Concept
Fundamental Rights Framework
Fundamental rights
Fundamental Rights and Equal Protection
Fundamental Rights Framework
Skinner v. Oklahoma shows the method this chapter repeats. Oklahoma ordered the sterilization of people convicted three times of larceny but spared people convicted three times of embezzlement, and the Court struck the scheme down under the Equal Protection Clause. Later opinions describe Skinner as invalidating the law under both liberty and equality principles.1 The offenders singled out were not a suspect class, so the closer look did not depend on who they were. It followed what was at stake, the capacity to have children, and the Court insisted that strict scrutiny of the classification in a sterilization law was essential, lest invidious discriminations be made, wittingly or not, against groups or types of individuals.2
The method now has a general form. The Court applies strict forms of review, under the due process clauses and the equal protection clause alike, to governmental actions that limit the exercise of fundamental rights.3 These rights have a value so essential to individual liberty that the Justices review the acts of other branches in a manner much like the substantive due process approach of the pre-1937 period.4 The chapter takes up the recognized rights one at a time (procreation, marriage, interstate travel, and voting) and then turns to other claimed rights, such as access to the courts, education, and employment.
Two ideas organize those discussions. The first is the trigger: what a challenger must show about the burden on a right before the government must carry a heavier load. The second is the choice of clause. A single right may be litigated under due process or under equal protection, and the choice changes the question the court asks more than it changes the level of review. Most decisions invalidating limits on these rights have rested on equal protection, which is why this chapter treats them here.5
The Strict Scrutiny Trigger
Equal protection review begins from deference. As Romer v. Evans explains, nearly every law classifies people for some purpose and so disadvantages some group, which means that a law that burdens neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class survives if it is rationally related to a legitimate end.6
Two exceptions interrupt that deference, and Carolene Products named both: the judiciary defers to the legislature unless a law discriminates against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringes a fundamental right.7 The first exception asks who is being sorted. The second asks what the law burdens, so it applies even when the people disadvantaged belong to no protected group, as the habitual offenders in Skinner did not. Relatively few claimed rights qualify as fundamental. The rest, including economic liberties under due process, receive only rational basis review.8
The choice between the two tiers often decides the case, and Loving v. Virginia shows why. Virginia argued that if its racial classification were not itself fatal, the question would shrink to whether any rational basis supported treating interracial marriages differently, and that the Court should defer to the legislature because the scientific evidence was in doubt.9 The Court rejected that approach and invalidated the ban under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, treating the freedom to marry as fundamental.10
Once a classification significantly burdens a fundamental right, the government usually prevails only if it proves that its action is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.11 Opinions phrase the test in different words. Some require a compelling state interest and legislation narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake.12 Justice Powell described the Zablocki majority as applying “critical examination” or compelling-interest analysis to regulation that “directly and substantially” interferes with the decision to marry.13 For an exam answer, state the portable version, necessary to a compelling purpose, and expect a tight fit between means and end.
Zablocki v. Redhail shows the trigger at work. Wisconsin barred people behind on child-support payments from marrying without judicial approval, and the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate the law, resting its analysis on the holding that the law burdened a right “of fundamental importance.”14 People behind on child support are not a suspect class. The burden on marriage supplied the heightened review.
The two tiers differ in the weight of the purpose and the tightness of the fit. Under rational basis review, virtually any goal the Constitution does not forbid is legitimate, traditional police purposes such as safety, public health, and public morals qualify without difficulty, and a loose fit between means and end is tolerated.15 Under strict scrutiny, the purpose must be compelling and the law must fit it better than any feasible alternative.16 A poor fit joined with an available less discriminatory alternative strongly suggests that the stated goal is a sham.
Compare the cap with the Wisconsin permit rule in Zablocki. Both laws sort people into those who may do something and those who may not, and neither sorts by a suspect trait. The permit rule receives strict scrutiny and the cap does not because of the interest on the receiving end: the cap allocates an ordinary economic opportunity, while the permit rule burdens marriage. An exam answer should therefore name the interest burdened before anything else. The status of the people sorted matters only to the separate suspect-class exception.
