Concept
Private Contracts in Practice
Contracts Clause
Private Contracts in Practice
Article I, Section 10 reads like an absolute: “No State shall … pass any … Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”1 The same sentence bars a State from coining money or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, and those prohibitions are specific enough to need no interpretation. The contract clause is not. Where a constitutional limit appears in a general clause that affords only a broad outline, Blaisdell explained, construction must fill in the details, and the clause’s place beside more specific prohibitions in the same section does not change that.2
Construction has produced a three-step inquiry for contracts between private parties. The court first compares the terms of the contract with the state law and asks whether the law increases, diminishes, or extinguishes an obligation the contract created.3 If the impairment is substantial, the State must justify it with a significant and legitimate public purpose.4 The court must then be satisfied that the legislature’s adjustment of the parties’ rights rests on reasonable conditions and suits the purpose that justifies the law.5
The inquiry has long roots. In 1810 Chief Justice Marshall used the litigation that grew out of the Yazoo land scandal, Fletcher v. Peck, to expound on the clause.6 Another opinion, by Justice Washington, asked whether a state insolvency law impairs a contract’s obligation when it discharges the debtor’s person and future acquisitions from liability, even under a contract made after the law passed.7
Two modern decisions show how the three steps work on real statutes. Allied Structural Steel and Keystone Bituminous Coal each applied the test to a state law that burdened private bargains, and they came out opposite. Allied teaches what counts as an impairment and why its severity matters; Keystone teaches how a State justifies an impairment and how much deference its judgment earns.
Allied Structural Steel
Allied Structural Steel shows that the clause protects a party from a statute that adds to its burdens, and not only from one that excuses the other side from performing. The Court applied the clause over a dissent, and the exchange between the two opinions is the quickest way to see why.8
The state statute imposed duties on an employer that closed a plant; the dissent compared them to a legislatively imposed requirement of severance pay measured by the length of the discharged employees’ service.9 Step one is a comparison. Set the terms of the obligation the contract created beside the provisions of the challenged law, and the law impairs the contract if it increases, diminishes, or extinguishes that obligation.10 A statute that adds a duty to the contract’s terms increases an obligation, so it impairs the contract even though it relieves no one of anything.
The dissent called that result a distortion of the clause. It saw no more anomaly in denying protection when a statute creates new duties than in recognizing that the clause does not reach acts of Congress, even when an act of Congress denies a creditor the ability to enforce a right to payment.11 The majority’s reply was practical: imposing new duties on one party can upset his contract-based expectations as much as a law that relieves the other party of any duty to perform.12 That reply states the rule to apply on an exam. A law that adds to a party’s obligations can impair the contract, and the court then moves to severity, purpose, and fit.
The dissent also attacked the majority’s description of the burden. Contrary to the Court’s “repeated protestations,” it argued, the Act imposed no “sudden and unanticipated” burden, because its duties arose only when an employer closed a plant after the Act took effect, which made them one factor in the business decision to close.13 The label matters because severity drives scrutiny. A more severe impairment brings a higher level of scrutiny to the State’s justification, though a total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a finding of substantial impairment.14 A burden that the Court sees as sudden and unanticipated therefore starts the State’s defense uphill.
A heavy loss of value does not by itself condemn a regulation. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, an owner had run a lawful brickyard for years in reliance on the existing law, and a local ordinance then banned brickyards in the locale and cut the value of his parcel and investment by nearly 90%; the ordinance still survived a taking claim.15 That was a takings case, but it carries a lesson for the contract clause. Severity raises the bar the State must clear; it does not decide the outcome by itself.16
Once the impairment is substantial, the State must show a significant and legitimate public purpose, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.17 Since Blaisdell the purpose need not address an emergency or a temporary situation, and the requirement guarantees that the State is exercising its police power and not handing a benefit to special interests.18 Emergency still has a place in the analysis: it creates no power and diminishes no restriction on power, but it may furnish the occasion for exercising power that already exists.19 Even the war power, Blaisdell added, does not remove constitutional limits that safeguard essential liberties.20
The emergency debtor-relief cases show how that demand works in practice. In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, Arkansas exempted the proceeds of a life insurance policy from the beneficiary’s judgment creditors, and the Court held the law invalid under the clause, stressing its retroactive effect and finding it not precisely and reasonably designed to meet a grave temporary emergency.21 Other emergency debtor-relief laws fell when they totally exempted major assets of debtors from creditors’ claims or eliminated remedies without protecting creditors’ rights, while under Blaisdell a State could alter remedies if the legislation reasonably related to a public purpose and protected the basic value of creditor claims.22 The pattern gives a checklist for any statute that adds duties: ask whether the law answers a real public problem, and whether its burden is reasonably related to that problem.
