Concept
Comparing the Landmark Cases
State action
Comparing the Landmark Cases
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority warns against reading its own result as a template. The Court wrote that “readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned,” that its conclusions were “by no means declared as universal truths on the basis of which every state leasing agreement is to be tested,” and that, given the very “largeness” of government, whether a relationship falls within the Fourteenth Amendment “can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present.”1
That warning is the best reason to read Burton beside Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. Each decision asks whether the state is responsible for the conduct of a nominally private actor, and each answers differently. The method for a new problem is to think in the broad categories of traditional public function, public-private symbiosis, and official involvement, and then to compare the facts at hand with the facts of the key modern precedents, looking for a compelling analogy one way or the other. At this stage of the analysis, there is no substitute for that comparison.2
The three decisions line up as follows.
- Burton involved a restaurant that leased space in a public building from a state parking authority. The Court held that the state had “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with its tenant that it had to be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which therefore could not be called “purely private.” The authority could have required the tenant, in the lease, to meet its Fourteenth Amendment responsibilities.3 The state also stood to profit from the restaurant's discrimination.4
- Jackson involved a privately owned utility that ended a customer's service under a practice it had initiated and a state commission had approved without ordering. The Court found no state action: the commission had not put its own weight behind the practice, and supplying utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.5
- Edmonson involved peremptory challenges exercised by private litigants. The Court found state action because, were it not for peremptory challenges, the entire process of determining who serves on the jury would plainly be state action, and delegating part of that power to litigants does not change its governmental character.6 The dissent described the majority as relying on “overt, significant” government participation, which it reduced to the government's providing the mechanism by which a litigant may choose to strike a juror.7
Read across, the entries show the state in three different positions relative to the specific act. In Burton, the state was a partner in the tenant's enterprise, bound to it as landlord and beneficiary. In Jackson, the state stood outside the act as a regulator that had allowed a practice the utility chose to adopt. In Edmonson, the state supplied the mechanism for the act, and the power being exercised was a governmental one that the state had delegated in part. A new problem is solved by placing the state in one of these positions, or in none of them, and by supporting that placement with facts.
Jackson drew its line against Burton on the facts. The utility was privately owned, leased none of its facilities from the state, and alone was responsible for providing power to its customers.8 It paid taxes and was extensively regulated, but so was the club in Moose Lodge, where regulation, however detailed, could not be said to foster or encourage discrimination or to make the state “in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer.”9 The commission's approval did not supply the missing link either. Where the initiative comes from the utility and not from the state, the utility's exercise of a choice that state law allows is not state action, and the commission's failure to overturn the practice amounted to no more than a determination that the utility was authorized to employ it if it so desired.10 Burton's tenant stood differently. The authority could have required its lessee to meet constitutional responsibilities, and no state may abdicate its responsibilities by ignoring them or failing to discharge them.11
The Edmonson dissent read Burton narrowly. It understood Burton to depend on the perceived symbiotic relationship between a restaurant and the state parking authority from which it leased space in a public building, and it counted the state's profit from the restaurant's discrimination among the peculiar circumstances behind that conclusion.12 On its view, the government's role in peremptory challenges was only to provide the mechanism by which a litigant could choose to strike a juror, and allowing that choice, with a judge's approval, does not turn a private decision into state action.13 The reasoning echoes Jackson, where the choice was one that state law allowed and the initiative came from the utility.14
The majority's key reason was different. It did not turn on interdependence or profit. It turned on the observation that, “[w]ere it not for peremptory challenges, there would be no question that the entire process of determining who will serve on the jury constitutes state action,” and that the “fact that the government delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the power exercised.”15
Burton and Edmonson therefore reach state action by different routes. Burton looks at the relationship between the state and the private party and asks whether the state has become a joint participant. Edmonson looks at the power being exercised and holds that a delegation of governmental power leaves the power governmental. Jackson fits neither route: the utility acted on its own initiative under a choice that state law allowed, in a field where supplying the service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.16
The fourth step does most of the work. Students often list every tie between the state and the defendant and conclude from the length of the list that the state is involved. Jackson shows why that fails: the utility paid taxes, was extensively regulated, and acted under a practice the commission approved, yet none of those ties reached the termination itself.23 A better answer finds the one tie that connects the state to the specific act, names the landmark case it resembles, and says what the facts lack that the landmark case had.
That gap matters because the Edmonson dissent counted the state's profit from the discrimination among the peculiar circumstances behind Burton.24 Change one fact, so that the cafe sits in a privately owned building and its only tie to the state is a health department permit, and the case takes on the profile of Jackson. Regulation of that kind, like the detailed regulation of the club in Moose Lodge, does not foster discrimination or make the state a partner or joint venturer, so the refusal remains the cafe's own.25