Concept
Endorsement and Coercion
Establishment
Endorsement and Coercion
Two questions do most of the work in the school-prayer cases, and they ask about different things. Endorsement asks what government has said: does the practice tell nonadherents that they are outsiders and adherents that they are favored members of the political community?1 Coercion asks what government has done to a person: has it forced or influenced someone to attend religious observance or to stay away from it, or to profess belief or disbelief?2 Because one looks at the message and the other at the pressure, they can come apart. A practice can compel no one and still convey official approval, and the Court has invalidated many noncoercive practices on that ground, among them Alabama's moment-of-silence statute, the aid program in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, and the display of a nativity scene on public property.3
Lee v. Weisman, taken up below, shows the Justices dividing over how the two relate. The concurring Justices treated coercion as sufficient to show a violation but not necessary,4 while the dissenters would find coercion only where law requires religious practice and punishes the failure to engage in it.5 The broader view has two supports. A Clause limited to coercion would duplicate the Free Exercise Clause, which already bars government from forcing anyone to practice or not practice a religion, and for that reason no majority has confined the Establishment Clause to coercion, although several Justices have been willing to.6 And Justice O'Connor treated endorsement as pressure in its own right: when government places its power, prestige, and financial support behind a religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure on religious minorities to conform is plain.7
Schools supply nearly all the facts because the Court has been most vigilant there. The wall of separation stands highest on public school grounds, and the keystone cases are Engel v. Vitale, which involved a voluntary, nondenominational prayer written by the state, and Abington School District v. Schempp, which involved mandatory Bible readings.8 Earlier in this chapter, a Kentucky law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms failed for want of a secular legislative purpose.9 Behind these decisions lies the State's own “substantial antiestablishment interest in ensuring that the constitutionally guaranteed public education it provides is religiously neutral.”10
The endorsement material below teaches a framework whose authority is now in doubt. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, a case about a high school football coach who gave thanks through prayer on the field at the end of each game, the Supreme Court rejected the endorsement test.11 Lee's holding, by contrast, rests on a coercion rationale, which the second subsection develops.12 The third subsection asks whether a prayer escapes the Clause by being nonsectarian.
The Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree restates the test she proposed the term before, in Lynch v. Donnelly, as a refinement of Lemon.14 Her premise is that the religious liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct government action endorsing religion is invalid on that view because it “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”15
Because the injury is the message, the test reaches practices that no one is forced to join, and it carries forward the commitment to religious equality that the school-prayer decisions of the 1960s established.16 The test also earns its place for a practical reason. A statute that promotes a secular interest will often help or hinder a sectarian belief as a side effect, and chaos would follow if every such statute fell; a State could not criminalize murder for fear of promoting the Biblical command against killing. Endorsement gives courts a way to sort the statutes and practices whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious liberty from those that merely overlap with religion.17
The test turns Lemon's purpose and effect prongs into two questions about one message. The purpose question asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect question asks whether, irrespective of that purpose, the practice in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either invalidates the practice.18 Either question can end the case. O'Connor found that Alabama's legislature meant to endorse prayer and so treated the effect question as unnecessary,19 but a law enacted for secular reasons can still fail the effect question, because what a practice communicates does not depend on what its sponsors meant. Since O'Connor offered the test as a clarification of Lemon, it shares Lemon's strengths and weaknesses: it may state more precisely how government is forbidden to advance or inhibit religion, and critics reply that it is too subjective because different people read government “messages” differently.20
The effect question is answered from the standpoint of an objective, informed observer. In Wallace, O'Connor asked whether “an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.”21 The Court asked the same question in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe and concluded that, whatever the listener thinks of the message, an objective student would unquestionably perceive an inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval.22 In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, O'Connor described the observer as a hypothetical person who knows the history and context of the community and forum in which a display appears. The device remains contested. Critics ask whose reaction counts (a reasonable member of a minority religion, the average citizen, or the most sensitive person), how much of the legal context the observer understands, whether endorsement was the Framers' primary concern, and how the test handles accommodation of religion.23 O'Connor herself called endorsement “in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.” Evidentiary submissions may help answer it, but the court decides what the practice means.24
The test does not require government to ignore religion. Government may acknowledge religion and take it into account in making law and policy; it may not convey, or try to convey, a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.25 O'Connor placed the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance on the permitted side of that line, as an acknowledgment of religion that serves the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions and expressing confidence in the future.26 Accommodation is likewise not sponsorship. An exemption allowing the Amish to avoid Wisconsin's compulsory-education law does not support or advance the Amish; it lets their religious society survive, and it reflects the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.27 The next section takes up accommodation in detail.
