Concept
Land-Use Exactions
Takings
Land-Use Exactions
A landowner who wants to build usually needs a permit, and the permit gives the government leverage. An exaction is what the government asks in return: land, infrastructure, a fee, or any combination of them, required as the price of subdivision or development approval, sometimes with a requirement that the developer connect water and sewer lines to the municipal system.1 Municipalities defend exactions as a way to make new development “pay its own way” for infrastructure the development itself makes necessary. Developers answer that the same exactions shift a public or taxpayer responsibility onto the private sector.2
The conflict sharpened after World War II. As the middle class moved to the suburbs, many communities, intent on making new subdivisions “pay their way,” enacted regulations that went far beyond what the Standard Act authorized: dedication or improvement of off-site land, dedication of subdivision land for recreation or schools, and cash payments into a park or school fund in place of land.3 Developers challenged these heavier exactions under state enabling acts, but the most difficult and important question they raised was constitutional: how far may a government go before an exaction becomes a compensable taking?4
That question starts from a basic rule of eminent domain. When a government demands an interest in land and the owner will not donate it, the government must condemn the interest and pay for it.5 A permit condition seeks the same land by another route. It asks the owner to choose between the permit and the property, and it never asks the owner to sell. The Court has named the danger as the central concern of the exactions cases: the government may use its power and discretion over land-use permits to pursue ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed use of the specific property, and so diminish the property’s value without justification.6 The government’s interest is real as well. It may be able to acquire land for a public purpose, but it may require the land as a condition of development only on a showing that the land is necessary to mitigate the project’s impacts.7
Exactions therefore run on a different track from use-restriction claims. In those claims the per se categories merely identify circumstances almost certain to be regulatory takings, and a claim that falls outside them can still succeed under Penn Central.8 An exaction claim asks whether a demand for property is tied to the harm the project will cause. It also differs from a public-use challenge, which the Court treats deferentially: in Kelo it again rejected the argument that a taking for private development violated the public-use requirement.9 The vote was 5–4,10 with Justice O’Connor, the author of Midkiff, leading the dissenters.11 The exactions cases put public use aside and ask what the government must show before it may require the property.
The subsections that follow take the doctrine in order. The first states the premise: the government may not make an owner surrender the right to compensation as the price of a discretionary benefit. The next two supply the requirements that follow, the nexus of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and the proportionality that Dolan v. City of Tigard added to it.12 The last two follow Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District in extending both requirements to denied permits and to demands for money.
Unconstitutional Conditions
The exactions cases apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. As the Lingle Court explained, Nollan and Dolan “involve a special application” of that doctrine, under which the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here, the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit that has little or no relationship to the property.14 The doctrine is general. Perry v. Sindermann applied it to a public college that declined to renew a professor’s contract because he criticized the administration, and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County applied it to a county that limited healthcare benefits to people who had lived there for a year and so burdened the right to travel. In land-use permitting, the benefit is the permit and the right at stake is the right to just compensation. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District carried the property version of the doctrine to denied permits and to demands for money.
Dolan explains why conditions of this kind receive closer review than ordinary land-use rules. The regulations the Court had sustained were essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of a city, while the condition in Dolan was an adjudicative decision about one individual parcel.15 Those regulations also limited the use an owner might make of her parcel, while the condition required her to deed portions of it to the city.16 Each difference removes a protection that ordinary regulation carries with it. Conditions that do not apply to all similarly situated land draw special concern, because the government is extracting a cost from a particular owner that it does not impose on others.17 When that cost is title to land, the government is collecting what it would otherwise have to buy.
Heightened scrutiny attaches only when the government presses the applicant to give up something it could not have ordered directly. Nollan and Dolan both start there. Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis, the Court had “no doubt there would have been a taking,” because eminent domain exists precisely so the government can require conveyance of such interests, so long as it pays for them.18 Ordinary regulation is different. “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,”19 so a generally applicable limit on use leaves the owner no right to payment for the permit to hold hostage. A demand that the owner pay or spend money raises the same predicate in another form, and the last subsection takes it up.
