Concept
Internal Powers of Congress
Other powers
Internal Powers of Congress
Article I, Section 1 vests the legislative powers “herein granted” in a Congress of two Houses, so lawmaking that binds the public takes both of them.1 Some of Congress's powers work differently. They operate on Congress itself or on the officers it can remove, and several belong to one House acting alone. Three groups matter here: the powers each House holds over its own membership and procedure under Article I, Section 5; the divided power to impeach and try officers; and an implied power to investigate that no clause mentions and that takes its limits from the lawmaking it serves.
Impeachment and Self-Governance
Impeachment splits one task between the two Houses. The House of Representatives has “the sole Power of Impeachment,” and the Senate has “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”2 The House brings the accusation, and the Senate decides whether it justifies removal. Because each grant is “sole,” neither chamber can do the other's job, and a House that wants an officer removed must convince a separate body sitting as a tribunal.
Section 3 sets three rules for that trial. Senators sit on oath or affirmation. The Chief Justice presides when the President is tried, in place of the Vice President, who otherwise presides over the Senate. And no person is convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.3 The two-thirds rule does the most work, because a bare majority of the Senate cannot convict. The sequence is therefore this: the House votes articles of impeachment, the Senate tries the charges, and the officer leaves office only if two thirds of the Senators present vote to convict.
Andrew Johnson, the first President impeached, shows the process at work. Congress adopted the Tenure in Office Act to keep him from firing Lincoln's cabinet and declared that such a firing would be a “high misdemeanor.” The House impeached him when he fired Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in violation of the Act. The Supreme Court later held that the Act violated separation of powers.4
Conviction has limited consequences. Judgment extends no further than removal from office and disqualification from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States, and the convicted person remains liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.5 A Senate conviction ends an officer's tenure without standing in for a criminal prosecution.
The Constitution leaves open what counts as “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” At one end of the spectrum, the phrase reaches only acts that violate the criminal law and seriously threaten society. At the other end is Gerald Ford's statement, made as a congressman proposing to impeach Justice William Douglas: “[A]n impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be.”6 No Supreme Court case resolves the question, and none is likely to, because the Court has held that challenges to the impeachment and removal process raise nonjusticiable political questions.7 That holding fits a text that gives each chamber a “sole” power and assigns no step to a court. A removed officer who sues over the Senate's procedure meets a refusal to review, not a ruling on the merits.
Section 5 supplies most of each House's other self-governing powers. Each House, on its own authority:
- judges the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members;
- determines the rules of its proceedings;
- punishes its members for disorderly behavior and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expels a member;
- keeps and publishes a journal of its proceedings, except for parts that require secrecy; and
- does business with a quorum of a majority, while a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may be authorized to compel absent members to attend.8
Not every part of Section 5 is a solo power. During a session, neither House may adjourn for more than three days, or to another place, without the other's consent.9
These grants keep decisions about who sits in a chamber and how it works inside the chamber. Expulsion carries the strictest margin because it removes someone the voters chose. The text requires two thirds for it and sets no comparable supermajority for lesser punishment of members.10
The power over membership has a boundary. In Buckley v. Valeo, the defenders of the federal election statute urged that Congress's extraordinary authority to regulate elections put the case on a different footing. The Court agreed that Congress has express authority to regulate congressional elections under Article I, Section 4, and it noted a very broad authority to prevent corruption in national presidential elections.11 But each House's power to judge whether a claimant has met the qualifications for office “cannot reasonably be translated into a power granted to the Congress itself to impose substantive qualifications,” and any legislative power over such qualifications must derive from Section 4, not Section 5.12 Section 2 shows what a House has to judge: a Representative must be at least twenty-five years old, a citizen for seven years, and an inhabitant of the state when elected.13
Section 4 covers the conduct of elections. Each state legislature prescribes the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, but Congress may at any time by law make or alter those regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.14 Because Congress acts “by Law,” this authority works through legislation, unlike the Section 5 powers, which each House exercises alone.
The one-House powers above are exceptions to the ordinary rule that legislative power sits in a bicameral Congress.15 In Chadha, the Court described the exceptions to that rule as “narrow, explicit, and separately justified,” and it treated them as support for the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied. It held that the one-House veto at issue there was not authorized by the constitutional design of the Legislative Branch's powers.16 A claim that one House may act alone in some new setting must therefore point to words that grant the power.
Investigative Power
No clause gives either House a general power to investigate. Article I, Section 1 vests only the legislative powers “herein granted,”20 and the Constitution nowhere expressly grants a general power to investigate in aid of legislation or in aid of overseeing the Executive Branch.21 The Supreme Court has nonetheless long recognized the power as implied, as in McGrain v. Daugherty. It is an essential concomitant of Congress's legislative authority and a power “necessary and proper” to carrying out Congress's other powers.22 Access to outside sources of information is essential to the legislative process, so compulsory procedures are required, and the power is buttressed by the sanction of contempt.23 The same compulsory process is available when a House judges an election or considers whether to expel a member.24
Because the power has no clause of its own, its entire justification is the task it serves, and its limits follow from that task. Witnesses called in these inquiries also keep constitutional protections, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (see Watkins v. United States).25
In Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, the Court described the power as “justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process” and held that a congressional subpoena is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”26 The subpoena must serve a “valid legislative purpose” and must concern a subject on which legislation “could be had.”27 The second requirement imports the rest of this chapter. Congress legislates only under a granted power, so a subject outside every grant is one on which legislation could not be had, and an investigation of it serves no end Congress may pursue.
Three further limits follow from the same logic:
- Congress may not subpoena for law enforcement, because the Constitution assigns that function to the Executive and the Judiciary, and so it may not use a subpoena to “try” someone before a committee for a crime or wrongdoing.
- Congress has no “general” power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures, and there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
- Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators, or to “punish” those investigated, are indefensible.28
Each exclusion has its own reason. A committee that tried a person for wrongdoing would be doing the work of prosecutors and courts, backed by contempt and without the safeguards those institutions provide. Exposure for its own sake serves no legislative end, and without a legislative end the implied power has nothing to execute. Finally, recipients of legislative subpoenas keep their constitutional rights throughout an investigation, along with long-recognized privileges such as attorney-client communications and executive privilege.29
The limits tighten when the subpoena reaches the President's own information. In Mazars, three committees of the House issued four subpoenas in five days in April 2019, seeking information about the finances of President Donald Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses.30 The Court reaffirmed that the House may issue subpoenas to carry out its legislative responsibilities, but it concluded that subpoenas for the President's personal information implicate weighty separation-of-powers concerns. A court deciding whether such a subpoena is related to a legitimate task of Congress must therefore take account of both Congress's significant legislative interests and the “unique position” of the President, drawing a “considerable impression” from the practice of the government.31 Several special considerations inform that analysis, including these three:
- Courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants involving the President and his papers. Congress may not rely on the President's information if other sources could reasonably supply what it needs, and it may not treat the President as a “case study” for general legislation.
- Courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support the legislative objective, because the specificity of the request is an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the Office of the President.
- Courts should attend to the evidence offered to show a valid legislative purpose, which should be more detailed and substantial when the legislation raises sensitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presidency. In that setting Congress must identify its aims and explain why the President's information will advance its consideration of the legislation.32
Each consideration answers the same worry. A subpoena for the President's information risks a constitutional confrontation between the branches, and such confrontations are to be avoided whenever possible.33 So Congress may reach for the President's information only when other sources would not serve, and only as narrowly and with as much support as its legislative aim allows.