Concept
Congress and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Authorization of otherwise invalid state action
Congressional Authorization of State Action
Congress and the Dormant Commerce Clause
A discriminatory state tax is invalid when Congress is silent and survives a Commerce Clause challenge once Congress consents. Both results come from one source: the Commerce Clause restrains the states in a way it does not restrain Congress.
Start with silence. When Congress has not legislated, the objection to a state regulation rests entirely on the negative implications of the Commerce Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, on the unexercised commerce power itself, and on the common-market, free-trade values the clause presumptively embodies.1 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors shows how that works in banking. Had Congress remained completely silent, a group of states could not set up a regional banking system by excluding bank holding companies from outside the region, and a single state acting on its own authority could not comprehensively regulate the acquisition of its local banks by out-of-state holding companies.2
That bar governs the states and no one else. The Commerce Clause is in no sense a limitation on Congress's power over interstate and foreign commerce; it is a grant to Congress of plenary and supreme authority over those subjects. Its only limit on Congress concerns what counts as commerce, including whatever sufficiently affects commerce to make regulation necessary or appropriate. The implied prohibition on discriminatory state action is a separate limitation, one that confines only the states, and the two limits do not cover the same ground.3
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin drew the consequence. In none of the variations of Commerce Clause theory has what the states may do in Congress's silence marked the full extent of Congress's power, and still less has it marked the limit on what Congress and the states may accomplish together. To hold otherwise would invert the constitutional grant into a limitation on the very power it confers.4 The Court added that it had never held such a congressional disclaimer invalid, and that in each instance it had given effect to Congress's judgment over its own earlier one.5
The explanation lies in what Congress can do for itself. Legislating alone, Congress is not restricted, except as the Constitution expressly provides, by any limitation that forbids it to discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local trade. Its plenary power lets it promote commerce and prohibit it, and that power does not run down a one-way street.6 A state acting with congressional authorization therefore exercises a power Congress could exercise itself. An opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson stated the point generally: nothing in the nature of federalism seems to prevent Congress from authorizing the states to do what Congress may validly do itself, and authorizing commerce regulations otherwise barred by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause is an example.7
The purpose of the implied bar confirms why Congress can lift it. State legislatures tend to advance in-state interest groups, particularly local manufacturers, at the expense of out-of-state interests that lack equivalent access to political influence. As the Court has put it, a burden that falls on economic interests outside the state is not likely to be relieved by the political restraints that normally check legislation harming interests within it.8 Courts guard against that risk when Congress has said nothing, and they do so provisionally. On one scholarly account, a court should presume that Congress would invalidate a state action that unreasonably interferes with national interests, a presumption rebuttable at the pleasure of Congress, while a state action that stops short of such interference prevails until Congress supersedes or nullifies it.9 When Congress consents, the presumption has been rebutted.
Congress can change the outcome in two opposite directions, and the two should not be confused. When it legislates against a state rule, the challenge rests on the exercise of the commerce power together with the preemptive effect of the federal statute under the Supremacy Clause, and the inconsistent state rule yields.10 When it legislates to permit a state rule, nothing is overridden. The Commerce Clause objection depended on the unexercised commerce power, and once Congress has exercised that power in the state's favor, the objection has nothing left to rest on.
Northeast Bancorp supplies both halves of the contrast. The Court treated it as beyond serious dispute that a regional banking scheme would fail in a silent field. But the field was not silent. Congress had exercised its commerce power in the Bank Holding Company Act and the Douglas amendment, and the Douglas amendment authorized the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes that the petitioners attacked under the Commerce Clause. When Congress so chooses, the Court held, state actions it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to attack under the Commerce Clause.11
Bar-exam stems that describe a discriminatory state measure invite an instant strike-down. Ask first whether Congress has said anything about state regulation of that industry.
Consent of this kind removes the Commerce Clause objection and nothing more, and it carries weight only where Congress has plainly authorized the state action. The sections that follow take up the limits on that consent.