Concept
Identifying Content Neutrality
Content-neutral regulation of protected expression
Identifying Content Neutrality
A speech regulation travels one of two tracks, and a court picks the track before it weighs anything else. A law that targets speech based on its communicative content is presumptively unconstitutional and survives only if the government proves that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.1 A law aimed at something other than the message receives the more forgiving intermediate scrutiny that later sections of this chapter develop. The label therefore carries the standard of review and the burden of proof with it, which is why cases are fought over the label.
Laws seldom announce that they target ideas. They draw lines among topics, speakers, places, and occasions, and a court must decide whether a given line tracks the message or tracks something else, such as noise, litter, or the orderly use of a sidewalk. Four questions organize that decision, and a law that clears one can still be caught by the next:
- Does the law, on its face, distinguish speech by topic, idea, or the function of the message?
- If the text is neutral, can the law be justified without reference to the content of the speech it burdens?
- Does a line between speakers, or a rule tied to an event, hide a preference for some messages?
- How far have later decisions limited a rigid reading of the facial rule?
The Facial Inquiry
A court classifies a regulation by reading it, and Reed v. Town of Gilbert makes that reading the required first step. A law is content-based when it applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed, so the court asks whether the law, on its face, draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.2 Turner had already described the instinct behind the question: laws that by their terms distinguish favored from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based, while laws that burden or benefit speech without reference to ideas or views are in most instances neutral.3 Reed turns that instinct into a first question with a definite answer.
Facial distinctions take two forms, and both count. Some define the regulated speech by subject matter, and others, more subtly, define it by function or purpose. Each is drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, so each draws strict scrutiny.4 A rule reaching only political speech is a subject-matter line of the obvious kind. A rule reaching only signs that direct the public to an event is a function line, easier to miss because it describes what the speech is for rather than what it is about. Either way, an official must read the speech and decide what it says or does before the law's consequences attach.
The Gilbert sign code draws both kinds of line in a single ordinance. It banned outdoor signs without a permit but exempted twenty-three categories, and three of them decided the case:5
| Category | What it covered | Limits |
|---|---|---|
| Ideological Signs | A message or ideas that fit no other category | Up to 20 square feet; no placement or time restrictions |
| Political Signs | Signs designed to influence the outcome of an election | Up to 32 square feet; displayed only during an election season |
| Temporary Directional Signs | Signs directing the public to a church or other “qualifying event” | Up to 6 square feet; no more than four per property; displayed no more than 12 hours before the event and 1 hour after |
The Good News Community Church, a small, cash-strapped congregation, owned no building and held its services at elementary schools and other locations in or near the town. To tell the public where the next service would be, it posted fifteen to twenty temporary signs each Saturday, giving its name and the time and place of the service, and took them down around midday Sunday.6 Those signs fell in the most restricted category.
The Court held the code content-based on its face because the restrictions applying to any sign depended entirely on its communicative content, so it did not need to consider the town's justifications or purposes before applying strict scrutiny.7 A sign announcing when a book club will discuss Locke's theory of government is treated differently from a sign urging a vote for one of Locke's followers, and both are treated differently from a sign expressing an ideological view rooted in Locke's theory. The Church's signs inviting people to worship were likewise treated differently from signs conveying other ideas.8
The Court of Appeals offered three reasons for treating the code as neutral, and each failure teaches a separate point. The first was motive: the town had not adopted the code out of disagreement with any message, and its interest in regulating temporary signs was unrelated to their content. The Supreme Court answered that this analysis skips the crucial first step, which is whether the law is content-neutral on its face.9 A law that is content-based on its face receives strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas in the regulated speech, so an innocuous justification cannot turn a facially content-based law into a neutral one.10 Turner had said much the same: a content-based purpose may be sufficient to show that a law is content-based but is not necessary, and the bare assertion of a neutral purpose cannot save a law that discriminates on its face.11 A fact pattern that stresses a town's concern for aesthetics and safety, or its lack of hostility to any idea, invites exactly the Court of Appeals' mistake.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism does not rescue the town. Ward involved a facially content-neutral rule requiring performers in a city-owned music venue to use the city's own sound system, so the Court there asked whether the city had regulated because of disagreement with the message and whether the rule was justified without reference to content. Its framework applies only if a statute is content-neutral.12
The facial rule rests on two supports. The first is the Amendment's own object. The First Amendment targets the abridging of speech by the operation of laws rather than the motives of the people who enacted them, and innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of a facially content-based statute, which later officials may use against disfavored speakers.13 The second is administrability. A court applying the facial inquiry reads the text and asks whether a sign's treatment depends on what it communicates, which spares it the harder task of reconstructing what legislators were thinking, and a challenger need adduce no evidence of an improper censorial motive.14 The first reason explains why benign motives are irrelevant to a facially content-based law, and the second explains why the analysis begins with the text.
