Concept
Morrison and Functional Review
Removal of officers
Morrison and Functional Review
Morrison v. Olson reached the removal question by way of an appointment dispute. The Court first held that the independent counsel is an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause, an officer with limited jurisdiction and tenure and no policymaking or significant administrative authority, so Congress could confer her appointment on a special court.1 That holding settled how the counsel entered office. It left open how she could be removed, and the Court’s answer to that second question makes the case a turning point in this chapter.
The Court framed two related issues. The first was whether the provision restricting the Attorney General’s power to remove the counsel to instances of “good cause,” taken by itself, impermissibly interferes with the President’s exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions. The second was whether the Act, taken as a whole, violates the separation of powers by reducing the President’s ability to control the counsel’s prosecutorial powers.2 This unit follows the first issue.
By the labels the Court had used before, the statute looked vulnerable. The counsel investigated and prosecuted federal crimes, work that Justice Scalia would call “quintessentially executive.”3 Humphrey’s Executor had confined Myers to “purely executive officers” and had upheld protection for Federal Trade Commissioners because the Commission acted “in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.”4 Sorted that way, a prosecutor resembled the postmaster in Myers, whose removal Congress had tried to condition on the Senate’s approval.5 The Court upheld the limit anyway, because it changed the question from what label the officer bears to whether the restriction impedes the President in performing his constitutional duties.
The three subsections below follow that change. The first explains what replaced the labels and what survived them. The second applies the new inquiry to the independent counsel statute, one question at a time. The third presents Justice Scalia’s dissent, which starts from the premise that executive power belongs wholly to the President.
Replacing the Labels
The challengers in Morrison built their argument on the labels. They contended that Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener involved no official who performed a “core executive function,” so a purely executive official fell under Myers, and under Myers the President must have absolute discretion to discharge such an official at will.6 The argument had support in the Court’s own words. Humphrey’s Executor had said that whether Congress may fix a term and forbid removal except for cause “will depend upon the character of the office,”7 and the Morrison Court admitted that it had “undoubtedly” relied on the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial terms to distinguish the officials in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener from those in Myers.8
The Court rejected the premise. Its “present considered view” was that whether Congress may impose a good-cause restriction on the President’s power to remove an official “cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”9 The removal cases, it explained, were designed “not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the President,” but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s exercise of executive power and his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.10 The inquiry therefore moves from the officer to the restriction: “the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light.”11 Function stays in the analysis, as the Court said expressly, but it now serves as evidence of how much control the President needs and no longer assigns the officer to a category.12
The Court’s own descriptions of agency functions show why the labels could not bear that weight. Buckley v. Valeo had called the Federal Election Commission’s functions “administrative” and “more legislative and judicial in nature”; Bowsher had found the Comptroller General’s functions “executive”; and Humphrey’s Executor had described the FTC as a body carrying into effect legislative policies that “occupie[d] no place in the executive department.”13 Justice Scalia, citing the majority’s discussion, agreed that the line between “purely executive” and “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” functions “is not a clear one or even a rational one.”14 The majority added that the quasi- labels in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener “in large part reflected” its judgment that those agencies’ heads did not need to be removable at will for the President to execute his Article II powers.15 A label that restates the answer cannot supply the reason for it.
The shift does not abolish at-will removal. The Court still asked whether the President’s need to control the counsel’s discretion is “so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will,”16 and an official whom the President must control that closely would still serve at his pleasure. The Court also noted that it has never held Congress barred from limiting removal of all executive officials simply because they wield executive power. Myers itself distinguished inferior officers whose appointment Congress had vested in a department head, and Perkins reasoned that the authority to vest such appointments implies authority to limit and regulate their removal.17
An exam stem on removal invites the older instinct: sort the officer as executive or quasi-judicial, then pick Myers or Humphrey’s Executor. Morrison forecloses that shortcut, because an official with plainly executive duties can still receive protection when the restriction leaves the President enough control.
Morrison drew the same line when it observed that its case was not one in which the power to remove had been “completely stripped from the President.”18 The executive character of the work is identical in both versions of the invented statute. The results differ because of what each restriction leaves in the President’s hands.
