Concept
Federal Versus State Immunity
Federal immunity from state law
Federal Versus State Immunity
McCulloch v. Maryland invites a tempting inference: if a state cannot tax a federal bank, the national government must be equally unable to tax a state. The Court protected the bank because Congress had chosen it, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as an appropriate means of carrying its enumerated powers into execution. Modern doctrine is nearly, but not quite, symmetrical. In South Carolina v. Baker, Justice Brennan stated the federal rule first: "[T]he states can never tax the United States directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with whom it deals." He then named the point where the two immunities part: "[t]he rule with respect to state tax immunity is essentially the same, except that at least some nondiscriminatory federal taxes can be collected directly from the States even though a parallel state tax could not be collected directly against the Federal Government."1 That exception organizes the rest of this section.
The two immunities differ in strength because they rest on different foundations. Federal immunity arises from the Supremacy Clause and is supported by theories of the role of a national government, while state immunity stems from the constitutional structure and the desire to protect state sovereignty.2 A state that burdens a federal instrument runs into a textual rule of priority, because the Supremacy Clause ranks federal law above state law. Nothing in the Constitution ranks state law above federal law, so a state resisting Congress must argue from the structure of a union that preserves its sovereignty. That argument gives courts a concept for sorting valid from invalid exercises of congressional power, but it supplies no automatic rule to apply whenever Congress acts.3
Representation explains why the weaker argument is enough for the states. As the McCulloch discussion showed, a state legislature that taxes a federal instrument answers only to its own voters, and no body in it speaks for the nation. Congress, by contrast, includes senators and representatives from every state, so the states can defend themselves in the process that produces federal measures. The Court's caution fits that picture. It has left open only the possibility of extraordinary defects in the political process, such as a state being deprived of any right to participate in the national political process or being singled out so that it is politically isolated and powerless, and it has not defined those defects.4
Taxation shows the asymmetry most clearly. Take the state-to-federal direction first: the states can never tax the United States directly, though they can tax private parties that deal with it, so long as the tax does not discriminate, even when the financial burden falls on the United States.5 Courts have also applied governmental immunity to invalidate a state tax on liquor sold to federal military installations.6 Now reverse the direction. The states are protected against direct, discriminatory federal taxes, yet some nondiscriminatory federal taxes can be collected directly from them.7 The Court has held that neither intergovernmental tax immunity nor the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from taxing the interest on municipal bonds, and neither that ruling nor the 1986 Tax Act that preceded it caused much of a reduction in municipal borrowing.8 On both sides of the line, Congress holds the controls: it can tax the states, it can consent to state taxation of the federal government, and it can explicitly designate which federal functions may or may not be subjected to state taxation.9
An answer that treats the two immunities as mirror images mispredicts the federal tax on the states by assuming the state's shield is as wide as the federal one. An answer that says the states have no protection overstates in the other direction. State sovereignty remains a viable concept that marks valid from invalid exercises of Congress's power, and the Tenth Amendment leaves the states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty. Congress therefore cannot compel a state to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, as New York v. U.S. (1992) held, because a choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is not a choice at all. The Court has not erected a general Tenth Amendment barrier to federal regulation of state governments, but it has reached some of the same result by more indirect means.12