The Court of Appeals' second reason was that the code mentions no idea or viewpoint and singles none out for differential treatment. That reasoning conflates two limits on government. Discrimination among viewpoints is the more blatant and egregious form of content discrimination, yet “[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”15 A law banning sound trucks for political speech, and only political speech, would be content-based even if it imposed no limit on which political viewpoints could be expressed. The sign code likewise favors ideological messages over messages about a political candidate, and favors those over messages announcing an assembly of like-minded people.16
Subject-matter lines matter because control over which topics may be debated can skew public debate as surely as control over which side may speak. A law forbidding any discussion of an unpopular war would fall hardest on the war's critics even though it named no side. The picketing cases show the same principle. The Chicago ordinance in Mosley exempted labor picketing from a ban on picketing near schools, and the statute in Carey v. Brown barred residential picketing except at a workplace involved in a labor dispute. Neither law favored one side of a labor dispute, yet each gave preferential treatment to expression on one subject, and each was held invalid.17
The third reason was that the code's lines turn on who is speaking and on whether an event is occurring. The Court rejected the factual premise first. The restrictions on political, ideological, and temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them, so a local business advertising the Church's meetings would face the same limits as the Church.18 It rejected the legal premise next. A speaker-based distinction is not automatically content-neutral, because laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference, and a law limiting the content of newspapers, but only newspapers, could not escape strict scrutiny by being labeled speaker-based.19 Event-based distinctions get the same treatment, so tying a rule to an election or a church service does not by itself make it neutral.20 A speaker or event label opens the inquiry rather than closing it, and the subsection on speaker and event distinctions carries it further.
A town that wants to manage its signs still has real tools. Gilbert has ample content-neutral options available, such as regulating size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. On public property a town may go a long way toward forbidding signs altogether, so long as it acts in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner, because only content-based distinctions draw strict scrutiny and neutral rules receive lesser scrutiny.21 Where the text does sort by message, the town carries the burden, and Gilbert could not carry it. Even assuming that aesthetics and traffic safety were compelling interests, a code that strictly limits temporary directional signs while allowing unlimited larger ideological signs is underinclusive, because directional signs are no greater an eyesore, and no greater a threat to safety, than the others.22 The Court added that an ordinance narrowly tailored to pedestrian and traffic safety, such as one covering hazard warnings, traffic-directing signs, or street numbers, might well survive strict scrutiny. The facial inquiry therefore sets the standard of review and leaves the outcome to the tailoring analysis.
Justification Without Reference to Content
A law that is neutral on its face has not yet cleared the content-neutrality inquiry, and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC supplies the rule that keeps the second question alive. After finding that the must-carry rules burdened and benefited speech without reference to content, the Court added that this did not end the matter: even a regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys.25 The question comes from Ward v. Rock Against Racism and asks whether the government adopted the regulation because of agreement or disagreement with the message.26 A content-based purpose can be enough to make a neutral-looking law content-based, though it is not necessary to that showing in every case, and the bare assertion of a neutral purpose cannot save a law that discriminates on its face.27
The purpose route exists because the facial test cannot see everything. A legislature that wants to silence a message can describe the burden as noise, safety, or order, and if review stopped at the text, drafting style would pick the track. Reed accordingly applies strict scrutiny both when a law is content-based on its face and when its purpose and justification are content-based, so a court must answer both questions before it calls a law neutral.28 The second category has two members: laws adopted because of disagreement with the message, and laws that cannot be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”29 The first looks to why the government acted. The second looks to whether the interest the government offers can even be described without mentioning what the speech says. Because governments rarely admit disagreement with a message, the second is usually where the dispute lands.
