Concept
Textual Limits on Taxation
Taxing power
Textual Limits on Taxation
The sentence of Article I, section 8 that grants Congress the power “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” also limits it, for the sentence closes with the proviso that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”1 The earlier sections of this chapter asked whether an exaction is a tax at all and supplied three screens for the answer: the label, the revenue yield, and the line between tax and penalty. A measure that passes those screens may rest on the taxing power. It must still clear every specific limit that the constitutional text places on that power.
Those limits fall into two groups. The first group is tax-specific, because each limit in it applies to taxes and to nothing else. Two of them govern the shape of a tax: duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform throughout the United States, and direct taxes must be apportioned among the states by population. A third bars one subject of taxation altogether, articles exported from any state, and a fourth fixes where revenue legislation must begin, in the House of Representatives. The Sixteenth Amendment modifies one of the four by freeing taxes on incomes from apportionment, so the apportionment clause must be read as amended.
The second group is general. The Bill of Rights restrains every federal power, so a tax stands under it exactly as a regulation under the commerce power would.2 The Tenth Amendment looks like a member of this group but does not behave like one, for reasons the last subsection explains. The subsections below take the limits in turn, beginning with the uniformity proviso because it sits inside the grant itself and its wording invites a common misreading.
Geographic Uniformity
The taxing clause ends with a proviso: “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”3 “Uniform” sounds like a promise that every taxpayer will be treated alike, and reading it that way is the most common error on this topic. The words that carry the limit are “throughout the United States.” They make uniformity a rule about place: Congress must impose duties, imposts, and excises “without geographic variation throughout the nation,” but it need not tax all taxpayers equally.4 The proviso also has a defined reach. It governs duties, imposts, and excises, while direct taxes follow the apportionment rule taken up next, and between them the two classes “include every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty.”5
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., a federal excise reached a business when a corporation carried it on and spared the same business when a partnership or an individual carried it on. The taxpayers called that arrangement so unequal and arbitrary that it fell beyond Congress’s authority. The Court answered that the only limitation on that authority is uniformity in laying the tax, and that “uniformity does not require the equal application of the tax to all persons or corporations who may come within its operation, but is limited to geographical uniformity throughout the United States.” It added that Knowlton v. Moore had already discussed the subject fully and set it at rest.6 Objections to a tax’s exemptions can still arise under other provisions. Steward Machine, for one, rejected an argument that an excise was invalid under the Fifth Amendment “by force of its exemptions.”7
Classification among persons has to stay open to Congress, and the Court has said so from the beginning. In levying excises it has recognized “the most ample authority … to select some and omit other possible subjects of taxation, to select one calling and omit another, to tax one class of property and to forbear to tax another.”8 Congress may likewise tax high-wage earners at higher rates than low-wage earners.9 A clause demanding equal treatment of every taxpayer would call every exemption and every graduated rate into question.
Because the clause asks about place and not about yield, a tax can draw most of its revenue from a few states and still be uniform. An excise on oil production raises nothing in a state with no oil, yet it varies nowhere, for it applies wherever oil is produced. Uneven revenue shows where the subject happens to be found. It does not show that the rule differs from place to place.
The hard case arises when the statute itself draws its line at a place. United States v. Ptasynski upheld an oil-tax exemption that, by its terms, applied only to Alaskan oil. The Court reasoned that Alaskan oil operations had features so distinctive that Congress could have directed the exemption to only and all Alaskan oil without mentioning Alaska at all. It stated the starting point in two steps: “Where Congress defines the subject of a tax in nongeographic terms, the Uniformity Clause is satisfied . . . . But where Congress does choose to frame a tax in geographic terms, we will examine the classification closely to see if there is actual geographic discrimination.”10 The decision yields a usable check. Ask whether Congress could draw the same line by describing the real feature that distinguishes the favored production. If it could, the place name is shorthand for a difference in the subject; if location is the only difference, the exemption discriminates. How far the Court will carry Ptasynski is unclear, so treat it as the starting point of the analysis and not as permission for every regional exemption.11
Step three is where students most often err, because uneven revenue looks like unequal treatment. A tax that raises nothing in one state and most of its money in another applies the same rule in both, and the clause asks only about the rule.
