Concept
Obergefell and the Right to Marry
Fundamental rights
Obergefell and the Right to Marry
Obergefell v. Hodges put two questions to the Court under the Fourteenth Amendment. Must a State license a marriage between two people of the same sex? And must a State recognize such a marriage when another State lawfully performed it? The Court answered yes to both. It reasoned that the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause include personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, among them the right of same-sex couples to marry and to have their marriages recognized on the same terms as opposite-sex couples. The answer completes the sequence this chapter has followed from Griswold through Lawrence. Windsor, just discussed, barred the federal government from disregarding marriages that a State had chosen to recognize, and it left open whether the Constitution requires a State to create them. Obergefell answers that question and moves the issue from federal definition to state licensing.
The Court did not start from a blank slate. It had long called the right to marry fundamental, and in Loving v. Virginia a unanimous Court described marriage as “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” when it struck down Virginia's ban on interracial marriage.1 Zablocki v. Redhail then held that a statute significantly interfering with that right cannot stand unless sufficiently important state interests support it and it is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests, which is why Wisconsin could not restrict marriage by parents with unpaid child support obligations.2 Turner v. Safley carried the right into prisons, where a lower level of scrutiny applies (a reasonable relation to a legitimate penological objective), and the marriage restriction at issue still failed.3 Pulling the other way stood Baker v. Nelson, in which the Court had earlier dismissed a challenge to a state ban on same-sex marriage.
Each of those decisions involved opposite-sex partners, and the Court conceded that its earlier cases presumed such a relationship, reflecting the assumptions of the world and time of which the Court was a part.4 The label “the fundamental right to marry” therefore does not say whether same-sex couples hold it, because the earlier opinions never had to say who belonged. The Court filled the gap by asking why the right to marry has long been protected and whether those reasons apply to same-sex couples; it concluded that four principles and traditions show they apply with equal force.5 That approach follows the reasoned judgment method taught earlier in this chapter, and it resolves the careful-description problem by describing the right as the right to marry in its comprehensive sense. The four reasons are that the choice to marry is inherent in individual autonomy, that marriage supports a two-person union unlike any other, that it safeguards children and families, and that it is a keystone of the social order.6 Each is taught separately below, followed by the way the opinion joins liberty with equality and then the holding on recognition of marriages performed in other States.
Four Justices dissented, and their objections track the method disputes taught earlier in this chapter. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the fundamental right to marry does not include a right to force a State to change its definition of marriage, that the majority repeated the error of Lochner, and that the absence of a tradition of same-sex marriage should have ended the inquiry.7 Justice Thomas objected that liberty has long meant freedom from government action and does not reach a claim to government benefits, and he rejected the idea that a clause promising due process can supply substantive rights at all.8 Justice Alito relied on Glucksberg's requirement that an unenumerated liberty be deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition, and he would have left the question to the people of each State.9 The sections below set those arguments beside the majority's reasoning, beginning with the first reason, the connection between marriage and individual autonomy.
Autonomy in Choosing Marriage
The first reason the Court gave for treating marriage as fundamental is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.10 Autonomy here means that the individual, and not the State, decides whether and whom to marry. The premise rests on the Court's earlier decisions, which located the essential attributes of the right to marry in history, tradition, and other constitutional liberties inherent in the intimate bond.11 It protects the decision for a reason that does not depend on who the couple is: if the choice is protected because it lets a person shape a life, the protection follows the choice to whoever makes it.