The statute rewrites a term of an existing contract, so step one is satisfied.23 Little else resembles Allied. The statute answers a state-wide problem, the kind of broad and general problem on which a significant public purpose can rest,24 and its prospective, gradual design avoids the sudden and unanticipated burden that the Allied majority saw.25 The State is well placed at steps two and three. A good exam answer names that contrast, because a worthy goal such as protecting pensions does not carry a State past a severe, retroactive burden by itself.
Keystone Coal
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis shows how a State prevails when its law alters private bargains. Pennsylvania’s Subsidence Act denied the coal companies the right to hold surface owners to their contractual waivers of liability for surface damage, and the Court held that the Commonwealth’s strong public interests were more than adequate to justify the statute’s impact on those agreements.27 Where Allied marks an impairment that fails, Keystone marks one that stands.
The Act answered a legislative judgment that earlier efforts had failed. In 1966 the Pennsylvania legislature concluded that the Commonwealth’s existing mine subsidence legislation did not protect the public interest in safety, land conservation, the tax bases of affected municipalities, and land development, and on detailed findings it enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act.28 Sixty-five years earlier, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the “particular facts” had led the Court to hold that the legislature exceeded its powers by prohibiting anthracite mining in a manner that would cause subsidence under certain structures; Keystone presented “a different set of particular facts.”29 The companies also attacked sections 4 and 6 as takings, but this unit follows only the Contract Clause claim, which targeted section 6.30
Section 6 required the coal companies either to repair subsidence damage or to give the surface owner funds to repair it, and in doing so it removed the surface owners’ contractual obligations to waive damages.31 The companies claimed to hold such waivers for a large percentage of the protected land surface.32 The case reached the Court as a facial challenge on stipulated facts and cross-motions for summary judgment.33
Step one was easy. The waiver was the surface owners’ obligation, and the Act extinguished it, so the comparison of contract and statute shows an impairment;34 the Court agreed that the statute operates as “a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.”35 Finding a protected contract and an impairment opens the inquiry; it does not close it. An older opinion made the point about a charter that both sides conceded was a contract between the plaintiffs and the State of Vermont, one the State had no power to impair under the clause. That proposition, taken as a postulate on both sides, “determines nothing as to the real merits.”36
The Court did not need to measure how severe the impairment was. The record left gaps on that question, and the Court said the gaps might be critical in some cases but were not essential here, because the Act withstands scrutiny even if it is assumed to be a total impairment.37 The shortcut follows from how the test is built. Severity raises the level of scrutiny,38 so a statute that passes at the highest level makes the exact measurement unnecessary.
Step two is where the Commonwealth won. The Court of Appeals relied on the legislative finding that subsidence damage devastated many surface structures and thereby endangered the health, safety, and economic welfare of the Commonwealth and its people.39 A purpose of that kind shows the State exercising its police power and not favoring special interests.40 The Court also quoted the older principle that “[o]ne whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them.”41 The idea has a broad foundation: into every contract enter conditions that arise from the preexisting and higher authority of the community to which the parties belong, every contract is made in subordination to them, and the right of eminent domain is one such condition.42 Eminent domain is a separate power, however. Taking property requires compensation, while traditional uses of the regulatory power, such as abating a nuisance, do not, and the question whether a State can take property is distinct from the question whether it can regulate it.43
A legitimate purpose does not end the analysis. The court must also satisfy itself that the legislature’s adjustment of the parties’ rights rests on reasonable conditions and suits the public purpose.44 Fit was not a close question. Requiring the companies to repair the damage or fund its repair accomplishes both deterrence and restoration of the environment to its previous condition, and the Court refused to second-guess the Commonwealth’s judgment that these were the most appropriate ways to deal with the problem.45 That deference depended on the contracts being private. Unless the State is itself a contracting party, courts defer to the legislature’s judgment on the necessity and reasonableness of a measure,46 and the Court of Appeals confirmed that wholly private contracts call for more deference than the State’s own agreements do.47
Allied and Keystone therefore share a test and part on the answer. Keystone defended an acknowledged substantial impairment with legislative findings of widespread damage and a remedy matched to that damage, and the justification was ample enough that the Court could assume a total impairment.48 Allied applied the same test and reached the opposite result.
The first order is Keystone again. The waivers are private bargains, the harm is widespread physical damage, and repair or payment matches that harm, so the operator loses even if the impairment is assumed to be total. The second statute fails at step two, because it protects no one from damage and benefits only the landowners who would escape the waivers, which is the special-interest favor that the public-purpose requirement guards against.49 A fact pattern with a general, documented harm and a remedy tied to that harm calls for the Keystone answer: state the substantial impairment, assume it is total if the facts do not measure it, identify the public interest that reaches beyond the private bargain, and apply the deference owed because the State is not a party. Use the shortcut only when steps two and three carry the State, since severity raises the scrutiny of a thin justification.