10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)
The suit was instituted on several covenants contained in a deed made by John Peck, the defendant in error, conveying to Robert Fletcher, the plaintiff in error, certain lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn and others, in the year 1795, from the state of Georgia. The contract for which was made in the form of a bill passed by the legislature of that state.
The first count set forth a breach in the covenant that the legislature of the state of Georgia at the time of passing the act of sale had good right to sell and dispose of the same in manner pointed out by the said act.1 The second count assigned as a breach that the original grantees had promised and assured members of the legislature an interest in the lands if they voted for the bill.2 The third count alleged that a subsequent legislature passed an act annulling and rescinding the law under which the conveyance to the original grantees was made.3 The fourth count assigned as a breach that the right to the soil was in the United States and not in Georgia.4
In the circuit court there were demurrers to three pleas and a special verdict found on an issue joined on the fourth plea. The pleas were all sustained and judgment was rendered for the defendant.5 After the opinion of the court was delivered on the initial demurrers, the parties agreed to amend the pleadings and the cause was continued for further consideration.6
The special verdict found the grant of Carolina by Charles the second to the Earl of Clarendon and others. It found the subsequent erection of Georgia as a colony. It found the surrender of the grantees to the crown in 1752. It found the appointment of governors with commissions describing the boundaries. It found the 1763 proclamation creating new colonies and reserving lands on the western waters for the use of the Indians. It found the 1787 convention between South Carolina and Georgia settling their boundary line. The verdict described the situation of the lands in such manner that their lying within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763, in the treaty of peace, and in the convention between that state and South Carolina has not been questioned.7 The case comes before this court on the amended pleadings consisting of sundry demurrers and the special verdict.8
Whether the constitution of the state of Georgia prohibited the legislature from disposing of the lands in the manner pointed out by the act of sale?9
The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy.10 It ought seldom if ever to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case.11 The opposition between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.12
No. The constitution of Georgia adopted in the year 1789 contains no restriction on the legislative power which inhibits the passage of the act of 1795.13 The legislature of Georgia unless restrained by its own constitution possesses the power of disposing of the unappropriated lands within its own limits in such manner as its own judgment shall dictate.14 The court can perceive no such opposition between the constitution and the law.15
The circuit court committed no error in overruling the demurrer to the first plea.16
Whether alleged corruption of members of the legislature in passing the 1795 act rendered the grant void against subsequent purchasers without notice?17
If the title be plainly deduced from a legislative act which the legislature might constitutionally pass, then a court sitting as a court of law cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual against another founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity in consequence of the impure motives which influenced some members of the legislature which passed the law.18 The act must be clothed with all the requisite forms of a law.19
No. The case as made out in the pleadings is simply that one individual who holds lands under a deed covenanting that the title of Georgia was in the grantor brings an action of covenant and assigns as a breach that some of the members of the legislature were induced to vote in favour of the law by being promised an interest in it.20 This solemn question cannot be brought thus collaterally and incidentally before the court.21 It would be indecent in the extreme upon a private contract between two individuals to enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the sovereign power of a state.22
The circuit court did right in overruling the demurrer to the second count.23
Whether a subsequent legislature could pass a valid act rescinding the original grant and impairing the title of innocent purchasers?24
When a law is in its nature a contract and absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot divest those rights.25 The principle that one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass cannot apply when an act be done under a law because the past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power.26
No. The lands in controversy vested absolutely in James Gunn and others the original grantees by the conveyance of the governor made in pursuance of an act of assembly to which the legislature was fully competent.27 Being thus in full possession of the legal estate they for a valuable consideration conveyed portions of the land to those who were willing to purchase.28 If the original transaction was infected with fraud these purchasers did not participate in it and had no notice of it.29 The rescinding act would annihilate their rights also though they were innocent purchasers without notice.30
A subsequent legislature could not constitutionally pass a valid act rescinding the original grant and impairing the title of innocent purchasers.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Johnson agrees that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants but reaches this conclusion on a general principle of the reason and nature of things rather than the Contract Clause.32 He views the distinction as lying between power and interest, the right of jurisdiction and the right of soil.33 Once the legislature conveys its interest or property the government loses all control over it as the property becomes vested in the individual.34
Johnson states that the acts of the supreme power of a country must be considered pure for the same reason that all sovereign acts must be considered just, because there is no power that can declare them otherwise.35
Whether the Contract Clause of the Constitution of the United States applies to a state law annulling a prior legislative grant of land?36
The constitution of the United States declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.37 A grant is a contract executed and the obligation of which still continues.38 Since the constitution uses the general term contract without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the former.39
Yes. A grant in its own nature amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor and implies a contract not to reassert that right.40 A law annulling conveyances between individuals and declaring that the grantors should stand seised of their former estates notwithstanding those grants would be as repugnant to the constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances.41 The words of the contract clause are general and are applicable to contracts of every description including those made with the state itself.42
The Contract Clause applies to a state law annulling a prior legislative grant of land and restrains Georgia from passing the rescinding act.43
Related opinions on this issue
Johnson expresses regret that words of less equivocal signification had not been adopted in the Contract Clause and doubts whether the clause was intended to reach all legislative acts affecting contracts in the manner the majority applies it.44 He notes that there can be no solid objection to adopting the technical definition of the word contract given by Blackstone.45 The difficulty arises on the word obligation which certainly imports an existing moral or physical necessity.46
Whether the state of Georgia was legally seised in fee of the soil subject only to the extinguishment of part of the Indian title?47
Yes. The special verdict establishes that the lands lie within the limits of Georgia as defined in the proclamation of 1763 in the treaty of peace and in the convention between that state and South Carolina.50 The reservation for the use of the Indians in the proclamation of 1763 appears to be a temporary arrangement suspending for a time the settlement of the country reserved but is not conceived to amount to an alteration of the boundaries of the colony.51 The majority of the court holds that the state of Georgia had power to grant the land and was seised in fee subject only to the extinguishment of part of the Indian title.52
The state of Georgia was legally seised in fee of the soil subject only to the extinguishment of part of the Indian title.53
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Johnson dissents from the judgment on the first count and concludes that the state of Georgia had not a fee-simple in the land in question.54 He views the interest of Georgia in that land as amounting to nothing more than a mere possibility and that her conveyance could operate legally only as a covenant to convey or to stand seised to a use.55 The Indian nations retain a limited sovereignty and the absolute proprietorship of their soil.56
Unaffected by particular treaties the interest of the states amounts only to a right of conquest or of purchase exclusively of all competitors within the defined limits which is not equivalent to a fee-simple estate.57