Concept
The Dissent's Response
Citizenship
The Dissent's Response
Afroyim v. Rusk was decided over a dissent. The majority held that Congress may not strip a native-born or naturalized citizen of citizenship without the citizen's consent, so a statute ending citizenship automatically when a citizen votes in a foreign election is unconstitutional. The dissent would have followed Perez v. Brownell and upheld the statute.1 A dissent binds no one, and the majority's rule controls. Still, the dissent states the strongest case for the opposite result, and each point it presses is a point the majority had to answer.
The dissent attacks on two fronts. On history, it argues that the congressional debates and judicial remarks the majority collected cannot bear the weight placed on them. On text, it argues that the Citizenship Clause only declares to whom citizenship initially attaches and says nothing about taking it away. If the dissent is right about the Clause, Congress may expatriate a citizen whenever a granted power supports the statute and the method of taking respects the Constitution's other commands.
The two attacks differ in force. The majority placed the Clause's language and purpose at the base of its holding and used history to confirm it. An attack on history therefore reaches only the upper layer, while a successful reading of the Clause as merely definitional would undercut the base. The historical case comes first.
The Dissent's Historical Case
The dissent first examines the 1817 and 1818 debates, on which the majority relied heavily, and finds them scarcely more revealing than the earlier debates. Debate centered on a brief bill under which a citizen who wished to renounce his citizenship would declare his intention in open court and then leave the United States, his citizenship ending at the moment of renunciation. Only the House debated the bill, and no one in either chamber proposed or considered the involuntary expatriation of any citizen.2 A bill that lets citizens leave says little about what Congress may do to a citizen who wants to stay.
From that debate the majority selected statements by three Congressmen who apparently denied that Congress could deprive unwilling citizens of their citizenship. The dissent traced those statements to a premise since discarded. The bill's opponents argued that “the relation to the State government was the basis of the relation to the General Government,” so that a man who remained a state citizen must be considered a citizen of the United States, and a statute dissolving federal citizenship in that situation “would be inoperative.” The Court does not revive that “entirely discredited doctrine,” the dissent said, and without it the statements give no significant support to today's ruling. To sever them from their constitutional premises is to transform what the speakers meant.3
The vote count poses a second problem. Other opponents attacked the bill on other grounds. One argued that it would let citizens escape wartime military service and would weaken “the love of country, so necessary to individual happiness and national prosperity,” adding that “The commission of treason, and the objects of plunder and spoil, are equally legalized by this bill.” Lowndes of South Carolina warned that passage might again raise difficulties with foreign governments over the rights of seamen. Given these “vigorous and repeated arguments,” the dissent found it “quite impossible to assume” that any substantial part of the House was moved, wholly or even in part, by a particular set of constitutional assumptions. The three statements show what three members believed, on premises since rejected, in a debate that did not directly involve the present issues.4
The dissent reads the Court's own remark in Osborn v. Bank of the United States with the same discipline. Any wider meaning “wrenches the dictum from its context” and attributes to the Court an observation extraneous even to the analogy before it. To treat the dictum as settling whether Congress may expatriate an unwilling citizen, one must assume that the Osborn Court meant to decide an issue that had scarcely been debated, that counsel had never mentioned, and that no case had brought before the Court, in an area of law where the Court had steadfastly avoided unnecessary comment.5
The dissent tests the majority's reliance on Wong Kim Ark by asking how the Court's own members later read it. Neither Justice McKenna, who joined the Court after argument but before decision in Wong Kim Ark, nor Chief Justice White, who joined the opinions in both Wong Kim Ark and Mackenzie, appears to have thought Wong Kim Ark required the result the majority reaches today. The dissent supposed the same of the six other Justices who joined Mackenzie despite Wong Kim Ark.6
The dissent does more than discount the majority's evidence; it offers evidence from the years just before the Fourteenth Amendment that points the other way. In 1867 Congress exempted from an earlier section's provisions those who had deserted after general hostilities ended, and the statute described the disability it lifted as a “loss of his citizenship.” The debates used the same phrase. From that exemption and the measures before it, the dissent concluded that Congress had twice, immediately before passing the Fourteenth Amendment, “unequivocally affirmed its belief that it had authority to expatriate an unwilling citizen.”7
Legislation adopted in the heat of war may deserve some discount for its origins. Even so, the dissent held the majority's conclusion “entirely unwarranted by the available historical evidence” for the period before the Amendment, because the evidence suggests that Congress in 1865 understood it had authority, at least in some circumstances, to deprive a citizen of his nationality.8
Each side's evidence has limits. The majority's statements are few and rest on a premise that has since fallen. The dissent's best evidence comes from wartime legislation that it concedes may warrant a discount, and it claims only that Congress understood it could expatriate “at least in some circumstances.” History therefore does not decide the case, and a showing that it points both ways does not dislodge a rule that rests on the Clause's language and purpose. The choice between the opinions turns on whether the Clause itself limits Congress, the question the next part takes up.
