Concept
Federal Taxation of States
State immunity from federal law, including the 10th Amendment
Federal Taxation of States
States enjoy a narrower shield against federal taxes than the federal government enjoys against state taxes. The constitutional structure and the desire to protect state sovereignty protect the states against direct, discriminatory federal taxes, and the protection runs no further: some nondiscriminatory federal taxes can be collected directly from the states even though a parallel state tax could not be imposed directly on the federal government.1 The word “some” carries weight. The Court has not held that every nondiscriminatory federal tax may reach a state, but a tax on the interest from state bonds, discussed below, is the settled example.
The Tenth Amendment does not change that picture. It reserves to the states, or to the people, the powers “not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.”2 The Court has not erected a Tenth Amendment barrier to federal regulation of state governments, although it has reached some of the same result by more indirect means.3 Beyond the narrow structural immunity, the states must find their protection in the national political process, not in judicially recognized areas of invulnerability. The Court has left open the possibility of extraordinary defects in that process that would warrant judicial intervention. It has not defined them, but it has suggested two illustrations: a state deprived of any right to participate in the national political process, and a state singled out in a way that leaves it politically isolated and powerless.4
The same reluctance to carve out zones of state invulnerability appears in the regulatory cases. When California argued that its operation of a railroad was a public function in its sovereign capacity, Justice Stone found it unnecessary to decide the point. He wrote that the sovereign power of the states “is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution,” and he rejected California's claim to immunity for “activities in which the States have traditionally engaged,” because the plenary power to regulate commerce has no such limitation: “The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.”5 The dissenters in Garcia objected to leaving the states to the political process. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, wrote that the states' role in our system of government “is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace,” and that letting federal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, judge the limits of their own power was inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the constitutional system.6 The tax cases follow the route the dissent rejected.
South Carolina v. Baker shows how little a state gains from the political-process exception when it cannot point to a real defect. South Carolina challenged a federal tax that reached the interest on its bonds. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found no violation, because there was no evidence that Congress had deprived the state of “any right to participate in the national political process” or had “singled out” the state in a way that rendered it “politically isolated and powerless.”7 The Court then confirmed that later cases had overruled the holding of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. that state bond interest is immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax.8 That determination came after Congress's 1986 Tax Act, and it settled that neither intergovernmental tax immunity nor Tenth Amendment considerations barred Congress from taxing the interest on municipal bonds. Neither event, however, has triggered much of a reduction in municipal borrowing.9