Concept
General Applicability
Free exercise
General Applicability
The Free Exercise Clause forbids laws “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.1 Under Smith, a law that only incidentally burdens religion escapes strict scrutiny if it is both neutral and generally applicable.2 Neutrality asks whether the government aimed at religion. General applicability asks something different: whether the law holds religious conduct to a rule that it relaxes for comparable secular conduct, or whether it lets officials choose which conduct to excuse. A policy that fails either test draws strict scrutiny, however neutral its text reads.3
The two requirements are separate, and the separation matters. One reading folds them into a single idea, a law that does not target religion. The other asks more: a law that imposes a substantial burden escapes scrutiny only if it is free from formal or deliberate discrimination and also generally applicable. On that reading the Clause may demand an exemption when a law excludes comparable secular conduct, even without purposeful discrimination, because the Clause then reaches laws that reflect selective indifference or inattention to religious interests.4
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District names the two ways a policy fails. It may prohibit religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way, or it may provide a mechanism for individualized exemptions.5 Each failure damages the government’s case for a different reason. A law that tolerates comparable secular conduct weakens its claim that uniform enforcement against the religious claimant is necessary.6 A law that lets officials grant exceptions invites the government to decide which reasons for noncompliance deserve solicitude, so a religious reason refused under it has been judged less worthy than the reasons the officials accept.7
Both failures carry a cost the Court has not resolved. Most laws contain some exemptions, and many apply a general standard to the facts of individual cases, so mandating religious accommodation whenever they do may contravene Smith’s policy of deferring to the political branches.8 The two subsections below take the failures in turn.
Underinclusive Secular Exceptions
A policy fails the first test when it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way.9 The defect is underinclusion: the government names an interest, enforces its rule against religious conduct, and leaves alone secular conduct that threatens the same interest. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah is the leading illustration. The Court there explained that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.10
The requirement works because a rule’s stated purpose is the government’s explanation for burdening anyone. When the government tolerates secular conduct that threatens that purpose as much as the religious conduct does, the purpose no longer explains why only the religious conduct is singled out. Two inferences follow. First, the interest may be less pressing than claimed, because tolerated exceptions undercut the argument that uniform enforcement serves a compelling interest.11 The Court has accepted the opposite argument at least once, holding that the government had a compelling interest in forcing religious objectors into the social security system, apparently on the theory that any exemption would unravel the entire system.12 That theory is hard to sustain where the government already tolerates comparable exceptions. Second, religion may be the real target. The Hialeah ordinances had “every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself.”13
The city in Hialeah defended its ordinances as protecting two interests, public health and the prevention of cruelty to animals. The Court found the ordinances underinclusive for both ends, because they failed to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers those interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.14 On cruelty, the city answered that killing animals for food is “important,” that eradicating pests is “obviously justified,” and that euthanizing excess animals “makes sense.” The Court called these answers ipse dixits, bare assertions that never explained why religion alone must bear the burden when many secular killings fall within the interest in preventing cruelty.15 The ordinances were drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice, and the underinclusion was substantial, not inconsequential. The Court therefore declined to define with precision the standard for general applicability, because the ordinances fell well below any minimum.16 In sum, each ordinance pursued the city’s interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.17
The comparison thus asks whether the tolerated conduct harms the stated interest. The government’s own ranking of which killings are worthy does not answer that question, and a government that ranks secular reasons above religious ones does what the requirement forbids. Hialeah is an extreme case, however. Its ordinances contained numerous exceptions, so it leaves open how much underinclusion a law with only a few exceptions must show.18
The same comparison applies when the unevenness lies in enforcement and not in the text. In Kennedy, the Court observed that a postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded, across-the-board way, and the District conceded before the Ninth Circuit that its challenged directives were not “generally applicable.”19 A supervision rule enforced against one coach’s prayer but not against other staff whose own activities leave students equally unsupervised fails for the same reason an underinclusive ordinance does.
