Concept
Two Tiers of Review
Other rights and interests
Other Substantive Due Process Interests
Two Tiers of Review
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar the federal government and the states from depriving a person of liberty without due process of law. Procedural due process asks whether the process that produced a decision was fair to the person it burdens.1 Substantive due process asks whether the law itself may restrict the liberty at all.2 Almost none of the liberties the Court protects through the second inquiry is named in the constitutional text, so every claim begins with a sorting question: how much protection does this liberty receive?3
The Court sorts claims into two tiers, a structure it announced in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.4 A small group of liberties are fundamental rights, and the government may interfere with one only by proving that its action is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose, a test called strict scrutiny.5 Nearly every other claim receives rational basis review, under which a law stands if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Claims of economic liberty fall in this group.6
The reason for two tiers lies in the breadth of the word “liberty.” Almost every statute restricts some freedom, whether it is a licensing rule, a zoning ordinance, or a price control. If each restriction demanded a close justification, courts would end up reviewing the wisdom of all legislation. Sorting reserves demanding review for the few interests that warrant it and leaves the rest to the political process.
The tier assigns the burden, so it usually decides the case. Strict scrutiny makes the government prove necessity for a compelling purpose, while rational basis asks only whether a reasonable connection to a legitimate purpose could exist. The same sorting question opens every interest taken up in this chapter: incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees, informational privacy, punitive damages, medical decisions, and family and intimate conduct. The boundary between liberty and government power is drawn case by case and then stated as doctrine, and the doctrine differs from one interest to the next.7 A maritime decision on punitive damages, for example, capped an award at a one-to-one ratio under federal maritime law, a limit separate from the due process guideposts discussed below.8 In an exam answer, as in most Supreme Court opinions, state the issue, the rule, the analysis, and the conclusion in that order, and settle the tier first.9
Rational Basis for Ordinary Interests
When no fundamental right is at stake, a court asks only whether the legislature could reasonably have thought the law would serve a legitimate purpose. Whalen v. Roe shows how little the state must prove. New York required that patients prescribed certain dangerous drugs be identified to the state, and the district court found that the state had not proved the requirement necessary. The Supreme Court held that this finding was not a sufficient reason to invalidate the requirement, which was a reasonable exercise of New York’s broad police powers.10 The state’s vital interest in controlling dangerous drugs supported an experiment with new control techniques, and if the experiment failed, the legislative process remained available to end it.11 The case is taught in full under informational privacy below.
That result follows from the general rule. Unless a law impairs a fundamental right or uses a classification such as race, ancestry, sex, illegitimacy, or in some circumstances alienage, it enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. It falls only if the challenger shows that it could not conceivably have a rational relationship to any possible legitimate government interest.12 The modern Court reviews independently only when a law substantially impairs a fundamental right or employs one of those classifying traits.13
The Court did not always defer. Economic substantive due process began with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, which held that state restrictions on foreign insurance companies infringed “the liberty of contract.”14 The modern era dates from 1937, when West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish turned the Court away from that aggressive review.15 Footnote four of Carolene Products fixed the pattern that followed. For economic regulation it announced weak review: the Court defers to the legislature and upholds statutes with a rational basis, even assuming facts that would make the regulation appear reasonable, so the government need only give some adequate reason.16 Deference has a practical logic. A foolish economic law can be repealed through the legislative process, as Whalen observed, and a court that demanded necessity for every regulation would put its own view of wise policy in place of the legislature’s. Vance v. Bradley states the point directly: “absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.”
The challenger’s task is hard because the court may supply the justification. Under rational basis review, a court may hypothesize a legitimate goal the law might have been designed to further. Whether that was the law’s actual goal, and whether the law in fact furthers it, are both irrelevant. The only question is whether some legitimate end exists that a rational legislature might have thought the law would further.17 In Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., the Court upheld an Oklahoma statute that drastically curtailed what opticians could do, because “it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct” an evil at hand.18 The Court even built a rationale one provision at a time. It sustained the ban on advertising eyeglass frames because, if lens advertising is to be controlled, frames “must come under the same restraints; or so the legislature might think.”19 Ferguson v. Skrupa applied the same deference to a Kansas law that confined debt adjusting to lawyers.