The hard part is deciding when an offered interest is tied to the message. Governments defend speech restrictions by pointing to a danger beyond the message, such as riot, disorder, or offense, and that ultimate interest always sounds unrelated to expression. The inquiry therefore turns on the causal link the government asserts between the danger and the speech in the case at hand. If the danger arises because of what the speaker said, the interest is related to the suppression of expression, and the law cannot travel the lenient track.30 That is the work of the third factor in O'Brien's test, which asks whether the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and so acts as a switch between strict and intermediate scrutiny.31 Texas v. Johnson later confirmed that O'Brien's relatively lenient standard applies only when the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.32
One way to apply the causal-link question is to ask whether the harm the government invokes would persist to the same degree if the audience could not understand the language of the speech. A leaflet ban justified by litter passes, because streets are littered by leaflets in any language. A rule justified by the distress listeners feel at what a sign says does not pass, because that injury exists only for those who take in the message.
The flag cases show the same switch operating on a single physical act. Burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires can be punished, because the interest in fire safety does not depend on any message, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag cannot be punished, because that interest attaches to the idea the burning expresses.33 In Texas v. Johnson, Texas defended a flag-burning conviction on two grounds: preventing breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. The Court held that the first interest was not implicated on the record, since no disturbance occurred or threatened to occur, and that the second was related to the suppression of expression.34 The second holding is the causal-link test at work, because concern for the flag's symbolism arises only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message.35
The federal Flag Protection Act, at issue in United States v. Eichman, contained no explicit content-based limitation on the conduct it prohibited, yet the Court held that the government's asserted interest was still related to the suppression of free expression.36 The Act was written in broader terms than the Texas statute, but its restriction could not be justified without reference to content, so it drew the most exacting scrutiny and fell.37 Eichman shows what the justification route adds to the facial test: the text was neutral, and the interest the government offered supplied the content-based character.
The justification route carries a built-in limit, because courts hesitate to look behind a neutral law for a hidden message-based motive. In O'Brien the Court upheld the federal ban on destroying draft cards despite the argument that Congress aimed at antiwar protest, declined to probe Congress's actual purpose, and treated the law as a neutral measure serving the administrative needs of the Selective Service System.38 Chief Justice Warren treated the committee reports, which tied Congress's concern with open destruction of cards to the smooth functioning of the Selective Service, as more authoritative than the hostile remarks of individual members.39 Three reasons support the hesitation. A legislature is a collegial body with many motives, so no single motive can be named as the law's. A law struck down for an improper motive can be re-enacted with a new justification, so the ruling may accomplish little. And a motive inquiry in a First Amendment case lets a judge's own predilections shape the finding too easily.40 Turner repeated the point by invoking O'Brien's “familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”41
That reluctance shapes the justification inquiry without displacing it. In practice the question is what interest the government actually invokes and whether that interest depends on the message, and a plausible neutral justification is taken at face value unless the interest itself arises from what the speech communicates. How far courts will look behind a neutral law remains uncertain.42 The Court does examine motive in other settings, so the hesitation is a practical caution rather than a bar.43 A fact pattern that offers one legislator's angry remark about a neutral law therefore does less work than one showing that the stated interest depends on how audiences react to the message.
Turner itself shows how the inquiry runs and why it can be contested. The majority read Congress's detailed findings as showing that the overriding aim of must-carry was to preserve access to free over-the-air television for the 40 percent of Americans without cable, a purpose unrelated to content, and it dismissed the cable operators' ability to hypothesize a content-based purpose as little more than speculation.44 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg and in part by Justice Thomas, read the same statute differently. She concluded that its preference for broadcasters over cable programmers was justified with reference to content, because Congress had pointed to the diversity and local-affairs focus of broadcast programming.45 Two readings of one set of findings show that the question is whether the stated interest depends on the message, and judges can answer that differently. Eichman supplies the opposite pole to the majority's reading, since there the asserted interest could not be stated without mentioning what the burning communicated.
Speaker and Event Distinctions
Turner answers the speaker question first. The must-carry rules distinguish between speakers in the television programming market, favoring broadcasters, which transmit over the airwaves, over cable programmers, which do not. The line rested on the manner in which speakers transmit their messages, not on the messages they carry, and speaker distinctions of that kind are not presumed invalid so long as they are not “a subtle means of exercising a content preference.”47 A speaker line therefore does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny, and Reed shows that it does not automatically avoid it either.48
Speaker lines are ambiguous because the people a law burdens often share a viewpoint or a subject. A legislature that cannot comfortably ban a message can burden the people most likely to deliver it, and the law never has to mention the message at all. The Court has observed that speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.49 Yet many classes of speakers are defined by something unrelated to what they believe, such as the technology they use, their economic position, or their past conduct, and a rule treating every such line as suspect would put ordinary industry regulation under strict scrutiny. The Court has accordingly not treated speaker identity as a proxy for viewpoint where the class rests on a trait independent of belief, as with a tax benefit for veterans' groups, justified by their service to the nation, or an injunction against protesters at an abortion clinic, justified by their past actions.50 The controlling question is why the legislature drew the line.
