Concept
Land-Use Exactions
Unconstitutional Conditions
Land-Use Exactions
Land-use permits are where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine meets the Takings Clause. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. marks the meeting point by looking back at Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard. In each case, the Court began from the premise that, had the government simply appropriated the easement, it would have committed a per se physical taking. The question was whether the government could demand that easement as the condition of a development permit it was entitled to deny, without paying the compensation a taking requires.1 Nollan said yes, provided the exaction would substantially advance the same government interest that would justify denying the permit. Dolan added that an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property must also be roughly proportional, in nature and extent, to the impact of the proposed development.2
Lingle called these decisions a special application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right, here the right to just compensation when property is taken for a public use, in exchange for a discretionary benefit that has little or no relationship to the property.3 The permit is the benefit, and the uncompensated easement is the surrender. That the government need not grant the permit does not alter the analysis. In Danskin, the California Supreme Court observed that a state has no duty to open school buildings to public meetings, but once it does, it cannot make the privilege depend on conditions that deprive anyone of constitutional rights, even though the privilege is the use of state property.4 Another opinion states the same intuition as a question: is a search of her home without a warrant made “reasonable” merely because she is dependent on government largesse?5
Because the owner chose to seek the permit, an exaction is not a per se taking. The Court nonetheless requires it to have a clear justification as a means of addressing problems the development creates.6 The funding cases earlier in this chapter show the same worry in another setting. There the line falls between conditions that define the limits of a spending program and conditions that leverage funding to regulate beyond it, and the Court concedes that the line is hardly clear because a program's definition can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition.7 Even Rust v. Sullivan, the decision a plurality invoked to reject one conditions claim, has been read to apply only to governmental speech, where the government seeks to communicate a specific message.8 In the permit setting no message is at stake. The danger is leverage, and the exactions tests address it directly.
Two limits govern everything that follows. The first is a predicate: an unconstitutional conditions claim requires that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person to do what it pressured that person into doing.9 Where the government can command the result directly, nothing is leveraged. The Court reasoned this way when it rejected a conditions challenge to inter partes review of patents, because Congress can command that review directly.10 The second limit is scope: the Court has not extended the rough-proportionality test beyond the special context of exactions.11 Lingle drew that boundary by contrasting these tests with a free-standing theory that a regulation is a taking because it fails to advance a legitimate government interest. Nollan and Dolan involved dedications so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would have been per se physical takings.12
An exactions problem therefore runs in sequence. Ask whether the demand is for a property interest that would be a taking if imposed outright, then whether an essential nexus ties the condition to the permit's justification, then whether the condition is roughly proportional to the project's impact. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District extended the sequence in two directions, to permits the government denies and to demands for money.13 The subsections below take these steps in order and end with the cases in which the sequence never starts.
Essential Nexus
The nexus requirement asks whether a permit condition serves the same governmental purpose that would justify denying the permit.14 Nollan supplies the standard. There the Coastal Commission demanded a beachfront easement from a homeowner as a condition of issuing a development permit.15 The Court asked whether conditioning a permit on the easement changes the analysis that applies to an outright taking, and it answered yes in one circumstance. A condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purposes as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found a taking if the refusal would not be one.16
That answer follows from the government's power to forbid the project. The Court's own example was a condition that would have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house. So long as the commission could have exercised its police power to forbid the house altogether, imposing that condition would also be constitutional.17 The condition borrows its legitimacy from the power to prohibit, so it keeps that legitimacy only if it does the prohibition's job. Where it does not, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose becomes simply the obtaining of an easement for a valid governmental use without paying for it. Unless the condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the Court concluded, the restriction is not a valid land-use regulation but “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”18
Nollan also explained why the check matters. A permit regime that allows the imposition of unrelated exactions, it observed, would be expected to produce stringent land-use regulation that the state then waives to accomplish other purposes.19 California's Ehrlich v. Culver City described its own facts as presenting the earmarks of that regulatory “leveraging.”20 For the California Supreme Court's later treatment of local permit conditions, see also San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco.
Other settings show the same logic at work. In Knights, the sentencing judge conditioned probation on the defendant's acceptance of a search provision, and the reviewing court found it reasonable to conclude that the condition would further probation's two primary goals, rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations.21 A condition tied to the purposes of the benefit stands on firmer ground than one that borrows the benefit's leverage for some other end, and the nexus requirement targets the second kind.
A stem on this topic usually supplies both halves of the comparison: the reason the agency could deny the permit and the thing it demands. The common error is to measure the condition against its general public value or against its size. The first step compares the condition only with the justification for denial. A generous condition can lack a nexus, and a condition aimed at the right problem can still demand too much. Size is the business of the next subsection.
