Concept
Text and Origins
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power
Enforcing the Nineteenth Amendment
Text and Origins
The Nineteenth Amendment has two sentences, and each does a different job.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.1
The first sentence is a prohibition. It names who is bound (the United States and every State), what they may not do (deny the vote outright or abridge it), and the one reason they may not give (sex). The second sentence authorizes Congress to enforce that prohibition by legislation.
Every enforcement question under the Amendment turns on both sentences. Congress's power is to enforce the Amendment, so a court asked whether a federal statute validly enforces it must first fix what the prohibition covers, and then decide how much freedom the enforcement clause gives Congress in choosing a remedy. This unit sets up that test. It asks why the Constitution needed an amendment at all, reads the prohibition, and then turns to the enforcement clause.
Why an Amendment Was Needed
Before 1920, nothing in the Constitution stopped a State from confining the ballot to men. The original document gave no one an express right to vote; it left the regulation of elections to the States and to Congress.2 The framers could not agree on national voting qualifications, because the States defined suffrage so differently, so they provided that anyone qualified to vote in a state election could vote in a federal one.3 State law therefore decided who voted, and the text imposed no limit on what State law could say about sex.
The Supreme Court confirmed that reading in Minor v. Happersett, which rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment had already made women voters. The argument ran through the Privileges or Immunities Clause: if voting is a privilege of national citizenship, a State cannot withhold it from women.4 The Court denied the premise. The Fourteenth Amendment, it said, “did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen”; it “simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had,” and “[n]o new voters were necessarily made by it.”5 The Constitution “has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted,” and a State's power over voter qualifications was “certainly supreme until Congress acts.”6
Two further strands of reasoning pointed the same way. The Fifteenth Amendment, adopted after the Fourteenth, expressly forbids denying the vote on account of race; if the Fourteenth already protected suffrage, the Court asked, “why go through with the form of amending the Constitution to protect a part?”7 And every state of the former Confederacy had been readmitted without conferring suffrage on women, which the Court saw as more evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment did not enfranchise them.8
Later opinions read the history the same way. One supposed that when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, most constitutional experts assumed the Equal Protection Clause gave women no relief,9 and another called the need for separate amendments on race, sex, and poll taxes “forceful evidence” that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood not to empower Congress to legislate in these respects.10 Equal protection doctrine has not stayed within its original focus: the Fourteenth Amendment's history and purpose point to racial classifications aimed at African-Americans, yet the Court has not confined the categories of “suspect” classification to race.11 Whatever the Fourteenth Amendment might deliver today, the Nineteenth Amendment answered the question in the Constitution's own words.
Women gained the vote through the amendment process, not through the courts. A pivotal victory came when New York granted women the right to vote in 1917; the result was enough congressional districts with women voters to induce Congress to approve the Amendment in 1919, and it was ratified the following year.12 Early arguments stressed democratic inclusion, and proponents later added the policy reforms that women voters might bring.13 Congress proposed the Amendment on June 5, 1919, and the Secretary of State proclaimed it ratified on August 26, 1920.14 Its text follows the Fifteenth Amendment's formula and adds sex to the prohibited grounds.15
The need for an amendment rather than a statute lies in what Minor left unsettled. The Court declined to decide whether Congress's power of supervision over federal elections could reach State voter qualifications, because “no such interference has ever been attempted.”16 A statute enfranchising women would therefore have rested on an open question about Congress's power. An amendment answers that question in the constitutional text, and its second sentence gives Congress express power to enforce the answer.17
The date of the refusal therefore decides which analysis applies. For a refusal before 1920, Minor controls: citizenship does not carry the vote, and State law governs qualifications. For a refusal after 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment's express prohibition controls, and a Fourteenth Amendment analysis of a post-1920 sex-based refusal is a wrong turn.
The Voting Prohibition
Section 1 is a command addressed to governments, and each phrase of it does separate work:
- “The right of citizens of the United States to vote” names the interest protected.
- “shall not be denied or abridged” names the forbidden conduct.
- “by the United States or by any State” names the governments bound.
- “on account of sex” names the one forbidden reason.20
The command form matters. The sentence tells governments what they may not do; it never says who must be allowed to vote. A later section takes up denial, abridgment, and the causal phrase “on account of,” so this one reads only the structure.
Two governments are bound because two governments shape the ballot. States set voter qualifications and decide how federal elections are run, except where Congress steps in; the Elections Clause directs each state legislature to regulate the “Times, Places, and Manner” of congressional elections while authorizing Congress to “make or alter such Regulations.”21 A prohibition aimed at one of those governments would leave the other free to do what the first could not, so the text binds both. It also reaches only governments, a feature that matters when later sections ask what the Amendment leaves untouched.
