Concept
Analyzing a Removal Restriction
Removal of officers
Analyzing a Removal Restriction
A century of removal decisions, from Myers through Seila Law, reduces to a framework in which two checks apply to every executive officer before rank enters the analysis. After Free Enterprise Fund and Seila Law, the doctrine has, for now, crystallized into roughly this shape.1
The first check asks whether the restriction gives Congress a role in the removal decision itself. It comes first because it requires no weighing of the President’s needs. A restriction that gives Congress such a role is unconstitutional under Bowsher for every executive officer, whatever the officer’s rank.2 The Court has flatly rejected congressional efforts to “draw to itself,” other than through impeachment, “the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power.”3 The objection is practical. An officer whom Congress can remove “might feel a need to comply with Congress’s wishes,” so congressional participation “would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws” by giving Congress a veto over executive action.4 A statute that makes commissioners removable by impeachment or by joint resolution of Congress therefore fails on its removal provision, even when the President appoints the commissioners and the Senate confirms them in the ordinary way.5
The second check counts layers of for-cause protection. One layer is tolerable because the decision whether cause exists stays with the President or with a subordinate the President can remove at will.6 A second layer takes that decision out of the President’s chain of command. An officer removable for cause by another officer who is himself removable for cause by the President sits behind two layers, and the arrangement is likely unconstitutional under the no-multi-layer rule of Free Enterprise Fund.7 The objection is again one of accountability: the result is “a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the Board.”8 The restatement says “likely” because the Court has not foreclosed exceptions, particularly for military officials and administrative law judges.9
This framework is a simplified restatement of a doctrine the Court has revised many times, so it approximates the current law and does not reproduce any single holding. Even so, it shows that the doctrine operates much as it did in the years after Myers: congressional restrictions on presidential removal are prohibited except in narrow circumstances. The Roberts Court has steered the law back to a point not far from where the Taft Court left it nearly a century ago.10 The restatement places Morrison’s “impermissible interference” inquiry at one point only, the single-layer inferior officer, and an answer that applies it to every officer misplaces it. The next two subsections take the third check one rank at a time, beginning with principal officers.
Principal Officers
For a principal officer, the Myers principle supplies the starting point, and every protection from at-will removal is an exception to it. Humphrey’s Executor described the principle through the postmaster, “an executive officer restricted to the performance of executive functions,” who is “inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is.”11 The same decision held that the President lacks “illimitable power of removal” over officers like Federal Trade Commissioners. When Congress creates quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, it may require them to act independently of executive control, and that authority includes the power to fix their terms and to forbid their removal except for cause.12 The Court limited Myers to “purely executive officers” and reasoned that the FTC “cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive,” because it acted “in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.”13
Seila Law then read that exception narrowly. The Court described Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison as limited exceptions to the Myers principle—“one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”14 A principal officer can invoke only the first exception, because the second protects inferior officers. Two sorting questions, asked in order, decide the matter: how many people head the agency, and what does the agency do?
The function question has a rationale. Politics should normally play no role in adjudication, since a person’s rights or duties under the law should not hinge on partisan considerations, so where executive agencies adjudicate, it may be critical that those who perform these duties not serve at the whim and pleasure of the President.15 Independence can matter for agencies that make rules as well, because it prevents an excessive concentration of lawmaking power in the President.16 Beneath both points lies the observation in Humphrey’s Executor that one who holds office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.17
The head-count question matters because the President influences a principal officer through appointment as well as removal. A multimember agency leaves the appointment channel open. Terms are typically staggered, many commissioners do not serve out their terms, and a newly elected President almost always has the chance to fill key seats early in the administration.18 A single director with a fixed term, removable only for cause, leaves the President no comparable opening. The Chief Justice in Seila Law found that arrangement unorthodox, noting that lower courts, litigants, and amici had found “only a handful of isolated incidents in which Congress had provided good-cause tenure to principal officers who wield power alone rather than as members of a board or commission,” and that single-director protection raised an especially worrisome problem of democratic accountability.19
The single-head step is the most categorical. In Seila Law the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was headed by one director with a five-year term who exercised broad rulemaking, adjudicative, and enforcement power. The Court ruled that she must be accountable to the President and severed her for-cause protection from the statute.20 Collins v. Yellen shows how little the size of the portfolio matters. The Federal Housing Finance Agency regulates government-sponsored enterprises rather than private companies and has much more constrained powers, yet the Court called the result “a straightforward application” of Seila Law and held that its Director must also be removable without cause.21 An answer that spends its time weighing how powerful the agency is has misread step 2, because the single-head structure carries the result.
