594 U.S. 220 (2021)
The shareholders claim to find implicit support for their argument in Seila Law and Bowsher, but they read far too much into those decisions. In Seila Law, after holding that the restriction on the removal of the CFPB Director was unconstitutional and severing that provision from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, we remanded the case so that the lower courts could decide whether, as the Government claimed, the Board's issuance of an investigative demand had been ratified by an Acting Director who was removable at will by the President. See 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2211. The shareholders argue that this disposition implicitly meant that the Director's action would be void unless lawfully ratified, but we said no such thing. The remand did not resolve any issue concerning ratification, including whether ratification was necessary. And in Bowsher, after holding that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutionally authorized the Comptroller General to exercise executive power, the Court simply turned to the remedy specifically prescribed by Congress. See 478 U.S. at 735, 106 S. Ct. 3181. We therefore see no reason to hold that the third amendment must be completely undone.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the shareholders have no entitlement to retrospective relief. Although an unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law (because the Constitution automatically displaces any conflicting statutory provision from the moment of the provision's enactment), it is still possible for an unconstitutional provision to inflict compensable harm. And the possibility that the unconstitutional restriction on the President's power to remove a Director of the FHFA could have such an effect cannot be ruled out. Suppose, for example, that the President had attempted to remove a Director but was prevented from doing so by a lower court decision holding that he did not have "cause" for removal. Or suppose that the President had made a public statement expressing displeasure with actions taken by a Director and had asserted that he would remove the Director if the statute did not stand in the way. In those situations, the statutory provision would clearly cause harm.
In the present case, the situation is less clear-cut, but the shareholders nevertheless claim that the unconstitutional removal provision inflicted harm. Were it not for that provision, they suggest, the President might have replaced one of the confirmed Directors who supervised the implementation of the third amendment, or a confirmed Director might have altered his behavior in a way that would have benefited the shareholders.
The federal parties dispute the possibility that the unconstitutional removal restriction caused any such harm. Reply Brief for Federal Parties 43. The parties' arguments should be resolved in the first instance by the lower courts.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I join the Court's opinion in full. I agree that the Directors were properly appointed and could lawfully exercise executive power. And I agree that, to the extent a Government action violates the Constitution, the remedy should fit the injury. But I write separately because I worry that the Court and the parties have glossed over a fundamental problem with removal-restriction cases such as these: The Government does not necessarily act unlawfully even if a removal restriction is unlawful in the abstract.
As discussed in more detail by the Court, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in 2008. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq. The FHFA is "an independent agency." 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a). Among other things, it supervises and regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two companies created by Congress to provide liquidity and stability to the mortgage market. See § 4511(b). In the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, the FHFA's Director exercised his statutory authority under § 4617(a)(1) to appoint the Agency as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As conservator, the Agency in effect had full control over the companies.
The FHFA used this control to have the companies enter into several agreements with the Treasury Department to secure financing to keep both companies afloat. Relevant here, the FHFA and Treasury signed two agreements, known as the Third Amendments, requiring the companies to pay a quarterly dividend to Treasury of nearly all their net worth minus a predetermined capital reserve.
Shareholders of the companies sued the FHFA, the Director, Treasury, and the Secretary of the Treasury. They advanced four theories about why the adoption and enforcement of the Third Amendments violated the law: (1) The FHFA's conduct exceeded its statutory authority; (2) Treasury's conduct exceeded its statutory authority; (3) Treasury's conduct was arbitrary and capricious; and (4) the FHFA's structure violated the "Separation of Powers" because the President could fire the FHFA Director only "for cause." App. 116-117; § 4512(b)(2).
The District Court rejected their claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims two and three, and the shareholders did not seek review of that decision. The Fifth Circuit reinstated the statutory claim, but today we correctly reverse that decision. Ante, at 1775-1779. The Fifth Circuit also held that the shareholders are entitled to judgment on the separation-of-powers claim. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 587 (2019).
For the shareholders to prevail, identifying some conflict between the Constitution and a statute is not enough. They must show that the challenged Government action at issue—the adoption and implementation of the Third Amendment—was, in fact, unlawful. See California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, -, 141 S. Ct. 1469, 1470-1474, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2021). Modern standing doctrine reflects this principle: To have standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury traceable to an "allegedly unlawful" action (or threatened action) and seek a remedy to redress that action. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984); accord, Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392, 108 S. Ct. 636, 98 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1988); contra, 938 F.3d at 586 (tracing injury to the removal restriction). Here, before a court can provide relief, it must conclude that either the adoption or implementation of the Third Amendment was unlawful.
The parties simply assume that the lawfulness of agency action turns on the lawfulness of the removal restriction. Our recent precedents have not clearly questioned this premise, and on this premise, the Court correctly resolves the remaining legal issues. But in the future, parties and courts should ensure not only that a provision is unlawful but also that unlawful action was taken.
This suit provides a good example. The shareholders largely neglect the issue of lawfulness to focus on remedy, but their briefing appears premised on several theories of unlawfulness. First, that the removal restriction renders all Agency actions void because the Directors serve in violation of the Constitution's structural provisions, similar to Appointments Clause cases, see Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 12) (holding that an Administrative Law Judge was unlawfully appointed), and other separation-of-powers cases, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727-736, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller General was not an executive officer and could not exercise executive power granted to him by statute). Second, that even if the Director is in the Executive Branch and the removal restriction is just unenforceable, the mere existence of the law somehow taints all of the Director's actions. Third, that "when FHFA's single Director exercises Executive Power without meaningful oversight from the President, he exercises authority that was never properly his." Brief for Collins et al. 64. Fourth, that the statutory provision that gave the Director the power to adopt and implement the Third Amendments must fall if the statutory removal restriction is unlawful. § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii).
As the Court's reasoning makes clear, however, all these theories appear to fail on the merits.
