Concept
Limits on the Clause
Other powers
Limits on the Clause
Article I vests in Congress only the legislative powers “herein granted.”1 Every federal statute therefore draws its authority from a Constitution that imposes structural features and substantive limits on federal lawmaking, and the Necessary and Proper Clause works inside those limits.2 The clause supplies authority to choose means. McCulloch v. Maryland treated the creation of a corporation as a means of carrying out other powers, and the Court today still describes the clause as authority to execute granted powers, not to add to them.3
Two limits follow, and they work together. The clause is auxiliary, so a statute must trace to an enumerated power, or to another power the Constitution vests, before the clause can help. And a means must be proper as well as necessary: courts read necessary generously, but proper does separate work.
Both limits keep generous means from becoming a roving power, and NFIB v. Sebelius shows both at work. A five-to-four majority rejected the argument that the individual mandate was sustainable under the Commerce Clause, including in tandem with the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the mandate survived only as an exercise of the taxing power.4 A generous reading of necessary can therefore coexist with a ruling that the clause does not support a particular statute. The first subsection takes up the clause’s auxiliary character, and the second turns to proper and the structure of government.
Auxiliary, Not Independent
The Necessary and Proper Clause is an auxiliary source of authority. Congress may use it to choose appropriate means for carrying into execution powers that the Constitution grants elsewhere, but the clause adds no substantive legislative power of its own. The clause’s words say as much. They authorize laws for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers that the Constitution vests in the government or in any department of it.5 Every use of the clause therefore has two parts: a granted power that supplies the subject, and the clause, which vouches for the means.
Marshall’s explanation of why a bank charter could be implied shows where the line falls. The power to create a corporation is never the end for which other powers are exercised; it is a means by which other objects are accomplished. Nobody gives to charity for the sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer the charity. A seminary is incorporated to serve education, and a city is incorporated as the best means of being well governed.6 Taxing, regulating commerce, and declaring and waging war are different in kind. They are great powers, and the clause does not license any “great substantive and independent power” beyond those the Constitution specifically enumerates.7 The distinction becomes a test for later problems. A power that could stand as the object of legislation for its own sake must be found in the text, while a power that is only a way of doing something the text already allows may be implied.
The structure of the Constitution explains the rule. If the clause were a source of power in itself, Congress could defend any statute it found useful by citing the clause, and the limitation to powers “herein granted” would have nothing left to limit.8 The list of powers would be decoration. A clause that carries into execution presupposes something to execute, and that dependence keeps broad discretion over means from growing into power over subjects.
The working test asks whether a statute is a means rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.9 The test has sustained powers the text never names, since neither Congress’s power to criminalize conduct, nor its power to imprison those who engage in it, nor its power to enact laws governing prisons and prisoners is mentioned in the Constitution. Each is implied as a means to an enumerated end, which is what auxiliary means. United States v. Kebodeaux put the same question about a federal sex-offender registration requirement applied to a person convicted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the Court answered by tying the requirement to Congress’s power to regulate the armed forces.10 A defense that rested on public-safety benefits alone would name no enumerated power for the clause to carry into execution.
The same dependence holds when the power served sits outside Article I. Marshall made the point about the federal courts: a statute cannot extend jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Constitution, so the inquiry runs back to the constitutional text.11 Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo v. City of New London applies the idea to federal eminent domain. The Takings Clause is a prohibition and grants no power, so the Government may take property only when the taking is necessary and proper to the exercise of an expressly enumerated power.12
These points decide how to build an exam answer about a federal statute. A question asking what authorizes the statute has a granted power as its answer, and the clause comes second or not at all.
A statute that does need the clause sits at the other pole. Sabri v. United States upheld a federal ban on bribes involving organizations that receive federal funds, and the ban is a means of protecting the funds the spending power authorizes.13 Add that ban to the grants in the hypothetical and the roles are plain. The spending power authorizes the money, and the clause supports a criminal law that guards how the money is used, so the grants need one source and the criminal law needs both, each doing its own job.
