Concept
Smith and Its Limits
Free exercise
Smith and Its Limits
The first words of the First Amendment concern religion, and the Free Exercise Clause bars any law “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 The text does not say how the Clause treats a law that binds everyone, that no legislator aimed at any faith, and that still collides with a believer's practice. For decades the Court answered with balancing. The Sherbert-Yoder test required the government to show that burdening religion was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, and a claimant could win when the government could exempt the claimant and others similarly situated without serious harm.2 Braunfeld shows the balance falling to the state, because an exception would have undermined its interest in a uniform day of rest. Yoder shows it falling to the Amish, because the state's interests were not undermined by exempting them.3
Employment Division v. Smith reset that default in 1990. Under its restrictive doctrine, the Free Exercise Clause as a general rule offers no relief from nondiscriminatory burdens on religion, meaning burdens that do not formally or deliberately discriminate against religious conduct.4 The trigger for heightened review thus moved from the weight of the burden to the government's treatment of religion. A law that binds everyone does not call for a religious exemption merely because it presses hard on one faith.
Smith itself left three openings, and later cases have treated them unequally. The opinion suggested that constitutional protection might survive when a law is not “generally applicable,” when a claimant asserts a “hybrid” claim that combines free exercise with other constitutional arguments, and when a law impairs the autonomy of religious institutions.5 The hybrid exception has had little impact. The Court has embraced and relied on the other two, which lets it protect religious freedom without formal or deliberate discrimination and without overruling Smith.6 A problem about a neutral law is therefore unfinished once the student has spotted its neutrality, because the student must also ask whether an opening applies. This section covers the general rule, the hybrid claim, and the church-autonomy limit called the ministerial exemption. General applicability, the first opening, gets its own section later.
The General Rule
The respondents in Smith lost their jobs for religiously inspired use of peyote and then applied to Oregon's Employment Division for unemployment compensation. The Division found them ineligible because they had been discharged for work-related “misconduct,” and the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the denial violated their free exercise rights.7 On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that their sacramental use fell within a statute that “makes no exception for the sacramental use” of the drug, yet concluded that the prohibition was not valid under the Free Exercise Clause and reaffirmed that the State could not deny benefits.8 The Supreme Court disagreed. A state may deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed for using peyote in religious ceremonies when the drug's use is criminally prohibited, and the Free Exercise Clause requires no special religious exemption from such a general law absent targeting of religion.9 The dispute concerned benefits, but the criminal prohibition decided it.
The holding rests on a rule the Court said its decisions had followed consistently: the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”10 The Court found that rule in the Clause's text. A state would be “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion if it banned acts only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, as by prohibiting the casting of statues used for worship or bowing before a golden calf. A general tax is different. Collecting it does not prohibit the free exercise of citizens who believe that supporting organized government is sinful, any more than it abridges the press freedom of publishers who must pay it. If prohibiting religious exercise is not the object of a law but merely “the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,” the First Amendment is not offended.11 The rule thus hinges on the difference between a law's object and its incidental effect.
Smith does not hold that Oregon's law left the respondents' religion unburdened. Lyng and Smith both involved laws whose application incidentally imposed a substantial burden on free exercise, and the Court nonetheless held that strict scrutiny does not apply to a generally applicable and otherwise valid law.12 The holding concerns the level of review, and a claimant in the respondents' position never reaches the demanding inquiry into compelling interest and tailoring.