Direct Taxes and Apportionment
Two clauses require some taxes to be divided among the states by population. Article I, section 9 forbids a “Capitation, or other direct, Tax” unless it is laid “in Proportion to the Census or enumeration,” and Article I, section 2 provides that “direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States” according to their numbers.13 Apportionment sets each state’s share of the revenue by its share of the national population, so a state with a tenth of the people must supply a tenth of the proceeds, whatever the wealth within its borders.14 The rule limits how Congress may exercise the taxing power; the power itself comes from Article I, section 8, which also supplies the uniformity proviso.15 Every tax therefore falls into one of two classes, direct taxes that must be apportioned and duties, imposts, and excises that must be uniform, and together the classes “include every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty.”16
Three terms sort a tax into its class. A capitation, or head tax, is paid by every person “without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.”17 A direct tax is a tax on real or personal property imposed solely because the taxpayer owns it, and a tax on the income from such property is also direct, though the Sixteenth Amendment exempts income taxes from apportionment.18 An excise, or indirect tax, falls on an activity or on the exercise of a privilege, such as manufacture, sale, or the carrying on of business, and it is not subject to apportionment.19 The variable that separates the categories is the trigger. Ownership alone puts a tax on the direct side; an act the taxpayer performs puts it on the indirect side.
The Court has read “direct” narrowly from the start. In Hylton v. United States the Court was unanimous, and the Justices who wrote opinions either asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of taxation were direct: capitations and land taxes.20 Justice Paterson, in an opinion later quoted in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., was no admirer of the apportionment rule. He called it “radically wrong,” said it “cannot be supported by any solid reasoning,” observed that “numbers do not afford a just estimate or rule of wealth,” and concluded that the rule “ought not to be extended by construction.”21
The tax in Hylton fell on carriages, and Justice Iredell’s arithmetic shows why a tax like it cannot be apportioned sensibly. He supposed a $10 tax on each carriage, with the carriages in the nation counted at 105, for $1,050 in all. Virginia’s share of 19/105 comes to $190, and Connecticut’s share of 7/105 comes to $70. If Virginia has 50 carriages, each Virginia owner pays $3.80; if Connecticut has only 2, each Connecticut owner pays $35; and a state with no carriages could not be taxed at all.22 The quota is set by head count while the tax base is carriages, so the burden on an owner depends on how many carriages the owner’s state happens to hold. A tax that cannot be apportioned sensibly, the reasoning ran, is not a direct tax. A capitation avoids the mismatch because its base is people, the same thing that sets the quota.
The distortion grows as the base becomes more varied. A dissent in Pollock reasoned that, if equal property in each state means equal income, each inhabitant of South Carolina would pay three and one-half times as much in proportion to means as each inhabitant of Massachusetts, and Mississippi, with a valuation of $352 per capita, would pay four times as much as Rhode Island, with $1,459.23
The narrow list held for generations. In 1880 the Court said that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” In 1895 Pollock added taxes on personal property and on income from personal property, in striking down aspects of the federal income tax. The Sixteenth Amendment overturned that result, though the Court has continued to treat taxes on personal property as direct.24 The next subsection takes up Pollock and the Amendment. For now, the line the decisions draw follows the trigger: a tax is direct when it falls on property solely by reason of ownership, and a tax on using the property, transferring it, or receiving it is indirect.25
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. applied the trigger test to a levy on corporations that was payable only if a corporation carried on business in the designated capacity. That made the tax an excise on the privilege of doing business and not a tax on property, because the difference between mere ownership of property and the actual doing of business in a certain way is substantial and not nominal.26 Who writes the check does not decide the classification. Scholey v. Rew sustained a federal tax on persons who received real property from a deceased under a will or by intestate succession, against the claim that it was an unapportioned direct tax on property. The recipient bore the tax, but the tax fell on the transfer and not on ownership.27
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius applied these categories to the individual mandate’s payment. The challengers argued that, if the payment was a tax, it was a direct tax that Congress had not apportioned.28 The Court tested the payment against the two recognized categories and found it in neither. It was not a capitation, because a capitation is owed by every person “without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance,” whereas this payment was triggered by specific circumstances: earning a certain amount of income and not obtaining health insurance. It was also plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or personal property, so it was not a direct tax that had to be apportioned.29 The Court declined to push the direct-tax concept further than Pollock had, and the challenge failed.30 The structure of the definition explains the result: a capitation attaches to existence alone, so any additional trigger takes a tax out of that category.