The predicate is only the first question. The second asks whether the government has a legitimate reason, tied to the project, for demanding the property, and the doctrine answers both because two features of permitting pull in opposite directions. The first is coercion. A permit is usually worth more to the applicant than the property the government wants for it, so the applicant is likely to yield to a demand no one would call reasonable, and the government obtains by bargaining what it would otherwise have to buy. The Court calls such demands extortionate: they run afoul of the Takings Clause “not because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation.”20 The second feature is mitigation. Many projects impose real costs on the public, and municipalities rely on exactions so that new development “pays its own way” for the infrastructure it makes necessary.21
Neither feature can be allowed to absorb the other, so the doctrine requires both a nexus and rough proportionality between the property demanded and the project’s impact, and it places the burden on the government to show that the exaction is roughly proportional in nature and extent.22 Each half answers one feature. The nexus requirement confirms that the demand aims at a harm the project actually causes, and proportionality keeps the price from exceeding that harm. The next two subsections develop them in turn.
A government may reply that it owes the applicant nothing because the permit was discretionary. The doctrine’s own wording answers the reply, since it protects against conditions on a “discretionary benefit,” one the government need not confer at all.23 The wrong lies in burdening the right not to have property taken without just compensation, so the injury exists even when no property has changed hands: the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.24 That point matters most when the applicant refuses the demand and loses the permit.
Nollan’s Essential Nexus
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission supplied the first requirement. A government may condition a land-use permit on the conveyance of a property interest only if there is an “essential nexus” between the condition and the legitimate interest that would have justified denying the permit outright.26 The government bears the burden of establishing that nexus by evidence.27
The Nollans owned a beachfront lot and sought a permit to rebuild their house. The Coastal Commission conditioned the permit on their agreeing to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public, giving lateral access along the shore.28 The Commission asserted three purposes: protecting the public’s ability to see the beach, helping the public overcome the “psychological barrier” to using a beach with a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on public beaches.29 The California Court of Appeal upheld the condition. It reasoned that when a project contributes to the need for public access, an access condition is sufficiently related to the burdens the project creates, even if the project alone did not create the need and even if the relationship is only indirect.30
The Supreme Court’s reasoning moves through three links. First, the Commission could not simply have demanded the easement. A permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro is a permanent physical occupation, even though no particular person may stay on the land,31 and when there has been a physical appropriation, a court does not ask whether the owner keeps other valuable use.32 The extent of the occupation bears on how much compensation is due, not on whether a taking occurred.33 The label matters. In a later dispute over a regulation granting the public access to private land, the lower courts held that the regulation was a matter for Penn Central balancing because it did not give the public permanent and continuous access, while dissenting judges argued that it appropriated a traditional easement in gross and was a per se taking.34
Second, the government may refuse a permit without paying if the refusal serves a legitimate interest and does not so drastically interfere with the owner’s use as to be a taking. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the Commission’s asserted purposes were legitimate. On that assumption the Commission could have denied the permit outright if the new house, alone or with the cumulative impact of other construction, would substantially impede those purposes.35
Third, the Commission argued that a condition serving the same police-power purpose as a refusal should not be a taking if the refusal would not be, and the Court agreed. A height limitation, a width restriction, a ban on fences, or a requirement that the owners provide a viewing spot for passersby whose view of the ocean the house would block would each be constitutional.36 The viewing spot teaches the most. It is a permanent grant of continuous access that would be a taking if demanded outright, yet the power to forbid construction in order to protect the public’s view includes the power to condition construction on a concession, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end.37 If the government may forbid the house to protect the view, a permit whose condition protects the view just as well gives the owner a choice between two outcomes the government could have imposed anyway.