The functional inquiry does not erase the bar on congressional participation in removal. Morrison quoted Bowsher for the rule that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment,” and it traced that rule to Myers.19 The independent counsel Act put removal “squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch,” with no requirement of congressional approval, so the case involved no attempt by Congress to gain a removal role beyond impeachment and conviction.20 The majority said as much in other words: the case “does not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.”21 The two rules therefore answer different questions. When Congress takes part in removal, the separation of powers bars it from taking any part other than by impeachment, and the Court has equated such involvement with the legislative veto.22 When Congress only limits the grounds on which an executive official may remove, the Court asks whether the limit impedes the President.
The method also contrasts with a formalistic approach, which treats the three powers as distinct and mutually exclusive and, when applied, tends to find violations.23 Morrison asks about effect. One formulation of that inquiry, drawn from Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, focuses on “the extent to which [such a limitation] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions,” and asks whether an overriding need justifies the limitation only if the potential for disruption is present. It offers “nothing approaching a bright-line rule or set of rules.”24 Predictability is the price. The majority used what the dissent called a “balancing test” without specifying the criteria or the weight each deserved.25
Later decisions have confined the generosity of that inquiry. Reading Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison narrowly, the Court in Seila Law described them as two limited exceptions to the Myers principle: one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority. It then ruled that a single director with a five-year term and broad executive power must be accountable to the President, so her for-cause protection had to be severed.26 The later sections of this chapter take up those decisions.
Applying Morrison to the Counsel
The Act allowed the independent counsel to be removed in two ways: by impeachment and conviction, and otherwise “only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.”28 The counsel whom that clause protected held “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice [and] the Attorney General.”29
Three features of the clause drive the analysis. Removal rests with an executive official, the Attorney General. Congress kept only impeachment and conviction, the removal route the Constitution itself names for civil officers,30 and the Act required no congressional approval of the Attorney General’s decision. The decision is subject to judicial review.31 Because Congress could end the counsel’s tenure only by impeachment, it could not use the threat of removal to supervise how the counsel investigated or prosecuted.32
The first question sorts the case into one of two lines of authority. Because the Act placed removal in the Executive Branch, the Court treated it as closer to Humphrey’s Executor than to Myers or Bowsher.33 The Myers statute had required the Senate’s consent before the President could remove an executive official,34 and Myers is read to bar Congress from drawing “to itself . . . the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power.”35 Participation differs from limiting grounds because of influence. If Congress could take part in removal, an officer “might feel a need to comply with Congress’s wishes,” in effect giving Congress a veto over executive action.36 A good-cause limit enforced by an executive official gives Congress no such lever.
The Court has rejected such arrangements flatly, holding that Congress may not “draw to itself,” other than through impeachment, the power to remove or the right to participate in that power.37
The second question measures the President’s need for control. The Court conceded that the counsel “exercises no small amount of discretion and judgment,” yet it could not see why the President’s need to control that discretion was “so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require” at-will removal. The counsel is an inferior officer with limited jurisdiction and tenure and no policymaking or significant administrative authority.38 Each of those attributes shrinks what the President loses when the counsel cannot be dismissed at will. The counsel’s status carries weight beyond Morrison. Seila Law later described Morrison as the exception for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority,39 and the Court has since been unwilling to extend congressional authority over the presidential removal power beyond the situations those exceptions cover.40
The third question asks whether the President keeps a real means of enforcing faithful execution. The Court stressed that this “is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has been completely stripped from the President.” Because the counsel may be removed for good cause, “the Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities.”41 The Attorney General counts as a channel of presidential control because the Attorney General is directly responsible to the President, who can act through that officer, and the Act gave the Attorney General several means of supervising the counsel.42 The Court later explained that in the cases upholding such protection only one level of protected tenure separated the President from the officer, and the President, or a subordinate he could remove at will, decided whether the officer’s conduct merited removal under the good-cause standard.43
The fourth question asks why Congress wanted the insulation and whether the limit still reaches real failures. The Court accepted that Congress considered the limit on the Attorney General’s removal power “essential . . . to establish the necessary independence of the office.” It left open everything that “good cause” includes, but it noted that the legislative history shows the Attorney General may remove a counsel for “misconduct.”44 The Act adds physical disability, mental incapacity, and any other condition that substantially impairs performance.45 Those categories cover the failures that the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed most plainly requires him to address.46
On those findings the Court concluded that the good-cause limit, taken by itself, does not impermissibly interfere with the President, and it turned to whether the Act as a whole unduly interferes with the Executive Branch.47 For removal analysis, the lesson is that no single feature carried the result. The majority weighed the features together without announcing criteria or weights, so an answer should walk through each one and not rest on a label.48 Justice Scalia’s dissent, taken up next, rejects the weighing itself.
Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Article II commands that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”50 and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison takes that command at full strength. He asked two questions of the independent counsel statute: whether the counsel’s functions are executive, and whether the statute deprives the President of exclusive control over them.51 On his reasoning those two answers decide the case, and no weighing of competing interests follows. The majority reached the opposite result by asking only whether the limit impedes the President’s ability to perform his duty.
The first answer needed little argument. The counsel held “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice,” and “governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.”52 The second answer came from the statute’s own purpose. Scalia wrote that the Court “does not, and could not possibly,” assert that the statute leaves the President with exclusive control, because that “is indeed the whole object of the statute.” The Court points only to the control the President retains through his Attorney General.53
Scalia then attacked the control the majority found. In his words, limiting removal power to “good cause” is “an impediment to, not an effective grant of, Presidential control,” which is “what Humphrey’s Executor was all about.” The Court there called the limit necessary for FTC members because “one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” What Humphrey’s found to be a means of eliminating presidential control, he said, the Court now treated as the “most importan[t]” means of assuring it.54
Scalia also tested the majority’s reasoning against the other two branches. Suppose a statute left Congress with less than total control over a small field of purely legislative power. “Of course we would have none of that,” he wrote, because once a purely legislative power is at issue Congress must exercise it “wholly and entirely.” A statute giving non-Article III judges a small share of purely judicial power in a minor field, subject to substantial but not total judicial control through something like “clear error” review, would be a fair equivalent of the Attorney General’s for-cause removal power.55 On this view, exclusive control is the baseline for each branch’s own power, and the Executive deserves no less than the other two.
He also pointed to what the insulation costs. The counsel works “in an area where so little is law and so much is discretion” and is “intentionally cut off from the unifying influence of the Justice Department, and from the perspective that multiple responsibilities provide.”56 The stakes, in his view, reached individual liberty. The separation of powers and the unitary Executive exist “not merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom,” and those who hold or have held offices covered by the Ethics in Government Act are entitled to that protection as much as anyone.57
The dissent further charged that the majority discarded a workable line. Before Morrison, Scalia said, it was established that the President’s power to remove principal officers who exercise purely executive powers could not be restricted, while his power to remove inferior officers who exercise purely executive powers, and whose appointment Congress had removed from the usual procedure of presidential appointment with Senate consent, could be restricted, at least where an officer of the Executive Branch had made the appointment.58 He conceded that the line between purely executive functions and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial ones was neither clear nor rational, but it at least identified officers and agencies whose functions were entirely within the President’s control, and Congress knew to legislate with that in mind. Humphrey’s Executor, he said, was now “swept into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles.”59 That older line had treated the FTC as something that “cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive.”60 After Morrison, he wrote, “There are now no lines.” If the removal of a prosecutor, “the virtual embodiment of the power to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’” can be restricted, what officer’s removal cannot? He suggested a special Assistant Secretary of State for one narrow area of foreign policy as the kind of officer Congress might shield next.61
The dissent’s demand for control is narrower than it first sounds. Scalia did not claim that every executive officer must serve at the President’s pleasure. He required “plenary power to remove principal officers such as the independent counsel.” Inferior officers are subject to the supervision of principal officers whom the President can remove at will, so removal “for cause,” which includes failure to accept supervision, is enough for them, “at least if they have been appointed by the President or by a principal officer.” Perkins, he said, is “in no way inconsistent” with that view.62 The counsel fell on the wrong side of the line. Subordination to another officer is “a necessary condition for inferior officer status,” and the Act gave her “full” and “independent” authority and made her removable only for good cause, a limit “specifically intended to ensure that she be independent of, not subordinate to, the President and the Attorney General.”63 That reasoning explains why the Attorney General’s power did not save the statute for him: control must run to the President, and an officer subordinate to no one leaves no channel through which it can run.
An essay on a prosecutor protected only by a for-cause removal power held by the Attorney General should state both analyses. Under the majority’s approach, the question is whether the limit impedes the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties, and a limit enforced by an executive official who can reach neglect or misconduct passes.64 Under the dissent’s approach, the analysis ends once the work is identified as executive and the statute leaves the President with less than complete control.65 The first is the law of Morrison. The second supplies premises that later decisions revisit, since the Court has since read Morrison narrowly, as an exception for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.66