I begin with whether the FHFA Director may lawfully exercise executive authority. The shareholders suggest that the removal restriction inherently renders the Agency's actions void. In support, they point to our Appointments Clause cases and our other separation-of-powers cases. But the cases on which they rely prove quite the opposite.
Consider our separation-of-powers cases, which set out a two-part analysis to determine whether an official can lawfully exercise a statutory power at all. First, we ask in what branch (if any) an official is located. Second, we determine whether the statutory power possessed by the official belongs to that branch. In Bowsher, the Court determined that the Comptroller General of the United States was "an officer of the Legislative Branch" based on other statutes dating back to 1945 declaring him as such, the expressed views of other Comptrollers General, the fact that only Congress could remove the Comptroller General, and the structure of the office. 478 U.S. at 727-732, 106 S. Ct. 3181. In light of this legislative identity, the Court held the Comptroller General could not lawfully exercise executive powers assigned to him by statute. Id., at 732-735, 106 S. Ct. 3181.
Assuming the shareholders raise a Bowsher-type argument, I agree with the Court that the FHFA Director is an executive official who can lawfully "carry out the functions of the office." Ante, at 1787-1789, and n. 25 (discussing Bowsher). The statutory scheme creates a common type of executive officer—an individual nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who heads an agency exercising executive powers and who reports to the President. The only statutory powers assigned to the Director are executive. No party contends the office of the FHFA Director is a nonexecutive office. No statute refers to him as a nonexecutive officer. And the statutory scheme recognizes that the President can remove the officer (but only "for cause"). § 4512(b)(2). In fact, the Court concludes that the removal restriction is unconstitutional in part because the FHFA Director is an executive officer whom the President needs to be able to control. See ante, at 1783-1787.
Our cases demonstrate that the existence of a removal restriction, without more, usually does not take an otherwise executive officer outside the Executive Branch. True, statutory provisions governing who can remove an officer (and when) can provide evidence of the branch to which that officer belongs. E.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-728, and n. 5, 106 S. Ct. 3181; American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 546, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L. Ed. 242 (1828). But they generally are not dispositive. In many cases, it is obvious that the officer is executive, and it is the removal restriction—not the officer's exercise of executive powers—that is the problem. E.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492-508, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010) (holding unconstitutional tenure provisions protecting executive officer, but concluding "the existence of the Board does not violate the separation of powers"); cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 108, 176, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).
The Appointments Clause cases do not help the shareholders either. These cases also ask whether an officer can lawfully exercise the statutory power of his office at all in light of the rule that an officer must be properly appointed before he can legally act as an officer. Lucia, 585 U. S., at ___, 138 S. Ct., at 2055; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182-183, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 132 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1995). Otherwise, the official's authority to exercise the powers of the office generally is legally deficient. Id., at 179, 182-183, 115 S. Ct. 2031. Here, "[a]ll the officers who headed the FHFA during the time in question were properly appointed." Ante, at 1787. There is thus no barrier to them exercising power in the first instance.
The mere existence of an unconstitutional removal provision, too, generally does not automatically taint Government action by an official unlawfully insulated. It is true the removal restriction here is unlawful. But while the shareholders are correct that the Constitution authorizes the President to dismiss the FHFA Director for any reason, no statute can take that Presidential power away. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2219, 207 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In the context of a constitutional challenge,... if a party argues that a statute and the Constitution conflict, then courts must resolve that dispute and ... follow the higher law of the Constitution" (internal quotation marks omitted)); ante, at 1788-1789.
That the Constitution automatically trumps an inconsistent statute creates a paradox for the shareholders. Had the removal restriction not conflicted with the Constitution, the law would never have unconstitutionally insulated any Director. And while the provision does conflict with the Constitution, the Constitution has always displaced it and the President has always had the power to fire the Director for any reason. So regardless of whether the removal restriction was lawful or not, the President always had the legal power to remove the Director in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Brief for Harrison as Amicus Curiae 15-16.
Moreover, no Director has ever purported to occupy the office and exercise its powers despite a Presidential attempt at removal. No court, for example, has enjoined an attempt by the President to remove the Director. So every Director is a lawfully appointed executive officer whom the President may remove in a manner consistent with the Constitution but did not attempt to do so.
Another possible theory the shareholders seem to rely on is that a misunderstanding about the correct state of the law makes an otherwise constitutional action unconstitutional. Thus, if the President or Director misunderstood the circumstances under which the President could have removed the Director, then that creates a defect in authority. But nothing in the Constitution, history, or our case law supports this expansive view of unlawfulness. The Constitution does not transform unfamiliarity with the Vesting Clause into a legal violation when an executive officer acts with authority.
Perhaps the better understanding of this argument is the Director might have acted differently if he knew that he served at the pleasure of the President. That may be true, but it is not enough for a party to show that an official acted differently because he or another official incorrectly interpreted the Vesting Clause—the party must show that the official acted unlawfully. If the President vetoed a bill on the ground that he believed it to be unconstitutional, this Court could not undo that lawful act simply because an injured plaintiff persuasively establishes that the President was mistaken.
Sure enough, we have not held that a misunderstanding about authority results in a constitutional defect where the action was otherwise lawful. Absent such authority in a "constitutional cas[e], our watchword [should be] caution." Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U. S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020). We should be reluctant to create a new restriction on a coequal branch and enforce it through a new private right of action. Id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 742-743. Doing so places great stress upon "the Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial power." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 741.
