Concept
Reauthorization and Northwest Austin
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
Reauthorization and Northwest Austin
The Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress power “to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,” and every extension of the Voting Rights Act is a fresh use of that power.1 The power is one over means. Congress selects the remedies, while the content of the underlying right is defined in the process of judicial review, so each renewal invites the question whether the remedy Congress chose is still appropriate.2 In 1965 the Court answered that question easily. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach it upheld the original Act as a response to “voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale.”3 Four renewals followed. The question of how long a remedy built for 1965 could last reached the Court in Northwest Austin, where it asked whether so long a life could be justified.
The preclearance procedures were born temporary. They were set to expire automatically after five years, on the theory that the voting discrimination they addressed would likely have been remedied by then. That theory gives the length of the remedy constitutional weight. A burden justified by the conditions of 1965 has a natural lifespan, which is the life of those conditions. If Congress could renew it indefinitely on the strength of its first record, nothing would remain to test whether the conditions still existed. Each renewal must therefore stand on its own footing.
Preclearance also differs in kind from the Act’s other tools. Section 2 of the Act applies nationwide and has no preapproval requirement; if voters or the federal government believe a districting scheme or other practice produces discriminatory results, the burden is on them to sue and prove the claim.4 Preclearance runs the other way. It singles out particular jurisdictions and requires them to obtain approval before changing their voting rules. That selectivity, and the duration of the selection, is what drew the Court’s scrutiny.
The four reauthorizations are easy to blur together, and the detail that matters for the later cases is whether each one refreshed the coverage formula or left it alone:
- 1970. Congress renewed the Act for five years and extended the formula to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent registration or turnout as of 1968. That swept in several counties in California, New Hampshire, and New York. Congress also extended the ban on tests and devices nationwide.5
- 1975. Congress renewed the Act for seven years, moved the formula forward to 1972 data, and amended the definition of “test or device.”6
- 1982. Congress renewed the Act for 25 years without altering the formula. It did amend bailout so that political subdivisions of covered jurisdictions could seek it, on a ten-year record free of a forbidden test or device, a failure to receive preclearance, or a lost Section 2 suit.7
- 2006. Congress again renewed the Act for 25 years without altering the formula. Section 5 now forbids voting changes adopted with “any discriminatory purpose,” as well as changes that diminish the ability of minority citizens to elect their preferred candidates.8
The formula’s history is in that list. Congress moved it forward in 1970 and 1975, so jurisdictions were measured against 1968 and then 1972 data, and it left the formula alone in 1982 and 2006. The formula in force after 2006 therefore still turned on whether a jurisdiction used a voting test in 1972 and had under 50 percent registration or turnout that year. No later development could count, either to bring a jurisdiction in or to take one out. The 2006 amendments to Section 5 thus enlarged the burden in the same renewal that declined to refresh the data deciding who bore it. The later cases confront exactly that combination.
The Court upheld each earlier reauthorization against constitutional challenge, in Georgia v. United States, City of Rome v. United States, and Lopez v. Monterey County.9 City of Rome shows why those renewals held up. The Court sustained the 1975 seven-year extension after observing that Congress, having given the matter careful consideration, found the extension necessary to preserve the “limited and fragile” achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of voting discrimination.10 That renewal was short, it came ten years after enactment, and it rested on a formula Congress had just moved forward to 1972 data. The 2006 extension ran 25 years, came 41 years after enactment, and rested on those same 1972 data. Judicial review of Congress’s choice of means persists in both years, but the record that has to satisfy it had aged three decades, so the question left open was whether the evidence before Congress in 2006 warranted continuing preclearance in the covered jurisdictions.11
The challenge to the 2006 reauthorization arrived as Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder. A Texas utility district sought to bail out of coverage and, in the alternative, attacked the Act’s constitutionality. The Court resolved the case on a statutory ground when one was available, which is the practice called constitutional avoidance. It concluded that “underlying constitutional concerns” compelled a broader reading of the bailout provision, and it construed the statute to let the utility district seek bailout.12 The Act therefore stayed in force, and the constitutional issues were left for another day.13
The opinion nevertheless said a good deal about the deferred question. Chief Justice Roberts explained that Section 5 “imposes substantial federalism costs” and “differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.”14 That concern is specific to preclearance, which treats States differently, whereas Section 2 applies nationwide without preapproval.15 The Court also observed that things had changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates approached parity, blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees were rare, and minority candidates held office at unprecedented levels. It questioned whether the problems Section 5 addressed were still “concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”16 The first two points describe what preclearance costs, and the last two ask whether the formula still fits the problem. Eight Members of the Court subscribed to these views, and the remaining Member would have held the Act unconstitutional.17
From those doubts the Court drew two statements that later decisions carried forward. It said that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs,” and that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”18 The first ties the duration of the burden to the duration of the problem, which restates the logic of the original sunset. The second is a fit requirement. Preclearance burdens only some States, so the geographic line Congress draws has to track where the problem actually lies. A formula frozen at 1972 data cannot register movement in either direction, and its fit can decay as the facts change.
Students often treat Northwest Austin as the case that struck down preclearance. It did not. It resolved the dispute on statutory grounds, so the 2006 reauthorization and the coverage formula survived it intact. What it supplied was the vocabulary of current burdens, current needs, and sufficiently related coverage. Four years later the Court turned that vocabulary into a holding in Shelby County v. Holder, which found the Section 4 formula beyond Congress’s enforcement power because it rested on 40-year-old data that did not adequately reflect current conditions. Shelby County described these same principles as the ones guiding its review.19