The justification fails when the condition does nothing for the purpose behind the denial. The Court compared the situation to a State that forbids shouting fire in a crowded theater but grants dispensations to anyone who contributes $100 to the state treasury. The ban is a legitimate use of the police power, but the unrelated payment changes what the scheme is for.38 Once the nexus is missing, the purpose becomes obtaining an easement without paying for it, and unless the condition serves the same purpose as the development ban, the restriction is no longer a valid land-use regulation but “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”39 Dolan later described the Nollans’ case this way: the Commission’s authority was “set completely adrift from its constitutional moorings” when it claimed a nexus between visual access to the ocean and lateral access along the lot, since enhancing the public’s ability to traverse the shorefront did not serve the purpose of visual access from the roadway.40
The policy behind the condition did not rescue it. The principal dissent argued that the Nollans, who bought the lot after the Commission adopted its policy, were on notice that new development would be approved only with lateral beach access. The majority replied that so long as the Commission could not have taken the easement from the prior owners without compensating them, those owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights when they conveyed the lot.41 The Court also made clear that this inquiry is not ordinary rationality review. Its takings formulations had generally been quite different from the standards for due process or equal protection claims, and it had required that a regulation “substantially advance” the “legitimate state interest” sought.42
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He wrote that the majority imposed “a standard of precision for the exercise of a State’s police power that has been discredited for the better part of this century.”43 Even under the majority’s test, he argued, the condition answered a burden the project created: the new house would diminish visual access and move private development closer to the public tidelands, so the Commission could reasonably offset the encroachment by assuring that the public may walk along the shoreline.44 The two opinions disagree about what counts as the problem. The majority takes the problem the Commission asserted for the ban, the blocked view, and asks whether the easement answers it. The dissent describes the problem as the erosion of public access to the shore and accepts any reasonable response. On an exam, the majority’s formulation governs.
An essay stem will often offer a condition that benefits the public in some way and ask whether that is enough. The benefit is not the test. The question is whether the condition answers the problem that would justify denial.
The second step is easy to skip, because the Court assumed the Commission’s purposes were legitimate without deciding that they were. The case therefore teaches nothing about which purposes qualify, and the decision turned entirely on the third step.45
Dolan’s Rough Proportionality
Dolan v. City of Tigard supplies the second step. A condition that demands a dedication of land or public access must have an essential nexus to a legitimate interest and must also be roughly proportional to the projected impact of the development, and the government bears the burden of showing proportionality.47 Nollan asked only whether the condition and the justification for denial were connected. It did not say how much a connected condition may demand, and Dolan described its own task as the “second part of our analysis”: deciding whether the degree of the exactions bears the required relationship to the projected impact.48 The second step is needed because a nexus shows only that the demand addresses the right kind of problem. A city could find a real connection between a store’s added paving and a creek and still ask for far more land than the paving could justify.
Florence Dolan wanted to expand her store. The city required her to dedicate to the city as greenway “all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek]” and all property fifteen feet above the floodplain boundary.49 The city’s planning commission found that the expansion would increase the impervious surface on the property and so the stormwater runoff into Fanno Creek, and that the pathway would relieve some traffic congestion in the central business district.50 Those findings tied each condition to an impact of the expansion, so the case turned on degree. An exam answer that stops at the observation that flooding and traffic are real problems has analyzed only the half of the test the city passed.
The Court looked to state courts, which had handled the question longer, and found a spread of approaches. A number had taken an intermediate position, requiring the municipality to show a “reasonable relationship” between the dedication and the impact of the development.51 Oregon’s courts had read Nollan more loosely still, to mean that an exaction is reasonably related to an impact if it serves the same purpose a denial of the permit would serve.52 That reading stops at the nexus. The Court found the intermediate test closer to the federal norm than the approaches at either extreme, but it declined to adopt the name, partly because “reasonable relationship” sounds too much like the rational-basis review of the Equal Protection Clause.53
The Court chose “rough proportionality” as the term that best captures what the Fifth Amendment requires. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.54 The government must “demonstrate ‘rough proportionality’ between the harm caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained by the condition.”55 The two measures in that sentence do different jobs. Relation in nature repeats the qualitative question from Nollan, whether the dedication addresses the same kind of problem the project causes. Relation in extent adds the quantitative question, whether the demand is about the size of the harm. The word individualized fixes the level at which the city must reason. A policy that every expansion along the creek will surrender its floodplain does not show what this store’s runoff or traffic will be.