Seila Law and Free Enterprise do not help the shareholders on the lawfulness of the Government actions question. Ante, at 1779, 1788-1789. In Seila Law, the Government in effect "conceded that [its] actions were unconstitutional" if the removal restriction was unconstitutional. 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200 (opinion of Thomas, J.). So the Court assumed "that [petitioner] `sustain[ed] injury' from an executive act that allegedly exceeds the official's authority." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2196; ante, at 1788-1789. In Free Enterprise, we considered a similar challenge to a removal restriction without questioning the plaintiffs' standing "where plaintiffs claimed injury from allegedly unlawful agency oversight." Ante, at 1779. And then we assumed that the agency lacked the authority to act lawfully if the removal restriction there were invalid.
The shareholders' briefing strongly implies one final argument: The statutory provision giving the FHFA the power to act as conservator, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii), cannot be severed from the removal restriction. Brief for Collins et al. 77-79. Thus, the argument goes, if the removal provision is unlawful, then § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii) is too and the FHFA Directors acted without statutory authority.
Assuming that the unlawfulness of one provision can cause another to be unlawful, this inquiry is just a question of statutory interpretation. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201-2202 (opinion of Thomas, J.); Lea, Situational Severability, 103 Va. L. Rev. 735, 764-776 (2017). The Recovery Act contains no inseverability clause. Contra, 4 U.S.C. § 125 (inseverability clause). Nor does it contain any fallback provision stating that § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii) should be altered if the removal clause is found unlawful. Without something in the statutory text or structure to show that § 4617(b)(2)(J)(ii)'s lawfulness rises or falls based on the removal restriction, this argument is also unconvincing.
I do not understand the parties to have sought review of these issues in this Court. So the Court correctly resolves the legal issues presented. That being said, I seriously doubt that the shareholders can demonstrate that any relevant action by an FHFA Director violated the Constitution. And, absent an unlawful act, the shareholders are not entitled to a remedy. The Fifth Circuit can certainly consider this issue on remand.
I agree with the Court on the merits and am pleased to join nearly all of its opinion. I part ways only when it comes to the question of remedy addressed in Part III-C.
As the Court observes, the only question before us concerns retrospective relief. Ante, at 1787. By the time we turn to that question, the plaintiffs have proven that the Director was without constitutional authority when he took the challenged actions implementing the Third Amendment. In response to such a showing, a court would normally set aside the Director's ultra vires actions as "contrary to constitutional right," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), subject perhaps to consideration of traditional remedial principles such as laches. See ante, at 1789, n. 26; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967). Because the Court of Appeals did not follow this course, this Court would normally vacate the judgment in this suit with instructions requiring the Court of Appeals to conform its judgment to traditional practice. Today, the Court acknowledges it has taken exactly this course in cases involving unconstitutionally appointed executive officials. Ante, at 1787-1789.
Still, the Court submits, we should treat this suit differently because the Director was unconstitutionally insulated from removal rather than unconstitutionally appointed. Ante, at 1787-1788; see also ante, at 1793 (Thomas, J., concurring). It is unclear to me why this distinction should make a difference. Either way, governmental action is taken by someone erroneously claiming the mantle of executive power—and thus taken with no authority at all. The Court points to not a single precedent in 230 years of history for the distinction it would have us draw. Nor could it. The course it pursues today defies our precedents. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986), this Court concluded that Congress had vested the Comptroller General with "the very essence" of executive power, id., at 732-733, 106 S. Ct. 3181, but that he was (impermissibly) removable only by Congress, id., at 727-728, 106 S. Ct. 3181. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 207 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020), we found Congress had assigned the CFPB Director sweeping authority over the financial sector, id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2192-2194, while insulating him "from removal by an accountable President," id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2204. In both cases that meant the officers could "not be entrusted with executive powers" from day one, Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732, 106 S. Ct. 3181, and the challenged actions were "void," Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2196.
If anything, removal restrictions may be a greater constitutional evil than appointment defects. New Presidents always inherit thousands of Executive Branch officials whom they did not select. It is the power to supervise—and, if need be, remove—subordinate officials that allows a new President to shape his administration and respond to the electoral will that propelled him to office. After all, from the moment "an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear." Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (DC 1986) (per curiam). Chief Justice Taft, who knew a little about such things, put it this way: "[W]hen the grant of the executive power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as conferred the exclusive power of removal." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926). Because the power of supervising subordinates is essential to sound constitutional administration, as between presidential hiring and firing "the unfettered ability to remove is the more important." M. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King 167 (2020).
Protecting this aspect of the separation of powers isn't just about protecting presidential authority. Ultimately, the separation of powers is designed to "secure[] the freedom of the individual." Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269 (2011); ante, at 1780-1781. That's no less true here than anywhere else. As Hamilton explained, the point of ensuring presidential supervision of the Executive Branch is to ensure "a due dependence on the people" and "a due responsibility" to them; these are key "ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense." The Federalist No. 70, p. 424 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). In the case of a removal defect, a wholly unaccountable government agent asserts the power to make decisions affecting individual lives, liberty, and property. The chain of dependence between those who govern and those who endow them with power is broken. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1989-1991, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few things could be more perilous to liberty than some "fourth branch" that does not answer even to the one executive official who is accountable to the body politic. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487, 72 S. Ct. 800, 96 L. Ed. 1081 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Instead of applying our traditional remedy for constitutional violations like these, the Court supplies a novel and feeble substitute. The Court says that, on remand in this suit, lower courts should inquire whether the President would have removed or overruled the unconstitutionally insulated official had he known he had the authority to do so. Ante, at 1788-1789. So, if lower courts find that the President would have removed or overruled the Director, then the for-cause removal provision "clearly cause[d] harm" and the Director's actions may be set aside. Ibid.
Not only is this "relief" unlike anything this Court has ever before authorized in cases like ours; it is materially identical to a remedial approach this Court previously rejected. In Bowsher, the Court directly addressed and expressly refused the dissent's insistence that it should undertake a "consideration' of the practical result of the removal provision.'" 478 U.S. at 730, 106 S. Ct. 3181. Instead of speculating about what would have happened in a different world where the officer's challenged actions were reviewable within the Executive Branch, the Court recognized that unconstitutionally insulating an officer from removal "inflicts a `here-and-now' injury" on affected parties. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2196. In this world, real people are injured by actions taken without lawful authority. "The Framers did not rest our liberties on ... minutiae" like some guessing game about what might have transpired in another timeline. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010).