The first and third steps interact, because the interest chosen at the start decides which exceptions count at the end. One lower court applied this comparison to a police department’s rule against facial hair. It found that a medical exception undercut the rule’s policies of discipline and neat appearance just as much as a religious exception would. An exception for undercover officers did not, because there a neat appearance might be a disadvantage.20 Other lower courts read the requirement more narrowly, holding a law generally applicable unless it contains so many exceptions that it singles out religion.21
The Court’s Covid-19 rulings pressed the comparison further. These cases came on the emergency docket, without full briefing or argument, and challenged orders that restricted worship to a greater degree than certain secular activities. The early rulings, decided five-to-four, gave considerable deference to the government and rejected the challengers’ claims; a later five-to-four decision seemingly shifted direction.22 In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, a synagogue or church in a red zone could admit no more than 10 people while businesses classed as “essential” could admit as many as they wished. The essential list included acupuncture facilities, campgrounds, and garages, along with businesses whose services were not limited to the essential. In an orange zone, houses of worship were capped at 25 while even nonessential businesses set their own limits.23 Stemming the spread of Covid-19 was a compelling interest, but the Court found it hard to see the regulations as narrowly tailored. They were far more restrictive than earlier Covid regulations before the Court and than those in many other hard-hit jurisdictions, and the district court had noted no outbreak in any of the Diocese’s churches since they reopened.24
Tandon v. Newsom then stated the principle generally. Regulations are not neutral and generally applicable whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise, and it is no answer that the State treats some comparable activities as poorly as or worse than the religious exercise. Comparability is judged against the government’s asserted interest and concerns the risks various activities pose, not the reasons people gather.25 Under that principle, an evenhanded limit on one kind of gathering still fails if the State lets people gather more freely in other settings that pose comparable risk.
The reach of Tandon remains untested. The Court issued these rulings without full briefing or argument, and most laws contain exceptions of some kind, so a rule that a single comparable exemption triggers strict scrutiny could make Smith’s deference easy to avoid.26 A stem that lists a rule’s exceptions invites one question per exception: does this exempted activity threaten the government’s stated interest as much as the religious conduct does?
Individualized Exemption Systems
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia identified a second way for a policy to lose Smith’s protection: a policy that gives officials a mechanism for individualized exemptions is not generally applicable. The Court reached that result without overruling Smith, because the policies before it failed the threshold requirement of being both neutral and generally applicable.31 The previous subsection asked what secular conduct a law leaves alone. This one asks what the law itself lets an official do, namely excuse noncompliance case by case, for reasons the official finds good enough.
Catholic Social Services (CSS) had contracted with Philadelphia for more than fifty years to provide foster care services while holding the beliefs at issue.32 CSS believes that certifying a couple amounts to endorsing their relationship. The City disputes that characterization, but CSS’s sincere belief is entitled to protection.33 No same-sex couple had ever sought certification from CSS, and any couple that did would have been directed to one of more than twenty other agencies in the City that certify same-sex couples.34 The City nonetheless refused to contract with CSS unless it agreed to certify same-sex couples, which forced CSS to choose between curtailing its mission and approving relationships contrary to its beliefs.35 The District Court and the Third Circuit held the City’s contract provision and its Fair Practices Ordinance neutral and generally applicable under Smith and denied CSS preliminary relief. The Supreme Court reversed.36
The obstacle to the City’s position was its own contract. Section 3.21 barred an agency from rejecting prospective foster or adoptive parents because of sexual orientation “unless an exception is granted by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole discretion.”37 That reservation made the requirement not generally applicable, because a formal mechanism for granting exceptions invites the government to decide which reasons for not complying are “worthy of solicitude.”38 The unit of analysis is the policy as written, including the power it hands an official. How any single request turned out does not control.
