Concept
Appropriations and Impoundment
Congressional limits on the executive
Appropriations and Impoundment
The President may not refuse to spend money that Congress has expressly directed be spent. The Take Care Clause requires him to carry out statutory directions about appropriations, and that duty rules out unilateral impoundment, meaning the executive's own decision to withhold appropriated funds. Casebooks usually credit this rule to Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, but the credit needs a qualification. Kendall did not decide an impoundment case. The rule is where Kendall's reasoning leads when it is applied to spending, and an answer that treats Kendall as an impoundment holding misdescribes the case.
The facts show the gap. The act at issue directed the Postmaster General to give the relators a credit on the department's books. The Court stressed that no money was required to be paid, and that none could have been drawn out of the treasury without further legislative provision if the credit overbalanced the debit standing against the relators. The Postmaster General did not have to furnish the means of paying any balance. He had only to give the credit, an official act in the same sense as an entry in a court's minutes made on the court's order.1 Kendall thus involved an officer who refused to make a ledger entry, not a President who held back money.
What carries over to spending is the Court's answer to the claim that the Take Care Clause lets the President decide whether a statute gets executed. The Court refused to sanction that claim. It would vest in the President a dispensing power that has no countenance in the Constitution, and carried to every case within it, it would clothe him "with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of justice."2 That reasoning does not depend on what the statute commands, so apply it to a statute directing that money be spent on a program. The officers who run the program owe a duty that comes from the statute. An order to withhold would excuse them from that duty, and the program would receive funds only as long as the President approved. That is the dispensing power under another name, which is why the impoundment rule follows from Kendall's logic.
Spending also fits the reasoning for a second reason. Kendall itself observed that no money could have been drawn from the treasury without further legislative provision.3 The dissent in Bowsher v. Synar, discussing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget-cutting mechanism, makes a parallel point: under ordinary appropriations, the level of funds available to the Executive Branch to carry out its duties is not within the President's discretionary control. Congress built that mechanism on precise criteria meant to keep the spending priorities in its appropriations unaltered.4 A dissent on a different question carries the force of an argument and not of a holding. It still describes the arrangement the impoundment rule protects. Congress sets the level of funds, the executive carries out the duties those funds support, and an order to withhold would let the executive change the level on its own authority.
The rule reaches only spending that Congress has actually commanded. A statute that leaves the executive real policy discretion over how much to spend, when, or on what terms leaves a genuine choice, and exercising that choice defies no statutory direction. This is the sorting question from the discussion of ministerial and political duties, applied to money. The Bowsher dissent shows the other side of the line. If a spending mechanism required the responsible officer to exercise a great deal of policymaking discretion, one might argue that Article II obliges Congress to vest that discretion in the Chief Executive or his agents. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings formula avoided the problem by minimizing policy choice.5 For any problem about withheld funds, then, the question is whether the statute fixed the spending or left a choice.
The clinic problem leaves the President nothing to direct, because Congress made the choice when it wrote the statute. The research problem leaves a choice open, and whether the President may direct how the agency makes it is the question of presidential guidance of discretion treated earlier under political duties.