Concept
The Steel Seizure Case
As commander in chief
The Steel Seizure Case
Article II vests “[t]he executive Power” in the President without qualification, while Article I gives Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted.”1 That difference in wording has fed arguments that the President holds inherent powers, authority that comes with the office although no provision lists it.2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is the leading Supreme Court decision on when the President may act without express constitutional or statutory authority.3
The case arose while American forces were fighting in Korea. President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the nation's steel mills.4 The mill owners argued that the order amounted to lawmaking, a legislative function the Constitution confides to Congress and not to the President.5 The government answered that the President had found seizure necessary to avert the national catastrophe a stoppage of steel production would cause, and that he acted within the aggregate of his powers as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief.6
The case matters in this chapter because it shows where the Commander in Chief title stops. The earlier sections showed Congress and the President sharing the war powers. Youngstown asks whether command also reaches the private industry that supplies a war effort. If it did, a President could turn any domestic dispute into a matter of command and bypass Congress altogether. The opinions answer in three steps, and the subsections below follow them: who authorized the seizure, what the command title adds, and whether emergency or historical practice supplies the missing authority.
Facts and Holding
The seizure order gave the Secretary of Commerce possession of the plants and authority to set the terms and conditions of employment in them, while recognizing the workers' right to bargain collectively so long as their activities did not interfere with operations.7 The companies obeyed under protest and sued. On April 30, 1952, the District Court preliminarily enjoined the Secretary from continuing the seizure and from acting under Executive Order 10340, and the Court of Appeals stayed the injunction the same day. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 3, heard argument on May 12, and announced its decision on June 2.8
The question for the Court in Youngstown was whether the President was acting within his constitutional power.9 It held the seizure invalid by a vote of six to three. Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court; Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, and Clark each concurred in separate opinions; and Chief Justice Vinson dissented, joined by Justices Reed and Minton.10 Black's method was formalist. He sorted legislative, executive, and judicial functions into separate boxes and demanded that the President's authority come from a statute or from a specific constitutional provision.11 The President's power, if he had any, had to stem from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.12
The first step found no statute. None expressly authorized the President to take possession of the mills.13 Two statutes, the Selective Service Act of 1948 and the Defense Production Act of 1950, did authorize the taking of property under stated conditions, but the government admitted that the conditions were unmet and that the order was not rooted in either act. It called the 1950 Act's seizure provisions “much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”14 Silence was not the whole story. When Congress considered the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it rejected an amendment that would have authorized seizures in emergencies, and the plan it adopted relied on mediation, conciliation, boards of inquiry, public reports, and temporary cooling-off injunctions, after which the unions were free to strike.15 Congress apparently thought that seizure, like compulsory arbitration, would interfere with collective bargaining.16 The President therefore was not filling a gap in the statutes. He was adopting a remedy that Congress had considered and declined, and that fact carries the weight in Jackson's framework in the next section.
The second step turned to the Constitution, and the provisions granting executive power to the President did not sustain the order.17 The President's duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his role in lawmaking to recommending laws he thinks wise and vetoing laws he thinks bad, and Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress.18 The next subsection takes up the Commander in Chief theory separately.
That reasoning explains why the Court called the seizure lawmaking and not execution. The order proclaimed public policies of a kind Congress may adopt. Congress can authorize the taking of private property for public use, regulate the relationships between employers and employees, prescribe rules to settle labor disputes, and fix wages and working conditions, and the Constitution does not subject that power to presidential or military supervision or control.19 The President, by contrast, had no statute to execute.
A statute would have saved the order. A seizure executed under an Act of Congress would carry “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,” and the burden of persuasion would fall heavily on anyone who attacked it.20 The government's concession that the conditions of the two property-taking statutes were unmet is what left Truman without one.21
Justice Douglas added a structural reason. Taking a plant to settle a labor controversy is a condemnation, and under the Fifth Amendment's condemnation provision the branch that can pay compensation is the only one able to authorize the taking. The President has no power to raise revenue, and Article I, Section 8 gives that power to Congress.22 Douglas did not say the President was helpless. The President might seize and Congress might later ratify the seizure, but until Congress acted, no condemnation would be lawful.23
The holding is narrower than it first appears. The Court did not hold that the President may never act in an emergency, or that the title Commander in Chief is empty. It held that nothing in the statutes or the Constitution allowed the President to make this law without Congress. Congressional authority would have changed the analysis, as Douglas's willingness to contemplate ratification shows. The dissent's contrary view, that emergency and historical practice supported a temporary seizure, belongs to the third subsection.