The principle did not begin with Fulton. In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh-day Adventist was fired because she would not work on Saturdays. When she could find no job that respected her Sabbath, she applied for unemployment benefits, and the State denied them under a law that disqualified claimants who had “failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work.”39 Smith later explained that the good-cause standard “created a mechanism for individualized exemptions,” and that where a State has such a system in place, it may not refuse to extend it to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason.40 A Hialeah ordinance supplied a second example. Because it required an evaluation of the particular justification for a killing, it was a system of “individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.”41 Fulton then confirmed that this exception to Smith reaches beyond unemployment compensation.42
The mechanism matters because of what it asks officials to do. A uniform rule asks everyone to bear the same cost for the same public goal, so a believer who loses under it is treated like every other person who must comply. A rule with an exceptions clause says something different: the government has decided that its goal can tolerate some departures and has put someone in charge of deciding which ones. Each reason for noncompliance then competes for the official’s approval, and a religious reason that is refused has been judged less worthy than the reasons accepted. The exceptions also weaken the government’s later argument that uniform enforcement is necessary.43 Every link in that chain exists as soon as the clause is written.
That is how the Court answered the City’s main defense, that the clause was irrelevant because the Commissioner had never granted an exception. The Court held that creating a formal mechanism for granting exceptions renders a policy not generally applicable, regardless whether any exceptions have been given.44 The power to decide which reasons deserve solicitude exists on the day the clause is signed, and an official who has not yet used it can use it tomorrow. A government’s assurance that it will not use the power for a religious claimant changes nothing. A refusal to extend the exception system to religious hardship is the very act that requires a compelling reason.45
The City’s other defenses failed for related reasons. It argued that a government setting terms for its contractors deserves more leeway, but neutrality and general applicability still constrain the government in its managerial role. No level of deference can save a formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions.46 The City also pointed to section 15.1, which prohibited sexual-orientation discrimination without mentioning exceptions. Under state contract-interpretation principles one provision cannot be read to nullify another, so the Commissioner’s reserved authority governed section 15.1 as well, and the contract as a whole contained no generally applicable rule.47 The Fair Practices Ordinance supplied no alternative ground. The Court read its reach to providers whose services are “made available to the public” as excluding foster-parent certification, which is a selective, individualized process that bears little resemblance to hotels, restaurants, or buses.48
Because the policy was not generally applicable, the City’s refusal to contract with CSS unless it certified same-sex couples had to survive strict scrutiny, and the Court held that it could not. CSS sought only an accommodation that would let it keep serving children consistently with its beliefs, and it did not ask anyone else to adopt those beliefs.49 How a court defines the government’s interest at this stage is the subject of the strict scrutiny section below.
The holding is narrow in one respect. It turned on the discretionary mechanism, and the Court stressed that it did not need to overrule Smith.50 A policy with no mechanism for exceptions and no comparable secular exemptions does not fail general applicability on this ground. The concurrences in the judgment argued for overruling Smith altogether, and that debate is taken up in the closing section of this chapter.51
Not every process for granting relief is clearly an individualized exemption system, and land-use permitting shows where the line gets hard to draw. Challenges to the exclusion of homeless shelters and soup kitchens from residential areas have met mixed results, and a number of courts uphold reasonable permit requirements.52 Whether a variance procedure amounts to a system of individualized exemptions is a closer question. A good-cause standard like the one in Sherbert invites an official to weigh the claimant’s own reasons, while criteria about a lot’s shape or topography ask nothing about why the applicant wants relief. An argument over a permit process turns on that difference.
This route also differs from the underinclusion route in the previous subsection. Some exemptions are categorical, defined by the kind of conduct they protect, and a categorical exemption involves no one weighing anyone’s reasons.53 The discretionary route applies when an official evaluates the particular circumstances behind the conduct. A claimant who establishes either route reaches strict scrutiny.
The fourth step is where the tempting wrong answer arises. A stem reporting that the exception clause has never been used invites the conclusion that the policy is generally applicable, and the facts of Fulton show why that conclusion is wrong.