The premise has its roots in Loving v. Virginia, and the connection it describes between marriage and liberty is why that decision invalidated bans on interracial marriage under the Due Process Clause.12 After holding that Virginia's statutes violated equal protection, the Court added that they also deprived the Lovings of liberty without due process, because the freedom to marry is one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness and because the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race “resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”13 That sentence puts the choice with the individual and names the State as the actor who may not take it. Zablocki v. Redhail later read Loving as holding that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for “all individuals,” and those words carry much of the weight when Obergefell reaches same-sex couples.14
Zablocki shows the principle protecting an ordinary person against a state licensing rule. Wisconsin forbade a person with a minor child outside his custody, for whom a court had ordered support, to obtain a marriage license without court permission, and the court could grant permission only on proof that all support payments were current.15 The Court held that a statute significantly interfering with the right to marry cannot be upheld unless sufficiently important state interests support it and it is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests, and it found the fit too weak. The law was underinclusive because it did not stop the parent from taking on other debts, and overinclusive because remarriage might improve the parent's ability to pay support.16 The Court also gave a reason for treating the licensing decision as part of family privacy: it would be contradictory “to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”17
That reasoning explains how much of this chapter depends on the marriage choice. Meyer and Pierce protect how children are educated, Stanley and Troxel protect custody, and Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey protect the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Each of those protections presupposes a family that someone was free to form. A State that controlled entry into marriage would control the family at its source, and everything downstream would rest on a permission the State could withhold. For that reason Obergefell placed decisions about marriage beside choices about contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, as among the most intimate that an individual can make.18 Turner v. Safley carried the same choice into prison, where a lower level of scrutiny applies, and a rule allowing inmates to marry only for compelling reasons still failed.19
Obergefell then asked whether the reasons for this protection extend to same-sex couples, and the answer follows from where those reasons lie. Choices about marriage shape an individual's destiny, and through its enduring bond two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality; this is, the Court said, “true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”20 It added that there is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry, and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.21 The earlier cases had presumed opposite-sex partners, which the Court called an assumption defined by the world and time of which it is a part.22 Each reason those cases gave concerned what the decision does for the person making it, so the partner's sex played no part in the justification. In Obergefell itself, same-sex couples in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were refused marriage licenses because those States defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license such a marriage.23
One overreading would turn the premise into a general license: if marriage is protected because it is a momentous act of self-definition, then every momentous personal choice must be protected too. Washington v. Glucksberg closes that route. The decision to commit suicide with another's assistance may be as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, yet it had never enjoyed similar legal protection, and the Court held that no fundamental right followed.24 Many protected liberties sound in personal autonomy, the Court explained, but that fact “does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”25 The autonomy premise in Obergefell works inside that limit, because it explains why marriage belongs among the family decisions that Loving, Zablocki, Turner, and Griswold had already treated as protected. A claimant who invokes autonomy for a choice unconnected to marriage or the related family relationships has left the threshold question unanswered.
Autonomy over the choice to marry also leaves room for ordinary regulation, and Zablocki marks the line. A law that interferes directly and substantially with the right to marry must be supported by sufficiently important state interests and be closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.26 The qualifier exists because States license marriages, set minimum ages, and forbid marriage between close relatives, and strict scrutiny for each of those rules would put the whole body of state marriage law in doubt. Two Justices who concurred in Zablocki said as much: one observed that the Constitution permits direct and substantial restraints such as bans on marriage to a child or close relative, and the other warned that a compelling-purpose inquiry would cast doubt on restrictions such as bans on incest and bigamy.27 The Court has likewise treated a right as unviolated absent direct and substantial interference, as in the Social Security cases of Califano v. Jobst and Bowen v. Owens, where benefits ended upon marriage and the right to marry remained intact.28
A Union Like No Other
The second reason the Court gave for treating marriage as fundamental concerns what the relationship means to the people inside it. In Obergefell the principle reads as follows: the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.31 The first reason, taught in the previous section, asked who decides whether and whom to marry. This one asks why the decision carries such weight once it is made, and the answer lies in the intimate association between the partners, the close and enduring personal bond that the Constitution shields from needless state interference. The Court traced that association to Griswold, where it was central to the holding that married couples may use contraception, and to Turner v. Safley, where it was acknowledged again.32
Griswold supplied the description of what makes this union distinctive. Marriage, the Court said there, is “a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,” an association built on a way of life, a harmony in living, and a bilateral loyalty, and it is “an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”33 The opinion tied that description to a human need. Marriage answers the fear that a lonely person might call out and find no one there, and it offers companionship, understanding, and the assurance that while both partners live, someone will care for the other.34 The protected interest lives in the bond itself, so the reason for shielding it turns on the role it plays in the partners' lives. Nothing in that account refers to the sex of the partners, which is why the Court could say that the right dignifies couples who “wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other.”35
Turner shows how far the principle reaches. The Court held there that prisoners could not be denied the right to marry, because their committed relationships satisfied the basic reasons why marriage is a fundamental right.36 The couples in Turner lived under prison restrictions, and the Court still asked whether their relationships served the reasons the right exists. That method is the one Obergefell announced for the whole inquiry: a court must respect the basic reasons the right to marry has long been protected and ask whether those reasons apply to the couple before it.37 If the test looks to the character of the relationship, the identity of the partners cannot decide it.
