Concept
Reach of the Clause
Contracts Clause
Reach of the Clause
Article I, Section 10 yields two screening questions before any weighing of interests begins. The clause provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”1 “State” names the actor the clause restrains, and “impairing the Obligation of Contracts” presupposes an obligation that already exists. A court therefore asks first who acted and then whether the contract came first.
A negative answer to either question ends the analysis. If a federal statute or a state court produced the challenged result, or if the parties signed after the law took effect, the clause never attached, and no one reaches the question whether the State had good reason. The order is practical as well as logical. The facts usually reveal who enacted a measure and when the parties bargained, while weighing a State's purposes against the burden on a contract takes a developed record. Asking the cheap questions first spares a court that work whenever the clause does not apply.
The clause has two neighbors in the Constitution's protection of property: the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clauses.2 Each asks its own question. Takings doctrine, for example, distinguishes the power to take property from the police power to regulate it,3 and the Contracts Clause asks only whether a state or local law interferes with existing contracts.4
State Legislation Only
The words “No State shall” and “Law” limit the clause to state legislation.5 It reaches local lawmaking along with statewide lawmaking, because it applies whenever a state or local law interferes with existing contracts.6 It does not apply to the federal government; a challenge to federal interference with contracts goes under the Due Process Clause.7
A federal statute that retroactively disturbs contracts raises no Contracts Clause question, because Congress is not among the actors the text names. Bankruptcy shows why that must be so. Impairment of contracts is what happens in bankruptcy, and if Congress could not pass bankruptcy laws that let debtors impair contracts, the constitutional grant of power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws would mean nothing.8
Association of Retired Employees v. City of Stockton applied this limit in a city's bankruptcy. The court explained that the Contract Clause forbids impairment by the state, not by the federal government, and that impairing contractual obligations is a core part of any bankruptcy proceeding. The federal bankruptcy power, through the Supremacy Clause, also trumped the similar contracts clause in California's constitution. The retirees therefore received no relief, even assuming their benefits were vested property interests.9
The limit holds outside bankruptcy as well. The dissent in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus pointed out that when an Act of Congress denies a creditor the ability to enforce a contract right to payment, the creditor has no Contract Clause remedy, a result that follows from the fact that the clause does not protect all contract-based expectations.10
Where the Contracts Clause stops, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause takes over, because it forbids the federal government to deprive any person of property without due process of law.11 Federal interference with contracts receives deferential rational-basis review there.12 Retroactivity adds a burden, but the government meets it by showing that applying the law to past transactions serves a rational legislative purpose.13 A State that legislates the same way must satisfy the Contracts Clause itself, which the sections below develop.
The kind of act matters as much as the actor. The clause applies only to state legislative acts, and consistent judicial interpretation excludes impairments by state judicial acts as well as by national legislation.14 In Barrows v. Jackson, the question was whether enforcing a racial restrictive covenant through an award of damages impaired the obligation of contracts. The rule applied was that the clause protects against state impairment only by legislation and not by judgments of courts.15 The Court cites Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan for that line between legislative and judicial action.16 A litigant who complains that a state supreme court's changed reading of existing law has undermined a contract therefore has no Contracts Clause claim, however much the ruling disappoints the bargain.
The line follows the evil the clause targets. One opinion described the clause as a limited prohibition directed at a particular, narrow social evil, likely to occur only through state legislative action.17 Courts have long distrusted retroactive legislation for a related reason: a legislature can benefit or harm disfavored classes of citizens more easily with retrospective laws than with prospective ones.18
A court's power to reach a result does not excuse a legislature that reaches the same result. An opinion in the Keystone coal litigation observed that Pennsylvania's courts might have had a valid basis for refusing to enforce perpetual covenants against later owners of the surface rights, yet that possibility was not necessarily a sufficient reason to conclude that the legislative impairment of the contracts was permissible.19
On an exam, the phrase “retroactively alters existing contracts” invites a Contracts Clause answer, so check who acted and what kind of act it was before anything else. Congress sends the analysis to Fifth Amendment due process. A state court ends it, because the clause is not triggered. Only state or local legislation advances to the next question, whether the contract existed when the law took effect.
