Concept
Parental and Family Rights
Fundamental rights
Parental and Family Rights
Due process protects liberty in activities the Constitution recognizes, and it leaves government broad power to restrict the rest.1 The family cases explain why a parent's authority over a child's upbringing falls on the protected side of that line. The Court has summarized the personal decisions an individual may make without unjustified government interference as those “relating to marriage,” “procreation,” “contraception,” “family relationships,” and “child rearing and education,” and for the last item it cites Pierce and Meyer.2 It also holds the list to its subject. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court found that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated,” and it rejected the claim that these decisions shield every kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults from state prohibition.3 The later discussion of Lawrence reexamines that reasoning.
The method for deciding which family claims qualify comes from the history-and-tradition test. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court wrote that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family “precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,” and that “[i]t is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”4 That tradition, Moore added, is “by no means” limited to the nuclear family: the tradition of “uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”5 The Constitution therefore “prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.”6 Moore left standing the Court's earlier approval of a zoning limit on unrelated residents in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, because the East Cleveland ordinance reached inside the family itself.
The cases in this unit apply that idea to parents. Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, from the 1920s, protect a parent's authority over a child's education. Stanley v. Illinois protects an unmarried father's existing relationship with his children against a presumption of unfitness. Troxel v. Granville asks how far a court may override a fit parent's decision when a state statute lets a third party seek visitation. Michael H. v. Gerald D., taken up within the Stanley discussion, marks the limit of the strand. Each case asks which relationships and decisions the Constitution treats as the family's own, and each answers with reasons. The Court states the discipline this requires in the marriage context: in assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, it “must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected.”7 The family cases invite the same habit. Ask why the Court protected the relationship, then ask whether that reason reaches the facts at hand.
Meyer and Pierce
Meyer v. Nebraska tested a state's power to use the classroom to make English the only language of instruction. The Nebraska statute declared that “[n]o person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language other than the English language,” and it allowed other languages to be taught as languages only after a pupil had passed the eighth grade.8 The Nebraska Supreme Court sustained the statute. Its “obvious purpose,” the court reasoned, “was that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state,” and such a statute “comes reasonably within the police power of the state.”9
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, and its account of liberty is the one the family cases still repeat. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court declared, protects “the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”10 The Court then stated the test for interference with that liberty. A legislature may not interfere “under the guise of protecting the public interest” by action that is “arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect,” and the legislature's own view of what is a proper exercise of the police power “is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts.”11
The test looks at means, and the statute's means were broad. It forbade teaching any subject except in English and barred teaching any other language until the eighth grade, an achievement “not usually accomplished before the age of twelve.” Its exceptions made the target plain: Latin, Greek, and Hebrew escaped the ban, while German, French, Spanish, Italian, and “every other alien speech” fell within it. The Court concluded that the legislature had “attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.”12 The opinion also compared the scheme with Sparta, which assembled boys at seven into barracks under official guardians, and it observed that the ideas of the men of great genius who approved such measures about “the relation between individual and State” were “wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest.”13
Meyer left the state's ordinary powers intact. The Court did not question “[t]he power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English,” or the state's power to prescribe a curriculum for the institutions it supports.14
Pierce v. Society of Sisters followed two years later and applied Meyer to a different kind of law. One challenger, the Society of the Sisters, conducted primary and high schools, junior colleges, and orphanages, and it gave “[s]ystematic religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church” beside the ordinary subjects.15 The other, Hill Military Academy, was a private corporation that ran a for-profit school for boys between five and twenty-one.16 Under “the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,” the Court found it “entirely plain” that Oregon's Act of 1922 “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” The reason was that the “fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.” In the Court's words, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”17
Both challengers were corporations, and the Court conceded that a corporation cannot claim for itself the liberty the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. It allowed the suit because the corporations had business and property that the state's compulsion over their present and prospective patrons threatened with destruction.18 The corporations therefore litigated their own property interests, while the unreasonableness of the compulsion was measured against the parents' liberty. Pierce also preserved the regulatory ground Meyer had left open. No one questioned the state's power “reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”19
The first law is the reasonable regulation of all schools that Pierce preserved, and the second is the standardization of children that Pierce forbade. The line separates regulating the schools children attend from replacing the family's choice of education with the state's.
Nebraska and Oregon used the schoolroom for the same end, which was to make children alike. Nebraska controlled the language of instruction, and Oregon funneled children into a single kind of school. In each case the Court answered that those who nurture a child have the right, “coupled with the high duty,” to prepare the child for additional obligations, and that a legislature may not pursue its goals by arbitrary means. A majority that controls both the legislature and the classroom could otherwise shape every child in the state, which is why the Court treated the parent's role as a liberty against the state and not a privilege the state grants.
