6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 2 L. Ed. 243 (1804)
The Act of Congress of 9 February 1799, entitled 'An act further to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France and the dependencies thereof,' authorized the seizure on the high seas of vessels of the United States bound or sailing to any port or place of the French Republic. That act did not authorize the capture of a vessel sailing from a French port, and the orders of the President of the United States to the commanders of the armed vessels of the United States enjoining the seizure of American vessels sailing from French ports will not protect them from a claim for damages for the capture of a vessel coming from a port of France.
On 9 February 1799, Congress passed the act further to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France and the dependencies thereof.
The first section provides in substance that, from and after 1 March next, no ship or vessel owned, hired, or employed wholly or in part by any person resident within the United States departing from the United States shall be allowed to proceed directly or via any intermediate port to any port or place within the territory of the French Republic or its dependencies, or to any place under the acknowledged government of France.
If any such ship in any voyage thereafter commencing shall be voluntarily carried or suffered to proceed to any French port, or be employed contrary to the intent of the act, every such ship and her cargo shall be forfeited, one-half to the use of the United States and the other half to any citizen of the United States who will inform and prosecute for the same. Such ships shall be liable to be seized and prosecuted and condemned in any circuit or district court of the United States which shall be holden within or for the district where the seizure shall be made.
The fifth section authorizes the President 'to give instructions to the commanders of the public armed ships of the United States to stop and examine any ship or vessel of the United States on the high sea which there may be reason to suspect to be engaged in any traffic or commerce contrary to the true tenor hereof, and if upon examination it shall appear that such ship or vessel is bound or sailing to any port or place within the territory of the French Republic or her dependencies contrary to the intent of this act, it shall be the duty of the commander of such public armed vessel to seize every such ship or vessel engaged in such illicit commerce and send the same to the nearest port in the United States, and every such ship or vessel thus bound or sailing to any such port or place shall, upon due proof thereof, be liable to the like penalties and forfeitures as are provided in and by the first section of this act.'
Under the provisions of this act the President gave instructions to the commanders of the armed vessels of the United States. Those instructions informed the commanders that the fifth section was part of their instructions and directed them in substance to prevent all intercourse, whether direct or circuitous, between the ports of the United States and those of France and her dependencies; to be vigilant for vessels really American but covered by Danish or other foreign papers and bound to or from French ports; and when, on just suspicion, a vessel was sent into port to send with her all papers and all evidence to support the suspicions, while taking care not to harass the trade of foreign nations with whom the United States were at peace nor the fair trade of its own citizens.
On 2 December 1799, the brigantine Flying Fish was captured near the island of Hispaniola, bound to Jeremie, by the United States frigates Boston and General Greene and sent into Boston as liable to seizure under the act of Congress.
The Flying Fish and her cargo were owned by Samuel Goodman, a Prussian by birth but at the time an inhabitant of the Danish island of St. Thomas. The master was born in and then an inhabitant of that island, had been employed for several years in vessels of United States citizens, spoke English in the American accent, and had the appearance of being American.
The crew were Englishmen, Portuguese, and Negroes, and the supercargo was a Frenchman. The vessel had carried dry goods from St. Thomas to Jeremie and was, when captured, returning with a cargo of coffee.
The district court adjudged the vessel to be restored to the original owners and refused damages to the claimants for the capture and detention because, in that court's opinion, there was probable cause to suspect the vessel to be American. On appeal to the circuit court that sentence was reversed because the Flying Fish was on a voyage from, not to, a French port, and therefore, even if an American vessel, not liable to capture on the high seas under the act. The circuit court therefore awarded damages, and the captors appealed to this Court.
The question presented is whether the fifth section of the act authorized the seizure on the high seas of a vessel that was sailing from a French port. It is by no means clear that the President, as commander in chief charged to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, might not, without special authority, have empowered officers to seize American vessels engaged in illicit commerce. But the general clause of the first section, which contemplates seizures and prosecutions in the district where the seizure is made, obviously contemplates seizure within the United States.
The fifth section gives a special authority to seize on the high seas and limits that authority to vessels bound or sailing to a French port. The legislature thus prescribed that the manner in which the law should be carried into execution excluded a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French port.
Consequently, however strong the circumstances which induced Captain Little to suspect the Flying Fish to be an American vessel, they could not excuse the detention of her, since he would not have been authorized to detain her had she been really American and sailing from a French port. The executive construction and orders sent to the captains, which appear to have construed the statute more broadly, cannot change the nature of the transaction or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.
The Court considered whether orders from the executive might excuse the officer from damages even if they could not give him a right to seize. Although initially inclined to distinguish military obedience and to think the injured party's recourse should be against the government issuing wrongful orders, the Court has concluded that the instructions cannot legalize an act that the statute does not authorize and therefore cannot excuse the trespass in this case.
Because the statute did not authorize the seizure of a vessel sailing from a French port, it is unnecessary to inquire whether probable cause would otherwise have excused Captain Little from damages had the seizure been of a vessel bound to a French port. Captain Little is therefore answerable in damages to the owner of this neutral vessel. The account taken by order of the circuit court is not objected to on its face and has not been properly excepted to before this Court, so no objection can be received here.
There appears to be no error in the judgment of the circuit court, and it is affirmed with costs.