Lawrence v. Texas supplies the next step, and the Court was careful about how far that step goes. Lawrence held that same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association, and it invalidated laws that made same-sex intimacy a criminal act.38 Obergefell then asked whether the freedom stops there and answered that it does not, since the right extends beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a criminal offense.39 In the Court's words, “[o]utlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”40 The mechanism is that Lawrence removed a penalty and left the institution closed. A couple that the criminal law leaves alone but that a State refuses to marry is still shut out of the association the Court calls sacred, at the very point where the Court says the bond matters most. The petitioners in Obergefell stood in that position, and a student who treats Lawrence as the end of the liberty has stopped one step short. The earlier discussion of Lawrence noted that the decision left open whether government must give formal recognition to such relationships, and Obergefell is the decision that takes up that question.
The dissent disputed that Lawrence leads anywhere near marriage. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that, unlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and sodomy, the marriage laws involve no government intrusion: they create no crime and impose no punishment, and same-sex couples remain free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families.41 The two sides read the privacy cases differently. The dissent treats them as guarantees against intrusion, so a marriage law that punishes no one burdens nothing. The majority treats them as protecting the association itself, so being shut out of marriage burdens the liberty directly.
The dissent also raised a second challenge, aimed at the phrase “two-person.” The majority, in Chief Justice Roberts's account, randomly inserts the adjective “two” in various places, yet “offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman element may not.”42 He added that, from the standpoint of history and tradition, the leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than the leap from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around the world.43 The majority's second principle is framed around a union of two, and the Griswold passage it relies on speaks of a bilateral loyalty, which gives that framing a textual anchor. The opinion does not, however, turn that word into an argument about plural unions or decide whether a State may refuse to recognize them. The question is one the dissent raised and the majority left unaddressed, and no part of the holding answers it.
An exam answer on this principle should move in a fixed order. It states the second principle and its source in Griswold and Turner, explains that Lawrence freed intimate conduct from punishment without opening the institution, and concludes that same-sex couples hold the same right to the association as opposite-sex couples. It then flags the dissent's challenge about the two-person element and treats it as open, because saying the opinion permits plural marriage and saying it forbids plural marriage both claim more than the Court decided.
Children and Families
The third reason Obergefell gives for treating marriage as fundamental is that the right safeguards children and families, and so draws meaning from the related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.46 The first two reasons concerned the partners: one asked who decides whether and whom to marry, the other what the bond means to the people in it. This reason looks outward to the children in the household and asks what marriage does for them.
The Court traced the link to Pierce v. Society of Sisters and to Meyer, the decisions taught earlier in this chapter on parental authority over a child's schooling and upbringing.47 It also observed that its cases describe these varied rights as a unified whole, quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, which in turn quoted Meyer: “[T]he right to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”48 That sentence places marrying, establishing a home, and raising children in a single series, so the reasons that protect a parent's authority over a child's education also bear on who may enter the marriage in which a family is formed.
Marriage serves children in two ways, one tangible and one less so. Under the laws of the several States, some of marriage's protections for children and families are material.49 Marriage also confers more profound benefits: by giving recognition and legal structure to the parents' relationship, it allows children “to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives,” and it affords the permanency and stability important to children's best interests.50 The mechanism runs through the community around the household. A child learns what kind of family this is largely from how others treat it, and a marriage is a public status that the community recognizes, so it tells the child and everyone else that the household is a family. The legal structure behind that status adds predictability, because the rights and duties between the parents are set by law and are not left to be worked out case by case.
The Court treated it as common ground that same-sex couples raise children. As all parties agree, many such couples provide loving and nurturing homes, whether the children are biological or adopted, and hundreds of thousands of children are being raised by them.51 Most States allow gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and the Court called that a powerful confirmation from the law itself that same-sex couples can create loving, supportive families.52 A State that has approved an adoption has already accepted the household as a place to raise the child, so the remaining question is whether the family will receive the recognition that marriage provides.
