Concept
Limits on the Requirement
State action
Limits on the Requirement
The state action requirement shields private conduct from most constitutional claims, but two routes lead around it. The Thirteenth Amendment reaches private persons directly, and legislation can impose constitutional-type duties on them by statute. Each route has its own source and its own limit, and the difference between the two is the subject of this section.
Legislation travels the second route because a statute is itself an exercise of governmental power. A legislature that regulates private people under a power it actually holds does not need the regulated party to be a state actor. The limit appears when Congress rests a statute on its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. That power enforces guarantees that reach only state action, so a statute aimed at wholly private conduct cannot rest on it alone. Congress may still reach private conduct through other powers, the commerce power chief among them, but each carries limits of its own.
The two routes differ in kind. A Thirteenth Amendment claim asserts a constitutional right that private defendants must honor on its own terms, while a statutory claim asserts a duty whose validity depends on the power Congress invoked. A private actor with no tie to the state escapes the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, yet it can still be liable under either route. When an exam problem describes discrimination or a deprivation by a private party, the attribution analysis of the earlier sections may end the Fourteenth Amendment claim, but a complete answer also asks whether one of these two routes is open.
The Thirteenth Amendment
A private person can violate the Thirteenth Amendment directly. It provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”1 The Amendment forbids people from being or owning slaves,2 and that wording separates it from the Fourteenth, whose second sentence begins “No State shall” and so supplies the foundation of the state action doctrine.3 The Thirteenth Amendment names no actor. The state action requirement therefore governs claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and does not govern claims under the Thirteenth.4
Most constitutional guarantees mark the line between individual liberty and government power,5 and the difference in text tracks a difference in what each provision forbids. The Fourteenth Amendment limits what a government may do to a person, so it needs a governmental wrongdoer before it applies. Slavery and involuntary servitude are conditions: one person’s control over the labor and liberty of another. An individual can impose that control without any help from a state, so a prohibition confined to state conduct would miss the wrong the Amendment names. By addressing the condition itself, the Amendment reaches the private holder directly.
The Court has said that the Thirteenth Amendment forbids compelling a person to work for another individual to repay a debt.6 A creditor who forces a debtor to labor off what is owed therefore violates the Amendment even though no state official, statute, or court takes part. None of the attribution questions from the earlier sections arises, because the Amendment binds the creditor directly.
The same text supports legislation. Because the Amendment is not confined to government, Congress may prohibit private as well as public conduct that it regards as a form of enslavement.7 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), concluded that Congress could bar housing developments from refusing to sell to persons of color. Justice Stewart wrote that a federal law that “bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property … is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.” Housing discrimination, he reasoned, was one of the badges and incidents of slavery that Congress could prohibit, and he put the point this way: “when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”8 The holding concerns the scope of congressional power. A developer’s refusal to sell is not itself the holding of a person in servitude, and Congress may reach it only because it can treat the refusal as a badge or incident of slavery.
Any remedy for the customer comes from a statute. The federal ban on race discrimination in such settings rests on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed under the commerce power, and not on a constitutional right.9 The Civil Rights Cases show what the Fourteenth Amendment route cannot do: the Court held there that federal constitutional rights do not govern individual behavior and that Congress lacks the authority to apply them to private conduct.10 The contrast with Jones lies in the source of the power invoked. A statute resting on the Fourteenth Amendment cannot reach a private actor, because that Amendment speaks to states.11 A statute resting on the Thirteenth can reach private conduct that Congress may reasonably treat as a badge or incident of slavery, because that Amendment speaks to the condition itself.
The practical consequence for an exam answer is to identify which amendment the plaintiff invokes before asking about state action. A claim under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment fails against a purely private defendant. A claim of involuntary servitude proceeds without any showing that a government stood behind the conduct, as does a statute enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment against private badges and incidents of slavery.
Congressional Legislation
A statute can bind a private actor that the Constitution does not reach, and the question for any federal statute is which power of Congress supports it. The Constitution’s liberty and equality guarantees restrict government, but a statute is itself an exercise of governmental power. The government can therefore enact laws requiring private conduct to meet the same standards the Constitution requires of the government, and both federal and state statutes do so.13 Equal protection illustrates the point: the constitutional requirement applies just to the government, yet a statute can require private conduct to meet the same standard.14 A plaintiff who sues under such a statute proceeds under its terms, and the Constitution still does not apply to the defendant.15 The cost of this route is that the protection exists only as far as the legislature chose to write it.
At the federal level, the commerce power is the leading source of authority over private conduct. Non-state actors who discriminate on the basis of race may violate federal laws passed under Article I even though their conduct violates no provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court recognized that Congress can prohibit racial discrimination in hotel accommodations that diminish interstate travel for persons of color.17 The hotel was reached because its refusals burdened interstate travel, so no one had to show that it acted for the state. The federal ban on race discrimination in inns, restaurants, and similar settings that operates today rests on the 1964 Act and the commerce power, and no constitutional right supplies it.18
Private discrimination in public accommodations met a different fate in 1875. The public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to purely private conduct, were held in the Civil Rights Cases to be beyond the scope of the Section 5 enforcement power.19 The 1964 Act succeeded because it stood on a power that does not ask whether the defendant is a state actor. The commerce power has limits of its own, but a state action requirement is not among them.
Section 5 differs because it is an enforcement power: it lets Congress enforce what the Fourteenth Amendment already guarantees, and the Amendment guarantees protection only against state action. In United States v. Morrison, the Court explained that the language and purpose of the Amendment limit the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct, and it named the foremost limit as “the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”20 Federal legislation enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments must therefore regulate only state action.21 The Court added a structural reason: these limits are necessary to prevent the Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government.22 A rule letting Congress use Section 5 to regulate private conduct directly would hand the nation a general power over the relations among private citizens, a task the traditional view assigned to the states.23
Two decisions from the generation that adopted the Amendment show the limit at work. In United States v. Harris, the Court held that a law exceeded Section 5 because it was “directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their administration by her officers.”24 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court reached a similar conclusion about the 1875 Act and said that “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment.”25 Morrison gave those decisions heavy weight. Every member of the Court that decided them had been appointed by Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur, and each had intimate knowledge of the events surrounding the Amendment’s adoption.26
Harris spoke of a law aimed exclusively at private persons, without reference to state law or state officers, and United States v. Guest shows what changes when state officials enter the picture. The parties defending the statute in Morrison relied on Guest for the proposition that the rule of the Civil Rights Cases was no longer good law. The Court in Guest had reversed the construction of an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 241 that charged private individuals with conspiring to deprive Black persons of equal access to state facilities, and it said it was dealing with “issues of statutory construction, not with issues of constitutional power.” The indictment contained an express allegation of state involvement, “active connivance by agents of the State,” and that allegation eliminated any need to decide “the threshold level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause.” Three Justices in a separate opinion said that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided, but they spoke to matters not before the Court. The Morrison Court concluded that Guest left the Civil Rights Cases and Harris undisturbed.27 How far Section 5 lets Congress go in defining and remedying violations of the Amendment by states is covered in a separate reading.
The two residents did the same physical thing at the gate. The fact that moved the answer is the manager’s agreement, which placed an official’s authority inside the exclusion and gave the statute a state-connected act to enforce against.
The second step guards against the most common exam error, which is to reason that a private defendant who is not a state actor cannot be liable for discrimination at all. Such a defendant escapes the Equal Protection Clause but can still be liable under a statute, so an answer that stops at the absence of state action misses the statutory route. The opposite error is to treat any federal statute against private discrimination as valid because Congress has acted. The power invoked decides the question, and Section 5 does not support a statute aimed at wholly private conduct.