Concept
The State Action Requirement
State action
State Action Doctrine
The State Action Requirement
The Constitution's guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection bind government and, with rare exceptions, do not bind private actors. The Fourteenth Amendment shows why. Its first section commands that "No State shall" deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, and those words are the textual foundation of the state action doctrine.1 A person claiming a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment must show that the conduct complained of can be imputed to a state actor.2 A non-state actor who discriminates by race may violate federal statutes passed under Article I, but that conduct violates no provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
The Court settled the point in the Civil Rights Cases. Reading Section 1 as "prohibitory upon the states," it declared: "It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."4 Because the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 reached purely private conduct, they fell beyond Congress's power to enforce the Amendment under § 5.5
Later decisions in very different settings repeat the principle. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, quoting Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley v. Kraemer, said that the Civil Rights Cases "embedded in our constitutional law" the rule that the Amendment reaches only action that "may fairly be said to be that of the States," and that it "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."6 United States v. Morrison called the same idea the foremost limit on Congress's enforcement power: by its very terms, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action.7 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. stated the rule for liberty and equality together. With a few exceptions, such as the Thirteenth Amendment, constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply to the actions of private entities.8 The requirement therefore operates as a threshold question whenever the defendant looks private, and a plaintiff who cannot satisfy it never reaches the merits.9
A privately owned inn that refuses a room because of the guest's race shows the rule at work. If no state law or official is involved, the owner has violated no provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, and any remedy must come from a statute rather than from the Constitution.10 The same asymmetry runs through ordinary life. Students may discriminate by race, religion, ethnicity, or gender in choosing friends and romantic partners, while the federal government may never prefer members of one race or one gender per se.11
The reason lies in how the Constitution defines liberty. Constitutional liberty and government power usually exist in a zero-sum ratio, and with few exceptions liberty under the Constitution means freedom from encroachments of governmental power.12 A private citizen who robs another takes the victim's property without any process, yet violates no constitutional guarantee, because the government did not do the taking. The wrong is a crime or a tort.13 The Constitution was a revolutionary answer to the age-old antagonism between individual liberty and government power,14 so its guarantees presuppose a governmental wrongdoer.
Despite its name, the doctrine is not confined to state governments. The Constitution applies to government at all levels, federal, state, and local, and to the actions of government officers at every level.15 Official acts such as legislation, executive orders, and court decrees always comprise state action, and counties, cities, and other local governments are part of the state.16 A statute that classifies by race therefore raises no attribution question, and the analysis moves directly to whether the classification can be justified. Attribution becomes a live issue only when the plaintiff complains about the conduct of a seemingly private actor.17
Officials who break the law remain state actors when they use the power of their office. Early on, the Court created the concept of acting "under color of law": a public official acting in an unconstitutional way still engages in governmental action if the official acts within the ostensible scope of official authority.18 In Screws v. United States, a county sheriff who beat a prisoner with the authority his office gave him acted under color of law, although state law forbade the beating.19 Without this rule, a state could disown every abuse by pointing to its own prohibition on paper, even though only the office made the abuse possible. The concept has a boundary. Government employees are treated as acting for the government unless their actions are clearly outside both their formal authority and the de facto authority their position grants them.20
The requirement carries a price. It leaves private actors free to ignore the Constitution and the limits it contains.21 The Court nonetheless defends the rule on two grounds. First, the requirement "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law," and without it a vast array of private actions could be challenged in court.22 Second, it "avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."23 A government answers for what it does or controls, and a rule charging it with every private act would assign blame where no governmental choice exists.
Because victims of private wrongs bear the cost of the rule, the doctrine cannot end with the observation that private conduct lies outside the Constitution. Courts usually find the needed connection between a state and an individual when the state has given the individual significant aid, or when it is fair to treat the individual as a partner or joint venturer with the state. A person who has been allowed to perform an essential state function is likewise subject to constitutional restraints.24 The sections that follow examine these routes to attribution one at a time.