Concept
Procedural Changes
Ex Post Facto Laws
Procedural Changes
The Ex Post Facto Clauses say that Congress shall pass no ex post facto law and that no state shall, and they say nothing about how a trial is run.1 The silence matters because the doctrine grew out of substantive criminal law. Of the four kinds of law Justice Chase listed in Calder v. Bull, the first three restrict substantive law, defining what counts as a crime, how grave it is, and how heavily it is punished. Only the fourth, which reaches a law that receives less or different testimony than the law required when the offense was committed, limits procedure.2 The question for this section is how much of the rest of a trial's machinery the Clause protects when a new rule is applied to an offense already committed: how juries are chosen, what a court may do after a verdict, who decides a sentence.
The Court's first answer reached well past Chase's fourth category. Later cases extended the Clause to procedural changes other than changes in the rules of evidence when the accused was thereby deprived of a substantial right.3 The test asked whether a retroactive procedural change injuriously affected a substantial right to which the accused was entitled when the offense was committed. If it did, the change was barred; if it did not, the change was valid though retroactive.4 Reducing the number of trial jurors was held substantial, and a change in the jurisdiction of courts was not.5 Duncan v. Missouri gave the test its familiar wording: a legislature may prescribe different modes of procedure and abolish and create courts, so long as it leaves "untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime."6 The Court would later call "substantial protections" a "rather amorphous phrase,"7 and the description fits. Neither the text of the Clause nor Chase's list says how important a procedural advantage must be before the Constitution protects it, so every case invited a fresh weighing of importance.
Collins v. Youngblood ended that weighing. The Court concluded that the earlier decisions extending the Clause to procedure were not consistent with the understanding of the term "ex post facto law" when the Constitution was adopted, and it overruled them.8 The Court kept one safeguard from the old cases. A legislature does not immunize a law from scrutiny by simply labeling it "procedural," because subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible than overt ones.9 The safeguard has a structural reason. A legislature barred from creating a crime, raising a penalty, or withdrawing a defense could reach the same result by rewriting the rules of trial and calling the rewrite procedural.
Ordinary procedural changes therefore apply to earlier crimes. Courts have upheld a new method of selecting grand jury lists, a different number of grand jurors, a different mode of summoning or impaneling the trial jury, and a shorter time for challenging jurors.10 Each leaves the definition of the crime, its punishment, and its defenses where they were. A person deciding whether to commit an offense relies on what the law forbids and how severely it punishes, and the manner in which the case will later be tried forms no part of that calculation.
Collins comes first below, with the facts that produced the retreat from the substantial-right test and the limits the Court kept in place. Dobbert v. Florida then applies the same framework to a state that rebuilt its procedures for imposing a death sentence after the offense.
Collins and the Calder Categories
In Collins v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute allowing a court to reform an improper verdict, applied to a crime committed before the statute took effect, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10.11 The decision replaced a loose inquiry into whether the accused lost some substantial protection with a test tied to the categories in Chase's opinion in Calder. The facts show why the old inquiry seemed to favor the defendant and why the Court discarded it anyway.
A Texas jury sentenced Youngblood to life imprisonment and assessed a fine that the Texas code did not authorize. Under Bogany v. State, an unauthorized punishment voided the entire judgment and entitled the defendant to a new trial. After his crime, Texas enacted a statute allowing an appellate court to reform an improper verdict, and the state court used it to delete the fine and deny a new trial.12 The Fifth Circuit granted habeas relief. It relied on the statement that a retroactive procedural statute is barred unless it leaves untouched the substantial protections the law gives an accused, and it counted the right to a new trial under Bogany as one of them.13
Put the pieces in order and the stakes are clear. Before the new statute, a defendant whose verdict carried an unauthorized fine got a second chance at acquittal even though the finding of guilt was untouched. The statute removed that chance by cutting away the unauthorized part and leaving the rest standing. Youngblood lost a procedural advantage but kept the life sentence the jury had imposed.