Holiday displays show where the line falls. In Lynch, O'Connor concluded that a crèche did not carry a message of endorsement because of the overall setting: Santa, holiday lights, and a tree neutralized its religious implications.28 In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, five Members of the Court found the prominent display of a nativity scene on public property an unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity, even though it coerced no one.29 The same case presented a menorah displayed next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, and in O'Connor's view the question was whether that combined display sent a message of endorsement of Judaism or a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs. A message of pluralism, she concluded, does not endorse religion over nonreligion.30 All three displays contained a religious symbol, so the symbol cannot be what decided them. The setting did, and an exam stem that places a religious object on public property calls for analysis of the whole display before any conclusion.
Wallace shows the test separating moment-of-silence laws that endorse prayer from laws that merely make room for it. Twenty-five states permit or require a silent minute in public school classrooms, and the typical statute lets students meditate, pray, or reflect on the activities of the day.31 In O'Connor's view, a state that mandates a moment of silence does not necessarily endorse what happens during it, and even a statute that says a student may choose to pray silently has not thereby encouraged prayer over the other listed alternatives.32 A law clearly drafted and implemented to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection without endorsing one over the others should pass.33 A dissenting opinion in Wallace likewise read the filed opinions as showing that a majority would approve statutes that provided for a moment of silence but did not mention prayer.34
Alabama's statute failed because its text and history made prayer the point. The sole purpose reflected in the official legislative history was “to return voluntary prayer to our public schools,” Alabama conceded in the courts below that the statute aimed to make prayer part of daily classroom activity, and both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that its purpose was to encourage religious activity.35 O'Connor agreed that the State meant to convey that prayer was the endorsed activity, and she thought the message actually conveyed to an objective observer was likely approval of the child who selects prayer over other alternatives.36 She and the majority reached that result by different routes. The majority relied in part on testimony from a state senator about the statute's purpose; O'Connor would give that kind of evidence little, if any, weight and rested instead on the statute's text read in light of its official history.37 She trusted courts to tell a sham secular purpose from a sincere one, and she expected the effect inquiry to help decide close cases.38
A law that passes on its face can still fail in operation. A moment-of-silence statute, as drafted or as actually implemented, can effectively favor the child who prays over the child who does not. The message of endorsement would seem inescapable if a teacher exhorts children to use the time to pray, and the same follows if the statute's face or its legislative history shows that it seeks to promote voluntary prayer over other alternatives.39
The test's future is doubtful. It began as a clarification of Lemon, so it shares Lemon's fortunes,40 and with Lemon overruled it is unclear whether the religious-symbol decisions that applied the test remain good law.41 Justice Kennedy, joined by three other Justices, attacked it in County of Allegheny as “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.”42 The Court in Kennedy v. Bremerton has now rejected it.43 The reasoning still supplies the vocabulary of the school-prayer and display cases, and the next subsection turns to the coercion rationale on which Lee rested.
Coerced Participation in Prayer
In Lee v. Weisman, a public school principal decided that an invocation and a benediction would be given at graduation, selected a rabbi to deliver them, and gave him guidelines for the prayers.45 The guidelines advised him that the prayers should be nonsectarian.46 A divided Court held, 5-4, that including clergy who offer prayers as part of a public school's official graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause.47 The Solicitor General had urged the Court to abandon Lemon and uphold the prayer as a noncoercive accommodation; Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, neither adopted nor repudiated Lemon and relied instead on the precedents about prayer and religious exercises in the schools.48 The discussion that follows tracks the opinion's order: state direction, pressure on the student, the voluntary-attendance defense, the contrast with legislative prayer, and the limits of the holding, ending with the dissent.
Coercion by government requires government action, and the Court traced the State's hand through the whole event. The principal decided that invocations and benedictions should be given, selected the religious participant, and provided the guidelines; the invitation to pray came from a state official, and the State supplied the venue and the audience.49 The Court treated the choice of a rabbi as attributable to the State and noted the potential for divisiveness over the choice of a particular member of the clergy.50 Government involvement was so pervasive that it created a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school, which conflicted with settled rules about prayer exercises for students.51 The school's good faith did not rescue the practice. It is “no part of the business of government to compose official prayers,” and the Court asked not whether the school meant well but whether it could legitimately undertake to produce a prayer for a formal religious exercise that students are, for all practical purposes, obliged to attend.52 The next subsection returns to the claim that inclusive wording cures the defect.