Deference is not abdication, because a law that could not conceivably relate to any legitimate government interest is invalid. The Court has invalidated laws under this standard in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down a criminal prohibition on consensual, nonviolent sexual activity between two adults in private; in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, which involved a city’s use of zoning to keep a group home for people with intellectual disabilities out of a neighborhood; and in Romer v. Evans, which involved a state constitutional amendment barring local antidiscrimination protections for gay residents.20 What separates these cases from the optician and debt-adjusting statutes is the availability of a story. In an economic case a court can almost always imagine a safety or consumer-protection purpose, whereas in these three the Court found no legitimate purpose that could explain the law other than disapproval of the group it burdened. Invalidations remain the exception.
Candidates lose points by debating whether the statute is a good idea or whether less restrictive means exist, and those are questions for legislators under this tier. The decisive move is the first step. If no fundamental right can be identified, the law is presumed to survive, and the challenger prevails only by showing that no rational justification can be imagined.
Strict Scrutiny for Fundamental Rights
The concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut states the demanding tier as plainly as any source. Where a law significantly encroaches on personal liberty, the state “may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,” and the law must be “necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”22 Those phrases impose two requirements: a compelling objective, and means necessary to reach it, which courts also call narrow tailoring.23 The deferential tier asks only whether a reasonable connection exists, whereas this tier requires the government to prove both.
The presumption flips as well. Footnote four of Carolene Products would presume certain laws unconstitutional and shift the burden of justification to the government. It gave three occasions for that shift: protecting rights the Constitution provides, guarding against laws that unduly restrict participation in the political process, and protecting discrete and insular minorities disadvantaged in majoritarian government.24 In each of these, ordinary politics may fail the people a law burdens, and so the state must justify the law instead of the citizen disproving it.
Each half of the test screens out a different defect. The compelling-interest half screens out trivial purposes. The necessity half screens out laws broader than their purpose requires, because an overbroad law burdens liberty without adding benefit. The Griswold concurrence applied the necessity half. The state invoked its interest in marital fidelity, but that interest could be served by a more discriminately tailored statute. The challenged law swept unnecessarily broadly, reached far beyond the evil it targeted, and intruded on the privacy of all married couples.25
Because the state’s burden is so heavy, the choice of tier usually decides the case. It is very hard for the state to justify intruding on a fundamental right once the right is found to exist, and relatively easy to satisfy rational basis review.26 The real contest therefore moves to the threshold question of whether the asserted interest counts as fundamental. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the crucial question was whether terminally ill patients had a fundamental right to physician-assisted death. Finding that right would have required the state to satisfy strict scrutiny, but the Court’s refusal to find it meant that only rational basis review applied.27 A second threshold also matters, because strict scrutiny is not triggered by every burden on a fundamental liberty. De minimis infringements do not trigger it.28
A negative answer to any of the first three steps sends the claim back to rational basis review, and the state’s burden never arises.30 That is why those steps carry most of the weight on an exam, and why steps four and five are run on the facts only after the right has been classified.
Strict scrutiny is demanding without being automatically fatal. The right to vote is a fundamental individual right, yet it exists alongside a compelling government power to regulate elections, so the holdings go both ways. The Fourteenth Amendment requires apportionment of state legislative districts by population to secure “one-person-one-vote” equality, while election regulation that serves that compelling power can stand.31 An answer should therefore classify the right first, because that choice predicts the outcome, and then test both halves of the test on the facts instead of assuming the government loses.
Zablocki and Whalen show how much the tier changes. In Zablocki v. Redhail, a state barred remarriage by anyone who was not current on support owed from a prior marriage. The Court treated the freedom to marry as one of the fundamental family-formation liberties,32 so the law faced strict scrutiny. Making sure that children receive support is a compelling interest, so the law cleared the first half of the test. It failed the second half, because denying marriage outright is not necessary to collect support when less restrictive methods of collection exist. Whalen v. Roe went the other way. New York’s reporting requirement survived even though a lower court had found its necessity unproved, because a reasonable exercise of the police power does not have to be necessary.33 Both states pursued sensible aims, so the tier explains the difference, and only the state in Zablocki had to prove that its means were necessary.