Other problems attend the Court's remedial science fiction. It proceeds on an assumption that Congress would have adopted a version of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) that allowed the President to remove the Director. But that is sheer speculation. It is equally possible that—had Congress known it could not have a Director independent from presidential supervision—it would have deployed different tools to rein in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Surely, Congress possessed no shortage of options. By way of example, it could have conferred new regulatory functions on an existing (and accountable) agency like the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or it might have enacted detailed statutes to govern Fannie and Freddie's activities directly. For that matter, Congress might have opted for no additional oversight rather than subject the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to supervision by the President.
This Court possesses no authority to substitute its own judgment about which legislative solution Congress might have adopted had it considered a problem never put to it. That is not statutory interpretation; it is statutory reinvention. Indeed, while never uttering the words "severance doctrine," the Court today winds up implicitly resting its remedial enterprise upon it—severing, or removing, one part of Congress's work based on speculation about its wishes and usurping a legislative prerogative in the process. See, e.g., Arthrex, 141 S. Ct., at 1991 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1393. By once again purporting to do Congress's job, we discourage the people's representatives from taking up for themselves the task of consulting their oaths, grappling with constitutional problems, and specifying a solution in statutory text. "Congress can now simply rely on the courts to sort [it] out." Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 552, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
The Court's conjecture does not stop there. After guessing what legislative scheme Congress would have adopted in some hypothetical but-for world, the Court tasks lower courts and the parties with reconstructing how executive agents would have reacted to it. On remand, we are told, the litigants and lower courts must ponder whether the President would have removed the Director had he known he was free to do so. Ante, at 1788-1789. But how are judges and lawyers supposed to construct the counterfactual history? It is no less a speculative enterprise than guessing what Congress would have done had it known its statutory scheme was unconstitutional. It's only that the Court prefers to reserve the big hypothetical (legislative) choice for itself and leave others for lower courts to sort out.
Consider the guidance the Court offers. It says lower courts should examine clues such as whether the President made a "public statement expressing displeasure" about something the Director did, or whether the President "attempted" to remove the Director but was stymied by lower courts. Ibid. But what if the President never considered the possibility of removing the Director because he was never advised of that possibility? What if his advisers themselves never contemplated the option given statutory law? And even putting all that aside, what evidence should courts and parties consult when inquiring into the President's "displeasure"? Are they restricted to publicly available materials, even though the most probative evidence may be the most sensitive? To ascertain with any degree of confidence the President's state of mind regarding the Director, don't we need testimony from him or his closest staff?
The Court declines to tangle with any of these questions. It's hard not to wonder whether that's because it intends for this speculative enterprise to go nowhere. Rather than intrude on often-privileged executive deliberations, the Court may calculate that the lower courts on remand in this suit will simply refuse retroactive relief. See, e.g., ante, at 1802 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part). But if this is what the Court intends, why not just admit it and put these parties out of their misery?
As strange as the Court's remand instructions are, the more important question lower courts face isn't how to resolve this suit but what to do with the next one. Today, the Court sounds the call to arms and declares a constitutional violation only to head for the hills as soon as it's faced with a request for meaningful relief. But as we have seen, the Court has in the past consistently vindicated Article II both in reasoning and in remedy. E.g., Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2211 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. ___, -, n. 5, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n. 5, 201 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2018); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182-183, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 132 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1995); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736, 106 S. Ct. 3181. These cases—involving appointment and removal defects alike—remain good law. So what are lower courts faced with future removal defect cases to make of all this? The only lesson I can divine is that the Court's opinion today is a product of its unique context—a retreat prompted by the prospect that affording a more traditional remedy here could mean unwinding or disgorging hundreds of millions of dollars that have already changed hands. Ante, at 1787-1788. The Court may blanch at authorizing such relief today, but nothing it says undoes our prior guidance authorizing more meaningful relief in other situations.
For my part, rather than carve out some suit-specific, removal-only, money-in-the-bank exception to our normal rules for Article II violations, I would take a simpler and more familiar path. Whether unconstitutionally installed or improperly unsupervised, officials cannot wield executive power except as Article II provides. Attempts to do so are void; speculation about alternate universes is neither necessary nor appropriate. In the world we inhabit, where individuals are burdened by unconstitutional executive action, they are "entitled to relief." Lucia, 585 U. S., at ___, 138 S. Ct., at 2055.
Faced with a global financial crisis, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and gave it broad powers to rescue the Nation's mortgage market. I join the Court in deciding that the FHFA wielded its authority within statutory limits. On the main constitutional question, though, I concur only in the judgment. Stare decisis compels the conclusion that the FHFA's for-cause removal provision violates the Constitution. But the majority's opinion rests on faulty theoretical premises and goes further than it needs to. I also write to address the remedial question. The majority's analysis, which I join, well explains why backwards-looking relief is not always necessary to redress a removal violation. I add only two thoughts. The broader is that the majority's remedial holding mitigates the harm of the removal doctrine applied here. The narrower is that, as I read the decision below, the Court of Appeals has already done what is needed to find that the plaintiffs are not entitled to their requested relief.