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage therefore conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry.53 Without the recognition, stability, and predictability that marriage offers, the children of those couples suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser, and they bear the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, left through no fault of their own with a more difficult and uncertain family life.54 The Court concluded that the marriage laws at issue “harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”55 That harm carries weight in the analysis because it falls on people who had no part in their parents' choices. A rule that penalizes children for the legal status of their parents defeats the purpose for which the right is protected, which is to safeguard children and families.
The petitioners' own situations give the harm a concrete form. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, nurses in Michigan, adopted three children, but in a State that defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman they could not both serve as legal parents under the adoption rules, which left their family without full legal protections.56 The children had two parents raising them and a legal relationship with only one. The recognition, stability, and predictability that the Court listed as marriage's gifts to children are exactly what this family lacked.
The States defending their laws argued from the link between marriage and procreation, and Justice Alito's dissent objected that the majority's understanding of marriage focuses on emotional fulfillment and leaves out the traditional connection to procreation.57 The Court did not make the right turn on that connection. Its answer was that the right to marry has evolved over time and does not require procreative capacity, as the precedents protecting married couples who do not or cannot have children show.58 Two decisions already taught in this chapter fit that answer. Griswold protected a married couple's decision to avoid having children, and Turner v. Safley protected the marriages of prisoners because their committed relationships satisfied the basic reasons why marriage is a fundamental right.59 A condition tied to the capacity or commitment to bear children would take the right away from couples those cases already protect, and the third principle itself is framed around children raised in the home, whether biological or adopted, so it reaches a family without asking how the children arrived.
The third principle explains why marriage matters to children and families, and the opinion does not treat children or childbearing as a requirement of any couple's claim. An exam answer should present it as one reason the right is protected, trace it to Pierce and Meyer, use the Michigan family as the illustration of harm to children, and reject any argument that conditions the right on procreation. The fourth principle moves from the household to society as a whole.
Marriage as a Social Keystone
The fourth reason Obergefell gives for treating marriage as fundamental turns from the couple and the household to the legal order built around them. States have made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities, so the institution sits at the center of the social order.62 The Court described the arrangement as a mutual pledge. Just as a couple vows to support each other, society pledges to support the couple by offering symbolic recognition and material benefits that protect and nourish the union.63 The first three reasons concern what marriage means to the partners and to their children, and this reason concerns what the State has constructed on top of the institution. The size of that construction gives an exclusion from marriage its weight.
The list of what the State has constructed is long and mostly ordinary. The Court named taxation; inheritance and property rights; the rules of intestate succession; the spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers' compensation benefits; health insurance; and the rules on child custody, support, and visitation.64 Each entry attaches a legal consequence to a single fact, that two people are married. A spouse who may enter a hospital room, who speaks for the patient when the patient cannot, and who collects the survivor benefit after a death holds those powers because the State assigned them to the status. Federal law adds to the pile, because valid marriage under state law is a significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law, a fact Windsor had already emphasized.65
Because the States placed marriage at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order, they contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right itself.66 The reasoning has a simple structure. A freedom to enter a status matters in proportion to what the status carries. If marital status controls who may be at a bedside, who inherits without a will, and who receives a deceased spouse's benefits, then a rule that closes the status to a class of couples closes every one of those doors at once. The more the State relies on marital status, the more an exclusion from it costs, and the stronger the claim that the freedom to enter it is basic. That structure explains why the Court found no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle: the benefits attach to the marriage, whoever the spouses are.67
The Court identified two kinds of injury from the exclusion, and each has its own logic. The first is the loss of the constellation of benefits. Same-sex couples shut out of the institution are denied the whole set the States have linked to it, and they are consigned to an instability that many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable in their own lives.68 The second injury is expressive. The State makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches to it, so exclusion from the status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects, and the State demeans them when it locks them out of a central institution of the Nation's society.69 The two harms feed each other, since the message of inequality gives each material loss a meaning beyond the dollars involved. The Court concluded that the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest, and such laws impose stigma and injury of the kind the Constitution prohibits.70
The facts of Obergefell itself show the constellation at work. James Obergefell and John Arthur, who was suffering from ALS, traveled from Ohio to Maryland and married aboard a medical transport plane, and after Arthur's death Ohio refused to list Obergefell as the surviving spouse on the death certificate.71 A death certificate is the public record that fixes who the deceased's family was, so the refusal withheld one benefit tied to marital status at the point where the couple's marriage mattered most. The same exclusion that produced the refusal would have reached every other item on the Court's list, which is why the harm is described as a loss of the whole set and not of a single entitlement.