As a practical matter, the limit now has little bite. In the twentieth century Congress has not imposed a capitation or a true direct tax other than perhaps an income tax, and the Sixteenth Amendment ended the controversy over unapportioned income taxes.31 An apportionment problem on an exam therefore usually resolves by showing that the exaction is neither a capitation nor a tax on ownership, the same sorting the Court performed for the mandate payment.
Step four carries most of the weight on modern fact patterns. A tax paid by an individual is not direct for that reason alone, and the identity of the payer does not decide the classification.
The Sixteenth Amendment
The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,” and without regard to any census.33 The grant is an exception to the apportionment rule, and it is narrow. It lifts the rule for one subject, income, and it covers income from every source, including income from property, the category the rule had been held to reach. The decision that prompted the Amendment explains its shape.
Pollock, decided in 1895, produced the rule the Amendment displaced. The Court reviewed the federal income tax of 1894 with evident gravity, saying that a question touching a great governmental power “demands in its discharge the utmost deliberation and care.”34 Its holding, as Eisner v. Macomber later summarized it, was that taxes on rents and profits of real estate and on returns from investments of personal property were “in effect direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by reason of ownership,” which Congress could not impose without apportionment.35 Congress had not apportioned the tax, so the Court held it void insofar as it fell on income from real and personal property, and because it treated sections twenty-seven through thirty-seven as one entire scheme of taxation, the whole group fell.36 The Court did not comment on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, which taxation had often reached in the guise of an excise sustained as such.37
The reasoning treated income from property as the property’s own yield. A landlord owes tax on rent only because the landlord owns the building, so a tax on the rent burdens ownership. The result was awkward for any general income tax, since an apportioned tax must raise from each state a sum fixed by head count. Pollock itself identified the remedy. If the Constitution should have been so framed that a tax of this kind could be laid, the Court said, “the instrument defines the way for its amendment.”38 The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1913 and ended the controversy over the constitutionality of unapportioned income taxes.39 As Eisner explained, the Amendment, adopted in recognition of the limit Pollock had placed on Congress, “did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income.”40
That narrowness shapes the analysis. If Congress’s label controlled, Congress could reach a landowner’s holdings by calling the tax an income tax, and the apportionment rule would vanish for property taxes. The Court closes that door. Congress “cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate,” and the line between income and what is not income must be drawn “according to truth and substance, without regard to form.”41 Tax law uses the same instinct elsewhere. The doctrines of substance over form, business purpose, and step transaction let courts recharacterize cleverly designed transactions and tax them as they would have been taxed had they been designed in a straightforward way.42 Here the instinct operates on the labels income and property, as the earlier sections applied it to the labels tax and penalty.