I agree with the majority that Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 207 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020), governs the constitutional question here. See ante, at 1783-1784. In Seila Law, the Court held that an "agency led by a single [d]irector and vested with significant executive power" comports with the Constitution only if the President can fire the director at will. 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200-2201. I dissented from that decision—vehemently. See id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2226 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("The text of the Constitution, the history of the country, the precedents of this Court, and the need for sound and adaptable governance—all stand against the majority's opinion"). But the "doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike"—even when that means adhering to a wrong decision. June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133, 207 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2020) (Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment). So the issue now is not whether Seila Law was correct. The question is whether that case is distinguishable from this one. And it is not. As I observed in Seila Law, the FHFA "plays a crucial role in overseeing the mortgage market, on which millions of Americans annually rely." 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2241. It thus wields "significant executive power," much as the agency in Seila Law did. And I agree with the majority that there is no other legally relevant distinction between the two. See ante, at 1785-1787.
For two reasons, however, I do not join the majority's discussion of the constitutional issue. First is the majority's political theory. Throughout the relevant part of its opinion, the majority offers a contestable—and, in my view, deeply flawed—account of how our government should work. At-will removal authority, the majority intones, "is essential to subject Executive Branch actions to a degree of electoral accountability"—and so courts should grant the President that power in cases like this one. Ante, at 1784. I see the matter differently (as, I might add, did the Framers). Seila Law, 591 U. S., at -, 140 S. Ct. at 2195-2198 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The right way to ensure that government operates with "electoral accountability" is to lodge decisions about its structure with, well, "the branches accountable to the people." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2245; see id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2245 (the Constitution "instructs Congress, not this Court, to decide on agency design"). I will subscribe to decisions contrary to my view where precedent, fairly read, controls (and there is no special justification for reversal). But I will not join the majority's mistaken musings about how to create "a workable government." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2245 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
My second objection is to the majority's extension of Seila Law's holding. Again and again, Seila Law emphasized that its rule was limited to single-director agencies "wield[ing] significant executive power." 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2192 (plurality opinion); see id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201 (majority opinion); id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2211 (plurality opinion). To take Seila Law at its word is to acknowledge where it left off: If an agency did not exercise "significant executive power," the constitutionality of a removal restriction would remain an open question. Accord, post, at 1808-1809 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But today's majority careens right past that boundary line. Without even mentioning Seila Law's "significant executive power" framing, the majority announces that, actually, "the constitutionality of removal restrictions" does not "hinge[]" on "the nature and breadth of an agency's authority." Ante, at 1784, 1785. Any "agency led by a single Director," no matter how much executive power it wields, now becomes subject to the requirement of at-will removal. Ante, at 1783-1784. And the majority's broadening is gratuitous—unnecessary to resolve the dispute here. As the opinion later explains, the FHFA exercises plenty of executive authority: Indeed, it might "be considered more powerful than the CFPB." Ante, at 1784-1785. So the majority could easily have stayed within, rather than reached out beyond, the rule Seila Law created.
In thus departing from Seila Law, the majority strays from its own obligation to respect precedent. To ensure that our decisions reflect the "evenhanded" and "consistent development of legal principles," not just shifts in the Court's personnel, stare decisis demands something of Justices previously on the losing side. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991). They (meaning here, I) must fairly apply decisions with which they disagree. But fidelity to precedent also places demands on the winners. They must apply the Court's precedents—limits and all—wherever they can, rather than widen them unnecessarily at the first opportunity. Because today's majority does not conform to that command, I concur in the judgment only.
I join in full the majority's discussion of the proper remedy for the constitutional violation it finds. I too believe that our Appointments Clause precedents have little to say about remedying a removal problem. See ante, at 1787-1788; cf. Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055, 201 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2018) (requiring a new hearing before a properly appointed official). As the majority explains, the officers heading the FHFA, unlike those with invalid appointments, possessed the "authority to carry out the functions of the office." Ante, at 1788. I also agree that plaintiffs alleging a removal violation are entitled to injunctive relief—a rewinding of agency action—only when the President's inability to fire an agency head affected the complained-of decision. See ante, at 1788-1789. Only then is relief needed to restore the plaintiffs to the position they "would have occupied in the absence" of the removal problem. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280, 97 S. Ct. 2749, 53 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1977); see D. Laycock & R. Hasen, Modern American Remedies 275 (5th ed. 2019). Granting relief in any other case would, contrary to usual remedial principles, put the plaintiffs "in a better position" than if no constitutional violation had occurred. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977).
The majority's remedial holding limits the damage of the Court's removal jurisprudence. As the majority explains, its holding ensures that actions the President supports—which would have gone forward whatever his removal power—will remain in place. See ante, at 1788-1789. In refusing to rewind those presidentially favored decisions, the majority prevents theories of formal presidential control from stymying the President's real-world ability to carry out his agenda. Similarly, the majority's approach should help protect agency decisions that would never have risen to the President's notice. Consider the hundreds of thousands of decisions that the Social Security Administration (SSA) makes each year. The SSA has a single head with for-cause removal protection; so a betting person might wager that the agency's removal provision is next on the chopping block. Cf. ante, at 1787, n. 21. But given the majority's remedial analysis, I doubt the mass of SSA decisions—which would not concern the President at all—would need to be undone. That makes sense. "[P]residential control [does] not show itself in all, or even all important, regulation." Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2250 (2001). When an agency decision would not capture a President's attention, his removal authority could not make a difference—and so no injunction should issue.
My final point relates to the last sentence of the majority's remedial section. There, the Court holds that the decisive question—whether the removal provision mattered—"should be resolved in the first instance by the lower courts." Ante, at 1789. That remand follows the Court's usual practice: We are, as we often say, not a "court of first view." Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 673, 122 S. Ct. 1764, 152 L. Ed. 2d 888 (2002). But here the lower court proceedings may be brief indeed. As I read the opinion below, the Court of Appeals already considered and decided the issue remanded today. The court noted that all of the FHFA's policies were jointly "created [by] the FHFA and Treasury" and that the Secretary of the Treasury is "subject to at will removal by the President." Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 594 (CA5 2019). For that reason, the court concluded, "we need not speculate about whether appropriate presidential oversight would have stopped" the FHFA's actions. Ibid. "We know that the President, acting through the Secretary of the Treasury, could have stopped [them] but did not." Ibid.; see ibid., n. 6 (noting that the plaintiffs' "allegations show that the President had oversight of the action"). That reasoning seems sufficient to answer the question the Court kicks back, and nothing prevents the Fifth Circuit from reiterating its analysis. So I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that this litigation could speedily come to a close.