A student who reads this principle as a guarantee that marital benefits can never change has overread it. The opinion recognizes that States are in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, so the fourth reason concerns the exclusion of a class from the status and does not freeze the content of the benefits.72
Ohio's refusal to list Obergefell as the surviving spouse differs on exactly that point. The State left the status and its benefits in place for opposite-sex spouses and withheld the benefit from a surviving husband solely because the marriage was between two men.73 The first law adjusts a benefit for everyone who is married, while the second removes a class from the benefit, and only the second runs into the reasoning above. Because the harm of exclusion is both material and expressive, the Court drew on both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, a link the next section takes up.
Liberty and Equality Together
Obergefell v. Hodges rests the right of same-sex couples to marry on two clauses at once. The opinion says the right is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment and is derived as well from that Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the laws; it describes the two clauses as “connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles.”75 The four reasons taught above explain why marriage counts as a liberty. This section asks what the opinion gains by adding equality, and it begins with how the Court says the two clauses relate.
The opinion's account of that relationship makes modest claims. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each can instruct the meaning and reach of the other, and in a particular case one clause may capture the essence of the right more accurately even as the two converge on its definition.76 The clauses differ in how a claim is phrased. Under due process the question is whether the government's interference with a liberty rests on a sufficient purpose; under equal protection the question is whether the government's choice about who may exercise the liberty rests on a sufficient purpose. A law that forbids everyone to buy contraceptives therefore presents a due process problem, and a law that lets only married persons buy them presents an equal protection problem. A marriage law that closes the institution to one class of couples sits where the two overlap, because it interferes with a liberty and also decides who may exercise it.
In Loving v. Virginia the Court struck down Virginia's ban on interracial marriage under both clauses, and the order of its reasoning shows how the clauses feed each other. It first held that the statutes rested solely on racial classifications, which demand the most rigid scrutiny and could not be justified, so restricting the freedom to marry on that basis violated the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.77 It then turned to due process and reasoned that denying the fundamental freedom to marry “on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes” deprives citizens of liberty without due process of law.78 The equality holding therefore supplied the reason the deprivation of liberty was unjustified, since the only justification Virginia offered was a racial classification the Court had just condemned. Obergefell adds that the reasons marriage is fundamental came into clearer view once the hurt caused by laws barring interracial unions was fully understood.79
Zablocki v. Redhail runs the same dynamic in the opposite direction. The Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a law barring fathers who were behind on child support from marrying without judicial approval, and its equality analysis depended in central part on the holding that the law burdened a right of fundamental importance.80 The mechanism is that a classification denying a fundamental right to some people while allowing it to others receives strict scrutiny under equal protection, so the weight of the liberty sets the strength of the equality review.81 A concurring opinion in Zablocki reached the result through due process, which shows that the Justices themselves have disagreed about which clause carries a marriage claim.82
Lawrence v. Texas supplies the third decision in the pattern, and it did so for gay and lesbian rights. The Court elaborated its holding under the Due Process Clause, yet it acknowledged and sought to remedy the continuing inequality that laws criminalizing intimacy produced, and it held that the State “cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”83 Neither Loving nor Lawrence rested on a single clause. Each asked about the nature of the liberty the Constitution protects and about the meaning of equality, and the equal protection analysis in those cases was in its essence also a due process analysis.84
Applied to the marriage laws before it, the same dynamic produced a two-clause holding. The Court said the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples and also abridge central precepts of equality, because the laws are “in essence unequal”: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right.85 The liberty half and the equality half therefore rest on the same facts, the exclusion from the fundamental right and from the benefits attached to it. Against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, the denial works a grave and continuing harm and serves to “disrespect and subordinate them.”86 The Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry, and the opinion cites Zablocki and Skinner for the point.87 The Court held that couples of the same sex may not be deprived of the right to marry under either clause, overruled Baker v. Nelson, and held the challenged state laws invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.88 It did not decide whether the equal protection analysis alone would lead to the same result as the due process analysis.89 The progression from Windsor, which relied solely on equal protection, to Obergefell, which found a violation under both clauses, follows this pattern.90
