Concept
Strict Scrutiny in Free Exercise
Free exercise
Strict Scrutiny in Free Exercise
The First Amendment bars any law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.1 When a law burdens religious practice without being neutral and generally applicable, the Court demands the most rigorous scrutiny: the law must advance “interests of the highest order” and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of them.2 The government carries the burden of justification, because the plaintiff's earlier showings have already done their work. This section asks two questions about that justification. Does the means the government chose fit the interest it names, and how should a court state the interest in the first place?
The test has a history that explains its strictness. The final step of the Sherbert-Yoder test required the government to show that burdening religion was the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest.3 Lyng and Smith then held that this scrutiny does not apply to a generally applicable and otherwise valid law, even when the law incidentally imposes a substantial burden.4 The test kept its content, but its trigger moved from the size of the burden to the way the government treated religion. Lukumi marks the other side of that shift: discriminatory laws trigger strict scrutiny and, by their nature, are very unlikely to satisfy it.5
The first subsection below follows the Hialeah ordinances through the tailoring inquiry and sets them beside cases the government has won. The second takes up the prior question of how a court states the government's interest, using Fulton and O Centro.
Narrow Tailoring and Underinclusion
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah shows the test at work on four ordinances that prohibited Santeria sacrifice.6 The Court found two separate failures. The city had not demonstrated that its interests were compelling in the context of these ordinances, and even if the interests were compelling, the ordinances were not drawn in narrow terms, because all four were overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects.7 The absence of narrow tailoring alone sufficed to invalidate them.8
Narrow tailoring tests the fit between a law and the harm that supposedly justifies it, and the fit can fail in two directions. An overbroad law restricts religious conduct that does not threaten the harm. An underinclusive law leaves unregulated the secular conduct that does. Hialeah's ordinances were both.
The ordinances were overbroad because they prohibited sacrifice even when it posed no threat to the city's interest in public health. The city's own counsel conceded at oral argument that sacrifices would be illegal even in licensed, inspected, and zoned slaughterhouses.9 If improper disposal, and not the sacrifice itself, was the harm to be prevented, the city could have regulated the disposal of organic garbage generally, and it did not.10 The Court read this excess as more than clumsy drafting. It found “significant evidence of the ordinances' improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice” in the fact that they proscribed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends.11
The city defended the breadth by arguing that a narrower rule would be unenforceable, and the District Court had accepted that argument because of the secrecy of Santeria rituals and the lack of any central religious authority. The Supreme Court found the reasoning hard to follow: if a ban on improper disposal, which occurs in public, cannot be enforced, it is difficult to see how a ban on the sacrifices themselves, which occur in private, can be.12 A government therefore cannot defeat a proposed alternative with an enforcement objection that applies equally to the means it chose.
The ordinances were underinclusive because the city pursued its objectives only against religious conduct. Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures against other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest it gives in justification is not compelling.13 The Court found that the city did not pursue its proffered objectives against analogous nonreligious conduct, and it concluded that each ordinance pursued the city's interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.14 The ordinances had “every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself.”15
The same facts do two jobs, and a complete answer carries them into both stages. As evidence that a law is not generally applicable, underinclusion opens the door to strict scrutiny, as the earlier discussion of secular exceptions explained. Inside strict scrutiny, underinclusion answers a different question: whether the interest is compelling as this law pursues it. That is why the Court held that the city had not shown its interests to be compelling “in the context of these ordinances.”16
The two defects explain why such laws rarely survive. The asserted reasons for the ban, protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals, could not explain why it was directed solely against ritual sacrifice, since other killing of animals could raise the same concerns.17 It is hard to imagine why government would ever need to single out religious exercise for discriminatory treatment, and a law that imposes a direct and discriminatory burden typically has no constitutional applications.18 The Court said that a compelling interest and a narrowly tailored law could justify such a burden “only in rare cases.”19
Rare does not mean never, and the cases the government has won show what a winning interest looks like. A woman may be convicted for allowing her nine-year-old niece to sell religious literature on street corners in violation of the child labor laws, because society's interest in child welfare is more important than this form of religious practice, as Prince v. Massachusetts held.20 A statute permitting prosecution of parents whose children fail to salute the flag at school, by contrast, may not be enforced against Jehovah's Witnesses, because there is no genuine interest in obtaining compulsory unification of opinion.21 The weight of the interest decided both outcomes.
In Lee, the Court rejected a challenge by Amish individuals who said that obtaining Social Security numbers and paying Social Security taxes violated their religious beliefs.22 The Court accepted that the law significantly burdened a sincerely held belief, yet held that denying the exemption was “essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.” Mandatory and continuous participation was vital to the integrity of the system, and a comprehensive system could not accommodate myriad exceptions flowing from varied religious beliefs.23 In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court upheld the IRS's withdrawal of tax-exempt status from private schools that practiced racial discrimination in admissions and forbade interracial dating. After suggesting that the loss of the exemption was not a serious burden, it found the interest in “denying public support to racial discrimination in education” compelling, given the “stress and anguish” that state-sponsored race discrimination had caused throughout American history.24 In each of these cases the government identified a harm and explained why excusing the claimant would leave it unaddressed. Hialeah could offer no such explanation, because it restricted religious sacrifice while leaving comparable secular conduct alone.