The Supreme Court began with what the Clause covers. Blackstone, an authoritative source on the term's technical meaning, described a law as ex post facto when, after an action indifferent in itself is committed, the legislator for the first time declares it a crime and inflicts a punishment on the person who committed it.14 Chase's opinion in Calder listed four kinds of law within the prohibition. They are a law that makes criminal an action innocent when done, a law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when committed, a law that inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, and a law that receives less or different testimony than the law required in order to convict.15 Beazell v. Ohio condensed that list into three prohibitions, which the Court applied here. A state may not punish as a crime an act previously committed that was innocent when done, make the punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commission, or deprive the accused of a defense available when the act was committed.16
The Texas statute fit none of them. It did not punish an innocent act, make the punishment more burdensome, or deprive Youngblood of a defense available when he acted.17 It changed procedure and left the definition of the offense and the available punishment alone. The claim could succeed only under the Fifth Circuit's broader rule, which barred any retroactive law that removed a substantial protection, and the Court rejected that rule. It traced the phrase "substantial protections" to a nineteenth-century treatise by Professor Cooley, who notably assumed that Calder's construction of the Clause was correct.18 A phrase that assumed Calder offered no warrant for stretching the Clause beyond it. The Court found two of its earlier decisions, Thompson v. Utah among them, inconsistent with the understanding of the term "ex post facto law" when the Constitution was adopted. It observed that their reasoning had not been followed since Thompson was decided in 1898, and that they had caused confusion in state and lower federal courts about the scope of the Clause.19
Thompson shows how far the substantial-right test had gone, because it treated a reduction in the number of trial jurors as forbidden.20 Collins agreed that the jury right is obviously substantial, but it said the right has nothing to do with the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments, which is the concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court therefore overruled Thompson to the extent that it rested on the Clause and not the Sixth Amendment.21
The defense category needs care, because a new trial can look like a defense. The category covers only the withdrawal of defenses related to the essential elements of a crime or to matters a defendant might plead as justification or excuse.22 A retrial after a sentencing error says nothing about whether the conduct was lawful or excused. For the same reason, extending a limitations period before a given prosecution is barred does not violate the Clause.23 A person deciding whether to commit an offense prices it by what the law forbids, how heavily it punishes, and which justifications it allows, and the chance that a mistaken fine might later void a conviction forms no part of that calculation.
The usual error after Collins is to treat the word procedural as a safe harbor. The Court rejected that reading in the same opinion: by simply labeling a law procedural, a legislature does not immunize it from scrutiny under the Clause, and subtle violations are no more permissible than overt ones.24 The Court applied the point to defenses. A law that abolishes an affirmative defense of justification or excuse contravenes Article I, § 10, because it expands the scope of a criminal prohibition after the act is done.25 The test looks at what the law does to the accused and ignores what the law is called.
The third step is the one most often misapplied, because a lost advantage can look like a lost defense. Collins ties the word defense to the definition of the offense and to justification or excuse, and a right to a retrial concerns only how a flawed verdict is corrected.
Dobbert and Capital Procedures
Dobbert v. Florida tests the reach of Article I, § 10 when a state rebuilds the machinery for imposing its gravest penalty after the offense has been committed.27 The murders for which Dobbert was convicted occurred while Florida's 1971 statutes were in force. As then written, those statutes provided that a person convicted of a capital felony was to be punished by death unless the verdict included a recommendation of mercy by a majority of the jury.28 In June 1972 the Supreme Court struck down Georgia's death penalty statute in Furman v. Georgia. In July the Florida Supreme Court held the 1971 Florida statutes inconsistent with Furman in Donaldson v. Sack, and late in 1972 Florida enacted a new death-penalty procedure.29 At Dobbert's trial the jury voted 10 to 2 that mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating ones and recommended life imprisonment. The trial judge, acting under the amended statute, overruled the recommendation and imposed death, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed over two dissents.30
Dobbert made three separate ex post facto claims, and the Court met each on its own ground.31
- The change in the roles of judge and jury in imposing a death sentence, between the time of the crime and the time of trial, took away a right the old statute gave him.
- No valid death penalty statute was in effect when he acted, because the earlier statute had been held invalid.
- The new law attached more stringent parole requirements to a life sentence.