The exam habit that follows is to name the enumerated power first and to add the clause only when the statute’s means need help carrying that power into execution. After that, the McCulloch test governs the means. A statute that falls within a power’s own terms, such as a plain grant of money under the spending power, needs no help from the clause. An answer that cites the clause alone omits the power it exists to serve.
Proper Means and Structure
The clause authorizes laws that are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the granted powers.14 Courts have spent most of their effort on the first adjective, and McCulloch set the tone. Necessary reaches means that are convenient, useful, or conducive to the beneficial exercise of a granted power, and the question is whether a statute is rationally related to implementing an enumerated power.15 McCulloch also said that the powers of the government are limited and that their limits are not to be transcended. It allowed only means that are appropriate, not prohibited, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.16 The modern Court has given that last requirement its own work to do. Laws that undermine the structure of government the Constitution establishes are not consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and so they are not proper means for carrying enumerated powers into execution.17 A law can therefore pass the generous test for necessity and still fail, and the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate is the case that shows how.
The mandate was a purchase requirement. The government defended it as an integral part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation, namely the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating insurance reforms.18 Chief Justice Roberts did not deny that the minimum coverage provision was “necessary” in the McCulloch sense. He held that a purchase requirement was not “proper” because it was not “incidental” to the exercise of the commerce power.19 His conclusion carried five votes against the Necessary and Proper defense, because the four Justices who joined the dissent also rejected it, and the mandate survived only as an exercise of the taxing power.20
The Chief Justice’s test is that each earlier case upholding a law under the clause involved authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power.21 The cases show what that means. The Court had upheld continued confinement of people already in federal custody who could not be safely released (Comstock), a criminal ban on bribes involving organizations that receive federal funds (Sabri), and the tolling of state statutes of limitations while cases are pending in federal court (Jinks v. Richland County).22 In each, federal authority had already attached to the person or matter, through custody, a federal grant, or a federal case, and the challenged law helped carry that authority through. The mandate, by contrast, “vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”23
The limit lives in the word proper because a generous reading of necessary has no stopping point of its own. Almost any regulatory scheme works better when more people are inside it, so a test that asked only whether a means is useful would never bind Congress. A power to compel people into a market so that Congress can regulate them would also stretch each enumerated grant beyond the reach the text gives it, against the limit of Article I, Section 1.24 The Chief Justice therefore concluded that even if the mandate was necessary to the insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a proper means of making those reforms effective.25
Gonzales v. Raich marks the other side of the line. That case involved no “great substantive and independent power” and concerned only “individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”26 The people regulated were already within the activity the scheme governed, so the question was how far a valid scheme reached over existing activity. The mandate would have created the activity it then regulated.
The Chief Justice read proper through the distinction between great powers like taxing, regulating commerce, and declaring and waging war and powers incidental to them.27 The line is not drawn with much precision. The Court has treated creating a national bank, deporting people, enacting criminal laws, drafting soldiers, and imprisoning or executing offenders as incidental, so a great deal turns on how the Court uses the distinction in later cases.28
Four Justices disagreed. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, viewed the provision as independently sustainable under both the taxing power and the commerce power.29 She predicted that the Chief Justice’s distinction between independent and derivative powers, or between substantive and incidental ones, would prove hard for judges to administer. In effect, she said, the lower courts were being told, “You will know it when you see it.”30 The dissent marks the fault line: the dissenters defended the mandate through the deferential reading of necessary, while the Chief Justice’s analysis gives proper force of its own.
Proper therefore gives courts a doorway for structural limits that the list of powers does not itself state. State sovereignty is one such interest. A central issue throughout American history has been how far concern for the prerogatives and institutions of state governments should matter in defining the scope of Congress’s power.31 The NFIB opinion cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the judgment in Comstock, which said that it is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by an assertion of federal power under the clause, and that if so, that is a factor suggesting the power is not properly within federal reach.32 Because that language comes from a concurrence, it signals how the structural limit may develop and is not a holding of Comstock. The same logic reaches the relations among the branches. The clause empowers Congress to make laws for the judicial department, but only laws that help carry into execution the powers vested in it by Article III, and it does not support legislation designed to frustrate the work of a coordinate department.33