The Covid-19 emergency cases ask the Hialeah question about a different harm. They involved pandemic orders that restricted worship services to a greater degree than certain permitted secular activities, and the Court decided them on its emergency docket without full briefing or argument. Its first rulings, by five-to-four votes, deferred to the government, and in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, also five-to-four, the Court seemingly shifted direction.25 The Brooklyn Court called stemming the spread of COVID-19 “unquestionably a compelling interest,” but found it hard to see how the challenged regulations could be regarded as “narrowly tailored.” They were far more restrictive than any COVID regulations that had previously come before the Court, much tighter than those in many other hard-hit jurisdictions, and far more severe than had been shown to be required to prevent the spread of the virus at the applicants' services. The District Court had noted that no COVID-19 outbreak had occurred in any of the Diocese's churches since they reopened, and it had praised the Diocese's record in combatting the disease.26 Because these rulings came without full briefing or argument, their precedential reach is less settled than a fully argued decision's, but they show the tailoring requirement applied to worship restrictions justified by an interest in public health.27
The fourth step does the most work in practice, because naming the harm precisely usually reveals the narrower rule, as the disposal alternative did in Hialeah. A government that stops at announcing an important interest has not begun its justification. Hialeah invalidated the ordinances for want of narrow tailoring even on the assumption that the interests were compelling.28
Defining the Government's Interest
Strict scrutiny cannot run until the court decides how to state the government's interest, and that choice often decides the case. In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the City refused to contract with Catholic Social Services unless the agency certified same-sex couples, and the Court framed the question as whether the City had a compelling interest in denying an exception to CSS.32 Strict scrutiny applied because the City's contract allowed exceptions at the Commissioner's “sole discretion.” A formal mechanism for granting exceptions defeats general applicability even if no exception has ever been granted, because it invites the government to decide which reasons for noncompliance deserve solicitude.33 The Court therefore did not need to revisit Smith, because the case fell outside it.34
The narrow framing matters because a broad interest almost always looks weighty beside a single exemption request. Justice Blackmun made the point in his Smith dissent: “Failure to reduce the competing interests to the same plane of generality tends to distort the weighing process in the State's favor.” It was not the State's broad interest in fighting the “war on drugs” that had to be weighed against the respondents' claim, he wrote, but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote.35 Wisconsin v. Yoder used the same method. Although compulsory education is valid in the generality of cases, the Court said, where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake it must “searchingly examine” the interests the State seeks to promote by requiring education to age 16 and the impediment to those objectives that recognizing the Amish exemption would create.36 The analysis turned on the cost of exempting the Amish, not the cost of disregarding compulsory education laws in general. That focus fits the least-restrictive-means requirement: if government can exempt the claimant, and others similarly situated, without serious harm, and leave the law in force for everyone else, the exemption is a less restrictive means to the end.37
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal applied the claimant-level inquiry under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Court described the inquiry as the “more focused inquiry required by RFRA and the compelling interest test.” The government invoked the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, which the Court agreed are exceptionally dangerous, but that invocation could not carry the day, because nothing indicated that Congress had considered the harms of the circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca at issue.38 The government had also created an exception for a listed drug, peyote as used in Native American sacraments. Having tolerated the risks of harm and diversion in that instance, it could not treat those same risks as precluding “any consideration of a similar exception for the [tiny] UDV.”39
Fulton shows the same logic at work on a different interest. Equal treatment was a weighty interest, the Court said, but the creation of a system of exceptions in the contract undermined the claim that departures could not be tolerated, and the City offered no compelling reason to deny CSS an exception when it provided them to others.40 CSS sought only an accommodation that would let it keep serving children consistent with its beliefs, and it did not seek to impose those beliefs on anyone else.41 Importance and necessity are different questions. In both O Centro and Fulton, the exceptions that weakened the government's case were the government's own.
Smith contains the contrasting method, in separate opinions that should be labeled for what they are. The Smith majority held that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve individuals of the duty to obey neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practice, and it let Oregon deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed for sacramental peyote use.42 The majority explained that the only decisions barring application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action had involved the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.43 Justice O'Connor concurred only in the judgment. She agreed that the constitutionality of Oregon's criminal prohibition should not turn on how central peyote was to the faith, but she weighed Oregon's specific asserted interest in uniform application of its drug laws and concluded that the interest justified refusing an exemption. She added that other governments may choose to grant an exemption without Oregon being required to do so.44 Justice Blackmun, dissenting, would have weighed only the State's narrow interest in refusing a religious exception.45 He added that the Court's prior decisions had refused to let a government rely on mere speculation about potential harms and had demanded evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious exception.46 O Centro and Fulton echo his method, and O'Connor's discounting of other governments' exemptions contrasts with the weight both cases gave to the government's own exceptions.
A claimant-level inquiry does not guarantee that the claimant wins. The government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a program by offering evidence that the requested accommodation would seriously undermine its ability to administer the program.47 Lee is the example: the Court there found that mandatory and continuous participation was vital to the Social Security system, which could not function with myriad religious exceptions.48 The risk of multiplying claims is generally greater with claims for exemption from taxation, where self-interest might encourage a multiplicity of claims, although the argument was questionable even in Lee itself.49
An answer that names a compelling interest in public safety or nondiscrimination and stops there has stated the program's interest without running the test. A complete answer names the exception the claimant actually seeks, says what that exception would do to the interest, and identifies the evidence of harm. The two autopsy scenes differ in one fact, whether this particular autopsy serves the interest, and that fact decided each outcome.