The burden rests on the city. Challengers to generally applicable zoning must show that the regulation is arbitrary, but when a city makes an adjudicative decision to condition a permit on an individual parcel, “the burden properly rests on the city.”56 Justice Stevens, dissenting, would have kept the presumption. Conditions that are rational, impartial, and conducive to a valid land-use plan, he argued, should carry a strong presumption of validity, with the burden on the challenger, and the Court “stumbled badly” by reversing that allocation.57 Justice Souter, dissenting separately, would have found the city’s findings sufficient.58 The majority answered that calling a measure a business regulation does not immunize it from a constitutional challenge under the Bill of Rights.59
The floodplain condition shows how a valid connection can still leave the extent of a demand unsupported. The city rested on findings that increased stormwater flow “can only add to the public need to manage the [floodplain] for drainage purposes,” findings the Court called “rather tentative.”60 Had the city simply forbidden building on the part of the lot nearest the creek, the condition might have been upheld as reasonably related to flood control. Requiring the owner to open the greenway to the public was not proportional to the effect of her expansion on flood control.61 The difference to the owner is the loss of her ability to exclude others, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”62 The Court found it difficult to see why recreational visitors on the floodplain easement were sufficiently related to the city’s interest in reducing flooding, and the city had made no individualized determination to support that part of its request.63
The pathway condition failed for a related reason. The city had shown only that the dedication of the floodplain would in some degree alleviate flooding and that a bicycle path “could” alleviate traffic problems.64 That language states a possibility. On the record before it, the Court held, the city had not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the development reasonably related to the dedication of the pathway easement.65 The city had not shown its dedication requirements to be roughly proportional to the projected impacts, so they were an uncompensated taking.66
The two cities differ in the quality of the evidence behind the demand and in how much land the demand reaches. Dolan does not require the first city to prove its numbers to the square foot, because rough proportionality tolerates approximation, but it does require the city to show its work. When an exam stem recites a legitimate purpose and a sensible-sounding condition, only the nexus is established. Look next for a finding specific to the project, ask whether that finding is a measurement or only a possibility, and compare the demand with what the measured impact supports.
Denied Permits
Nollan and Dolan both arose from approved permits, and the first extension in Koontz answers a question they left open: does the test also apply when the government refuses the permit because the applicant will not meet the demand? In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes the Court had declined to extend the Nollan and Dolan tests to a challenge to the denial of a development permit, though in dicta it treated conditions on approval, and fees in lieu of dedication, as exactions.68 Koontz held that the government’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.69 This subsection takes up the first half of that holding.
Coy Koontz sought permits from a Florida water management district to develop part of a wetland tract. The District would approve construction only if he accepted one of two concessions. Both required him to deed a conservation easement over the rest of his land, and the second also required him to pay contractors to improve District-owned wetlands several miles away. Koontz refused, the permits were denied, and he sued under a Florida damages statute.70 One secondary source reads the off-site demand as an attempt to carry out a general plan of the agency, with no essential nexus to the environmental problems his development would create, just as in Nollan.71 The Florida Supreme Court ruled for the District on two grounds: a denial resting on a refused unconstitutional condition cannot be a taking, and a demand for money falls outside Nollan and Dolan. The Supreme Court rejected both in a single holding.72 The second ground belongs to the next subsection.