The opinion does not say what the pairing adds beyond mutual illumination, but one reading stresses a difference in remedy. A ruling resting only on equality leaves a State free to restore equal treatment by withdrawing the benefit from everyone, while a ruling that recognizes a fundamental liberty requires the State to extend the right.91
The opinion never addresses a State's withdrawal of civil marriage, so the point is an inference from how the two claims are built and forms no part of the holding. The pairing leaves a second matter equally unsettled, which is the standard of review. The majority nowhere says which tier of equal protection scrutiny it applied. It also did not hold that classifications based on sexual orientation receive heightened scrutiny.92 The result does show more than ordinary rationality review, since the Court struck down the bans without a sustained discussion of the states' objectives or of the fit between those objectives and a total ban. A common reading treats the equality half as reaching strict scrutiny through the fundamental right: discrimination about access to a fundamental right is reviewed strictly under equal protection, a path limited to marriage and distinct from any holding that sexual-orientation classifications generally receive heightened scrutiny, which the Court has not issued.93
The two situations therefore come out differently. A law that bars same-sex couples from marrying burdens a fundamental right and falls on the strict side of the line. A law that disadvantages gay and lesbian persons in a setting that touches no fundamental right lands where Romer and Windsor left the question, with no announced standard.94 Several further questions follow from the pairing, and the opinion leaves them open. If a law demeans the dignity of a group, does that injury by itself trigger heightened review under equal protection? If the fundamental right already brings strict scrutiny on the equality side, what does the due process element add? And the opinion spends little time on the states' interests, although the fit between interest and means ordinarily drives equal protection review.95
Run on Virginia's ban, step one finds a classification by race, step two finds the fundamental freedom to marry, step three finds a racial group excluded from it, and step four finds both clauses violated, which is why the decision is the model for the pairing. Run on a law forbidding everyone to buy contraceptives, step one sends the analysis to due process alone, because the law singles out no group.
Recognition of Out-of-State Marriages
The licensing holding settled whether a State must issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple, and a second question remained for couples who had already married elsewhere. The Court framed it as an issue under the Fourteenth Amendment: must a State recognize a same-sex marriage that was lawfully licensed and performed in another State?98 Its answer was that there is “no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”99 Two limits sit inside that sentence. The marriage must have been lawful where it was performed, and the forbidden ground of refusal is the marriage's same-sex character, so the holding speaks to the reason a State gives for refusing. A State that points to some different reason raises a question the Court did not decide.
The Court gave this holding no separate argument, because it follows from the first. Respondents' counsel acknowledged at argument that if the Constitution requires States to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the justifications for refusing to recognize those marriages performed elsewhere are undermined.100 The concession tracks how a recognition ban works. A State that will not honor an out-of-state same-sex marriage has only one thing to point to, the spouses' sex, and that is the same ground on which it refused to license such marriages at home, so a recognition ban carries the licensing exclusion across the state line. Once the Court held that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, that ground for exclusion was gone, and the Court said it followed that no lawful basis remained for non-recognition.101 The two holdings are therefore linked, and the second depends on the first. Had the Court left each State free to keep its own definition of marriage, the justification for refusing recognition would have survived with it.
The petitioners lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, and the group included couples who sought recognition of marriages performed elsewhere and men whose partners had died.102 One couple married in Maryland, and Ohio refused to recognize the marriage when one spouse died. An Army Reserve couple who had married in New York found that Tennessee would not recognize theirs.103 In each household the marriage was valid where it was made and absent at the border. That result undercuts what marriage is for, because marital status carries hospital access, medical decisionmaking authority, and survivor rights. A status that holds in one State and lapses in the next supplies those protections only while the couple stays put, and a job transfer, a trip that ends in an emergency room, or the death of a spouse can strip them at the moment they are most needed.
A recognition problem therefore comes down to two inquiries: whether the marriage was lawful where performed, and whether the refusing State relies on its same-sex character. When both answers are yes, the refusal fails, and the source of the rule is the same Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process and equal protection that supports the licensing holding.104 A student should present the answer as a consequence of the licensing holding and state that link expressly.