Turner states the test directly. Speaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the government's preference for the substance of what the favored speakers have to say, or its aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say.51 Turner reads Buckley v. Valeo as the model of a line that does reflect such a preference. Federal law capped at $1,000 per year what an individual could spend to support or oppose a candidate, and Turner treated the equalizing rationale as revealing a concern with communicative impact: a limit unrelated to the content of expression would have given no one a reason to “equaliz[e] the relative ability” of individuals to influence elections.52 Influence over voters is the communicative impact of speech.
Buckley and must-carry both draw lines between speakers, and what separates them is the reason for the line. Congress favored broadcasters on the belief that the broadcast industry was in economic peril because of the physical characteristics of cable transmission and the economic incentives facing the cable industry.53 The cable operator's position supplies the rest of the explanation: by owning the physical pathway into the subscriber's home, an operator can silence competing programmers with a mere flick of the switch.54 Neither the peril nor the bottleneck depends on what any programmer says, and operators bear the carriage burden only because they control access to the cable conduit.55 In Buckley the reason for the line was the persuasive power of the favored speech, so the same speaker label sent one law to strict scrutiny and left the other on the intermediate track.
Reed adds that a speaker label cannot launder a content line the rule already contains. A law limiting the content of newspapers, but only newspapers, remains content-based, and so would a law restricting the political speech of all corporations, because the restriction on political speech is itself the content line and singling out corporations adds nothing that neutralizes it. Characterizing a distinction as speaker-based opens the inquiry and does not close it.56 A fact pattern that stresses a legislature's lack of hostility to any viewpoint is silent on the real issue, which is whether the stated reason for singling out these speakers would hold up if their message were different.
Event-based lines call for the same attention to function. The Gilbert code could have set a period before an election during which citizens might post signs on any topic whatever, a rule that uses the election as a clock and requires an official to check only the date. It did something different: when election time came, it required town officials to decide whether each sign was “designed to influence the outcome of an election” and so “political,” or merely communicated a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes and so “ideological.”57 That inquiry is content-based, and the Court held that it does not evade strict scrutiny because an election is involved.58
The role the event plays decides the classification. When the event is only a time window, the rule applies to speech of every content and no official reads anything. When the event is the subject of the message, the rule applies because of an idea the sign conveys, and the official must read the sign to know whether the consequences attach. The Court put the point directly: a regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less content-based than one that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea, and the Code singled out signs bearing a particular message, the time and location of a specific event.59 The Court also found no precedent for an exception to the content-neutrality requirement for event-based laws, and it preferred a clear and firm rule over leniency toward ordinances that merely seem reasonable.60
The next subsection turns to how a later decision limited a rigid reading of Reed's facial rule, which matters most for laws that sort speech by location rather than by speaker or event.
Austin and the Limits of Reed
Reed's facial test raised an obvious worry about how many ordinary sign rules it condemned, and City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC answered by holding that a city's regulation of off-premises signs, which include billboards, is not subject to strict scrutiny.62 Austin's code defined an off-premises sign as one advertising a business, person, activity, or product not located on the site where the sign stood, or directing people to a location not on that site. It prohibited new off-premises signs, let existing ones remain as grandfathered signs that could not change the technology used to convey a message, and permitted on-premises signs to be digitized.63 After the city denied permits to digitize its billboards, Reagan National Advertising sued. The Court of Appeals read Reed to make a rule content-based whenever applying it requires asking who is speaking and what the speaker is saying, and it therefore subjected the code to strict scrutiny.64
The Supreme Court held that this read-the-sign rule is too extreme an interpretation of its precedent.65 Austin's provisions do require an official to look at a sign, but only to see whether it points to the property it stands on or to some other location, so the examination serves to draw a neutral, location-based line and the sign's substantive message is irrelevant to how the provisions apply.66 A rule keyed to location gives no official a lever for favoring one topic over another, because a sign about politics and a sign about hardware receive identical treatment if each sits away from the thing it discusses. The Court found support in its solicitation cases, where identifying a request for something requires reading or hearing the speech first, yet the restriction stays content-neutral so long as it does not discriminate based on topic, subject matter, or viewpoint.67 What triggers the content-based label is therefore discrimination based on the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed, and the mere need to examine speech does not.68
Reed involved a different kind of law. Gilbert's code was a comprehensive scheme that singled out specific subject matter for differential treatment, applying distinct size, placement, and time limits to twenty-three categories of signs. Ideological signs fared best, political signs fared worse, and temporary directional signs for qualifying events, such as gatherings sponsored by religious or nonprofit organizations, were restricted most heavily.69 Austin's provisions create no classification for political messages, ideological messages, or directional messages about specific events, and a given sign is treated differently solely according to whether it sits on the same premises as the thing it discusses.70 The on-/off-premises line therefore resembles an ordinary time, place, or manner restriction, and Reed does not require strict scrutiny for that kind of location-based regulation.71 A Gilbert-style code that ranks signs by topic stays on the strict-scrutiny track after Austin, because the line it draws is the one the Court said Reed condemns.