Meyer and Pierce predate the modern tiers of scrutiny, so they test arbitrariness. Justice Souter later called such decisions “the more durable precursors of modern substantive due process,” which reaffirmed the Court's “obligation to conduct arbitrariness review” even before the economic due process cases had been repudiated, and he named Meyer first.20 The contrast with economic liberty explains the word “durable.” Meyer's list opens with contract and occupation, and when the Court later demoted freedom of contract it ceased to be a fundamental liberty, and laws affecting it came to be treated as presumptively valid.21 The parental liberties on the same list kept their protection. Pierce took a slightly different turn from Meyer, with less emphasis on freedom of contract and more on individual autonomy.22 Later opinions repeat the pair as settled. One calls it “not the first time” the Court has said that liberty includes the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” and “to direct the upbringing and education of children,” and that these are among “the basic civil rights of man.”23 A student should therefore describe Meyer and Pierce as reasonable-relation decisions and should leave strict scrutiny language to the cases that came after them.
Stanley and Unwed Fathers
Stanley v. Illinois moves from a parent's authority over how children are raised to the protection of a bond that already exists. Illinois defined “parents” to mean “the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child,” along with adoptive parents, and the definition left out unmarried fathers.24 The state had two ways to remove non-delinquent children from their parents' homes. In a neglect proceeding it had to show that the present parent or guardian did not provide suitable care. In a dependency proceeding it needed only to show that the children had no surviving parent or guardian.25 When the mother of Stanley's children died, the statute let the state treat them as parentless and use the shorter route. The Illinois Supreme Court accepted that Stanley's own unfitness had not been established, but it held that he could be separated from his children upon proof of one fact, that he and the dead mother had not been married.26 His actual fitness as a father, the state court held, was irrelevant.27
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that, as a matter of due process, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him, and that denying him a hearing while extending it to all other parents whose custody was challenged denied him equal protection.28 The state's right and duty to protect children through a neglect proceeding was not in dispute. The dispute concerned a dependency statute that let officials circumvent neglect proceedings “on the theory that an unwed father is not a ‘parent’ whose existing relationship with his children must be considered.”29
The Court began with the private interest at stake. The interest “of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children “come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.” Stanley's interest in retaining custody was, “at the least, ... cognizable and substantial.”30 That language ranks a parent's interest well above the economic liberties that modern review treats deferentially.
The Court accepted that the interests Illinois invoked were legitimate. They were “well within the power of the State to implement,” and neglectful parents may be separated from their children.31 The defect lay in the presumption. Illinois could insist that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable parents, and Stanley himself might be one. But “all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children,” as the state readily conceded, and nothing in the record showed that Stanley had been a neglectful father.32 The Court found a model in Carrington v. Rash. Texas had a powerful interest in restricting its electorate to bona fide residents, and most servicemen stationed there did not intend to stay. The Court nonetheless refused to tolerate a blanket exclusion of all servicemen when some were clearly bona fide residents and “more precise tests” were available to tell the groups apart.33 Bell v. Burson, which required a hearing on fault before a state could suspend a license on the ground of fault, is of the same kind. In each case the state used a rule about a class where its own scheme made an individual fact decisive.
Illinois defended the presumption on grounds of convenience, and the Court rejected that defense. Illinois “insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove,” and under the Due Process Clause “that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.” The equal protection holding followed. Once all Illinois parents were entitled to a hearing on fitness before removal of their children, withholding the hearing from Stanley and those like him was “inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.”34 A presumption is right on average and wrong in particular cases, and when the stake is the family, the cost of each wrong case falls on a father and his children while the state saves only effort.
The doctrine that grew from this line has two layers. Parents hold a liberty interest in the custody of their children, so procedural due process requires notice and a hearing, and clear and convincing evidence of a need to terminate custody, before parental rights are permanently ended. Because the right to custody is treated as fundamental, substantive due process requires the government to prove that terminating custody is necessary to a compelling purpose, such as preventing abuse or neglect of the child.35
Stanley grants a hearing and nothing more. It hands an unwed father no right to custody. The remedy is a hearing at which his fitness is decided on the same footing as any other parent's, and the Court left intact the state's power to separate neglectful parents from their children. The dissent shows the view the Court rejected. It was “unable to construe the Equal Protection Clause as requiring Illinois to tailor its statutory definition of ‘parents’ so meticulously as to include such unusual unwed fathers,” while excluding the unwed and generally unidentified biological fathers who in no way share Stanley's professed desires.36 The majority's answer was that a generalization about a class cannot stand in for proof about this father.
Because the protection attaches to a relationship that exists, a biological tie alone carries much less. In Lehr v. Robertson, a putative biological father who had never established an actual relationship with his child had no constitutional right to notice of the child's adoption by the man who had married the mother. A parent's liberty interests, the Court said, “do not spring fullblown from the biological connection between parent and child” but “require relationships more enduring.”37 Quilloin v. Walcott belongs to the same line, and Lehr v. Robertson is its clearest statement. The unmarried father who raised his children in Stanley held a protected relationship, while the fathers in these cases who never took up the burdens of parenthood held little more than biology.
