Concept
The Kendall Dispute
Congressional limits on the executive
Binding the Executive by Statute
The Kendall Dispute
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes began as a billing dispute and ended as a ruling on whether an executive officer must obey a statute when he believes that only the President can direct him. The relators were private contractors who claimed pay for extra services they had performed. They asked a court to compel the Postmaster General to carry out an act of Congress, and the circuit court for the District of Columbia ordered a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding Postmaster General Amos Kendall to credit the relators with the full amount awarded to them. The case reached the Supreme Court on a writ of error from that court.1 Mandamus is a court order commanding a public officer to perform a duty that the law requires of him.
The relators needed Congress's help because the real parties to the dispute were the relators and the United States, and the United States cannot be sued, or a claim enforced against it, without its consent given through an act of Congress.2 The relators therefore presented a memorial to Congress. On July 2, 1836, Congress passed a law for their relief that authorized and directed the Solicitor of the Treasury to settle their claims for extra services, to inquire into and determine the equity of those claims, and to allow whatever amount seemed right on a full examination of the evidence under principles of equity. The same law directed the Postmaster General to credit the relators with whatever sum the Solicitor decided was due them.3
The Court read that statute as leaving the Postmaster General no room to maneuver. He had no discretion or control over the Solicitor's decisions, and the act provided no appeal or review of them. Congress was free to set the terms of the submission, and it was not for the Postmaster General to control Congress or the Solicitor in the matter.4 Congress had made the Solicitor the decision-maker, and the Postmaster General's only remaining task was to credit the account.
The Solicitor, Virgil Maxcy, took up the duty the law conferred and communicated an award of $161,563.89 to the Postmaster General.5 Congress had also spoken. A Senate committee reported that, unless some cause appeared that would set aside an award between private parties before a judicial tribunal, it could not recommend that Congress interfere with the award, "more especially, as it has been made by a high officer, selected by the government." The Senate unanimously resolved that the Postmaster General was fully warranted in paying, and ought to pay, the full amount. The Court added that the relators' right to the credit had been "ascertained and fixed by law" and that its enforcement therefore fell within judicial cognizance.6
The Postmaster General's defense gave the case its constitutional weight. He believed that only the President could direct him to pay the award, and he claimed that a judicial order enforcing the Solicitor's award under the statute would be "an infringement upon the executive department of the government." The justices would have none of it.7 If his claim were sound, an officer's compliance with an act of Congress would turn on the President's will rather than on the statute's terms. The Court answered that the proceeding did not interfere with the rights or duties of the executive and created no conflict of powers between the executive and judicial departments. The mandamus did not seek to direct or control the Postmaster General in any official duty "partaking in any respect of an executive character"; it sought to enforce "a mere ministerial act, which neither he, nor the President had any authority to deny or control."8 The sections that follow unpack what makes an act ministerial and why that label defeated his defense.
Chief Justice Taney dissented, but he framed the case in narrower terms. He asked whether Congress had conferred on the circuit court for the District of Columbia the jurisdiction and powers needed to issue the writ. "This is the only question in the case," he wrote, and he acknowledged that a majority of his brethren thought the jurisdiction had been conferred.9 That is a question about a court's statutory authority, and it does not ask whether Congress may bind an executive officer. On the dissent's own account, then, the Postmaster General's claim of executive independence was not what divided the Court.
The dispute leaves a question that the rest of this chapter answers: when Congress has spoken to an executive officer in a statute, does the statute or the President control what that officer does?