The distinction also had a long regulatory pedigree. American jurisdictions have regulated outdoor advertising for well over a century and have long separated signs promoting things located elsewhere from signs identifying things onsite. The federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 directed States receiving federal highway funds to limit off-premises signs, and the city represented that tens of thousands of municipalities use analogous distinctions.72 The majority added that the contrary view would make all those jurisdictions presumptive violators of the First Amendment, some for more than half a century, on the strength of a distinction the Court had repeatedly reviewed without questioning.73 Reed itself had pointed the same way, since Justice Alito's concurrence listed rules distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs among the regulations cities remain free to adopt.74
Austin limits Reed without overruling it. The majority maintained that it was applying the standard Reed repeatedly stated and that it cast no doubt on any precedent treating topic or subject-matter discrimination as content-based.75 Nor did the holding end the case. A facially neutral restriction may still be content-based if evidence shows an impermissible purpose or justification underlying it, and a neutral restriction must still survive intermediate scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, a question the Court left to the lower court on remand.76 That is the second track described earlier, which asks for important interests unrelated to the suppression of speech and no substantially greater burden on speech than necessary. The reservation for a content-based purpose matters in practice because identical text can travel on different tracks.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, dissented on the ground that Reed's rule applies to Austin's code as written: a law is content-based if it draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys, and Austin treats a sign promoting an off-site activity differently from one promoting an on-site activity.77 That the definition describes regulated speech by its function or purpose, advertising or directing people elsewhere, made no difference to him, because Reed itself recognized that subtler distinctions of that kind remain message-based.78 He also rejected the idea that location saves the rule, since an official must know what a sign says as well as where it stands.79 In his account the majority replaced a clear rule with an incoherent and malleable standard by treating a law as content-neutral whenever it sweeps in a broad enough category of communicative content, and the virtue of the clear rule was that it protects speech from viewpoint discrimination and governmental caprice.80
Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion because Reed is binding precedent, and he wrote separately to explain why Reed ties content discrimination too rigidly to strict scrutiny.81 In his view the category works better as a rule of thumb applied with common sense. The more basic question is whether the regulation harms First Amendment interests disproportionately in light of its regulatory objectives, which requires weighing the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the competing objectives, how well the law achieves them, and whether less restrictive means exist.82 His concurrence in the judgment in Reed had rested on the breadth of ordinary regulation: virtually all government activities involve speech, regulatory programs almost always require content discrimination, and an automatic strict-scrutiny trigger writes a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory activity.83 Justice Kagan's concurrence in Reed had made a related argument. Strict scrutiny exists to protect the marketplace of ideas and to guard against official hostility or favoritism toward a message, so it should apply when there is a realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot, as with viewpoint distinctions or restrictions on an entire topic, and it can be relaxed when that risk is absent.84 She predicted that courts applying Reed would have to invalidate the entirely reasonable ordinances of thousands of towns, one after another.85
The three positions are worth keeping distinct. The majority keeps Reed's trigger but reads it to reach laws that single out a topic or subject matter, so a neutral location-based line stays on the intermediate track.86 Justice Breyer would go further and demote content discrimination to a rule of thumb, while Justice Thomas would treat every distinction based on a message as content-based. Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants had suggested that a majority accepted a broad reading of Reed, and Austin shows that the broad reading was subject to significant modification.87 Whether the limit in Austin marks the start of a retreat from Reed or only a minor adjustment is not yet settled, and the debate between Justice Breyer's concurrence and Justice Thomas's dissent can be expected to continue.88