Prior to 2010, this Court had gone the greater part of a century since it last prevented Congress from protecting an Executive Branch officer from unfettered Presidential removal. Yet today, for the third time in just over a decade, the Court strikes down the tenure protections Congress provided an independent agency's leadership.
Last Term, the Court held in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 207 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020), that for-cause removal protection for the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) violated the separation of powers. Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2192. As an "independent agency led by a single Director and vested with significant executive power," the Court reasoned, the CFPB had "no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201. Seila Law expressly distinguished the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), another independent Agency headed by a single Director, on the ground that the FHFA does not possess "regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB." Id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2202. Moreover, the Court found it significant that, unlike the CFPB, the FHFA "regulates primarily Government-sponsored enterprises, not purely private actors." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2202.
Nevertheless, the Court today holds that the FHFA and CFPB are comparable after all, and that any differences between the two are irrelevant to the constitutional separation of powers. That reasoning cannot be squared with this Court's precedents, least of all last Term's Seila Law. I respectfully dissent in part from the Court's opinion and from the corresponding portions of the judgment.
Congress created the FHFA in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Recovery Act), 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq. The FHFA supervises the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the 11 Federal Home Loan Banks. These 13 Government-sponsored entities (GSEs) provide liquidity and stability to the national housing market by, among other things, purchasing mortgage loans from, and offering financing to, private lenders.
The FHFA "establish[es] standards" for the GSEs relating to risk management, internal auditing, and minimum capital requirements. § 4513b(a). If the FHFA believes a GSE may be failing to meet its requirements under the Act, the Agency may initiate administrative proceedings, § 4581, issue subpoenas, § 4517(g), and, in some circumstances, impose monetary penalties, § 4585. In the event a GSE falls into financial distress, the FHFA may appoint itself "conservator or receiver for the purpose of reorganizing, rehabilitating, or winding up" the GSE's affairs. § 4617(a)(2).
In 2008, the FHFA put both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship. In 2016, shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (petitioners) sued the FHFA, challenging the Agency's conservatorship decisions in part by arguing that the Agency's structure is unconstitutional. The FHFA is headed by a single Director, who serves a 5-year term and may be removed by the President "for cause." § 4512(b)(2). According to petitioners, the separation of powers requires the FHFA Director to be removable by the President at will.
Where Congress is silent on the question, the general rule is that the President may remove Executive Branch officers at will. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126, 47 S. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926). Throughout our Nation's history, however, Congress has identified particular officers who, because of the nature of their office, require a degree of independence from Presidential control. Those officers may be removed from their posts only for cause. Often, Congress has granted financial regulators such independence in order to bolster public confidence that financial policy is guided by long-term thinking, not short-term political expediency. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2231-2233 (Kagan, J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (discussing examples). Other times, Congress has provided tenure protection to officers who investigate other Government actors and thus might face conflicts of interest if directly controlled by the President. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (making an independent counsel removable "only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause" or disability).
In a line of decisions spanning more than half a century, this Court consistently approved of independent agencies and independent counsels within the Executive Branch. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 78 S. Ct. 1275, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1958); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 101 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1988). In recent years, however, the Court has taken an unprecedentedly active role in policing Congress' decisions about which officers should enjoy independence. See Seila Law, 591 U. S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2183; Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010). These decisions have focused almost exclusively on perceived threats to the separation of powers posed by limiting the President's removal power, while largely ignoring the Court's own encroachment on Congress' constitutional authority to structure the Executive Branch as it deems necessary.
Never before, however, has the Court forbidden simple for-cause tenure protection for an Executive Branch officer who neither exercises significant executive power nor regulates the affairs of private parties. Because the FHFA Director fits that description, this Court's precedent, separation-of-powers principles, and proper respect for Congress all support leaving in place Congress' limits on the grounds upon which the President may remove the Director.
In Seila Law, the Court held that the CFPB Director, an individual with "the authority to bring the coercive power of the state to bear on millions of private citizens and businesses," 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201, must be removable by the President at will. In so holding, the Court declined to overrule Humphrey's Executor and Morrison, which respectively upheld the independence of the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) five-member board and an independent counsel tasked with investigating Government malfeasance. See 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2206 ("[W]e do not revisit Humphrey's Executor or any other precedent today"). Instead, Seila Law opted not to "extend those precedents" to the CFPB, "an independent agency led by a single Director and vested with significant executive power." 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201.
The Court today concludes that the reasoning of Seila Law "dictates" that the FHFA is unconstitutionally structured because it, too, is led by a single Director. Ante, at 1783-1784. But Seila Law did not hold that an independent agency may never be run by a single individual with tenure protection. Rather, that decision stated, repeatedly, that its holding was limited to a single-director agency with "significant executive power." 591 U. S., at ___, ___, ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2191, 2200, 2211. The question, therefore, is not whether the FHFA is headed by a single Director, but whether the FHFA wields "significant" executive power. It does not.
As a yardstick for measuring the constitutional significance of an agency's executive power, Seila Law looked to the FTC as it existed at the time of Humphrey's Executor (the 1935 FTC). 591 U. S., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2199-2200. That agency had a roving mandate to prevent private individuals and corporations alike from engaging in "unfair methods of competition in commerce.'" *Humphrey's Executor*, 295 U.S. at 620, 55 S. Ct. 869 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45). To carry out its mandate, the 1935 FTC had broad authority to issue complaints and cease-and-desist orders. 295 U.S. at 620, 55 S. Ct. 869. The agency also had "wide powers of investigation," which it used to make recommendations to Congress, as well as the responsibility to assist courts in antitrust litigation by "ascertain[ing] and report[ing] an appropriate form of decree.'" Id., at 621, 55 S. Ct. 869.
