Concept
Foreign Affairs Powers
War, defense, and foreign affairs powers
Foreign Affairs Powers
The Constitution says little about foreign policy, and what it says is divided between Congress and the President. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to declare war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to make rules concerning captures on land and water, to raise and support armies, and to define and punish piracies, felonies on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. Article II makes the President Commander in Chief and gives the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the power to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.1
Courts add little to that text. The Supreme Court has often treated foreign policy questions as nonjusticiable political questions, matters for the executive and the legislature to resolve without judicial review, and Goldwater v. Carter is the standard example: the Court held nonjusticiable a challenge to the President's rescission of the treaty with Taiwan.2 With few judicial decisions to draw on, analysis in this area starts from the constitutional grants and from the handful of cases that speak to the allocation. The war and defense powers covered earlier in this chapter are one part of the subject, and this unit takes up the rest of Congress's authority over the nation's dealings with other countries.
Four questions organize what follows. Which foreign affairs powers does Article I give Congress expressly? Does Congress hold foreign affairs power that no clause names? What does that power do to the balance between federal and state authority? And where does the Constitution commit a function to the President alone, beyond Congress's reach?
Express Foreign Affairs Grants
Article I, Section 8 supplies most of Congress's express authority over the nation's dealings with other countries. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court collected the main grants while explaining how much of foreign policy still runs through legislation: Congress may "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," "declare War," "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," and "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."3 Article I also gives Congress the power to provide for the common defense and to raise, support, and regulate an army and a navy.4
The grants sort into four groups, each defined by what it lets Congress control:
- The powers to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to set a uniform rule of naturalization govern what crosses the border and who may become a citizen.5
- The power to define and punish piracies, felonies on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations lets Congress make that conduct a federal crime.6
- The powers to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, make rules concerning captures, and raise and support the armed forces decide when and how the nation fights, as the earlier sections of this chapter developed.7
- The power to provide for the common defense, together with Congress's control of appropriations, decides whether an embassy or an operation can be paid for.8
The money power is the easiest to overlook, and it often gives Congress its leverage over initiatives that begin in the executive. The Court's illustration was recognition. Formal recognition of a foreign government may be a hollow act without the dispatch of an ambassador, the easing of trade restrictions, and the conclusion of treaties, and each of those steps requires action by the Senate or by the whole Congress. The President cannot appoint an ambassador or make a treaty without the Senate's approval, and could not build an embassy abroad without a congressional appropriation of the necessary funds.9 A President can announce a policy alone, but carrying it out takes legislators.
Article II supplies the executive half of the allocation. The President is Commander in Chief and makes treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senators present.10 Because the text says so little, the line between the two shares is contested, yet the success of executive foreign policy depends, to a great extent, on the support of Congress.11 Matching a statute to a clause is the first step in any problem about congressional power over foreign relations.
A common error runs the other way: because a measure concerns foreign relations and passes easily, its sponsors assume that Congress can finish the job alone.
The two scenes differ in which clause is available. The import ban and the piracy statute fit grants that Article I assigns to Congress, so Congress acts by ordinary legislation. The compact fits only the Treaty Clause, which gives the power to the President with the Senate's consent and gives the House no part.12 The threshold is two-thirds of the senators present, a lower bar than two-thirds of the whole Senate whenever attendance is incomplete.13 The next subsection turns to foreign affairs authority that Congress holds without any clause naming it, and the last subsection shows where the Constitution commits a function to the President alone.
Inherent Foreign Affairs Power
Some of Congress's foreign affairs authority attaches to no clause at all, and the explanation begins in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.. The case was a prosecution under a joint resolution authorizing the President to prohibit arms sales to countries engaged in a border conflict.16 Before it turned to the challenge to that delegation of power, the Court compared the federal government's powers over external affairs with its powers over internal affairs and said that the two classes differ both in origin and in nature.17
The familiar rule that the federal government may exercise only enumerated powers, plus the implied powers necessary and proper to carry them into effect, is categorically true, the Court said, only of internal affairs.18 The reason lies in how the internal powers were assembled. In that field the Constitution's primary purpose was to carve from the general mass of legislative power the states then possessed those portions it thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving the rest with the states.19 A carving needs something to carve from, so the enumeration principle describes only powers the states once held. Powers of external sovereignty could not have been taken from the states, because the states never held them, and the Court concluded that their investment in the federal government "did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."20 The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, and to maintain diplomatic relations would have vested in the federal government even if the Constitution had never mentioned them, as "necessary concomitants of nationality."21
That account describes the federal government as a whole, and Perez v. Brownell applied it to Congress. The Court sustained a statutory provision on loss of citizenship while acknowledging that "there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs," and it held that "there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation."22 The reasoning was functional. The states that joined together to form a nation, and created a federal government to conduct its affairs, must be held to have granted the powers indispensable to that government's functioning effectively in the company of sovereign nations.23 The Court has not abandoned the point. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, which held that Congress could not make recognition determinations contrary to the President's, the majority still noted that it did not question the substantial powers of Congress over foreign affairs in general.24
Some inherent powers may flow to the executive, while others rest with Congress. Three theories compete to explain the congressional ones, each offering a different reason why a legislative power could exist without a matching clause:25
- The power must exist somewhere, and the states cannot wield it and never have in any serious way, so it rests with Congress.
- Simple logic suggests that the power to deal with any distinctly national subject must lie with the national lawmaking authorities.
- The power springs from the Necessary and Proper Clause, on the theory that exercising it helps carry into execution the aggregate of national powers vested in the federal government.
The theories need not exclude one another, since different unenumerated powers might rest on different theories. The result is a cluster of congressional powers, often called inherent, that lack a readily discernible attachment to any specific textual grant.26 The Necessary and Proper theory stays closest to the constitutional text, because it treats foreign affairs legislation as a means of executing granted powers, while the other two rest on the structure of nationhood that Curtiss-Wright described. For a statute with a genuine foreign relations subject, an answer can invoke any one of the three.
The first statute shows why the power matters in practice. Whether Congress could use its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations to compel state courts to hear such petitions is far from clear, yet the statute seems valid because it deals with a matter of foreign relations, and because Congress can enact it, Congress can displace state decision-making in a police-power field such as family law.27 The second statute falls on the other side of the line. Its subject is a domestic matter between residents of one state, so the opening premise of Curtiss-Wright controls: the principle that the federal government holds only enumerated powers and the implied powers needed to execute them applies fully to internal affairs.28 The foreign element carries the whole difference between the two statutes.
Curtiss-Wright is also remembered for describing the President as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." That description was not necessary to the decision, which concerned action that Congress had authorized, and in Zivotofsky the Court declined to treat it as unbounded presidential power or as freeing the President from Congress's lawmaking authority in international relations.29 The limits on presidential claims are taken up in the last subsection. The point here is narrower: external sovereignty supports legislation by Congress.
Federalism Consequences
Congress's inherent authority over foreign affairs changes the usual federalism analysis in three ways, and each leaves state law more exposed than it would be against a statute on a domestic subject.33 The text already withholds some foreign relations functions from the states. Article I, Section 10 forbids a state to make a treaty or coin money, and Congress cannot waive that prohibition: a federal statute purporting to authorize states to make treaties would exceed Congress's power.34 The three consequences below go further, because they reach state laws that no clause names. The first concerns how courts read federal statutes, the second concerns state laws that no federal statute addresses, and the third concerns protections for the states that may not follow the foreign affairs power at all. The first two can be applied with confidence, and the third is an open question.
Preemption is the displacement of state law by federal law. In most fields courts approach it with a presumption against preemption, which tilts the reading of a federal statute toward leaving state law in place. That presumption does not operate when the federal statute concerns foreign relations, and in that domain the Court often seems inclined, if not eager, to find the challenged state law incompatible with the federal scheme.35 One way to see why is to ask what the presumption protects. It shelters fields the states have traditionally governed, such as family law and property, and the states never held the powers of external sovereignty. A state rule that would survive an ambiguous statute on a domestic subject may therefore fall to an equally ambiguous statute about foreign relations.
The second consequence reaches state laws that no federal statute addresses. In Zschernig v. Miller the Court invalidated an Oregon statute that restricted testamentary gifts to foreign beneficiaries. It neither could nor did point to any preemptive federal statute. It struck the law down because it constituted "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress."36 Ordinary preemption asks what Congress has said. Zschernig asks which government holds the field, and the Constitution's answer is the President and Congress, so a state law that intrudes on that field is invalid whether or not either branch has legislated. If state laws fell only when a federal statute displaced them, each state could pursue its own foreign policy in the gaps between federal enactments.
The doctrine reaches only some state laws, those that impinge so much on federal authority over foreign affairs that they cannot stand.37
The Oregon statute made a foreign beneficiary's ability to take depend on the state's treatment of foreign nationals, so the state was in effect entering the field of foreign affairs. The divorce rule enters no such field, and any effect on foreign relations is incidental. A reader should therefore ask what the state law actually does. An effect on foreigners does not decide the question, and a state law in a police-power field without a real foreign relations impact is displaced only by a preemptive federal statute.
The third consequence is an open question, and an answer should say so. The commerce power is subject to federalism-based external limits that protect the states: the anticommandeering principle, which bars Congress from conscripting state governments to carry out federal policy, and state sovereign immunity from suit. It is possible that neither limit applies to laws enacted under the foreign affairs power.38 The argument is that the principle should give way to choices made by federal decisionmakers who are pursuing critical national objectives in the delicate field of international relations.39 The difficulty is that no decision settles the point, so the argument cannot be recited as a rule.
The three consequences differ in strength. The first two follow from decided law and can be stated as rules. The third is a possibility, and a sound answer labels it as an argument to make and not a holding to cite.
Presidential Recognition Limit
Congress's foreign affairs authority, whether it rests on an express clause or on external sovereignty, stops where the Constitution commits a function to the President alone, and recognition is the clearest example. Recognition is the formal act by which the United States acknowledges a foreign state or government as sovereign. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry the Court held that the power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone, so Congress cannot make recognition determinations contrary to the President's.41 The President's Article II powers to receive ambassadors, make treaties, and send ambassadors are the traditional avenues of recognition.42 The decision draws a boundary around the congressional grants described above and leaves those grants in place.
The reasons come from what recognition demands of a government. The Court reasoned that the Nation must speak with one voice on recognition and that the voice must be the President's, because between the two political branches only the Executive has unity at all times, and with unity come "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch."43 A recognition decision settles how the United States will treat another government, including whether a foreign state may initiate lawsuits here to vindicate its rights, and the Court said that assurances of that kind cannot be equivocal.44 If the President and Congress could announce conflicting positions, a foreign government could not tell which one bound the country. The President is also better placed than a legislature to conduct the delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that lead to a recognition decision, and to take the decisive, unequivocal action that recognizing a state requires.45
Practice points the same way. Since the founding the President has exercised the power to recognize new states unilaterally, and the Court has endorsed that practice.46 The judiciary has ordinarily followed the executive on such questions. Baker v. Carr observed that recognition of foreign governments so strongly defies judicial treatment that, without executive recognition, a foreign state has been called "a republic of whose existence we know nothing," although once sovereignty over an area is politically determined and declared, courts may examine the resulting status and decide independently whether a statute applies to that area.47
The allocation was tested by section 214(d) of a foreign relations statute, which directed the Secretary of State, on the request of a citizen born in Jerusalem or the citizen's guardian, to record the place of birth as "Israel" for passport and related purposes.48 The provision sought to override the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual, which implemented the Executive's consistent decision not to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the city.49 Because the power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone, the question was whether the statute infringed on that decision. The Court reasoned that a recognition power covering only the initial formal determination would mean little, so the power must also let the President maintain that determination in the statements of the President and the President's agents.50 The last step decides the case: if Congress could command the President to state a recognition position inconsistent with the President's own, Congress could override the recognition determination itself, and the statute was held unconstitutional.51 A passport entry is a statement the Secretary of State makes for the government, so the statute amounted to a congressional instruction about what the Executive would say on a recognition question.
The Secretary's argument for broad presidential authority leaned on Curtiss-Wright's description of the President as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." The Court declined to acknowledge power of that breadth. The description was unnecessary to the holding in Curtiss-Wright, which concerned action Congress had authorized and not a unilateral presidential determination, and that case did not hold that the President is free from Congress's lawmaking power in international relations.52 The distinction follows the general structure of executive power, which is at its maximum when the President acts with congressional authorization and at its minimum when the President acts against an express or implied congressional prohibition.53 Curtiss-Wright presented the first posture. Zivotofsky arose in the opposite posture, with the President's position contradicted by a statute, and the President's position prevailed because the Court found the recognition power to reside in the President alone.
None of this makes foreign affairs a presidential preserve. The Court itself listed the powers Congress holds, among them the powers to regulate commerce with foreign nations, establish a uniform rule of naturalization, define and punish offenses against the law of nations, declare war, and make rules for the forces, while the President cannot make a treaty or appoint an ambassador without the Senate or build an embassy abroad without an appropriation.54 Although the President alone effects the formal act of recognition, those powers and Congress's central role in making laws give it substantial authority over many of the policy determinations that precede and follow recognition, so a Congress that disagrees with the President's recognition policy can impose real consequences.55 The majority accordingly did not question Congress's substantial powers over foreign affairs in general or over passports in particular.56 The statute fell because of what it commanded, a statement contradicting the President's recognition position, and the subject of passports stayed within Congress's reach.
The first two responses let a disagreeing Congress press its view without contradicting the recognition decision, and the third attempts to reverse that decision through the Executive's own voice. Zivotofsky also differs from the cases on congressional war powers in its posture: there Congress acts within a power it holds, while here Congress reaches for a function the President holds alone. Reading the case as general presidential supremacy in foreign affairs stretches it, since the Court read the sole-organ language narrowly and left Congress's substantial powers intact.