Concept
The Public Function Doctrine
State action
The Public Function Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment is “prohibitory upon the states”: it reaches “state action of a particular character,” and “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”1 A plaintiff who sues a private defendant must therefore explain why the defendant’s conduct should count as the state’s. The public function doctrine supplies one explanation. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a private person’s actions constitute state action if the person performs functions traditionally reserved to the state.2 Put another way, if private persons engage in activities that are traditionally and exclusively reserved to the government, the Constitution applies to them.3 Courts also call the doctrine the governmental function or sovereign function doctrine, and one formulation states it directly: when a state permits a private party to exercise what is clearly governmental power, the party’s activity is state action.4
The rationale is evasion. A state that hands a governmental task to a private party has not surrendered the authority; it has changed who exercises it. Treating the delegate as the state keeps constitutional guarantees from disappearing through a change of label, and it places responsibility where the state’s power is actually in use.
The doctrine is broad in theory and narrow in practice. In theory, any private party that steps into the state’s shoes should carry the state’s constitutional duties. In practice, the function must have been traditionally the state’s and exclusively the state’s, and that word does the limiting work. Government sometimes runs hospitals, supplies utilities, operates schools, and provides foster care, but private organizations have often initiated and performed those services too, so they are not the state’s exclusive prerogative.5 If a function qualified merely because government also performed it, the test would sweep most private enterprise into the Constitution and defeat the purpose of the state action requirement, which is to preserve an area of private freedom.
This unit first collects the settings in which courts have found a private actor performing a public function, then examines the exclusivity limit that Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. placed on the doctrine. On an exam, the question under this route is whether the defendant was doing something government has historically and exclusively done. Heavy regulation, monopoly, and funding do not answer that question; they belong to the separate route of state involvement in private conduct, taken up in the next part.
Functions That Qualify
The doctrine took shape in Marsh v. Alabama, which arose in a company-owned town and involved a Jehovah’s Witness who wished to distribute literature in Chickasaw.6 Despite the private ownership and private governance of the town, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments applied in full.7 The reasoning turned on how completely the company had replaced the municipality. By monopolizing all governmental functions within the town, the company took on the character of a governmental actor and became subject to the same First Amendment restraints that bind state and local governments.8 The Court later summarized the case in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: “the owner of the company town was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State.”9 If title to the streets could carry a town beyond the Constitution, the guarantees would depend on who owned the ground. The Court looked past title to who was exercising the governing power.
Jackson later cabined the public function analysis that Marsh launched, and the Court has applied the doctrine relatively strictly since.10 Shopping centers show the contrast. A mall may resemble a downtown shopping district, yet in Hudgens v. NLRB the Court held that the mall owner was not a state actor for purposes of a First Amendment claim of access. A mall owner, like the owner of a private school, exercises authority over a limited private domain, and that authority is far narrower than the quasi-governmental authority of the company-owned town in Marsh.11
Elections form a second family of qualifying functions. In Smith v. Allwright, the Court concluded that the Democratic Party, in conducting its primary, was performing a governmental function as an agent of the state, so the racial discrimination it practiced was state action.12 The reasoning follows from what a primary does. Whoever controls the stage at which the field of candidates is narrowed controls who can win in the end, and a state that routed that step through a private body and then disclaimed the body’s exclusions would run a discriminatory election without owning the discrimination.
The doctrine does not depend on the label the private body wears. In Terry v. Adams, the Jaybirds held a privately conducted “pre-primary” that, as a practical matter, controlled access to the state’s ballots; the candidates who won it typically ran unopposed in the Democratic primaries.13 No opinion commanded a majority, but only Justice Minton dissented. One opinion stressed the Jaybirds’ “decisive power” in the county’s electoral process and concluded that “when a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution’s safeguards into play.”14
When Jackson later listed the settings in which it had found state action in a private entity’s exercise of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, it named two election cases (Nixon v. Condon and Terry), the company town in Marsh, and a municipal park in Evans v. Newton.15
Delegated custody of prisoners is a third setting. In West v. Atkins, a privately employed doctor who provided medical care to inmates in a state prison was held to be a state actor, because the state is required to provide medical care to those it imprisons and the doctor contracted with the state to provide it.16 The duty to supply care is the state’s own, so the contractor carries out the state’s obligation and does not conduct a business of its own.
Private prisons raise the same question on a larger scale. Operating a prison is akin to conducting primary elections or governing a company-owned town, since all three are quintessential governmental operations.17 The Fifth Circuit has described the work of employees of a private correctional facility as a “fundamentally governmental function,” and in Street v. Corrections Corp. of America the Sixth Circuit held a private prison under contract with the state to be a state actor performing a public function.18 The question is not uniformly settled, because the Fourth Circuit in Holly v. Scott has been read to take a narrower view of whether operating a jail is a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the states.19 A strong answer about a private jail draws the analogy to company towns and primaries and notes that courts are divided.
The qualifying settings share one feature: each involves the sovereign’s own power, whether governing a community, selecting the officials who govern, or holding prisoners. The private actor must also exercise that power fully enough to stand in the state’s place. The owner in Marsh performed the full spectrum of municipal powers, and the party in Smith controlled the path to the ballot, while the mall owner and the private school hold only a limited private domain. A service that is merely useful or important to the public does not qualify on that ground alone, as the next subsection explains.