The line between approving a permit on condition and denying it until the condition is met is a difference in drafting, and the doctrine does not recognize it. If the test reached only the first, an order saying a permit is “approved if” the owner turns over property would be reviewed, and an order saying it is “denied until” she does would escape. In either form the agency withholds a benefit worth more to the applicant than the property it wants, and that leverage is what pressures an owner to surrender a right the Fifth Amendment would otherwise make the government pay for. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.73 An applicant who yields is protected, and so is an applicant who holds out and loses the permit. A rule limited to approvals would also invite gamesmanship, because an agency could choose the denial form and force the owner to accept the unlawful condition before suing.
Applying the test to a denial does not turn the denial into a taking. Where the permit is denied and the condition is never imposed, nothing has been taken, because Koontz conveyed no easement and paid no money. The injury is the burden on the right to just compensation. Because the Fifth Amendment compensation remedy follows a taking, whether money damages are available depends on the cause of action the owner invokes. Koontz sued under a Florida statute, and the Court left to the Florida courts the state-law question whether that statute covers an unconstitutional conditions claim.74 Other relief can still be appropriate: an order to issue the permit without the condition or, for a fee, an order to recalculate it in line with Nollan and Dolan.75
The Court did not decide whether the District’s demands in fact failed Nollan and Dolan. It reversed and remanded, expressing no view on the merits of Koontz’s claim.76 It also left open whether the District had issued a demand concrete enough to trigger the test, a question the Florida Supreme Court had not reached.77 The dissent concentrated there. It accepted that nothing was taken but argued that the District had made no concrete demand, only non-exclusive suggestions for bringing the applications into compliance.78 The argument protects something real about permitting. Review of an application is usually a conversation in which staff explain what a revised proposal might need, and if every suggestion counted as a demand, officials would stop making suggestions. The trigger remains a demand for property as the price of approval. A bare refusal, or a suggestion about how to comply with the law, does not supply it.
The doctrine also has a limit that the denial rule does not erase. An applicant who is offered at least one alternative that would satisfy nexus and rough proportionality for the benefit the applicant sought has not been forced to give up the right to compensation, because the applicant may take the lawful alternative. The alternative must deliver what the applicant sought. A smaller permit that carries its own unlawful condition does not qualify.
Where the government refuses a permit and demands nothing, the exactions test has nothing to attach to, and the claim is an ordinary use-restriction claim. The court weighs the economic impact on the claimant, the interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.79 Use-restriction claims raise threshold disputes of their own, such as which tract is the parcel. In Murr the owners argued that the ordinance took Lot E, while the State and county proposed that both lots together were the relevant parcel.80 The categorical route is narrow. The Lucas rule is limited to the extraordinary circumstance in which no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, and a 95% diminution in value would call for Penn Central analysis.81 A restriction that reaches only part of a parcel, whether limited by time, use, or space, does not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use, as the Ninth Circuit reasoned in the moratorium litigation.82
The fifth step catches the common error of assuming that an applicant who wins on the doctrine automatically recovers constitutional compensation.
Monetary Exactions
The second holding in Koontz carries the exactions test from demands for land to demands for money. The government’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy Nollan and Dolan even when the demand is for money.84 The Florida Supreme Court had reasoned that the District asked Koontz only to spend money, on wetland improvements miles away, and did not ask him to give up an easement or another interest in real property.85 That objection rests on the predicate taught at the start of this section: an unconstitutional conditions claim requires that the government could not have ordered directly what it pressured the applicant to do. The question was whether an order to pay money can ever satisfy that predicate.