A court works through the trigger in order. It asks first whether the interest is a fundamental right and second whether the law significantly burdens it. A negative answer at either early stage returns the case to rational basis review.17 Only if both answers are yes does the government carry its two-part burden, a compelling purpose and a necessary means.18
The first question causes the most trouble because many fundamental rights are not named in the text, so the Court must decide which liberties qualify. One test asks whether the liberty is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and it raises two difficulties: how much tradition suffices, and how abstractly to state the right. Stated generally enough, any liberty is consistent with the nation’s traditions, and stated very specifically, few nontextual rights would qualify.19 The second question looks to the size of the interference. Justice Powell’s description of Zablocki reaches regulation that “directly and substantially” interferes with the decision to marry, and the marriage cases below return to what counts as direct and substantial.20
The trigger was contested from the start. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the majority struck down a rule that denied welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they had recently moved into the jurisdiction. It held that any classification that penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right is unconstitutional unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.21 Justice Harlan dissented. He accepted the compelling-interest test for racial classifications, a category tied to the Clause’s origin in the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment,22 but he thought the branch reaching fundamental rights both threatened to swallow the ordinary equal protection rule, since nearly every statute affects some important interest, and was unnecessary, since an infringement of a right the Federal Constitution assures can be handled under the Due Process Clause. Extending the compelling-interest rule to every such case, he warned, would go far toward making the Court a “super-legislature.” For matters the Constitution does not mention, he knew of nothing that entitled the Court to pick out particular human activities and label them “fundamental.”23 His two objections, which interests count and whether due process is the better home, remain live. The first is why identifying the right decides so many cases. The second is the subject of the next subsection.
Due Process or Equal Protection
A fundamental right can be litigated under either clause, and the choice depends on the question each clause asks. Due process asks whether the government has a sufficient reason to interfere with the liberty. Equal protection asks whether the government has a sufficient reason to let some people exercise the right while denying it to others.25 A law that denies the right to everyone fits due process best, because no comparison group exists and the objection is to the interference itself. A law that burdens only one class of persons is examined under equal protection.26 Because most laws regulating fundamental rights burden one classification rather than society as a whole, most fundamental-rights decisions are equal protection decisions.27 Many of these rights have been protected under both clauses, and the justices sometimes disagree about which clause fits.28
Skinner shows how little the label can matter to the right itself. Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court rested on equal protection and left the scope of the state’s police power unexamined.29 Yet the capacity to have children would have been as endangered had Oklahoma sterilized every repeat felon without distinction. The right stayed the same however the statute was drawn, and only the framing of the challenge changed.
Zablocki sits on the some-but-not-all side of that line. Wisconsin barred people behind on child-support payments from marrying without judicial approval, and the majority invoked the Equal Protection Clause because the law burdened a right “of fundamental importance.”30 The statute left most people alone and singled out one group, so the affected group could ask why it, and not everyone else, had to seek permission to marry. That is the equal protection question in its plainest form.
The second version of the hypothetical is Eisenstadt v. Baird, where the Court invoked both principles to invalidate a prohibition on distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons but not married persons.31 The liberty is the same in both versions. What moved is whether the state divided people into those who may and those who may not, and that fact alone changes the natural framing.
Separate opinions in Skinner and Zablocki show justices who would have preferred the other clause. In Skinner, Chief Justice Stone thought the real question was not equal protection but whether the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty, without any opportunity for an individual to show that his case did not justify sterilization, satisfied due process.32 Justice Jackson joined both that due process ground and Douglas’s equal protection ground, objecting to each opinion only to the extent that it minimized the other.33
In Zablocki, Justice Stewart objected to the choice of clause itself. Importing the essence of substantive due process analysis “under the guise of equal protection,” he wrote, serves “no purpose but obfuscation,” because it shifts the inquiry away from its proper concerns: the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between means and purpose, the existence of alternative means, and the degree of confidence that the statute reflects a legitimate legislative concern.34 Justice Powell concurred only in the judgment because the majority’s rationale swept too broadly in a field traditionally subject to pervasive state regulation.35 All four justices voted to strike the challenged law down, and they disagreed only about which clause names the wrong.
Recent decisions treat the clauses as partners. Loving v. Virginia invalidated Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage under both. The Court first declared the ban invalid because it treated interracial couples unequally, and then, building on that link, held that denying the fundamental freedom to marry on so unsupportable a basis deprived all of the state’s citizens of liberty without due process.36 In Obergefell v. Hodges the Court stressed that each concept, liberty and equal protection, leads to a stronger understanding of the other, and it held that same-sex couples may not be deprived of the fundamental right to marry under either clause.37 Because the right drives the level of review, strict scrutiny generally follows whichever clause the Court uses.38
The choice of clause has practical consequences in Lawrence v. Texas. The Court called an equal protection argument tenable but chose to address whether Bowers v. Hardwick itself remained valid. A holding under equal protection alone, it reasoned, would leave some to wonder whether a prohibition drawn to cover both same-sex and different-sex participants would be valid.39 An equal protection ruling resolves only the line the state drew. It leaves open whether the state may redraw the line to reach everyone, and only a due process holding answers that question. On an exam, ask first whether the law burdens everyone or only some, and when the facts allow either framing, reach strict scrutiny under both clauses.