A father with both biology and a relationship can still lose, and Michael H. v. Gerald D. shows how. The Court concluded there that, despite biological parenthood and an established relationship with a young child, the father's liberty interest in keeping some connection with the child did not overcome a state statutory presumption that the husband of the child's mother was the child's parent. Because state law made the husband the parent, the biological father could be denied even visitation.38 Under California law, a baby born during a marriage was presumed to be the child of the husband and wife, who alone could rebut the presumption and only under limited circumstances.39 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion contended that American tradition gave no basis for recognizing the parental rights of a biological father in that situation. It treated the parental liberty interest as a function not of “isolated factors” such as biology and intimate connection but of “the broader and apparently independent interest in family.”40 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined that opinion with the caveat that its tradition-based approach did not provide the exclusive avenue for establishing fundamental rights.41
The two decisions reconcile once you ask what stood against the father. In Stanley, the obstacle was the state's own presumption of unfitness, which the state could not use in place of proof. In Michael H., the obstacle was a presumption placing the child within the mother's marriage, and the plurality found no tradition of protecting a biological father against it. Biology and a bond were present in both cases, so the difference lies in the family structure the claim would disrupt and in the tradition behind that structure. The dispute over how specifically to define the relevant tradition, which the earlier discussion of the history-and-tradition test raised, resurfaces here and remains unsettled.
Step two carries the weight when the two decisions are compared, because a relationship that defeats a presumption of unfitness may not defeat a presumption that the child belongs to a marital family.
Troxel and Fit Parents
Troxel v. Granville asked what a judge may do when a third party invokes state law against a fit parent's decision about who sees the child. Washington's statute allowed “any person” to petition for visitation “at any time,” and it authorized a court to order visitation over a parent's objection if the judge decided that “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” A trial court used the statute to grant visitation to the Troxels, the paternal grandparents of two girls whose father had committed suicide, and the rights granted were more extensive than the girls' mother, Tommie Granville, was willing to allow. The Washington Supreme Court held the statute facially invalid because it unconstitutionally infringed the fundamental right of parents to raise their children.43
A plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to this case. It declared the law invalid because of “the combination of several factors” that made it too easy for the state to infringe Granville's “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters.”44 The statute's text shows how easy the infringement was. Any person could petition at any time, and the judge's own view of the child's best interests decided the outcome. The plurality's factors were these:
- No one alleged that Granville was unfit, and where a parent adequately cares for his or her children, “there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family.”
- The trial court was not required to give, and did not give, any deference or weight to Granville's opposition to the petition, so it ignored the “presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.”
- Granville did not seek to bar visitation entirely, so the dispute concerned how much contact the grandparents would have, and the court overrode the parent's own position with a larger award.45
The three factors fit together. The first supplies the premise, because the protection assumes a parent who adequately cares for the child. The second identifies the constitutional fault, because the judge's view of best interests prevailed with no presumption in the parent's favor. The third shows why the override was hard to defend: Granville was willing to allow some contact, yet the judge, not the parent, set the amount. A parent's choice about which adults spend time with a child is an ordinary decision of childrearing, and a right to make such decisions that survives only when a judge agrees with them leaves the parent without real authority to decide.
The plurality's narrowness matters. It decided the case before it and applied none of “the Court's basic strict scrutiny model or any of its recognized variations.”46 Justice Thomas, concurring, observed that the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter all recognized the parental right “but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review.” He would apply strict scrutiny and would hold that Washington “lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties.”47 Other privacy decisions state their tests more directly. Carey described Doe v. Bolton as striking down an accredited-hospital requirement for abortions as an unconstitutional burden on the right to choose abortion, “in the absence of proof that the requirement was substantially related to the State's interest in protecting the patient's health.”48 How much a Court should decide is itself a recurring disagreement. In Dobbs, discussed later in this chapter, Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment because the Court “need not and should not decide more than necessary.”49
The dissent explains why the holding stayed narrow. Justice Stevens accepted that this constitutional liberty carries a presumption, “albeit a rebuttable one,” that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.” He stressed that parental liberty interests “have never been seen to be without limits,” and he pointed to Lehr v. Robertson and Michael H. v. Gerald D. as proof.50
Moore protected grandparents who share a household, and Troxel protected a parent against a grandparent's petition, which may look like tension. The two decisions fit together. Moore guarded a family's freedom to arrange its own household against a state-imposed pattern, and Troxel guards a fit parent's choices about contact with the child against a judge's override.
Troxel's protection rests on the premise of a fit parent. Where “a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),” the state normally has no reason to question the parent's decisions, and the presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests carries the weight.51 A court that has found a parent does not adequately care for the child is no longer relying on that presumption, so it does not owe the parent's decision the same deference.
Who counts as a parent can itself be contested. Increasing numbers of nonmarital opposite-sex and same-sex couples have children through intercourse, adoption, or surrogacy, and one commentator describes “a rapid and extreme change in the definitions of family and parenthood.”52 Troxel presupposes a parent, so a dispute over parental status comes before any question of weight.
Step three decides cases like Troxel, because the trial court's failure to weigh the mother's decision was the fault the plurality found. Steps one and two carry the limits, since an unfit parent, a different kind of petitioner, or a contested claim to parental status can each change the answer.