The one forbidden reason is sex. The text speaks of sex, not of women, so on its face a rule that excludes citizens on that ground falls within the prohibition whichever sex it excludes. A single named criterion also keeps the inquiry narrow: a court asks whether sex is the reason for the denial and never has to decide who ought to vote in the first place. Other qualifications, such as residence and registration, remain where the Constitution's design put them, with the States, subject to other constitutional limits.22
That design explains why Section 1 prohibits instead of guaranteeing. The Constitution does not explicitly guarantee anyone the right to vote, and Section 1 does not add a general guarantee.23 It sits on top of a structure in which States set qualifications, and it removes one ground of exclusion from their toolkit. Had it granted every citizen an affirmative right, it would have displaced every residence and registration rule and left courts to decide who should vote.
The Amendment therefore looks to the reason for the refusal. Where sex is the reason, Section 1 applies. Where a neutral rule is the reason, the claimant must look elsewhere, to the Equal Protection Clause, which the Court has identified as the primary source of the fundamental right to vote, or to another voting amendment.25
The Nineteenth Amendment is one of four voting amendments that each bar a single ground of exclusion. The Fifteenth covers race, color, or previous condition of servitude;26 the Nineteenth covers sex; the Twenty-fourth covers failure to pay a poll tax or other tax in federal elections;27 and the Twenty-sixth covers age for citizens eighteen or older.28 None confers an affirmative right to vote on all citizens.29 Their scopes differ. The Twenty-fourth Amendment's text is confined to federal elections and to taxes, and the Twenty-sixth protects only citizens eighteen or older, while the Nineteenth Amendment's text contains no comparable limit on the elections it covers.30 In Rice v. Cayetano, the Court applied the Fifteenth Amendment's parallel command to a State, striking down a Hawaii constitutional provision that limited the vote for trustees of a state agency to descendants of certain races as “a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.”31 The Nineteenth Amendment works the same way with sex as the forbidden ground.
Voting also carries special weight, which is why a sex-based barrier draws the strongest response. The Court regards the right to vote as fundamental because it is through voting that the people choose their government and hold it accountable,32 a description that goes back to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, where the Court called the vote “preservative of all rights.” Because the right is fundamental, state and local laws that distribute the franchise selectively or unequally are usually subject to strict scrutiny.33 A rule that withholds the ballot on the basis of sex distributes the franchise selectively, and the Amendment's text forbids it outright. Fundamental status does not turn the prohibition into a guarantee, however, because the Constitution is not understood to prohibit every barrier to voting.34
The Enforcement Clause
Section 1 commands governments, and Section 2 empowers Congress to back that command with legislation: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”36 The words “this article” tie the power to the Amendment's own subject, the denial or abridgment of the vote on account of sex, so the clause takes its boundaries from Section 1.
For the parallel clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, general agreement exists that the slight wording differences are legally insignificant, that the clauses give Congress power to remedy violations, and that Congress can do more than make declarations such as “any person held as a slave has a right to habeas corpus.” Substantial disputes remain over what Congress may do beyond remedying violations.37 Those disputes belong to the later sections on appropriate legislation. Here it is enough to see where the Nineteenth Amendment's clause sits among its siblings.
The Nineteenth Amendment did not invent the device. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits denying the vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and its Section 2 gives Congress the same power in nearly the same words.38 The Twenty-fourth Amendment, which bars denial of the vote in federal elections for failure to pay a poll tax or other tax, and the Twenty-sixth, which bars denial of the vote on account of age to citizens eighteen or older, both close with essentially the same sentence.39 Five amendments use the words “right to vote,” and a dissenting opinion in Shelby County v. Holder observed that each contains the same broad empowerment of Congress, so that “Congress holds the lead rein in making the right to vote equally real for all U. S. citizens.”40 That is a dissent's reading of the constitutional structure, not a holding.
Each of these clauses lets Congress choose the means for carrying out one specific constitutional command, so each amendment that contains one has, in effect, its own Necessary and Proper Clause.41 The clause also differs in coverage from Congress's general election power. That general power comes from the Elections Clause, which concerns the times, places, and manner of electing Senators and Representatives.42 Section 2 depends on no such clause, because it attaches to the Nineteenth Amendment itself, and it supplies a separate source of authority whenever a statute targets sex-based denial of the vote. How much room “appropriate” leaves Congress, and where that room ends, is the subject of the later section on Congress's enforcement power.
The shared design also points to where doctrine comes from. The clauses are one grant of power attached to prohibitions built on the same pattern, so decisions about the sibling clauses, above all the Fifteenth's, offer the closest guide to how a court would read this one. A ruling on how Congress may enforce a ban on race-based denial of the vote shows the approach a court is likely to take to a ban on sex-based denial.
An exam problem will usually test the boundary by pairing two statutes that both cite Section 2.
The two statutes show what “appropriate” legislation is measured against. A statute earns Section 2 authority by connecting to the prohibition in Section 1, and a statute on a different subject needs a different constitutional source. Students go wrong by reading the clause as a general warrant to legislate on women's issues. It is a grant to enforce one article, and the first question on any problem is whether the statute addresses denial or abridgment of the vote on account of sex.