365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)
The Wilmington Parking Authority, a public body corporate and politic created by the City of Wilmington pursuant to 22 Del. Code §§ 501-515, undertook its first project by acquiring four parcels of land on Ninth Street in downtown Wilmington through negotiated purchases financed in part by city donations and loans from Equitable Security Trust Company.1
After determining that parking revenues alone would not support bond financing, the Authority invited bids and in April 1957 executed a twenty-year lease, renewable for ten years, with Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc. for operation of a restaurant, dining room, banquet hall, cocktail lounge, and bar at an annual rent of $28,700.2 The lease contained no nondiscrimination requirement, and Eagle expended approximately $220,000 on improvements to the space whose main public entrance opened onto Ninth Street rather than the parking area.3
In August 1958 appellant William Burton, a Negro, parked his automobile in the Authority's building and was refused service at the Eagle Coffee Shoppe solely because of his race.4 Burton thereafter commenced an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Delaware Court of Chancery against the Authority and Eagle, alleging that the refusal abridged his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
On cross-motions for summary judgment supported by the pleadings and affidavits, the Chancellor ruled for Burton.6 The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, concluding that Eagle operated in a purely private capacity under its lease and that, as a restaurant rather than an inn within the meaning of 24 Del. Code § 1501, it was not obligated to serve all persons seeking service.7 Burton appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal but granted certiorari.8
Whether the racially discriminatory refusal of service by a privately operated restaurant leasing space inside a publicly owned and financed parking facility constitutes state action subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?9
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action that denies equal protection of the laws.10 Private conduct, however discriminatory, is not subject to the Amendment unless the state has become involved to a significant extent.11 Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.12 The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private actor that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.13
Yes. The land and building were publicly owned by the Authority, an agency of the State exercising public powers.14
The commercially leased areas formed an integral and indispensable part of the State's plan to operate the project as a self-sustaining unit.15 The peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility conferred mutual benefits on each.16
By its inaction the Authority made itself a party to the refusal of service and placed its power, property, and prestige behind the discrimination.17 The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which cannot be considered purely private.18
The exclusion of appellant under the circumstances shown to be present here was discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Whether the Supreme Court of Delaware's judgment rests upon a construction of a state statute so as to confer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)?20
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from state court judgments that necessarily rest upon a determination of the constitutional validity of a state statute.21 The judgment of Delaware's court does not depend for its ultimate support upon a determination of the constitutional validity of a state statute.22
No. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that Eagle's racially discriminatory action was exercised in a purely private capacity and was therefore beyond the prohibitive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
The judgment did not depend for its ultimate support upon a determination of the constitutional validity of 24 Del. Code § 1501.24
The appeal is dismissed, but the papers are treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari which is granted.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart agreed that the judgment must be reversed but reached that conclusion by a more direct route than the Court.26 In upholding Eagle's right to deny service to the appellant solely because of his race, the Supreme Court of Delaware relied upon a statute of that State.27 The statute permits the proprietor of a restaurant to refuse to serve persons whose reception or entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his customers.28 There is no suggestion in the record that the appellant as an individual was such a person.29
The highest court of Delaware has thus construed this legislative enactment as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclusively on color.30 Such a law seems to Justice Stewart clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 He therefore concluded that the appeal was properly taken and that the statute, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, is constitutionally invalid.32
Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Harlan's proposal to remand the case to the Delaware Supreme Court for clarification on the construction of the statute.33 He did not find the clarity that Justice Stewart found in the views expressed by the Supreme Court of Delaware regarding 24 Del. Code § 1501.34
If forced to construe that court's construction, Justice Frankfurter would reach the opposite conclusion from Justice Stewart.35 Since the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Delaware lends itself to three views, none of which is patently irrational, Justice Frankfurter believed the time would be well spent to ascertain the exact basis before deciding the constitutional questions.36 This approach would avoid deciding serious questions of constitutional law any earlier than due regard for the appropriate process of constitutional adjudication requires.37
Joined by Justice Whittaker
Justice Harlan dissented. He argued that the case should be sent back to the state court for clarification as to the precise basis of its decision.38 This clarification should occur before passing on the far-reaching constitutional questions that may be lurking in the judgment.39 If the Delaware court construed the state statute as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclusively on color, he would agree that the enactment is offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment.40 If on the other hand the state court meant no more than that under the statute, as at common law, Eagle was free to serve only those whom it pleased, then the question of state action would be presented in full-blown form.41
Sound principles of constitutional adjudication dictate that the exact basis of the state judgment should first be ascertained before reaching issues of such broad constitutional significance.42