The Court treated this rule as old law and traced it to Reynolds. There it rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not constitutionally reach people whose religion commanded the practice. Laws are made for the government of actions, and “while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” To excuse a believer would be “to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”13
United States v. Lee carried the same logic into taxation. The Court refused to exempt an Amish employer from the social security system, even while accepting that the law significantly burdened a sincerely held belief, because denial of the exemption was “essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.” Mandatory participation was vital to the integrity of the system, and the system could not accommodate “myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.”14 The Court also saw no way to confine the Amish objection to social security taxes. A believer who thinks war a sin could claim exemption from the percentage of the federal budget devoted to war-related activities, and “[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.”15
The remaining question was whether Sherbert's balancing test should govern anyway, and the Court said no. Outside unemployment compensation it had never invalidated government action under that test. Where it purported to apply the test, as in Lee and Gillette v. United States, it had always found the test satisfied, and in recent years it had abstained from applying the test outside the unemployment field at all.16 The sounder approach, and the one in accord with the vast majority of its precedents, was to hold the test inapplicable to challenges against across-the-board criminal prohibitions, which the test had never been used to invalidate. The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, “cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.”17
A tempting compromise would keep the test but confine it to practices central to the claimant's religion. The Court refused, because no principle of law or logic can contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is central to personal faith, and judging centrality is akin to the unacceptable “business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.”18 Without that screen the test would reach every religiously motivated claim, and the result would be a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself. The Court warned that any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, and that the danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.19
The familiar phrase “compelling interest” did not move the Court. It looks benign because it governs different treatment on the basis of race and regulation of the content of speech. In those fields, though, it produces equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech, which are constitutional norms, while here it would produce “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws,” which the Court called “a constitutional anomaly.”20
Smith does not forbid exemptions; it leaves them to the political process. Congress exempted wine used by Catholics for communion during Prohibition, and under Smith that exemption was not constitutionally required, because a neutral law of general applicability could have required grape juice.21 The Court conceded that leaving accommodation to the political process places at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in. It preferred that “unavoidable consequence of democratic government” to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.22 The choice carries weight in a society where the role of religion in public life has often been divisive.23 The political branches may accommodate religion even when the Constitution does not require it, though their discretion has limits under the Establishment Clause.24
Statutes can restore what Smith withholds. Where federal or state religious freedom legislation (RFRAs) or a distinctive state constitutional rule governs, the government must justify even a generally applicable law, and any substantial burden on religious exercise must serve a compelling interest by the least restrictive means.25 Against the federal government, RFRA remains enforceable even though the Court's earlier decision in Boerne, which rested on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reached only states and localities. In the UDV litigation the Court concluded that the group had effectively demonstrated that the government's action substantially burdened its sincere exercise of religion.26 Later sections take up these statutes.
Four Justices rejected the categorical rule. Justice O'Connor concurred only in the judgment, and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. All four would have kept the compelling-interest test and disagreed only over whether Oregon could satisfy it.27 Keeping the test would have preserved the inquiry Yoder made central: the cost of exempting the claimants, not the cost of disregarding the law in general.28
The rule reaches ordinary laws of many kinds. A father who causes his child's death by relying on prayer instead of a doctor may be guilty of manslaughter despite an honest belief in prayer. Laws punishing spiritualism and fortune telling have been upheld, and a statute punishing the practice of medicine without a license has been applied to a person who believes he is a divine healer.29 Regulatory disputes follow the same pattern. Challenges to excluding homeless shelters and soup kitchens from residential areas have met mixed results under the First Amendment and under a federal land-use statute (RLUIPA), and a number of courts uphold reasonable permit requirements without deciding whether sheltering the homeless is a religious exercise.30
A law leaves this rule behind when its object is religion. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the ordinances contained numerous exceptions.31 Because they were neither neutral nor generally applicable, the Court concluded that they were enacted because of, not despite, their impact on a religious practice, and it applied strict scrutiny.32 A law that discriminates against religious expression or conduct very likely violates the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clauses.33 Knowing that a law will fall on a religious practice does not by itself show that the law was enacted because of that effect. A city ordinance that bans the intentional killing of any animal under any circumstances stays on Smith's side of the line, even if council members knew that worshippers who practice animal sacrifice would be affected.
Smith thus turns a free exercise claim against a neutral law into a question about what the law targets, and strict scrutiny returns where the answer is religion. The rule remains good law, although the Court is now more protective of religious exercise than it once was and has put Smith under more intense scrutiny.34 Later sections develop neutrality, general applicability, and the calls to overrule Smith.
Hybrid Claims
A rule that excuses no one from neutral laws had to account for earlier decisions that did excuse religious actors, and Smith did so by creating a category. The only decisions barring application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action, it said, involved “not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.”36 The category is Smith's own account of its precedents, not a body of doctrine the Court later built. It explains why the general rule did not erase every earlier exemption, and it has done little else.
Smith's examples pair free exercise with freedom of speech and of the press, as in Cantwell v. Connecticut and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, and with the right of parents to direct the education of their children.37 The opinion added that some compelled-expression cases decided on free speech grounds also involved religion, such as Wooley v. Maynard, which invalidated a license plate slogan that offended religious beliefs, and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, which invalidated a compulsory flag salute challenged by religious objectors. It added that a freedom-of-association challenge could likewise be reinforced by free exercise concerns.38
The respondents' claim in Smith lacked that second element. They urged the Court to hold that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. The Court had never so held and declined to do so. It called the case “a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.” No one contended that Oregon's drug law attempted to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, so the rule followed since Reynolds controlled: “Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.”39 The line the Court drew thus runs through what the law touches besides the religious practice.