Limits of Command Authority
The government's first constitutional argument rested on the clause making the President “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” and it leaned on decisions upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.25 Justice Black answered that, even if “theater of war” is an expanding concept, the Court could not hold, consistently with the constitutional system, that the Commander in Chief has ultimate power as such to take private property to keep labor disputes from stopping production. “This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.”26
The answer turns on what an act operates on. Command directs the forces Congress has raised, and the decisions the government cited involved commanders doing exactly that where fighting was under way. The steel order directed no soldier. It took over private mills and set the terms of employment for private workers, and Black classified that as lawmaking.27 Calling a measure a war measure does not move it into the President's column.
Justice Jackson's concurrence shows why the government's theory proves too much. The theory held, in effect, that a President's own commitment of forces to a foreign venture enlarges his power over the country's internal affairs. Jackson saw the circularity: if the commitment itself generated domestic authority, a President could create that authority by making the commitment. He thought no doctrine the Court could announce would be more “sinister and alarming,” and he found it unnecessary to consider the legal status of the Korean enterprise to reject the argument.28
Jackson placed military procurement with Congress. Congress alone controls the raising and appropriation of revenue and may decide how and by what means it is spent on military and naval procurement; it could even take over war supply as a government enterprise. It may instead rely on free private enterprise, bargaining with free labor, to support the forces, and the Executive then may not seize a facility because of lawful disagreements incidental to that process.29 Congress had chosen the second course: it had refused to adopt seizure for labor disputes and had built its scheme on mediation and bargaining.30
One of Jackson's sentences carries the point. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command.31 The constitutional design fits that reading. The framers feared a standing army and also distrusted inadequately trained soldiers, and they compromised by authorizing Congress both to raise and support a national Army and to organize the Militia.32 The title makes the President commander of the forces. It does not, Jackson wrote, make him “Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants,” and he has no monopoly of “war powers,” whatever they are.33
An argument made to the Court in Ex parte Milligan puts the same point in miniature. It can hardly be contended, the argument ran, that if Congress neglects to find subsistence the commander in chief may lawfully take it from the nation's citizens, or that if Congress fails to provide the means of recruiting he may lawfully force citizens into the ranks.34 That was advocacy, not a holding, but it anticipates the steel case: a gap in what Congress supplies does not hand the commander power over civilians.
Jackson found further support in the Third Amendment and the Militia Clause. The amendment forbids quartering soldiers in a house in peacetime without the owner's consent and permits it in wartime only “in a manner to be prescribed by law,” so even the seizure of housing an army needs must be authorized by Congress.35 If a statute is required to shelter soldiers who are present, an order taking a mill whose steel will reach the forces only after production and shipment cannot rest on military need alone. The Constitution also left it to Congress to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” That limitation underscores the policy that Congress, not the Executive, controls the use of the war power as an instrument of domestic policy.36
Jackson did not shrink the title. He would indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain the President's exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside world for the security of society. He would withhold that latitude when force is turned inward, “not because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor.” Even the outward power is no absolute: it “is subject to limitations consistent with a constitutional Republic whose law and policy-making branch is a representative Congress.”37
A statute would change the shipyard answer. A seizure executed under an Act of Congress carries the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, so the statute, and not the title, would carry such an order.38 Later courts have used Youngstown's framework against other claims of command-based authority. In the litigation over Padilla's detention, the court held that the Non-Detention Act was an explicit congressional prohibition on executive detention absent congressional authorization. That placed the President's powers at their “lowest ebb,” and his commander-in-chief powers under Article II were insufficient to authorize the detention.39
Whether the clause gives the President any core of command that Congress may not override is a different question, and Youngstown leaves it open. Jackson warned against using the occasion “to circumscribe, much less to contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander in Chief.” At the same time he acknowledged that Congress's power to make rules for the “Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces” may “to some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions.”40 A careful answer treats that question as unsettled and argues both sides.
