a ban on a class of images, while Williams reaches the transaction in which someone offers or seeks the illegal material.
Because each decision in this line answers a different question about how the harm rationale reaches the facts, a child pornography problem is best run as a sequence: