Concept
Private Conduct Without State Action
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power
Private Conduct Without State Action
Congress may reach private conduct under the Thirteenth Amendment because the Amendment never confines its command to the state. Section 1 provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Section 2 adds one sentence: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”1 No word in Section 1 makes the state the only actor whose conduct is forbidden. The text describes a condition that may not exist anywhere within the nation’s jurisdiction, and it is silent about who brings that condition about.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are different. Due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, like voting rights under the Fifteenth, apply only to state interferences, so a litigant who wants to reach a private actor under either must bring the conduct within the state action concept.2 That concept does stretch to some seemingly private behavior, but the showing can be demanding. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the Court, by a vote of 6-3, rejected a claim that a private club’s racial discrimination was unconstitutional because the club held a state liquor license.3 The Thirteenth Amendment spares a claimant that inquiry. The state action requirement applies to claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, not to claims under the Thirteenth,4 and the Thirteenth Amendment, even absent implementing legislation, is not subject to it.5
Section 2 carries that breadth with it. Because the declaration in Section 1 does not stop at state action, Congress may enforce it by prohibiting private as well as public actions that it believes are forms of enslavement.6 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. applied that principle to housing. The statute at issue, § 1982, operated on the unofficial acts of private individuals, whether or not state law sanctioned them, and the Court found that this presented no constitutional problem.7 Its reasoning was conditional. If Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that keep people from buying and renting property because of race or color, then a federal statute calculated to achieve that objective does not exceed the power simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate private individuals.8 The real constitutional question, in the Court’s words, was whether the authority to enforce the Amendment “by appropriate legislation” includes the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property.9
On those premises, Congress could prohibit housing developers from refusing to sell to persons of color. Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court called a federal law that “bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property” “a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment,” reasoning that housing discrimination was one of the badges and incidents of slavery that Congress could prohibit.10 Whether a given condition qualifies as a badge or incident is a separate question for later sections. The point here is narrower: under this Amendment, the absence of state action does not put private conduct beyond Congress’s reach. The next section turns to the Civil Rights Cases, the backdrop to this line of authority.
The commerce power offers a second route to private actors, and it has been invoked to support civil rights legislation forbidding private racial discrimination.12 The Thirteenth Amendment is a separate source of power. All three Reconstruction Amendments close with a clause giving Congress power to enforce them by appropriate legislation, but the post-Civil War additions, unlike the original grants, were born of a special concern with racial discrimination, and the civil rights powers they confer are potentially the most far-reaching.13 The enforcement clauses therefore do not explain why the Thirteenth Amendment reaches private conduct while the others generally do not; what each clause enforces does. Legislation under Section 2 need not rest on any commercial connection. How closely it resembles commerce power legislation is nonetheless unsettled. A court could reason that restrictions on private conduct under the Thirteenth Amendment are akin to restrictions imposed under the commerce power and therefore subject to the anti-commandeering rule. It might instead view the Thirteenth Amendment as closer to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth, as to which that rule appears inapplicable.14 A later section returns to these questions.