Concept
Reach of the War Power
War, defense, and foreign affairs powers
Reach of the War Power
The power to make war is the power to prosecute war successfully, and that formula covers a conflict from beginning to end. Congress and the President may use the war power to prepare for war, to act to prevent it, to wage it, to end it, and to ameliorate its effects after hostilities have ceased.1 Each phase follows from the same logic. A government that could fight but could not arm beforehand or repair the damage afterward would hold a power too thin to do what the grant was meant to do.
Most of those phases unfold far from any battlefield, so the war power operates at home. Its exercise is not limited to precise military or battlefield scenarios, and a court will rarely second-guess Congress or the President in a war-related context.2 Factories must produce, materials must be allocated, and returning veterans need housing and jobs. Legislation on any of these subjects can rest on the war power even though no soldier is involved.
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. gives the leading illustration. The Court sustained rent controls that Congress imposed after the fighting stopped, because the housing deficit had been caused in considerable measure by the heavy demobilization of veterans and by the diversion of building materials to military projects during the war. Since the war effort had contributed heavily to that deficit, Congress could act even after the cessation of hostilities to control the forces that the shortage created.3 A later section examines how long and how far the power lasts once the shooting ends.
Two settings show the domestic reach most clearly. The first is the war itself, when mobilization puts the national economy under Congress's regulatory hand. The second is the period near war in time, before or after, when Congress shapes civilian programs and institutions so that the forces stay ready and the country has the people and resources it needs to defend itself.
Regulation During War
The war power reaches the domestic economy with its greatest force while a war is under way. A modern war is won partly in factories, rail yards, and rental markets, and Congress may regulate all three. It may, for example, freeze wages and prices to stabilize an economy buffeted by the effects of war.4
The reason for so broad a reach lies in what a modern war consumes. Farms, mines, factories, and railroads feed, arm, and move an army, so the power to raise and support armies cannot stop at the recruiting office. In Lichter v. United States the Court described the express grant as “broad rather than restrictive,” stressed the power to support armies as well as to raise them, and observed that in global warfare “mobilized property in the form of equipment and supplies became as essential as mobilized manpower.”5 That reasoning also answers a property owner who objects to the burden. In Bowles v. Willingham the Court reasoned that “[a] nation which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging of . . . war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control on the domestic front which will assure each landlord a ‘fair return’ on his property.”6 The argument runs from the greater burden to the lesser: if Congress may take a citizen's service at risk of death, it may regulate what a landlord charges.
The decided cases show how many forms the regulation takes. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. recognized that Congress may draft men for battle service and may also impose affirmative duties on business organizations to support the fighting men. The Court has likewise upheld laws requisitioning food and fuel and laws taking over factories, telephone systems, and rail lines as part of the war effort.7 Price and rent controls fit the same pattern. Woods, taken up in its own section below, sustained controls that were still operating after the fighting had ended, because they addressed a housing shortage the war had helped create.8
The World War I ban on the sale of intoxicating beverages shows how deeply wartime regulation can reach into ordinary life. Congress barred sales to each and every would-be drinker in the nation, and the Court upheld the law “as a means of increasing our war efficiency,” on the ground that it fostered the sobriety, and so the productivity, of the American work force.9 The chain of reasoning is short: a sober work force produces more, and greater production strengthens the war effort. The Court accepted that justification even though the ban had what it later called an “undoubtedly commercially crippling” effect on brewers, distillers, and liquor distributors.10 Harm to the regulated industry did not defeat the law, because the connection to the war supplied the constitutional footing.
Authority this wide raises the question of limits. The war power remains subject to constitutional limitations, yet the actuality of war has sometimes weakened the Court's willingness to apply them with full force. Korematsu v. United States, which deferred to the wartime detention of Japanese Americans, is the usual example, and it is one reason the war power is perhaps the most dangerous of all constitutional powers.11 A later section takes up the limits and the character of judicial review. For now, expect wartime economic regulation to be the ordinary exercise of the power and invalidation to be rare.
The war power also matters as a separate source of federal authority, because it does not depend on the commerce power. Congress may regulate civilians under it where the commerce power would not reach. The prohibition law illustrates the point, since the ban may well not have been sustainable under the commerce power at that time.12 Individual mandates make the contrast sharper. In NFIB v. Sebelius the Court held that strict limits apply to individual mandates imposed under the commerce power, yet it made clear that Congress could impose such mandates under its military powers.13 That pronouncement was unsurprising, because the Court has long recognized that Congress may conscript citizens into the armed forces under its powers to raise an army and provide a navy, as in Arver v. United States (the Selective Draft Law Cases).14
Two facts moved the answer: whether the measure had a war-related object, and which power Congress invoked. Those facts matter more as time passes. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have increasingly constrained the commerce power, and the separate work done by the war powers and the other non-commerce powers grows in importance as a result.15
Readiness Beyond the Battlefield
The war power does not wait for a war to begin. Article I gives Congress the powers to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and those grants, coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause, support action to prepare for the possibility of war and to prevent it.17 An army cannot be raised and supported in any meaningful way if civilian conditions around it undermine the troops' health, discipline, and morale, or if the nation cannot recruit the personnel and expertise it needs. Measures that protect and prepare the force before and apart from combat are therefore part of what the power to raise armies includes.
The simplest example looks ahead. In preparation for the possibility of war, Congress might establish a student loan program that ensures the nation an ample supply of scientists and engineers, some of whom will work in the defense industry.18 The link to readiness is the pipeline. A military that depends on advanced technology needs people who can design and build it, and loans that fill laboratories and engineering schools produce those people before the need becomes urgent. The power also runs backward in time. After a war, Congress might provide educational benefits to veterans to promote educational opportunity and to prevent saturation of the postwar job market.19 Woods, which sustained rent controls after hostilities had ended, belongs to that backward-looking side and receives its own treatment below.
Peacetime regulation can also reach civilians directly. The Court has recognized Congress's ability to regulate off-base civilian conduct, including conduct the commerce power would not reach, when doing so enhances troop morale, fitness, and discipline and is therefore necessary and proper to raising and supporting armies.20 In McKinley v. United States, Justice Day declared for a unanimous Court that, “to guard and promote the health and efficiency of the men composing the army,” Congress could make it a crime to operate a house of ill fame within five miles of a military station.21 The five-mile radius states the link to readiness on its face. An establishment that close threatens the health and fitness of the soldiers stationed there, so a ban on it protects the force itself. The regulated party was a civilian operating off the base, and the case shows that readiness can justify federal criminal law over people who never wore a uniform.
A court will rarely second-guess Congress in a war-related context, and readiness regulation is no exception.22 Deference still leaves something to examine. Each example above rests on a stated connection between the regulated activity and the condition of the forces: scientists for defense work, soldiers' health and discipline, troop morale and fitness.
The two statutes differ in one respect, the presence of a readiness link, and that fact decides whether the war power is available. The power is wide in peacetime because readiness has many parts. Its limit is the requirement that the regulation actually serve one of them.