533 U.S. 98 (2001)
In 1992, the Milford Central School District enacted a community use policy based on New York Education Law section 414. The policy authorized after-school use of its facilities for instruction in any branch of education, learning, or the arts. It also permitted social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainment events pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided such uses were nonexclusive and open to the general public. The policy expressly prohibited use for religious purposes.
Stephen and Darleen Fournier, district residents and sponsors of the Good News Club, submitted a request in September 1996 to hold the Club's weekly after-school meetings in the school cafeteria. The Good News Club is a private Christian organization for children ages six to twelve sponsored by the Child Evangelism Fellowship. The proposed meetings included taking attendance with Bible verse recitation for treats, singing songs, playing games involving Bible verses, relating a Bible story and explaining its application to the children's lives, closing with prayer, and distributing treats and verses for memorization.1
Milford's interim superintendent denied the request in October 1996 after reviewing materials describing the activities. He concluded that they constituted the equivalent of religious instruction and worship rather than a discussion of secular subjects from a religious perspective. In March 1997 the Good News Club, along with the Fourniers and their daughter Andrea, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The suit alleged that the denial violated the Club's free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction in April 1997 that allowed the Club to hold meetings in a high school resource room and middle school special education room from April 1997 until June 1998.2 In August 1998 the district court vacated the preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment to Milford, finding the Club's subject matter decidedly religious in nature.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in 2000. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2000.4
Whether the Milford Central School District's exclusion of the Good News Club from its after-school facilities on the ground that the Club's activities were religious in nature constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause?5
When a state establishes a limited public forum, it may reserve the forum for particular groups or the discussion of particular topics.6 The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.7 Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government excludes speech addressing a permitted subject from a religious perspective.8
Yes. Milford opened its facilities under the 1992 community use policy for instruction in any branch of education, learning, or the arts and for social, civic, and recreational meetings pertaining to community welfare while prohibiting religious purposes.9 The policy allowed the Boy Scouts to promote moral and character development.10 The Good News Club's activities teach morals and character from a Christian perspective.11
The superintendent denied the request after reviewing the materials because the activities constituted the equivalent of religious instruction rather than discussion of secular subjects from a religious perspective.12 This exclusion based solely on the religious nature of the speech on a permitted topic is viewpoint discrimination indistinguishable from the exclusion of films teaching family values from a religious perspective in Lamb's Chapel.13 The district court and Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Milford but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed holding that the exclusion violated the Club's free speech rights.14
The school district's exclusion constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to stress that the exclusion remains viewpoint discrimination even though portions of the Club's speech urge children to trust Jesus as Savior.16 The forum permits other groups to inculcate beliefs on morals and character yet the Club alone is barred from defending the religious premise that God exists and His assistance is necessary to morality.17 This selective demand for sterility of speech on the same subject constitutes blatant viewpoint discrimination.18
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the school district could permissibly exclude proselytizing religious speech aimed principally at inculcating belief in a particular faith.19 He allowed speech about moral development from a religious point of view.20 He viewed the Club's meetings as falling into the intermediate category of religious speech whose principal goal is to promote the gospel rather than merely discuss a topic from a religious standpoint.21
He concluded that a school, particularly an elementary school, must be permitted to draw such distinctions without violating the First Amendment.22
Whether permitting the Good News Club to meet on school premises after school hours would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?23
Permitting private religious speech in a limited public forum does not violate the Establishment Clause when the meetings occur after school hours.24 The meetings must not be sponsored by the school.25 The meetings must be open to any student with parental consent.26 The meetings must occur under a neutral policy that makes the forum available to a wide range of groups.27
No. The Club's meetings were held after school in a high school resource room and middle school special education room.28 The meetings were not sponsored by Milford.29 The meetings were open only to students who obtained parental consent.30 Milford's only involvement was the one-time decision to allow use of the premises under its community use policy that already permitted other organizations.31
There is no coercion because parents decide whether their children attend.32 There is no excessive entanglement because no ongoing supervision is required.33 The circumstances do not support any reasonable perception by elementary school children that the school endorses religion. This is especially true given that students from kindergarten through twelfth grade use the building after hours and members of the public are also permitted access.
Permitting the Good News Club to meet on school premises after school hours would not violate the Establishment Clause.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer concurred in part to note that neutrality toward religion is only one relevant consideration and that a child's perception of endorsement may also prove important.35 He emphasized that the specific circumstances including time of day, age of the children, and nature of the meetings must be examined to determine whether a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval in the children's minds.36 Because the case arrived on summary judgment, he concluded that disputed facts about children's perceptions should be resolved at trial rather than foreclosed at this stage.37
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Souter dissented and argued that the majority erred in reaching the Establishment Clause issue at all because neither the district court nor the court of appeals had addressed it.38 On the merits he maintained that the temporal and physical continuity of the Club's meetings immediately after the school day in classrooms next to regular elementary rooms with only four other outside groups using the building created a serious risk that young children would perceive official endorsement.39 He viewed the facts as materially different from Lamb's Chapel and Widmar where the audiences were adults or the forum was used by a large number of diverse groups.40
Whether the school district's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation justified any viewpoint discrimination against the Club?41
A state's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation may justify content-based discrimination.42 The interest does not justify viewpoint discrimination when the school has no valid Establishment Clause concern because the proposed use is materially indistinguishable from activities already permitted under neutral criteria.43
No. Milford argued that its interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation justified excluding the Club but the Court held that no valid Establishment Clause interest existed.44 The Club's meetings after school without school sponsorship and with parental consent under a neutral policy available to many groups created no realistic danger that the community would perceive endorsement.45 Because the school lacked a compelling interest that could justify viewpoint discrimination the exclusion remained unconstitutional.46
The fear that young children might misperceive endorsement does not constitute a compelling interest sufficient to permit viewpoint discrimination when the facts do not support such a perception and when excluding the Club could itself be perceived as hostility toward religion.47
The school district's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation did not justify the viewpoint discrimination against the Club.48