State sponsorship marks the exercise as the school's own, and the Court then explained why it reached the objecting student. Prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion, a concern that may not be limited to schools but is most pronounced there.53 It is of little comfort to a dissenter to be told that standing or remaining silent signifies mere respect, because, given social convention, a reasonable dissenter could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval.54 Nor did the Court discount the intrusion because the prayers were brief. The embarrassment and intrusion of a religious exercise are not de minimis, and the intrusion is greater than the two minutes or so the prayers consumed.55 Age also matters. The Court has described college students as less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination, and it has reasoned that college courses, through their own internal disciplines, tend to limit sectarian influence, so religion is less likely to permeate secular education there than in primary and secondary schools.56
The school district and the United States made voluntary attendance the center of their case: a student who objects can stay home, they said, and a student who stays home is not coerced.57 The Court rejected the argument. “Law reaches past formalism,” and to say that a teenager has a real choice not to attend her own graduation is “formalistic in the extreme.”58 Graduation is one of life's most significant occasions, and a student who stayed away would forfeit the intangible benefits that motivated her through her high school years.59 Attendance and participation were therefore “in a fair and real sense obligatory” even though the district did not condition the diploma on attendance.60 Earlier cases had already reached the same result: in Engel and Abington, provisions that let students be excused from the daily prayers did not shield the practices from invalidation.61 An exam stem that recites a stipulation of voluntary attendance is therefore inviting the formalistic answer the Court rejected.
The obvious counterpoint is Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening each session with a prayer by a chaplain paid out of public funds.62 Marsh rested on an unambiguous and unbroken history of more than two hundred years of legislative prayer.63 The Court in Lee distinguished it by setting. At a graduation, teachers and principals retain a high degree of control over the program, so the state-imposed character of an invocation by clergy the school selected makes the prayer a state-sanctioned exercise in which the student is left with no alternative but to submit.64 At a legislative session, by contrast, adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons, an atmosphere that cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school event most important for a student to attend.65
The holding is bounded. Questions about accommodating religious values, practices, and persons in the schools were not before the Court, which added that a relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution.66 The Court called its jurisprudence here one of line drawing, of determining at what point a dissenter's rights are infringed, and it found the line crossed because the State had in every practical sense compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of singular importance that the objecting student had no real alternative to avoid.67
The reasoning also reaches events that no student must attend. Santa Fe involved a pregame prayer at high school football games, and the district argued that attendance at a game, unlike graduation, is not required for a diploma. The Court assumed that the informal pressure to attend a game is weaker than a senior's desire to attend her own graduation, but it noted that cheerleaders, band members, and team members have seasonal commitments that mandate their attendance, sometimes for class credit.68 The line runs the other way for private religious activity, where no state hand directs the exercise. The school-prayer cases condemn the school's own involvement in religious activity,69 and Good News Club v. Milford Central School is the contrast case: the Court held that a school unconstitutionally excluded a Christian children's club from a limited public forum, rejecting the argument that the Establishment Clause required the exclusion, because the meetings took place after school hours, were not sponsored by the school, and were open to any student with parental consent. The first question in a school-prayer fact pattern is therefore whether the school sponsored the exercise.
The concurring opinions in Lee separate the coercion holding from the endorsement approach. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, stressed that the Clause can be violated without coercion: it is not enough that government refrain from compelling religious practices, for it must not engage in them either. Justice Souter, joined by the same two Justices, added that coercion is sufficient for a finding of violation but not necessary, because symbolic government endorsement of religion is a violation even without coercion.70 A showing of coercion therefore wins the challenge, and its absence leaves the endorsement question open.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, dissented on grounds that answer the majority point by point. He first argued that history and tradition, meaning the long acceptance of public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition, should have been determinative.71 He would also confine coercion to what marked historical establishments: coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.72 On that view the nondenominational prayers, which no one was legally coerced to recite, violated nothing, although he conceded that government-sponsored sectarian endorsement, which specifies details on which believers in a benevolent Creator differ, is out of order even without legal coercion.73 Finally, he welcomed the Court's neglect of Lemon but attacked its replacement, a psycho-coercion test that has no roots in historic practice and is as infinitely expandable as the reasons for psychotherapy itself.74
The majority's reply is that government must engage in political speech but is constitutionally restrained from religious speech, a reply that draws the retort that Lee's concept of coercion is so expansive that it effectively bans any government expression of religion.75 Scalia added a point about public culture: nothing fosters among believers of various faiths a toleration, even an affection, for one another so much as voluntarily joining in prayer together, and while no one should be compelled to do so, it is a shame to deprive public culture of the opportunity.76
Nonsectarian Prayer
The principal in Lee gave the rabbi guidelines and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian, and the school offered that instruction as a reason the ceremony was acceptable.78 The Court read the instruction the other way. By telling the rabbi what kind of prayer to give, the school attempted to compose an official prayer, and “it is no part of the business of government” to do that.79 The inclusiveness the school sought became the evidence of its authorship. A nondenominational prayer therefore violates the Establishment Clause when the school sponsors it.