These powers may seem "significant" in a colloquial sense. In Seila Law's view, however, they did not rise to the level of constitutional significance. That was in contrast to the CFPB's powers, which far outstrip the 1935 FTC's. While the 1935 FTC's ambit was limited to preventing unfair competition and violations of antitrust law, the CFPB "possesses the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19 federal statutes, including a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in a major segment of the U. S. economy." Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200. While the 1935 FTC could issue cease-and-desist orders and recommended dispositions, the CFPB "may unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in administrative adjudications" and "seek daunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf of the United States in federal court." Ibid. Far from a "mere legislative or judicial aid" like the 1935 FTC, ibid., the CFPB is a "mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens," id., at ___, n. 8, 140 S. Ct., at 2202 n. 8.
Measured against such standards, the FHFA comfortably fits within the same category of constitutional insignificance as the 1935 FTC. To some, the CFPB Director was "the single most powerful official in the entire U. S. Government, other than the President, at least when measured in terms of unilateral power." PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bur., 881 F.3d 75, 171 (CADC 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The FHFA Director is not one of the most powerful officials in the U. S. Government. As the Court recognized in Seila Law, the FHFA does "not involve regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB." 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2202.
The FHFA's authority is much closer to (and, in some respects, far less than) that of the 1935 FTC. Like the 1935 FTC, the FHFA oversees regulated entities and gathers specified information from them on Congress' behalf. Unlike the 1935 FTC, however, which was tasked with implementing the Nation's antitrust laws and policing unfair competition, the FHFA is limited to specified duties under the Recovery Act. Furthermore, while the 1935 FTC had jurisdiction over countless individuals and corporations, the FHFA regulates just 13 GSEs.
Moreover, one of the FHFA's main powers is assuming the mantle of conservatorship or receivership over the GSEs, which hardly registers as executive at all. When acting as a conservator or receiver, an agency like the FHFA "steps into the shoes'" of the party under distress, *O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC*, 512 U.S. 79, 86, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 129 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1994), and largely "shed[s] its government character,'" Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 169 (CADC 2017). Even granting that there are differences between the FHFA's powers as a conservator and those of a common-law conservator, "the FHFA's conservatorship function [is] a role one would be hard-pressed to characterize as near the heart of executive power." Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 620 (CA5 2019) (Higginson, C. J., dissenting in part).
To be sure, the FHFA has at least one executive power that the 1935 FTC did not: the power to impose fines. But that fining authority is quite limited. The FHFA may impose fines on the 13 GSEs it regulates for failing to meet their reporting requirements and housing goals under the Recovery Act and for violating the requirements of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 3941. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4585, 4636. Petitioners point to no instance in the Agency's 13-year history in which it has ever fined a GSE.
That is not to say that the FHFA possesses no executive authority whatsoever. It does. But the 1935 FTC, too, possessed executive authority, just not enough to be "significant." See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, n. 2, 140 S. Ct., at 2217 n. 2 ("`[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey's Executor would at the present time be considered "executive," at least to some degree'" (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690, n. 28, 108 S. Ct. 2597)). When measured against the benchmark of the 1935 FTC, the FHFA does not possess "significant executive power" within the meaning of Seila Law. It is in "an entirely different league" from the CFPB. 591 U. S., at ___, n. 8, 140 S. Ct., at 2202 n. 8.
Because the FHFA does not possess significant executive power, the question under Seila Law is whether this Court's decisions upholding for-cause removal provisions in Humphrey's Executor and Morrison should be "extend[ed]" to the FHFA Director. 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201. The clear answer is yes.
Not only does the FHFA lack significant executive power, the authority it does possess is exercised over other governmental actors. In that respect, the FHFA Director mimics the independent counsel whose tenure protections were upheld in Morrison. The independent counsel, as Seila Law noted, could bring criminal prosecutions and thus "wielded core executive power." 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200. Separation-of-powers concerns were allayed, however, because "that power, while significant, was trained inward to high-ranking Governmental actors identified by others." Ibid. In explaining why "[t]he logic of Morrison" did "not apply" to the CFPB, Seila Law emphasized that the CFPB "has the authority to bring the coercive power of the state to bear on millions of private citizens and businesses." Id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2200.
Morrison's logic may not have applied to the CFPB, but it certainly applies to the FHFA. The FHFA's executive power, too, is "trained inward," on the 13 GSEs "identified by" the Recovery Act. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200. While the GSEs are now privately owned, they still operate under congressional charters, see 12 U.S.C. § 4501(1), serve "important public missions," ibid., and receive preferential treatment under law by dint of their Government affiliation, § 1719. Seila Law itself distinguished the CFPB from the FHFA precisely on the basis that the latter Agency "regulates primarily Government-sponsored enterprises, not purely private actors." 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2202.
Historical considerations further confirm the constitutionality of the FHFA Director's independence. Single-director independent agencies with limited executive power, like the FHFA, boast a more storied pedigree than do single-director independent agencies with significant executive power, like the CFPB. Consider three such examples, each discussed in Seila Law. First, the Comptroller of the Currency, who was briefly independent from Presidential removal during the Civil War and thereafter retained a lesser form of tenure protection. Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200. Second, the Office of Special Counsel, which has been "headed by a single officer since 1978." Id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2201. Third, the Social Security Administration, which has been "run by a single Administrator since 1994." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2202. Like the FHFA, these examples lack "regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB." Id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2202. While these agencies thus offered "no foothold in history or tradition" for the CFPB, id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2202, they provide historical support for an agency with the FHFA's limited purview.