Yoder strains the category. It cited Pierce, which grounded parents' authority over their children's education in the substantive liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. But it also said that secular “philosophical and personal” views against public education, such as views inspired by Thoreau's writings, fall outside the Religion Clauses and “may not be interposed as a barrier against reasonable state regulation of education.”40 That limit suggests religion did independent work in Yoder. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment in Smith, made the point directly. In Yoder the Court had expressly rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, because some areas of conduct are protected by the Clause and are beyond the State's power to control “even under regulations of general applicability.”41
Justice Souter later framed the objection as a dilemma, in his Lukumi concurrence. If a hybrid claim is any claim in which another constitutional right is implicated, the exception would swallow Smith's rule, and it would even cover Smith itself, since free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. If a hybrid claim is one in which the litigant would actually obtain an exemption under another constitutional provision, then the Court would have had no reason in the so-called hybrid cases to mention the Free Exercise Clause at all.42
The lower courts have divided over which reading to adopt. Some read the category narrowly, applying it only when the other constitutional claim is independently valid. The First Circuit, for example, dismissed Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, a suit by students and parents challenging a mandatory sex-education assembly, because parents' rights over their children's education added nothing to the free exercise claim. Probably the majority of decisions take that attitude, and the hybrid-rights doctrine has been mostly ineffective as a result. Other courts apply it more generously and trigger strict scrutiny whenever the other claim is “colorable,” as the Ninth Circuit did in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, a panel decision later vacated on other grounds by the en banc court.43
The Supreme Court has not stepped in. A challenger in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission invoked free speech as well as free exercise, and the Court did not rest its decision on a hybrid theory. In a dispute over a city's conditioning of contract renewal on a nondiscrimination clause, the district court and the Third Circuit held the contract provision and the city's ordinance neutral and generally applicable under Smith and rejected the free-speech claims for related reasons.44 Those rulings show the usual result: adding a speech claim does not by itself avoid Smith.
Smith's other openings have fared better. The Court has embraced and relied on the general-applicability and church-autonomy exceptions to a significant degree, while the hybrid-claim exception has had little impact.45 A student writing about a neutral law should check the hybrid category briefly, as a gateway, and spend the analysis on the other two.
Ministerial Exemption
Church autonomy is the third opening Smith left, and the Court has embraced it. Free exercise cases about exemptions from general laws now fall into three categories. Smith governs the first: no exemption is required from a neutral and generally applicable law, though Smith's rule may still require exemptions in some cases. In the second, the Court has limited Smith and declared a mandatory zone of exemption for “internal church governance.” The third category, internal disputes over church property, falls outside that autonomy rule and may be decided, in a method reminiscent of Smith, under “neutral principles of [property-related] law.”47 Even a generally applicable law may not intrude on the internal governance of a religious organization.48
The leading case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. A teacher at a religious elementary school was fired for insubordination after the school concluded that she might sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act over the loss of her job following a serious illness.49 The Court recognized a “ministerial exception” that prohibits ministers from suing their churches for firing them. The majority was unimpressed by the arguments that teachers outside the ministerial category performed the same duties when needed and that this teacher's religious duties took only 45 minutes of her workday.50
The Free Exercise Clause supplies the rationale: “By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”51 The mechanism is easy to trace. A discrimination suit asks a court to decide whether a church had a lawful reason for ending someone's service, and an order of reinstatement or an award of damages pressures the church to keep that person in a role that speaks for the faith. Either way, government ends up influencing who preaches and teaches. A government that dictated a congregation's ministers would also move toward ground the Establishment Clause forbids, since Everson announced that the Clause means at least that neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church.52
That reasoning explains why the general rule gives way here. A generally applicable statute still binds employers in ordinary matters, but a church's choice of the people who carry its faith belongs to the internal governance the Court has placed beyond ordinary regulation.
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru shows how the zone reaches teachers at religious schools. The religious education and formation of students is the very reason most private religious schools exist, so the selection and supervision of the teachers upon whom the schools rely lie at the core of their mission. Judicial review of how schools discharge those responsibilities “would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate.”53 The rationale is functional. It protects a school's choice of the people who perform religious education and formation, and it does not turn on a formal title or on the share of the workday given to religious subjects.
Because the doctrine depends on function, run the analysis as a short sequence that keeps Smith's general rule in view as the default.
The usual error on an exam is to stop at the observation that the statute is neutral and generally applicable and to conclude that the church has no defense. That observation ends the inquiry only outside the internal-governance zone, and a dispute over who will serve as the voice of the faith lies inside it.