The first claim has the most obvious force. Under the 1971 statutes death followed unless a majority of the jury recommended mercy, and Dobbert's jury had voted 10 to 2 for life imprisonment.32 Under the amended statute the trial judge could override that recommendation, which is what happened.33 The amended procedure also required the court to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to set out written findings of fact to support a death sentence, and to submit that sentence to automatic, priority review by the Florida Supreme Court.34 Dobbert called the shift a deprivation of a substantial right to have the jury decide, without review by the trial judge, whether he would be put to death. The Court concluded that the changes were procedural, and on the whole ameliorative, and found no ex post facto violation.35
The conclusion follows the categories, because a procedural change can hurt the defendant and still be valid. In Hopt v. Utah, a convicted felon who could not have testified when the homicide occurred was allowed to testify by the time of trial and implicated the accused. The change obviously harmed the defendant, yet the Court found the law was not ex post facto, because it neither made criminal an innocent act, nor aggravated a crime, nor increased the punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to convict.36 Dobbert's change fit none of those categories. It altered how the sentencing decision was made and left the crime, its punishment, and its defenses where they were.
The label ameliorative has content, which becomes visible when the two procedures are compared. Under the old text, death followed from the verdict unless the jury recommended mercy, and the statute required no weighing, no written explanation, and no review. Under the new procedure, every death sentence requires a judge to weigh the circumstances, state findings in writing, and submit the sentence to review, so it must survive more scrutiny than before.37 The penalty the law attached to the crime stayed the same, and what changed was who weighs the circumstances and how the weighing is checked. A person deciding whether to kill relies on the penalty the law announces, and replacing the machinery that later applies it withdraws no warning. A change in the procedures for arriving at a death sentence is permissible so long as it does not increase the punishment.38 Collins later reached the same result by tying the Clause to Calder's categories, since the loss of jury control over a sentence is a procedural advantage unconnected to the definition of the crime, its punishment, or its defenses.
The second claim goes to the validity of the earlier law. Dobbert contended that, because the 1971 statutes had been held inconsistent with Furman, no valid death penalty statute was in effect when he acted, so the replacement imposed a penalty that did not then exist.39 The majority answered by stressing the fair-warning function of the Clause. It was enough that the law in force at the time of the conduct revealed what the legislature wished to accomplish, which was to treat murder as a capital crime.40 A death sentence imposed under valid procedures that replaced procedures later declared unconstitutional therefore did not violate the prohibition, and a new statute applying the death penalty under proper procedures could be applied to the earlier crime.41 The inquiry looks to what the earlier statute told the person about the offense and whether the later one retracts that message.
The third claim concerned what happens to a prisoner who is spared death. The new law attached more stringent parole requirements to a life sentence, and Dobbert objected that the change made his punishment heavier.43 The claim failed because Dobbert had been sentenced to death. The stricter parole terms burdened only the life-sentence alternative, which he never received, so they had no effect on the punishment applied to him. A defendant who did receive a life sentence would stand differently, because the better view treats an increase in the time that must be served before parole as an increase in punishment.44 A challenger must tie the change to the sentence actually imposed or faced, which is a different requirement from proving that the sentence exceeded the old limits.
The dissenters would have resolved the second claim the other way. They stressed that at the time of the crime Florida had no valid means of imposing a death sentence.45 Their yardstick was Lindsey v. Washington, which looks to the standard of punishment the law prescribes and not only to the sentence actually imposed. A statute that converts a discretionary punishment into a mandatory one raises that standard, as does a change from life imprisonment or death to a mandatory death penalty.46 A defendant may therefore object to such an increase even if the sentence received falls within the old limits.47 If the invalid 1971 statute supplied no valid standard at all, the dissent's position is that the replacement had no valid death penalty to leave unchanged.
The two sides differ on the baseline for comparison. The majority counted the invalid statute as evidence of the penalty the legislature attached to murder, while the dissent would not treat an invalid statute as a baseline. A statute like Lindsey's removes the lenient outcomes the old scale allowed, whereas Florida's replacement kept death as the penalty and added a weighing, written findings, and review before it could be imposed. The majority's view is the holding, and the dissent is the source of the argument that the standard of punishment, and not notice alone, decides a close case.
The second step does the work in a case like Dobbert, because the answer depends on whether the earlier statute counts as a baseline. The fourth step disposes of the parole claim at once.