Rough Proportionality
A condition that passes the nexus step must still pass a second one, because nexus asks only whether the condition answers the right problem. It says nothing about size. A city could cite a modest effect, such as a few added car trips, and demand land worth far more than that effect justifies. Dolan closes the gap: an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property must be roughly proportional, in nature and extent, to the impact of the proposed development.23 A reviewing court therefore asks whether the factual findings made by the permitting body support the condition as more or less proportional, in both nature and scope, to the public impact of the proposed development.24
Dolan itself began with an ordinary request. The owner sought a permit to enlarge her store and to enlarge and pave her parking lot. The city told her it would deny the permit unless she dedicated the part of her property next to the creek for a public greenway and a fifteen-foot strip for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway. She argued that the two conditions took her property and could not be imposed without just compensation.25
When the Court decided Dolan, state courts had reviewed such conditions in three ways:
- Some gave great deference to the government and upheld a condition if it had any arguably reasonable basis.26
- Others took the opposite position and invalidated a condition unless the government showed it was precisely tailored to meet specific social needs by mitigating harms caused by the development.27
- Most state supreme courts used a third approach, which Dolan endorsed. Lingle describes the resulting standard as rough proportionality in nature and extent.28
Rough proportionality sits between the first two. It asks for findings that support the fit, as the phrase “more or less proportional” signals, without demanding exact tailoring.29 Both parts of the standard must be met. Nature asks whether the kind of property demanded answers the kind of impact the project creates, and extent asks whether the amount demanded is tied to the size of that impact.30 Drainage land answers a runoff problem, which satisfies nature, but the amount of land must still be traced to how much runoff this project adds.
Dolan speaks of an adjudicative exaction, a condition fixed for one applicant on one parcel, and commentary supplies a reason such decisions draw closer review. An owner whose land alone is regulated cannot join with owners of similar property to influence the decisionmakers, though the Court has not announced separate standards for reviewing spot regulation generally.31 Compare the settings in which courts give the government room. When the government acts as employer, its interest in efficient operation rises from a relatively subordinate interest, which is what it is when the government acts as sovereign, to a significant one. Courts accordingly give greater deference to its predictions of harm from employee speech than to predictions used to restrict the speech of the public at large.32 A land-use agency that conditions a permit acts in the sovereign role, the role in which that passage treats the government's efficiency interest as relatively subordinate.
A condition that fails the fourth step fails the test even though it passed the first. An answer that stops once it finds a link between the demand and the project's harm has stopped one step early.
Denials and Monetary Demands
Koontz holds that a government's demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when the demand is for money.34 The District believed it had circumvented the two decisions through the way it handled the application. It did not approve the permit on condition that the owner surrender an interest in his land. Instead, after suggesting he could obtain approval by signing over such an interest, it denied his application because he refused to yield, and the Florida Supreme Court blessed the maneuver.35 The owner had sought to develop 3.7 acres. The District argued that its offer to let him build on one acre was an alternative to offsite mitigation, and the Court answered that this misapprehended the benefit he was denied. The District had in effect told him it would not allow building on 2.7 of those acres unless he agreed to spend money improving public lands.36
The Court rejected two rationales, and the first concerns denials. The Florida court distinguished approving a permit on condition from denying it because the owner refused. Nollan and Dolan themselves involved permit denials, and the Court held there that the government's demands for property were unconstitutional even when the government only denied the permit in the absence of the demand.37 The principles beneath the tests do not change with the phrasing. In both forms the government may be leveraging its power over permits to pursue ends unrelated to the owner's proposal, and absent a nexus and rough proportionality the owner is coerced into acquiescing in an uncompensated taking.38
Law elsewhere refuses to let labels do this work. An equitable mortgage is declared when the transfer of a deed was intended merely to provide security for a loan rather than to sell the property.39 The Court has likewise held that Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to “a simple semantic exercise.”40 An exactions rule that turned on whether an agency wrote “approved subject to” or “denied until” would invite the same exercise.
The Florida court also puzzled over how a demand can violate the Takings Clause when no property of any kind was ever taken. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine resolves the puzzle: the claim targets the pressure on the right to just compensation and does not depend on the agency's having obtained the property.41 Extending Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions in the permitting context creates no new free-floating constitutional right. It simply applies the doctrine to the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.42
An agency may answer that its power to deny the permit altogether includes the power to condition it on anything. The Court has long rejected that move. In Frost & Frost Trucking, the Court accepted that a state with power to deny a privilege may generally grant it on conditions, but it held that the power is not unlimited. One limit is that the state may not impose conditions requiring the relinquishment of constitutional rights, for a state that could compel the surrender of one right could compel the surrender of all.43 By the October Term 1909, the Court had decided cases in conflict with the principle that the states possess unlimited power to condition the entry of foreign corporations.44 As the Court has put it, “a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result.”45
The tests protect an owner against coercion, which explains the limit Koontz confirms. The Court accepted the premise that the government need only provide a permit applicant with one alternative that satisfies the nexus and rough proportionality standards. So long as the agency offers at least one such alternative, the owner has not been subjected to an unconstitutional condition.46 That premise explains the second rationale the Court rejected, that a demand for money cannot trigger the tests because Nollan and Dolan involved demands for real property.47 If money demands escaped review, a permitting authority wishing to exact an easement could give the owner a choice between surrendering the easement and paying a sum equal to its value. The untested payment option would count as the lawful alternative and would shield the easement demand from scrutiny.48
Koontz does not turn every payment obligation into an exaction. The Nollan/Dolan standard applies to the monetary exactions in Koontz itself, a monetary payment that substitutes for a dedication of property and is meant to mitigate the project's environmental impact. The full range of monetary land-use conditions it reaches remains at least somewhat ambiguous.49 The dissenting justices warned that heightened scrutiny of fees would wreak havoc with local governments' power to charge permitting fees. The majority found the warning specious, since local governments in several states had long subjected fees to these tests without significant practical harm. Neither opinion addressed whether the tests apply to legislatively adopted, uniformly applicable impact fees.50
Two questions stayed open, and the first is remedy. When a permit is denied and the condition is never imposed, there is no taking. Commentary suggests that a federal civil rights action under § 1983 might still yield money damages for loss of use of the property, from the time of the demand until a court finds a Nollan/Dolan violation. It might also yield an injunction, such as an order to issue the permit without the condition or to recalculate the fee in line with Nollan and Dolan.51 The second open question is whether the District ever issued a demand concrete enough to trigger the tests. The Florida Supreme Court did not reach it, and the Court declined to do so in the first instance.52
A stem that stresses that nothing was taken, or that the agency asked only for money, describes features that no longer take a claim outside the tests. A stem that stresses that the agency never said what it wanted raises the open question whether any demand was made at all.