The FHFA also draws on a long tradition of independence enjoyed by financial regulators, including the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Second Bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2230-2233 (opinion of Kagan, J.). The public has long accepted (indeed, expected) that financial regulators will best perform their duties if separated from the political exigencies and pressures of the present moment.
In Seila Law, this tradition of independence was of little help to the CFPB because, "even assuming financial institutions... can claim a special historical status," the CFPB's unique powers put it "in an entirely different league" from other financial regulators. Id., at ___, n. 8, 140 S. Ct., at 2202 n. 8 (majority opinion). In contrast, the FHFA's function as a monitor of regulated entities important to economic stability makes the FHFA far more similar to historically independent financial regulators than to the CFPB. See FHFA, Performance and Accountability Report 18 (2020) ("The [Recovery Act] vests FHFA with the authorities, similar to those of other prudential financial regulators, to maintain the financial health of the regulated entities").
To recap, the FHFA does not wield significant executive power, the executive power it does wield is exercised over Government affiliates, and its independence is supported by historical tradition. All considerations weigh in favor of recognizing Congress' power to make the FHFA Director removable only for cause.
The Court disagrees. After Seila Law, the Court reasons, all that matters is that "[t]he FHFA (like the CFPB) is an agency led by a single Director." Ante, at 1783-1784. From that, the unconstitutionality of the FHFA Director's independence follows virtually a fortiori. The Court reaches that conclusion by disavowing the very distinctions it relied upon just last Term in Seila Law in striking down the CFPB Director's independence.
On three separate occasions, Seila Law stated that its holding applied to single-director independent agencies with "significant executive power." See 591 U. S., at ___, ___, ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2191-2192, 2200, 2211. Remarkably, those words appear nowhere in today's decision. Instead, the Court appears to take the position that exercising essentially any executive power whatsoever is enough. Ante, at 1784-1785. In terms of explanation, the Court says that it is "not well-suited to weigh the relative importance of the regulatory and enforcement authority of disparate agencies" and that it "do[es] not think that the constitutionality of removal restrictions hinges on such an inquiry." Ante, at 1785.
The Court's position unduly encroaches on Congress' judgments about which executive officers can and should enjoy a degree of independence from Presidential removal, and it cannot be squared with Seila Law, which relied extensively on such agency comparisons. Not only did Seila Law contrast the CFPB's powers against those of the 1935 FTC in Humphrey's Executor, see 591 U. S., at -, 140 S. Ct., 2199-2200, as well as the independent counsel in Morrison, see 591 U. S., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2200-2201, it concluded that the FHFA (along with the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Social Security Administration) does not possess "regulatory or enforcement authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB." Id., at -, 140 S. Ct., at 2202. Those distinctions underpinned Seila Law's proclamation that the CFPB had "no basis in history and no place in our constitutional structure." Id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2201. In the Court's view today, however, all of those comparisons were irrelevant to the bottom-line question whether the CFPB Director's tenure protections comport with the Constitution.
The Court today also suggests that whether an agency regulates private individuals or Government actors does not meaningfully affect the separation-of-powers analysis. Ante, at 1786-1787 ("[T]he President's removal power serves important purposes regardless of whether the agency in question affects ordinary Americans by directly regulating them or by taking actions that have a profound but indirect effect on their lives"). That, too, is flatly inconsistent with Seila Law, which returned repeatedly to this consideration. Not only did Seila Law distinguish the CFPB from the independent counsel in Morrison on this basis, see 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2200, it distinguished the CFPB from both the FHFA and the Office of Special Counsel for the same reason, see id., at ___, 140 S. Ct., at 2202. That the Court is unwilling to stick to the methodology it articulated just last Term in Seila Law is a telltale sign that the Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence has only continued to lose its way.
The Court has proved far too eager in recent years to insert itself into questions of agency structure best left to Congress. In striking down the independence of the FHFA Director, the Court reaches further than ever before, refusing tenure protections to an Agency head who neither wields significant executive power nor regulates private individuals. Troublingly, the Court justifies that result by ignoring the standards it set out just last Term in Seila Law. Because I would afford Congress the freedom it has long possessed to make officers like the FHFA Director independent from Presidential control, I respectfully dissent.
I continue to adhere to the views that I expressed in Seila Law: A combination of statutes can produce a separation-of-powers violation that renders Government action unlawful. See 591 U. S., at ___, 140 S.Ct., at 2202-2203 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). In remedying such a separation-of-powers violation, courts cannot purport to rewrite the statute to avoid the violation. Ibid.; post, at 1798, n. 2 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) ("[W]e cannot divine `which of the provisions' Congress would have kept and which it would have scrapped ... had it known its actual choice was unconstitutional," "absent statutory direction from Congress"). However, I respectfully part ways with Justice GORSUCH, because, on the merits, I am uncertain whether the unlawful removal restriction here combines with any other statutory provision in a way that renders the Government action at issue unlawful.
a case in law or equity,' in which a right, under such law, is asserted." Ibid. We have indicated that individuals may have an implied private right of action under the Constitution to seek equitable relief to "preven[t] entities from acting unconstitutionally.'" Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491, n. 2, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010). This includes "Appointments Clause or separation-of-powers claim[s]." Ibid. I assume the shareholders have brought such a cause of action here and have a legal right to obtain equitable relief if they can show they suffered an injury traceable to a Government action that violates the Constitution. The shareholders did not raise the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in count four of their complaint, but now contend their "constitutional claim is cognizable under the APA," which permits a "`reviewing court [to] hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.'" Brief for Collins et al. 74 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706; ellipses omitted; emphasis in original). Even assuming they raised their constitutional claim under the APA, it would not change the analysis; the shareholders would need to show they suffered an injury traceable to a Government action that violates the Constitution.