The Court’s first answer is practical. If money fell outside the test, an authority that wanted an easement could offer the owner a choice between surrendering the easement and paying a sum equal to its value. The easement option would face review, the payment option would not, and an owner who preferred to keep the land would write the check. The authority would end up with the economic equivalent of the easement, obtained through the leverage of the permit, and its demand would never have to be justified. The Court called such “in lieu of” fees “utterly commonplace” and “functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions,” and it held that monetary exactions must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality requirements.86 The practice is old. Cash payments into park and school funds in place of land dedication were among the heavier exactions that suburban communities began demanding after World War II,87 and Monterey had already said in dicta that fees in lieu of dedication are exactions.88
The respondent and the dissent relied on Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, where the United States retroactively required a former mining company to pay for the medical benefits of retired miners and their families. A four-Justice plurality concluded that the retroactive financial liability was so arbitrary that it violated the Takings Clause. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result on due process grounds, but he joined four other Justices in dissent in arguing that the Takings Clause does not apply to government-imposed financial obligations that “do[] not operate upon or alter an identified property interest.”89 Five Justices thus doubted that the Clause reaches such obligations, and Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. had earlier rejected a takings challenge to a requirement that employers withdrawing from a pension program pay their share of unfunded obligations. On that reasoning, an order to improve public wetlands at the owner’s expense would be an ordinary liability to pay, outside the Clause and so outside the exactions doctrine.
The majority accepted the general rule and denied that it governed. Koontz’s claim rested on a more limited proposition: when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest, such as a bank account or a parcel of real property, a per se approach is the proper mode of analysis.90 The mining company owed a general obligation. The demand on Koontz was directed at the owner of a particular parcel because of what he wanted to do with it. The Court named the hinge of the decision as “the direct link between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property.”91 That link reproduces the danger Nollan and Dolan address: the government’s use of its power over land-use permits to pursue ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the new use, diminishing the property’s value without justification.92
Four Justices disagreed. In their view Nollan and Dolan apply only when the property demanded is the kind the government would otherwise have to pay for, since only then does the demand force the owner to give up the right to just compensation. The doctrine burdens that right and does not itself take anything.93 An order to pay money outside the permitting process is not a taking under Eastern Enterprises, and the District’s demand, which did not target a lien, an account, or an income stream, never reached the doctrine.94 The two sides disagree about what makes a demand for money operate on an identified property interest. For the majority, a payment demanded of the owner of a particular parcel qualifies, and for the dissent, only a demand that seizes a particular lien, account, or income stream does.
The dissent also predicted significant practical harm to the routine permit fees that cities impose every day. The majority replied that no such harm has come to pass, and it agreed that state law normally provides an independent check on excessive land-use permitting fees.95 Other checks remain as well. The Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary or irrational government action that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights an owner legitimately expected.96 Justice Kennedy has reasoned that, without a takings remedy, that clause would likely prevent a State from doing “by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”97 The objection that a due process claim raises close questions about what owners might have expected is not a sound argument against it, because the same close questions arise in deciding whether a government action is a taking.98
Taxes and user fees stay outside the doctrine. The Court stated that its holding does not affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on property owners.99 It conceded that the line between a tax and a taking can be hard to draw, and it pointed to Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, where a state court’s seizure of the interest on client funds held in escrow was a taking despite the propriety of a tax that would have raised the same revenue.100 The Court also declined to say whether Florida’s statute covers an unconstitutional conditions claim, a question of state law that the Florida Supreme Court had not addressed.101
The holding is narrower than critics and supporters sometimes assume. The Court did not say that every permit fee must be tested. It said that a demand for funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest falls within the rule, and it left the merits of Koontz’s claim for remand.102 The boundary between an exaction and an ordinary charge is still being drawn. In California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, the California Supreme Court upheld a requirement that developers sell fifteen percent of new units below market value or pay a fee in lieu. It found no exaction and therefore no unconstitutional condition.103
The second and third steps do the classifying. A payment that every owner would owe whether or not anyone applied for a permit is a tax or a fee, while a payment demanded because this owner wants to develop this parcel, or one that stands in for land the government would otherwise have to buy, is a monetary exaction. The fifth step reflects the point on which the majority and the dissent agreed, that other law usually checks excessive permitting fees, so a charge that survives the federal doctrine may still fail elsewhere.