Concept
Disguised Attainders
Bills of Attainder
Disguised Attainders
A legislature that wants to punish a group without enacting something called a bill of attainder has an obvious move: leave out the word guilty and draft the law so that the same people lose the same rights. Article I, section 9 forbids Congress to pass a bill of attainder, and section 10 forbids the states, but neither clause defines the term or says what shape a forbidden bill must take.1 In Cummings v. Missouri the Court closed that gap by reading the ban as a rule about substance. The framers meant the rights of the citizen to be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, “under any form, however disguised,” and if a change of form could evade the prohibition, putting it in the fundamental law was “a vain and futile proceeding.”2
The working corollary is that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, because the Constitution “deals with substance, not shadows.”3 The rest of this section applies that principle in three steps: first to the oath, then to the line between a genuine qualification and a sentence dressed up as one, and finally to the pardon.
Oaths as Conditional Attainders
A way of avoiding the penalty does not take a law outside the clause. The Court illustrated the point with a language borrowed from the Supreme Court of Kentucky: a British act of Parliament might declare that if certain individuals, or a class of individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day, they would be treated as convicted felons or traitors. Such an act, that court said, comes precisely within the definition of a bill of attainder, and the English courts would enforce it without indictment or trial by jury.4
The Missouri provisions worked the same way with less candor. They presumed the guilt of priests and clergymen and adjudged the loss of their right to preach or teach unless the presumption was first removed by an expurgatory oath, an oath by which each person swore that he had never done the listed acts. In the Court's words, the provisions “assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment conditionally.” Clauses declaring guilt outright would have differed only in declaring it instead of assuming it.5 The lawmaker's purpose would have been openly avowed in one case and merely disguised in the other, so the legal result had to be the same.6
A legislature defending the oath will say that anyone burdened can escape by swearing it. That escape exists only for people who never did the acts. The framers of the Missouri constitution knew that whole classes of individuals would be unable to take the oath.7 Making the enjoyment of a right depend on an impossible condition is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition, and a denial enforced for a past act is punishment for that act.8 The deprivation is punishment, and it is no less so because the expurgatory oath opens a way out for some.9
The Court also stated what is at stake if disguise were allowed to succeed. Under this form of legislation, the most flagrant invasion of private rights may be enacted in periods of excitement, and individuals, even whole classes, may be deprived of political and civil rights.10
Qualification or Punishment
None of this strips a legislature of its power to set qualifications. Ex parte Garland acknowledged that a legislature may prescribe qualifications for an office and, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, for the ordinary avocations of life.12 But to count as a qualification, the condition “must be attainable, in theory at least, by every one.” A condition that the nature of things or the past conduct of the party puts beyond some citizens is not a qualification at all; for those who cannot meet it, it is a disqualification that operates as a perpetual bar.13 The Court therefore framed the question as whether the power to prescribe qualifications had been used as a means of inflicting punishment, and a legislature's label does not decide that.14
Two criteria follow, and each guards against a different abuse. Attainability asks whether anyone willing to meet the condition can meet it. A true qualification sorts applicants by what they can do next, so a course, an examination, or a present promise leaves the outcome in the applicant's hands, while a condition fixed by history sorts people by who they have been. Relation to fitness asks whether the condition bears on the work. In later cases the Court has read Cummings to rest on the fact that the oath was a qualification “having no possible relation” to fitness for the chosen professions, so that the constitution was intended “to reach the person, not the calling.”15 The modern formulation turns this into a question about legislative focus. Where the source of legislative concern can be thought to be the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear harshly on someone. The contrary is true when the statute is evidently aimed at the person or class of persons disqualified.16
The federal oath in Garland contained both kinds of condition in one statute. Its final clause was a promise to support and defend the Constitution and to bear true faith and allegiance to it, which the Court called promissory only. The constitutional questions arose from the other clauses, which concerned past acts: bearing arms against the United States, giving aid or encouragement to those hostile to it, seeking or holding office under hostile authority, and yielding voluntary support to a hostile government. Some of those acts were criminal offenses when committed, and others might or might not have been, depending on circumstances and motive, yet the oath treated them alike.17 A promise about future conduct can be kept by anyone willing to keep it. A clause about the past can be satisfied only by people who avoided certain acts years earlier.
Garland and the Pardon
Garland rested on a second ground that reaches federal legislation. The petitioner was an attorney who had held offices under the Confederate government, which made it impossible for him to take the oath required by the act of January 24, 1865. In July 1865 he received from the President a full pardon for all offenses committed by participation, direct or implied, in the rebellion. He then asked to continue practicing in the Supreme Court without taking the oath. He relied on two grounds: that the act was unconstitutional and void as it affected his status in the court, and that, if the act was valid, the pardon released him from compliance.22 The Court sustained him on both grounds. On the pardon ground, Congress could not use an oath about the pardoned offense to continue punishing him for it, and so could not inflict by indirection a penalty that executive clemency had removed.23
The pardon ground and the attainder ground reinforce each other, but each is complete without the other. The pardon point protects a person who has been forgiven, however the statute is classified. The attainder point protects every member of the class locked out by the oath, pardoned or not.
The pardon point does not make legitimate conditions disappear. Attorneys are officers of the court, admitted upon evidence of sufficient legal learning and fair private character, which has traditionally been established by examination of the applicant.24 A requirement that every applicant must meet, such as learning and character, remains available to a court. What the pardon and the attainder clause both forbid is exclusion by reason of a past offense, with an oath serving as the means of exclusion. On an exam, a pardoned federal offender plus a statute requiring everyone in a profession to swear that the offense was never committed calls for both lines of analysis. The oath fails as a conditional attainder for everyone it locks out, and as to the pardoned person it also fails because it nullifies the pardon.