Concept
Officers Versus Employees
Appointment of officers
Officers Versus Employees
The Appointments Clause governs only people who are “Officers of the United States,” so every appointments problem begins with one sorting question: does this person hold an office at all? The clause directs the President to nominate, and the Senate to consent to, “all other Officers of the United States,” and it lets Congress vest the appointment of “such inferior Officers” in the President alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments.1 Everything in the clause attaches to officers. A federal worker who is not one is an employee and falls outside it. The text lists examples, among them ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and judges of the Supreme Court, but it never says what an “Officer” is.
The Supreme Court supplied the definition in two steps. Buckley v. Valeo held that “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” is an officer and must be appointed as Section 2, Clause 2 prescribes.2 Lucia v. SEC, decided in 2018, added that “an individual must occupy a ‘continuing’ position established by law to qualify as an officer.”3 The two markers ask different questions. One looks at what the appointee can do, and the other looks at what kind of post the appointee holds. Each gets its own subsection below.
Neither marker is precise. The Court has described the Buckley test as “no doubt framed in general terms” and, in Lucia, found no need “to refine or enhance” it.4 The practical method is therefore comparative: set a position’s duties beside positions the cases have already placed on one side of the line or the other. A position that clears this hurdle raises two further questions, taken in order: whether the officer is principal or inferior, and whether the method of appointment fits that rank.
Significant Authority
The clause never says who counts as an officer, and Buckley v. Valeo answered by reading the term for its substance. The Court observed that United States v. Germaine had defined “Officers of the United States” to include “all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government,” and it concluded that the term was “intended to have substantive meaning.”5 Its “fair import,” the Court held, is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an officer and must be appointed in the manner Section 2, Clause 2 prescribes.6
Because the test turns on substance, labels do not control. Neither the appointee’s title nor Congress’s choice of an appointment method is dispositive.7 Nor can Congress escape the clause by pointing to the nature of an agency’s work. No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions, and the clause still controls the appointment of members of an agency whose functions are “predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.”8
Congress’s plenary power over a field of regulation does not change the analysis either. The Court called the contrary position, that power to regulate a field carries power to appoint those who administer the statute, “both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause.”9 Unless their selection is provided for elsewhere in the Constitution, all officers of the United States are appointed in accordance with the clause.10
The Federal Election Commission shows the definition at work. The statute gave it “direct and wide-ranging” enforcement power, including authority to bring civil actions against violators, together with “extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers.”11 Those powers, the Court reasoned, cannot be regarded as merely in aid of Congress’s legislative function. They belong to the execution of the laws, which the Constitution entrusts to the President, so a body that exercises them must consist of officers.12 The Court added that if a first-class postmaster and a district court clerk are inferior officers, as they are, the commissioners are at the very least inferior officers too.13
The same decision marks where the definition stops. An agency with a majority of congressionally named personnel may exercise only those powers Congress could delegate to one of its own committees, such as investigatory and informative powers.14 The commission that inquired into the security lapses behind the September 11 attacks illustrates the category: the President appointed its chair, congressional leaders appointed the other members, and its task was to investigate and inform.15 Had the Election Commission been limited to such work, the Court said, it would have reached a different result.16 The defect lay in pairing a majority of congressionally named members with rulemaking, adjudicative, and enforcement powers.
Adjudicators fit the same pattern. In Lucia, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted a proceeding against Raymond Lucia for deceiving prospective clients about a retirement savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.” An administrative law judge found Lucia guilty and imposed sanctions that included $300,000 in civil penalties and a lifetime bar from the investment industry.17 The judge’s powers explain why that mattered. An ALJ assigned to an enforcement action has “authority to do all things necessary and appropriate” to ensure a “fair and orderly” adversarial proceeding, and after the hearing the ALJ issues an initial decision.18 If the SEC declines to review that decision, the Commission issues an order making it final, and the decision is then “deemed the action of the SEC.”19 The Court held that the ALJs were officers because they held a continuing position created by statute and exercised significant discretion in presiding over adjudications and issuing decisions.20
The Election Commission and the ALJs reach officer status by different routes. The Commission wrote rules and sued violators, while the judges decided cases and imposed sanctions. Each acted on people outside the body, and neither acted merely to inform Congress. That shared feature separates both from the investigative commission, which gathers facts and reports.
On an exam, start by asking what the position can actually do. Binding rulemaking, adjudication, or enforcement usually answers the question, whatever the statute calls the post. A position limited to investigating and informing Congress falls on the other side of the line. When the duties sit between the two, compare them with the examples above, because the definition itself is general.
A Continuing Position
The clause describes officers as those whose offices “shall be established by Law,”22 and Lucia makes the durability of the post part of the test: “an individual must occupy a ‘continuing’ position established by law to qualify as an officer.”23 A position is continuing when its duties are “continuing and permanent,” not “occasional or temporary.”24 Significant authority asks what the appointee can do. This marker asks whether the appointee holds a standing post at all, and an officer must satisfy both.
The SEC’s administrative law judges satisfied it. Their appointments were continuing, career positions, and each judge carried the powers described above.25 A statute created the post, so the Court treated the judges as holding a continuing position established by law.26 Combined with the significant discretion they exercised, that made them officers.
Germaine marks the opposite side of the line. The commissioner of pensions appointed a surgeon to examine pension applicants and paid him $2 per examination. The Court treated the surgeon as an employee rather than an inferior officer, because his duties were not continuing and permanent.27 The engagement was occasional in structure: the surgeon was paid per examination, and nothing in it amounted to a standing post. The ALJs, by contrast, held career positions.
“Continuing” does not mean “permanent,” and the two are easy to blur. The Second Circuit held in United States v. Donziger that special prosecutors are officers because a “continuing” position need not be permanent.28 A post that lasts for years and ends when its work is done can still be a standing assignment whose duties persist.
Temporariness matters in two different places, and the two should be kept apart. Here it bears on whether a position is an office at all: in a close case, the fact that a position is only temporary may be critical in placing it on the employee side of the line.29 Later in the chapter it bears on rank. An 1898 decision treated a vice-consul appointed to perform a consul’s functions on a temporary basis as an inferior officer rather than a principal one, even though Article II refers to consuls as principal officers.30 The vice-consul was already an officer, and the temporary basis lowered his rank. The Germaine surgeon never held an office.
Duration cannot carry the analysis alone. Mail carriers, prison guards, and computer programmers often hold permanent positions that can be ended only for cause, yet they are mere employees: they implement rather than make policy, persons far down the executive hierarchy ordinarily supervise them, and the lack of significant authority is dispositive.31 A position must therefore pass both tests. A standing post established by law, with significant authority attached, is an office, and a position that fails either test belongs to an employee.
Taken together, the cases in this unit sort positions as follows.
| Position | Sorted as | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Election Commission members | Officers, at least inferior | Rulemaking, adjudicative, and enforcement powers, including civil suits |
| SEC administrative law judges | Officers | Continuing statutory position; significant discretion in adjudications |
| First-class postmaster; clerk of a district court | Inferior officers | Treated in Buckley as inferior officers |
| Special prosecutors | Officers | A continuing position need not be permanent |
| Surgeon paid $2 per examination | Employee | Duties not continuing and permanent |
| Mail carriers, prison guards, computer programmers | Employees | No significant authority, even when the job is permanent |
| Members of a purely investigative and informative commission | Congress may appoint them | Powers limited to what Congress could delegate to its own committees |