A Merely Definitional Clause
The dissent reads the Citizenship Clause as a definition and nothing more. The Clause, it says, “neither denies nor provides to Congress any power of expatriation,” and its consequences are “exhausted by its declaration of the classes of individuals to whom citizenship initially attaches.”10 The majority read the same words as a limit on Congress, and its reading is the law. The dissent still repays study because it frames the question the majority had to answer: does the Clause take a power from Congress, or does it say who is a citizen and leave expatriation to the Constitution's other provisions?
The dissent begins with the purpose behind the Clause. Its draftsmen meant to overturn the restrictions of Dred Scott and of the doctrine of primary state citizenship. They also wanted a basis for federal citizenship that was indisputably independent of state citizenship, which would stop state legislatures from circumventing the Amendment by denying freedmen state citizenship.11 A definition does all of that. Nothing in the debates, the dissent said, supports the majority's assertion that the Clause was intended to deny Congress its authority to expatriate unwilling citizens; the draftsmen expected the Clause only to declare unreservedly to whom citizenship initially adhered, while preserving Congress's authority to prescribe the methods and terms of expatriation.12 A provision written to say who is a citizen has no need to say when a citizen may be unmade.
The dissent's strongest evidence is what the Clause's sponsor said. Senator Howard declared: “I take it for granted that after a man becomes a citizen of the United States under the Constitution he cannot cease to be citizen, except by expatriation or the commission of some crime by which his citizenship shall be forfeited.”13 The dissent emphasized the last clause and found it difficult to imagine a more unqualified rejection of the majority's position, since Howard plainly believed the Clause would leave unimpaired Congress's power to deprive unwilling citizens of their citizenship.14
Congressman Van Trump's silence points the same way. He offered one of many similar amendments to an expatriation bill, a proposal to create formal machinery by which a citizen could voluntarily renounce citizenship. His principal speech examined at length the debates and judicial decisions on voluntary renunciation and never mentioned the Citizenship Clause. So far as his remarks on the House floor show, the dissent concluded, Van Trump supposed the Clause entirely immaterial to expatriation.15
Practice after 1868 points the same way in the dissent's account. For forty years the executive authorities acted on the premise that a citizen might be deemed to have expatriated himself by conduct short of voluntary renunciation, and individual citizens were regularly held on that basis to have lost their citizenship. Interested Members of Congress could scarcely have been unaware of the practice. In 1874 President Grant urged Congress, in his Sixth Annual Message, to supplement the Act of 1868 with a statutory declaration of the acts by which a citizen might “be deemed to have renounced or to have lost his citizenship.” The need for a more satisfactory basis for the practice led to the Citizenship Board of 1906 and then to the Nationality Acts of 1907 and 1940.16
From this record the dissent drew a two-part test. Nothing in the Clause's history, purposes, or language forbids Congress in all circumstances to withdraw the citizenship of an unwilling citizen, so Congress remains at liberty to expatriate a citizen when both of the following hold:17
- The expatriation is an appropriate exercise of a power the Constitution otherwise gives Congress, the war power for instance.
- The methods and terms of expatriation Congress adopts are consistent with the Constitution's other relevant commands.
The test does not leave citizens defenseless, and the dissent proposed no theory of unlimited congressional power. Once obtained, citizenship is protected from arbitrary withdrawal by the constraints the Constitution places around Congress's powers. What the dissent resisted was an additional restriction drawn from the Clause itself, which it considered entirely unwarranted. In its view the majority's construction rests on the Court's ipse dixit, a bare assertion without supporting argument, and shows little more than the majority's own distaste for the expatriation power.18
Because the majority's view controls, a student who writes that the Clause is merely definitional, and that Congress may expatriate a citizen by pointing to a granted power, has stated the dissent. An answer that follows the law begins with the Clause as a limit on Congress, asks whether the citizen consented, and treats a statute that ties loss of citizenship to an act, regardless of intent, as beyond Congress's power. The dissent earns its place in the analysis as the rejected alternative, and it shows what the majority's holding forecloses.