The Exclusivity Limit
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. confined the public function doctrine to a narrow band of governmental powers. A customer sued after a privately owned electric utility terminated her service without notice or a hearing, claiming a denial of due process. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the termination was not state action, and the court of appeals affirmed.21 The Supreme Court affirmed as well. Jackson rejected several theories of state action, and this section takes up two of them, the public function theory and the monopoly theory. The arguments built on regulation return in the next part.
On the public function theory, the Court began from the proposition that it had found state action in a private entity’s exercise of “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,” and it cited elections, a company town, and a municipal park as examples.22 Each word matters. Traditionally asks whether history shows government performing the function, and exclusively asks whether government alone has done so. The petitioner argued that because Pennsylvania law obliged the utility to furnish service, the utility performed a “public function.” The Court answered that the statute imposes the obligation to furnish service on regulated utilities and imposes no such obligation on the State, and that the Pennsylvania courts had rejected the contention that furnishing utility services is either a state function or a municipal duty.23
The answer rests on a simple mechanism. A private actor stands in the state’s shoes only when it carries out something the state itself is responsible for. If the state owes no duty to supply electricity, a utility’s choice about one customer’s account is the utility’s own business decision under rules the state set. West shows the opposite arrangement: the state owes inmates medical care, so a contractor who provides it performs the state’s own duty. In Marsh, the company governed the community in place of a municipality.
The petitioner also invited the Court to treat businesses “affected with a public interest” as state actors in all they do. The Court declined. Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, the utility, and a grocery selling a quart of milk all work in regulated businesses and supply arguably essential goods and services, and the Court did not believe that such status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State.24 The reason is that importance has no limiting edge. Almost every service a community relies on is important, so a test built on importance would pull most of the private sector under the Constitution.
Regulation does not change the result, however thorough it is. The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State, and extensive and detailed regulation, as with most public utilities, does not either.25 The Court did allow that the acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a governmentally protected monopoly may more readily be found to be state acts than the acts of an entity lacking those characteristics.26 “More readily” is not “automatically,” though. In the earlier monopoly cases there was insufficient relationship between the challenged actions and the entities’ monopoly status, and Jackson showed no greater connection.27 A monopoly describes how many private sellers a market holds, while exclusivity asks whether the state alone has performed the function. A sole seller of electricity remains a private seller, and ending one customer’s account is a decision the state did not make.
Jackson drew exactly this line. The Court remarked that if it were dealing with the exercise of some power delegated by the State that is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, the case would be quite a different one.28 The Court did not decide an eminent domain case, so the remark signals the kind of power that would qualify and does not announce a holding. It fits the settings that did qualify: the Jaybirds’ pre-primary, for instance, practically decided who would hold office, an electoral power that belongs to the state.29
Later decisions confirm that exclusivity is the controlling word. In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks (1978), the Court held that a warehouseman’s proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage, to satisfy a warehousemen’s lien under the Uniform Commercial Code, was not state action. Justice Rehnquist rejected the claim that the State had delegated a power “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State”: creditors and debtors have historically had “a far wider number of choices than has one who would be an elected public official, or a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses who wished to distribute literature in Chickasaw.”30
Government funding does not supply the missing exclusivity. In Blum v. Yaretsky, a privately owned nursing facility that received state funding did not perform a public function.31 The same reasoning governed Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, where a private school for maladjusted high school students received about 90 percent of its operating budget from the state, discharged a teacher, and was held not to be performing a public function because special education is not a traditional and exclusive state function.32 A state that pays a private school to teach has handed over money and has handed over no sovereign power.
The lottery shows the same limit from the other side. Suppose a state that has operated its own lottery for years contracts with a private company to run it, with the profits reverting to the state. Operating a lottery is not a traditional function of state government, and private entities operate similar activities through racetracks, casinos, and sweepstakes, so the company performs no public function.33 The contrast with West is the point: the state must provide medical care to those it imprisons, so the doctor who contracts to provide it becomes a state actor, while no comparable duty obliges the state to run a lottery.
The exclusivity requirement has critics. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Flagg Bros., wrote that “[w]hether termed ‘traditional,’ ‘exclusive,’ or ‘significant,’ the state power to order binding, nonconsensual resolution of a conflict between debtor and creditor is exactly the sort of power with which [due process] is concerned.”34 Some scholars have speculated that the doctrine could be rejuvenated to enable judicial supervision of social media platforms.35 Under the current approach, a state’s choice to use or regulate private providers does not by itself transfer the state’s accountability; the doctrine follows what the state has exclusively done and leaves what it has left to the market.
The usual exam error is to stop at step one and write that the defendant provides an essential service, so it is a state actor. Jackson rejected that argument, and step three is where most public function claims fail, because private actors have supplied power, schooling, nursing care, and dispute resolution alongside government. Regulation, funding, and monopoly are not worthless facts; they belong to the separate route of state involvement, where they are weighed against the challenged act.