Engel v. Vitale supplies the older authority. The state there wrote a voluntary, nondenominational prayer, and the Court nonetheless condemned the school's use of it.80 The principle is that each government should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people and to those they choose for religious guidance.81 Madison's warning shows why drawing the line at a particular sect gives little protection: the authority that can establish Christianity in exclusion of all other religions can establish any particular sect of Christians in exclusion of all other sects, and the authority that can force a citizen to contribute three pence to one establishment can force conformity to any other.82
The school's best argument was good faith, and the Court accepted that the officials' efforts were a good-faith attempt to recognize the common aspects of religions and not the divisive ones.83 It held that good faith could not carry the argument: “The question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all when the object is to produce a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.”84 The sentence separates two inquiries that students often merge. Motive asks why officials acted; authority asks whether officials may act as prayer-drafters at all. The Court granted the benign motive and denied the authority. School officials are in a particular bind, because students will perceive an official's effort to monitor prayer as inducing a participation they might otherwise reject.85
The Court also rested the rule on religion's own interest. The Constitution commits the preservation and transmission of religious belief to the private sphere, and the religion clauses exist to protect religion from government interference as well as to protect dissenters. Madison opposed establishments in part for that reason, observing that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of religion, have had a contrary operation.86
Justice Scalia's dissent offered the strongest counterargument, the civic-religion theme: public ceremonies of long standing, nonsectarian in character, whose prayers of thanksgiving and petition foster community.87 Justice Kennedy, for the Court, answered that distinguishing a permissible civic religion from an impermissible public involvement in religious exercises is an unacceptable contradiction.88 The two opinions disagree about what a state-written generic prayer is. To the dissent it is a shared ceremony that favors no faith; to the majority it is government-authored worship whose generic wording leaves the State in the role of author.
The nonpreferentialist theory would make a carefully generic prayer permissible. On that reading, government is free to promote religion generally, even to discriminate against nonreligion, so long as it does not create a preference for any particular religion.89 A prayer that favors no sect raises no preference problem under that view.90 Which theory governs matters, because the theory chosen determines the approach used and often the result.91 Justice Souter's concurrence in Lee rejects the nonpreferentialist reading. Since Everson, he noted, the Court has applied the Clause no less to acts favoring religion generally than to acts favoring one religion over others.92 The Framers were vividly familiar with efforts to impose general, nondenominational assessments and other incidents of ostensibly ecumenical establishments, and the Virginia statute for religious freedom, written by Jefferson and sponsored by Madison, condemned all establishments, however nonpreferentialist, guaranteeing that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.93
Nor does it solve the problem to say that the State should promote a “diversity” of religious views. That would compel government and the courts to make inappropriate judgments about how many religions the State should sponsor and how often it should sponsor each, and, as Madison observed in criticizing religious presidential proclamations, the practice of sponsoring religious messages tends over time to narrow the recommendation to the standard of the predominant sect.94
Legislative prayer confirms what the rule protects. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the town neither reviewed the prayers in advance nor gave guidance on their tone or content, and it left guest clergy free to compose their own devotions, which often sounded both civic and religious themes.95 The Court rejected the argument that equality among religions requires prayers to be nonsectarian and addressed only to a generic God, because such a rule would require courts to evaluate the content of religious speech, would require ministers to set aside their nuanced and deeply personal beliefs for vague and artificial ones, and would favor religious views acceptable to the majority.96 The two decisions rest on one premise approached from opposite directions. In Lee the generic prayer fails because officials supplied the guidelines; in Greece a generic-only rule fails because courts would have to police the content. What separates them is who controls the prayer: the town left visiting clergy free to pray in their own traditions, while the principal in Lee advised the rabbi that his prayers be nonsectarian.97
A fact pattern in which a school official asks for a prayer that is generic, brief, or inclusive therefore turns on one question: who wrote or directed the prayer? If the State supplied the text or the guidelines for a formal school exercise, generic wording and good faith do not cure the defect. If the State did neither, the authorship problem is absent, and the analysis returns to the endorsement and coercion questions taken up earlier in this section.