Concept
The Line Item Veto Case
The presentment requirement and the president’s power to veto or to withhold action
The Line Item Veto Case
Article I, Section 7 gives the President two choices when a bill reaches him: he signs it, or he returns it with his objections to the house where it originated, and Congress can then enact it over his objections only by a two-thirds vote in each house.1 Both choices concern the bill as a whole. A President who dislikes one item in a long spending bill must therefore accept the item or put the entire bill at risk. In the Line Item Veto Act, Congress tried to give him a third choice by ordinary statute, and Clinton v. City of New York held that the Act's cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause.2
The case is hard for a reason that makes it instructive: the political branches agreed. Congress itself conferred the power, so no branch was taking authority from another. The earlier discussion of repeal, amendment, and execution supplied the governing principle, that repeal, like enactment, must follow Article I. Clinton asks whether that principle survives when Congress hands the President a shortcut. The Court said no, and its answer unfolds in three parts: what the Act authorized, why a cancellation counts as a repeal, and why Congress's authorization cannot save it.
The Line Item Veto Act
The Act, enacted in April 1996 and effective January 1, 1997, let the President “cancel in whole” three types of provisions that had been signed into law: any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, and any limited tax benefit.3 The statute never used the word “veto.” It spoke of cancellation, and it reached only a bill or joint resolution “that has been signed into law pursuant to Article I, section 7.”4
Two features of that sequence carry the rest of the case. The first is timing. It was undisputed that each provision at issue had been signed into law under Article I, Section 7 before the President canceled it, so the cancellation operated on an existing statute and not on a proposal.11 The second is scope. The two challenged cancellations prevented one section of each statute from having legal force or effect, and the remaining provisions, apart from a second canceled item in the Taxpayer Relief Act, kept the force they had when signed.12 The Court's comparison with the constitutional veto turns on these two features.
The design answered a real problem. Under Article I the President faces a single massive spending bill and one choice: sign all of it or return all of it.13 Cancellation after signing let the full bill be presented and signed while still giving the President a way to prune it. Congress kept a check of its own, because a disapproval bill could restore a canceled item by the ordinary route. The check had a catch. A disapproval bill is subject to the President's veto, so restoring an item over his objection required two thirds of each house, and the burden of assembling that supermajority fell on the supporters of the item he had canceled.14
The first challenge to the Act came before any cancellation existed. The day after the Act took effect, six Members of Congress who had voted against it sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia.15 The Supreme Court held in Raines v. Byrd that they had not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to establish Article III standing, and it remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.16 The suits that reached the merits came from parties who lost something when the President actually used the power, and the Court held that those appellees had standing and that the cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause.17
The first cancellation involved Medicaid. On August 11, 1997, the President sent identical notices to the Senate and the House canceling “one item of new direct spending,” section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and stated that the cancellation would reduce the federal budget deficit.18 He explained that the section would have let New York keep relying on impermissible provider taxes to finance its Medicaid program, and would have treated New York differently from all other States.19 The cancellation left New York dependent on a favorable ruling from the Department of Health and Human Services on its waiver request. If the department denied the waiver, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation would have to reimburse the State for some of the money the State would be returning to the federal government, and the Court found that contingent liability an immediate injury sufficient for standing.20
The second cancellation struck section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, a limited tax benefit. Snake River was negotiating to buy an Idaho potato processor when the President canceled the section, and the negotiations collapsed because Snake River could no longer offer sellers the capital-gains tax deferral. The Court found a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing.21 The parties conceded that the New York case involved an item of new direct spending and the Snake River case a limited tax benefit, that the President meticulously followed the Act's procedures, and that both provisions had been signed into law before he canceled them.22 What remained in dispute was purely constitutional.
Cancellation as Repeal
The Court held that the Act's cancellation procedures violate Article I, Section 7.24 The Constitution lets the President approve a bill or reject it whole, and no provision authorizes him to enact, amend, or repeal statutes.25 The reasoning runs in four steps, and each answers an objection to the next: a cancellation is a repeal; it differs from the constitutional return in ways that matter; the Constitution's silence forbids it; and the holding rests on that ground alone.
A cancellation works as a partial repeal. Under the Act's text, canceling a spending item or a limited tax benefit prevented the item “from having legal force or effect,” while the rest of the statute kept the force it had when signed.26 The Court therefore treated cancellations as the functional equivalent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress, and a repeal, like an enactment, must conform with Article I, as INS v. Chadha put it.27 The two cancellations show how concrete the effect was. After the President acted, section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer provided a tax benefit, and section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act no longer relieved New York of its contingent liability.28
The Government replied that a canceled item keeps a “real, legal budgetary effect” under the Act's lock-box procedure. The Court held that this continuing effect does not change the fact that the cancellations made the items entirely inoperative as to the appellees. Changes of that kind do not lose their character because the canceled provision retains some financial effect on the Government, and canceling one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a partial repeal even if part of the section is not canceled.29
The Court next compared a cancellation with the one presidential act the text does recognize, the return of a bill, and found two differences. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part.30 Both differences follow from the clause, which requires presentment “before it become a Law” and speaks of the Bill as a whole.31 A President who returns a bill acts on a proposal, and Congress can still pass the same text by two-thirds votes.32 A President who cancels acts on a statute already in force and chooses which of its provisions keep their force, so the text that governs the public is no longer the text both houses voted on and he signed. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 became Public Law 105-33 only after three steps that the Constitution explicitly requires: a bill with its exact text won a majority in the House, the Senate approved precisely the same text, and the President signed it. Omitting one paragraph at any of those stages would have meant the law was not validly enacted. A valid Line Item Veto Act would have let the President create a different law, one whose text neither house voted on and no one presented to him for signature.33
The return has a cost. Because it covers the whole bill, an objection to one item puts every other provision at risk. The Act tried to remove that trade-off, and the Constitution leaves it in place.