Existing Contracts Only
The second screening question also comes from the text: a State may not pass a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,”21 and an obligation can be impaired only if it exists. The clause therefore attaches to a contract already formed when the state law takes effect. A law that regulates the terms of agreements yet to be made falls outside it, and a State that wants to tighten its rules for future bargains may do so without satisfying the clause.22
The emergency debtor-relief cases show what the existing-contract requirement protects. Under Blaisdell, discussed in the next part, a State could alter remedies for debts when the legislation reasonably related to a public purpose and protected the basic value of creditor claims. It could not significantly impair the basis of creditors' accrued rights in order to improve debtors' economic position.23 What the clause shields, then, is a right that has already accrued under a contract in existence.
A contract's obligation includes more than its text. An agreement rarely specifies every term on its face; many terms are implied and governed by the law in force when the contract is made or to be executed. Take an agreement to pay a sum with interest: when the agreement does not state the rate, the law presumes the parties meant the common rate established where the contract was to be performed.24 A statute already in force when the parties bargain therefore becomes part of what they agreed to, while a statute enacted afterward rewrites a bargain that neither side can renegotiate. That asymmetry explains why a State may regulate future contracts freely and still may not reach back to obligations that have already attached.
An early opinion drew the line with familiar examples. Statutes of frauds and statutes of limitations are valid unless, by their express provisions, they operate on contracts previously entered into, and even then they are void only so far as they so operate, because only then do they impair the obligation of those contracts.25
Rights already transferred in a completed transaction stand apart from any wrongdoing that preceded them. In Fletcher v. Peck, the Court observed that the legislature may have had ample proof that an original land grant was obtained by corrupt practices, and that proof would have justified abrogating the grant as to those to whom the crime was imputable. But the grant conveyed a transferable fee simple, and later purchasers of parts of it, who took without notice of the fraud, stood like any other purchasers of a legal estate.26
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey puts both sides of the line in a single dispute. The States made a covenant with bondholders in 1962 and repealed it prospectively in 1973. Holders of bonds issued after that repeal and before the later retrospective repeal were not parties to the 1962 covenant, because the States undoubtedly had power to repeal it prospectively.27 Only the retrospective repeal reached back to holders who had bought while the covenant stood, and so only it raised the Contracts Clause problem that the sections below test.
Texaco, Inc. v. Short confirms the point from the property side. Mineral owners attacked the Mineral Lapse Act under the Contract Clause, but they had signed their coal and oil leases only after their mineral rights had lapsed under the statute. The Court answered that the statute “cannot be said to impair a contract that did not exist at the time of its enactment.” The statute did impair the owners' right to enter such leases, but the Court called that right a property right, not a contract right, and it added that a mineral owner could safeguard any existing contractual rights by filing a statement of claim in the county recorder's office.28
Maeker v. Ross adds a drafting point. A New Jersey statute effective January 18, 2010 provides that no action shall be brought to enforce a palimony agreement unless the agreement is in writing and was made with the independent advice of counsel. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no signal in the text or legislative history that the Legislature meant to extinguish previously formed lawful oral agreements, and it noted that the Legislature knows how to write a retroactive statute, as when it made an estate-tax amendment explicitly retroactive.29 A legislature that wants a law to reach back knows how to say so, so read the statute's text before comparing dates.
The commonest error with this limit is to treat a complaint about the freedom to make future contracts as a Contracts Clause claim. The liberty to contract that the Due Process Clauses protect is the freedom to enter into contracts on terms and conditions of one's choosing. It should not be confused with the Contracts Clause, which prohibits a State from impairing the obligation of contracts by interfering with the terms of preexisting contracts.30 Both labels contain the word contract, yet they attach to different moments, one to the decision to bargain and the other to a bargain already made.
One statute can also produce different answers for different contracts, so each agreement needs its own date.
A court analyzes the statute contract by contract because a law may be void in part and good in part: void so far as it applies retrospectively to past contracts, and valid as applied prospectively to future ones.31