394 U.S. 557 (1969)
An investigation of Robert Stanley's alleged bookmaking activities led to the issuance of a search warrant for his home at 280 Springside Drive, S.E., in Atlanta, Georgia.1 Federal and state agents executed the warrant and secured entrance to the premises.2 They found very little evidence of bookmaking activity, but while looking through a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom, one of the federal agents, accompanied by a state officer, found three reels of eight-millimeter film.3
The agents used a projector and screen found in an upstairs living room to view the films.4 The state officer concluded that the films were obscene and seized them.5 Since a further examination of the bedroom indicated that Stanley occupied it, he was charged with possession of obscene matter and placed under arrest.6 He was later indicted for knowingly having possession of obscene matter in violation of Georgia law.7
Stanley was tried before a jury and convicted.8 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.9 Stanley appealed, and the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).10
The search warrant had described with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized, which included bookmaking records, wagering paraphernalia, and other property used in or derived from an illegal wagering business.11 The agents were lawfully present in the home under the warrant when they opened the desk drawer, but the warrant did not authorize seizure of films.12 After finding the reels, the agents spent some 50 minutes exhibiting them by means of Stanley's projector in another upstairs room before returning downstairs and arresting him.13
Whether the Georgia obscenity statute, insofar as it punishes mere private possession of obscene matter, violates the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment?14
The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime.15 The right to receive information and ideas is fundamental to a free society and takes on added dimension in the privacy of the home, where the right to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions is also fundamental.16 While the State retains broad power to regulate obscenity through statutes targeting public distribution or commercial dissemination, that power does not extend to criminalizing mere private possession by an individual in his own home.17
Yes. The established facts show that Stanley was investigated for alleged bookmaking.18 He was subjected to a search of his home under a warrant limited to wagering paraphernalia.19 Stanley was then charged, tried, and convicted solely for knowingly possessing three reels of film deemed obscene.20 There was no allegation or evidence of intent to sell, distribute, or exhibit the material.21 The Georgia statute on its face criminalizes knowing possession without any public or commercial element.22 This directly invades the privacy of Stanley's home and his right to receive information and ideas there.23 The agents' discovery and seizure of the films occurred during a search for unrelated evidence.24
These facts fall squarely within the constitutional protection against state control of private thoughts and reading material in the home. The asserted state interest in protecting the mind from obscenity or preventing hypothetical antisocial conduct cannot justify such an intrusion.25 The absence of any danger of exposure to children or the general public further confirms that the statute's application here exceeds permissible bounds.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black stated that the mere possession of reading matter or movie films, whether labeled obscene or not, cannot be made a crime by a State without violating the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth.29 His reasons for this belief have been set out in many of his prior opinions, as for example, Smith v. California, 361 U. S.
147, 155 (concurring opinion), and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 476 (dissenting opinion).30
Before the commencement of the trial in this case, the appellant filed a motion to suppress the films as evidence upon the ground that they had been seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.31 The motion was denied, and the films were admitted in evidence at the trial.32 In affirming the appellant’s conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court specifically determined that the films had been lawfully seized.
The appellant correctly contends that this determination was clearly wrong under established principles of constitutional law.33 The warrant had authorized only the seizure of bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia.34 Once the agents found the films they had no authority to view them for fifty minutes or to seize them.35
Because the films were seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, they were inadmissible in evidence at the appellant’s trial.36 The judgment of conviction must therefore be reversed under Mapp v. Ohio.37