Emergency and Historical Practice
Chief Justice Vinson's dissent, joined by Justices Reed and Minton, charged the majority with a “messenger-boy concept” of the presidency. An officer on duty every day of the year, the dissent said, could not invoke Article II to avert disaster and had to confine himself to sending Congress a message recommending action.42 On that view the President could not even act to preserve legislative programs from destruction, and the gravity of the emergency became irrelevant as a matter of law, although no court had found that the President's finding of an emergency lacked a basis.43 The dissent also called the seizure modest. The possession was temporary and subject to congressional direction, whether approving, disapproving, or regulating how the mills were run and returned, and the President immediately informed Congress and stated his intention to abide by the legislative will.44
History supplied the dissent's second line of support. In what it called “a most apt precedent,” President Lincoln, without statutory authority, directed the seizure of the rail and telegraph lines leading to Washington. Many months later Congress recognized and confirmed his power and provided criminal penalties for interference with government operation, though the act conferred no additional power of seizure.45 Six months before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered the seizure of an aviation plant at Inglewood, California, where a dispute had interrupted a segment of military aircraft production. He acted, in the words of his order, “as President of the United States of America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” The Attorney General who justified that order, Robert Jackson, insisted that the President had a moral duty to keep the nation's defense effort a “going concern.”46
The Justices who concurred did not deny that emergencies call for executive action. They asked whether Congress had already decided how to meet this one. Justice Clark stated the rule: where Congress has laid down specific procedures for the type of crisis the President faces, he must follow them, and only in the absence of such congressional action does his independent power depend on the gravity of the situation.47 He drew the rule from Little v. Barreme. There Congress had given a special authority to seize on the high seas and had limited it to vessels bound to a French port, so the legislature seemed to have prescribed the manner of execution and excluded the seizure of any other vessel. A unanimous Court held the President's instructions unauthorized, because they could not “legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.”48
Congress had prescribed methods in the steel crisis as well. When it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, it specifically rejected a proposal to empower the President to seize any “plant, mine, or facility” in which a threatened stoppage would, in his judgment, “imperil the public health or security.” The Act instead directed the President, if a strike had not settled during the 80-day injunction period, to submit a report to Congress with recommendations, and the legislative history shows that Congress believed the 80 days would give it time to decide whether special legislation was needed.49
Justice Burton reached the same place by stressing what the case was not. It was not an imminent invasion or threatened attack, and no one claimed that the seizure was a military command addressed to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently threatened with, total war, so the Court did not face what the President might do in those settings. What the Court did face was a President who declined the procedure Congress had authorized, followed another that he hoped might make the first unnecessary, and, when that failed, issued a seizure order “in the face of the reserved right of Congress to adopt or reject that course as a matter of legislative policy.”50 An answer should therefore not say that Youngstown rejected emergency power. Clark's rule presupposes such power where Congress has not acted, and Burton left open the President's power in an invasion or total war.
Justice Frankfurter met the argument from history on its own terms. Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government, he agreed, “cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them”; it is “an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”51 A gloss is an interpretive layer that settled practice adds to a text. In Frankfurter's formulation, practice earns that weight only when it is systematic, unbroken, long pursued to Congress's knowledge, and never before questioned. Repetition proves something only if Congress saw the practice and let it stand; a scattered or contested series shows only that some Presidents tried.
The seizures the dissent invoked do not qualify. President Wilson's eleven seizures of industrial facilities were made, or at least purported to be made, under authority granted by Congress, so they cannot be offered as a President's own reading of his powers when no statute exists.52 A President acting under a statute shows what the statute reaches, and counting those instances as proof of independent power counts one grant of authority twice. Lincoln's seizure ended in congressional confirmation, which is the route Douglas described for making a presidential seizure lawful.53 Frankfurter found the model of a qualifying practice elsewhere, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., where Presidents over many years openly and without challenge withdrew public land from entry for temporary periods so that Congress could deal with the withdrawals. The seizures of record offered no comparable pattern; the only other instances came during the two World Wars.54
The government's last plea, that overriding public interest should keep the seizure in place despite its illegality, fared no better. “Balancing the equities” is lawyers' jargon for choosing between conflicting public interests, and when Congress itself has struck the balance, a court of equity may not ignore that pronouncement under the guise of exercising equitable discretion.55
Jackson put the structural point in his own terms. Because Congress had addressed the subject and withheld seizure, the seizure fell under his third grouping, where presidential action can be “supported only by any remainder of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject.” To sustain it, the Court would have to hold that seizure of strike-bound industries is within the President's domain and beyond control by Congress. That leaves presidential power “most vulnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible constitutional postures.”56 The next section develops the framework.
The opinions thus show why Congress's choice decided the case. The dissenters and the concurring Justices did not disagree that the crisis was grave. They disagreed about whether Congress had already addressed it. The dissent saw a President holding legislative programs together until Congress could act; Burton and Clark saw a President who bypassed the tools Congress supplied and took the one it had considered and left out. If a President could substitute a withheld power whenever he judged a situation grave enough, Congress's choice of procedures would bind only when he agreed with it. His pledge to abide by Congress's later decision could not repair the defect, because the order issued in the face of Congress's reserved right to adopt or reject seizure.57 A statute authorizing seizure would have changed the analysis, because the President would then have been carrying out Congress's choice.58
Run on the steel seizure, the history of earlier seizures fails at the second step, since Wilson's seizures rested on statutes and Lincoln's ended in congressional confirmation. The emergency argument fails at the fourth step, since Congress had prescribed other procedures and withheld seizure. Midwest Oil shows what a qualifying practice looks like.