The separate-bill route shows what the holding leaves open: choosing among items remains possible whenever it travels through the procedure Article I prescribes. What the Act supplied was a way around that procedure for a single omnibus text.
The third step addresses what the Constitution leaves unsaid. Article I and Article II assign the President duties that relate directly to lawmaking, but neither addresses unilateral presidential action that repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.34 The Court read that silence as equivalent to an express prohibition.35 Article I's enactment procedures were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself, and the power to enact statutes may only “be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”36 The text names an actor for each stage of enactment (each house, the President, and a two-thirds majority to override his return), and a presidential power to rewrite enacted text corresponds to none of them. The Court also found support in the understanding of the first President, who read the Presentment Clause as requiring him either to “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.”37 What the cancellations produced instead were truncated versions of two bills that passed both houses, not the product of the finely wrought procedure the Framers designed.38
The fourth step fixes how far the holding reaches. Because the cancellation provisions violate Article I, Section 7, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the district court's alternative holding that the Act impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches, and it described its decision as resting on the narrow ground that the Act's procedures are not authorized by the Constitution.39 An answer that labels Clinton a balance-of-powers ruling therefore attributes to the majority a ground it set aside. Because the defect is textual, so is the remedy: if there is to be a new procedure in which the President plays a different role in determining the final text of what may become law, the change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures of Article V.40 That remedy explains why Congress's consent cannot cure the Act, the point taken up next.
Why Authorization Fails
The Government's first answer was that Congress had authorized the President's action. On that view, the President did not amend the Balanced Budget Act or the Taxpayer Relief Act; he exercised discretion that Congress had granted in those Acts, read in light of the earlier Line Item Veto Act. The Government relied primarily on Field v. Clark, an 1892 decision.42 The Court rejected the argument. The Government's second argument, that cancellation is no more than declining to spend, receives its own treatment in the next section.
Field concerned a section of the Tariff Act that let the President suspend an exemption from import duties when other countries imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” import duties, and that specified the duties to apply during a suspension. The Field Court concluded that the section had not delegated legislative power to the President.43 The analogy is easy to see: if a President can suspend a statutory exemption without making law, perhaps he can cancel a statutory item under a comparable grant without making law. The Court distinguished Field without disturbing it. Its conclusion that the tariff suspensions were not exercises of legislative power does not undermine the conclusion that cancellations under the Act are the functional equivalent of partial repeals that fail Article I, Section 7.44 The student's task is to see why the two powers differ, and the Court identified three differences.45
First, the triggers differ. The tariff suspension depended on a condition that did not exist when Congress passed the Act, the imposition of unequal and unreasonable duties by other countries, so Congress wrote a conditional rule and left the President to find whether the condition had arrived.46 A cancellation made within five days after enactment, in contrast, necessarily rested on the same conditions Congress had evaluated when it passed the statute.47 The only thing that could differ was who judged the policy. The President's stated reason for canceling section 968 shows it: he concluded that the provision “failed to target its benefits to small-and-medium size cooperatives,” a view about the merits of the policy.48
Second, the choice differs. Under the Tariff Act, once the President determined that the contingency had arisen, he had a duty to suspend.49 The Line Item Veto Act required three determinations before a cancellation, but those determinations did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel.50 A duty to act means Congress already made the decision, and the finding reports only that the triggering event occurred. Discretion over whether to cancel gives the President the last word on whether a provision survives.
Third, the policy differs. Whenever the President suspended an exemption under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy Congress had embodied in the statute. Whenever he cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax benefit, he rejects the policy judgment Congress made and relies on his own.51 The three differences reinforce one another: a later-arising fact and a duty to act leave the policy decision with Congress, while the same facts and open discretion move that decision to the President.
The Government also invoked other tariff and import statutes discussed in Field, and the Court found them unavailing for the same reasons.53 Some of those statutes authorized the President to “suspen[d] and discontinu[e]” statutory duties upon his determination that other nations had abolished discriminatory duties.54 The Court noted that many of the statutes allowing presidential discretion dealt with foreign affairs, where the President has traditionally had considerable leeway and, as Field itself observed, has a better opportunity than Congress to know conditions in foreign countries.55 It treated a different point as more important: when Congress enacted those statutes, it decided to suspend or repeal the particular provisions upon the occurrence of particular later events and left the President only to determine whether the events occurred.56 A statute that itself provides for repeal when a specified event happens has done the repealing, and the President's finding signals that the event arrived. The Line Item Veto Act, by contrast, authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures of Article I, Section 7.57
The fact that Congress intended the President to have this power is of no moment. Congress presumably anticipated that he might cancel some items in the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act, but it cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, Section 7 without amending the Constitution.58 Congress followed Article I when it passed the Line Item Veto Act itself, but the statutes the President later cut were rewritten without that procedure, and no bill carrying the rewritten text went through both houses or reached him for signature. If the branches could waive the procedure by agreement, it would bind them only when they disagreed.