A department head is the oldest version of the same problem. Humphrey’s Executor confined Myers to purely executive officers, and a Secretary who carries out the President’s policies in an executive department is the paradigm of that category.22 A statute limiting the President’s removal of such a Secretary fails both sorting questions, since the Secretary is a single head whose work is purely executive.
A multimember body is not automatically safe. The exception as Seila Law described it covers multimember expert agencies “that do not wield substantial executive power,” and the FTC fit because it acted quasi-legislatively and quasi-judicially rather than as an arm of the executive.23 A board whose members mainly bring enforcement actions and run statutory programs sits outside that description, and the better prediction is that a limit on removing its members is invalid. That prediction is an inference from the Court’s language, so an answer should present it as one.
The multimember category is itself under pressure, and an answer should say so. Humphrey’s Executor has survived for now, but only as to multimember agencies, and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have overruled it outright in Seila Law.24 The safe course is to apply Humphrey’s Executor to a body that fits its profile and to flag the doubt about its future in a sentence.
Inferior Officers
Article II lets Congress vest the appointment of inferior officers “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,” and the removal cases treat that rank differently from the principal-officer rank.26 In Morrison v. Olson the Court treated the independent counsel as an inferior officer “with limited jurisdiction and tenure and lacking policymaking or significant administrative authority,” and it upheld a good-cause limit on the counsel’s removal.27 Seila Law later described Morrison as one of only two exceptions to the Myers principle, “one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”28 Within that exception, the question for a single layer of protection is whether the arrangement “impermissibly interferes” with the President’s executive power under Morrison.29
A single layer of protection is tolerable because the decision whether cause exists never leaves the President’s chain of command. Free Enterprise Fund said of the earlier cases that “only one level of protected tenure separated the President from an officer exercising executive power,” so it was the President, or a subordinate the President could remove at will, who decided whether the officer’s conduct merited removal under the good-cause standard.30 The independent counsel fits that description. Because the counsel could be terminated for good cause, “the Executive, through the Attorney General, retain[ed] ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities,” and the legislative history made clear that the Attorney General could remove the counsel for “misconduct.”31
Counting layers is only the first move, because a single-layer restriction must still survive Morrison’s own question. The Court conceded that the counsel’s law-enforcement functions were “executive,” and it exercised no small amount of discretion. But the counsel was an inferior officer with limited jurisdiction and tenure and no policymaking or significant administrative authority, so the Court could “not see how the President’s need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require” that the counsel be terminable at will.32 It concluded that the limit did not deprive the President of enough control “to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.”33
A second layer changes the answer for the reason Free Enterprise Fund gave. The statute there protected the Board’s members from removal except for good cause and withdrew from the President any decision on whether good cause existed, vesting that decision instead in other tenured officers, the Commissioners, none of whom was subject to the President’s direct control.34 The result was “a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the Board.”35 The counsel’s protection survived because the officer who decided cause served within the Executive, and the same protection routed through an official the President could remove only for cause would have created the second layer the Court condemned.
Congress’s own role in removal stays barred at every rank. A statute that lets Congress make or block a removal fails under Bowsher however few layers it counts, because the Court has held that Congress may not draw to itself the power to remove, or the right to participate in removal, other than through impeachment.36 The Constitution supplies that route in its own text: the President, Vice President, and all civil officers “shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”37 Two categories remain open on the layer rule itself, military officials and administrative law judges, and an answer involving either should say that the layer count does not settle the question.38