Concept
Presentment Binds Both Branches
The presentment requirement and the president’s power to veto or to withhold action
Presentment Binds Both Branches
Article I vests the legislative powers it grants in Congress, and Article II vests the executive power in a President.1 Presentment is where the two grants meet. Under Article I, Section 7, a bill that has passed both houses goes to the President, who signs it or returns it with his objections, and it becomes law over his veto only if two thirds of each house repass it. The same route governs every order, resolution, or vote that needs the concurrence of both houses, except one on adjournment.2 The route admits no shortcuts, and it binds whoever tries one. In INS v. Chadha, one house of Congress tried to act alone. In Clinton v. City of New York, a statute tried to let the President change enacted law without either house voting on the change. The two cases are mirror images: Chadha held that Congress could not repeal or amend a delegation without both houses and the President's signature, and Clinton held that the President could not unilaterally repeal or amend a law.3 One question resolves both. Who is changing the law, and did the change pass through bicameralism and presentment?
The facts of Chadha show the question at work. The Attorney General, exercising authority Congress had delegated to him, determined that Chadha should remain in the United States. Section 244(c)(2) of the statute authorized one house to override that determination and require his deportation, and the House did so.4 The Court looked past the form of the House's act to its substance. Action is legislative when its purpose and effect is "altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons" outside the Legislative Branch.5 The House's act did exactly that, because it deprived Chadha of the right to remain and placed the Attorney General under a duty to deport him.6
The House could not defend its act as anything less than lawmaking. Neither house, nor both together, claimed that without the veto provision they could have forced the Attorney General to deport an alien he had decided to let stay; that would have required a statute requiring deportation. Nor could the veto pass as an amendment of the statute's standards or a repeal of the statute as applied to Chadha, because amendment and repeal, no less than enactment, must conform with Article I.7
Not every one-house act triggers presentment. A house that adopts a resolution appointing a special committee, takes up a bill out of order, or recesses until Wednesday morning changes no right or duty of anyone outside Congress, so such acts stay outside Section 7.8
The Constitution also names four situations in which one house acts alone with the unreviewable force of law. The House alone initiates impeachments, the Senate alone tries and convicts on them, the Senate alone approves or rejects presidential appointments, and the Senate alone ratifies treaties the President negotiates.9 The Chadha Court drew a lesson from the explicitness of these provisions. When the Framers meant to give one house special powers, they said so in unambiguous terms, and the resulting exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified, so congressional authority is not to be implied.10 A list works this way only if it is exclusive. If a house could claim solo power whenever it judged a matter important, the careful enumeration would do no work.
Clinton applied the same discipline to the President. The Line Item Veto Act sought to give him power to cancel the funding for certain limited types of provisions that had already been signed into law. An ordinary veto rejects a bill in toto, but this power reached only parts of a bill.11 The Court held the cancellations to be legislative acts that failed bicameralism and presentment, because "[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each," and repeal, like enactment, must comply with Article I.12 These are the same "finely wrought" lawmaking requirements that the Chadha Court applied to the House.13
The two devices fail together for parallel reasons. A statute authorized each one, yet a statute could not supply the steps Article I demands. Each also handed the final say to fewer actors than Article I requires: the one-house veto left out the Senate and the President, and the cancellation power left out both houses. Convenience was no defense. The Chadha Court conceded that the veto was a convenient shortcut and, on its face, an appealing compromise, but it held that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.14
Congress keeps real tools for controlling delegated power, provided it uses the constitutional route. It can always revoke or narrow authority it has granted by a later statute. When consumers complained about the seat belt interlock rule, for example, Congress amended the agency's organic act to bar such requirements.15 After Chadha, Congress turned to report-and-wait provisions and to the Congressional Review Act, under which a joint resolution disapproving a recent regulation nullifies it if the President signs.16 Each of these tools ends in a statute or a signed resolution, so each satisfies bicameralism and presentment. The cases forbid the shortcut, and they leave the policy behind it open.