When There Is No Exaction
Nollan and Dolan reach only exactions, and the cases fix that category by what the government demands. Lingle described the feature the two cases share: the government demanded an easement, one whose outright appropriation would have been a per se physical taking, as the price of a permit it could deny. The Court has not extended the standard beyond that special context.54 The California Supreme Court restated the boundary in operational terms. The governmental requirement that the owner convey some identifiable property interest is what constitutes an exaction and brings the unconstitutional conditions doctrine into play.55
Two limits follow, and each has its own reason. The first concerns what the government asks for. When a condition only restricts how the owner may use the property, and the same restriction would not be a taking if imposed outside the permit process, the applicant gives up no right to just compensation, so there is no trade of rights to police.56 The second concerns whether the government asked for anything at all.
California Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San Jose applies the first limit. The city conditioned housing development permits on the developer's selling 15 percent of the units for less than market value or, in the alternative, paying a fee in lieu. The court considered whether these inclusionary zoning requirements were exactions implicating Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, and it found no exaction and therefore no unconstitutional condition.57 The condition required the developer neither to dedicate any portion of its property nor to pay any money to the public. Like many land-use regulations, it restricted the way the developer could use its property, here by limiting the price at which some units could be offered.58 The court read Koontz to make it a predicate of any unconstitutional conditions claim that the government could not have ordered the same thing directly, and it acknowledged that the full range of monetary conditions to which the tests apply remains somewhat ambiguous.59
Koontz supplies the contrasting case. The payment there substituted for a dedication of property and was meant to mitigate the project's environmental impact, so the tests applied.60 The edge of that line is contested. The majority and dissent in Koontz disagreed about how hard the exactions distinction is to draw, and neither addressed whether the tests reach impact fees that a legislature applies uniformly to all development.61
Ending the exactions analysis does not end review. A land-use regulation violates the takings clause if it is a physical taking or deprives the owner of all viable economic use. In the unusual case in which a use restriction goes too far, it is a regulatory taking under the multifactor Penn Central test.62 That inquiry begins with a question the exactions tests never ask, namely what counts as the owner's parcel. In Murr v. Wisconsin, the owners argued that the ordinance took Lot E, while the State and County argued that Lots E and F together were the relevant parcel. The trial court sided with the State and County, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, instead of asking whether the lots were separate parcels under Wisconsin law, adopted a takings-specific approach to defining the parcel.63
The second limit comes from the dissent in Koontz, which would have held that the District imposed no unconstitutional condition because it imposed no condition at all.64 It reasoned that a court must first find that the permit was denied because the government made a demand the owner rebuffed, and that Nollan and Dolan are reserved for reviewing what an official demands, not all he says in negotiations. A denial without a demand, in its view, would be tested under Penn Central.65 On that account, the permits failed because the applications were legally deficient and the owner was unwilling to correct them by any means, not because he refused an extortionate demand.66 The dissent's practical reason is worth tracing. If every suggestion made in negotiation could become the subject of a lawsuit, the agency's lawyer could give only one recommendation, which is to deny the permit without advice, even if the applicant asks for guidance. The Florida Supreme Court had made the same prediction.67 The majority did not decide the point. It declined to reach the argument that the District's demands were too indefinite, because the Florida Supreme Court had not decided whether the District issued a demand concrete enough to trigger the tests.68 An answer should therefore present the no-demand argument as the dissent's position and report that the Court left it unresolved.
A plain denial on the merits likewise falls outside Nollan and Dolan, and on the dissent's account it would be tested under the multifactor regulatory takings framework.69 In each of these settings the owner has not been pressed to trade away a compensation right, which is the pressure that justifies heightened scrutiny of an exaction.