Eisner supplied the working definition, which Taft v. Bowers later repeated. Income is “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets.” The “gain derived from capital” is “not a gain accruing to capital, nor a growth or increment of value in the investment, but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however invested, and coming in, that is, received or drawn by the claimant for his separate use, benefit and disposal.” Taft also stated the consequence of the line: the Amendment “confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income.”43
The stock dividend in Eisner falls on the capital side of the line. Congress had declared in the Revenue Act of 1916 that a “stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value,” and the Act taxed shareholders on that basis.44 The Court rejected the argument that the Amendment saved the tax, “since the Amendment applies to income only, and what is called the stockholder’s share in the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not income.” Before a dividend is declared, the stockholder has no individual share in accumulated profits or in any particular part of the corporation’s assets.45 A tax on that capital interest burdens property by reason of ownership, and Congress’s declaration that the dividend counted as income could not change the constitutional category.
Taft v. Bowers marks the other side of the same boundary. The recipient of stock from a donor later sold it at a gain. The stock represented only a single investment of capital, the donor’s, and when the increase was separated from it through sale or conversion, the increase “became income from that investment in the hands of the recipient subject to taxation according to the very words of the Sixteenth Amendment.”46 Appreciation that stays inside the investment is capital; the same appreciation, severed by a sale, is income.
Simmons v. United States shows two routes by which an unapportioned tax can survive. The Fourth Circuit held that the tax fell on the receipt of money and not on its ownership, which made it indirect and so outside the apportionment rule.47 It also concluded that the taxpayer had received income within the meaning of the Amendment. Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code paraphrases the Amendment, and Congress used it “to exert in this field the full measure of its taxing power,” so a tax sustained under section 61 is necessarily authorized by the Amendment, and a receipt that is income under the Amendment is taxed by sections 61(a) and 74(a).48
Eisner and Simmons come out on opposite sides for a reason that can be stated. The stock dividend gave the shareholder nothing separated from the investment, so the tax fell on a capital interest held by reason of ownership. The money in Simmons was a receipt, so the tax fell on receipt and not on ownership, and it was income besides. The tax in Eisner failed both tests. The Amendment, moreover, lifts only the apportionment restriction. The other limits on the taxing power remain: the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee, the ban on taxing exports, and the uniformity requirement for indirect taxes.49
Step one does more work than students expect, because a tax on receipt, use, or transfer is indirect and never needs the Amendment, as the first ground in Simmons shows. The Amendment matters when a tax reaches property or its yield, and there step three is bounded by the two decisions above: income from property needed apportionment before 1913 and does not now, while the capital that produces the income remains protected by the original rule.
The Export Clause
Article I, section 9, clause 5 removes one subject of taxation from Congress entirely: “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”51 The limits examined so far govern the shape of a tax. Uniformity controls where a duty, impost, or excise must apply, and apportionment controls how a direct tax is divided among the states. The Export Clause works through subject matter instead: it names something Congress may not tax at all, at any rate and however evenly. A measure that qualifies as a tax and satisfies the uniformity and apportionment rules can therefore still fail because of what it reaches.
The word “export” signifies goods in transit to a foreign country.52 Two features of that definition do the work. The first is destination. Dooley v. United States read the clause to apply only to shipments to foreign countries, so a shipment to an unincorporated territory of the United States falls outside it.53 The second is movement: the clause protects goods in export transit, not goods that merely might someday leave the country.54
The protection extends past the goods themselves to services tied to the journey. The prohibition prevents Congress from taxing either goods in export transit or services related to that transit.55 In United States v. International Business Machines Corp. Congress had taxed premiums paid for insurance covering the shipment of goods to foreign countries, and the Court held that the tax violated the clause because it fell on a service related to goods in export transit.56 Fairbank v. United States supplies the standard. It rejected the idea that the clause only precludes targeted taxation of the exported items themselves and held that the clause requires “not simply an omission of a tax upon the articles exported, but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the exportation.”57 That standard explains why services fall within the clause. A premium paid to insure a cargo bound abroad is a cost of getting the cargo abroad, so taxing it burdens exportation.
The Court has not given Fairbank’s principle the full breadth of its enthusiastic expression. It has rejected efforts to exempt from the general income tax the income derived from export-related activities.58 Nor does the clause reach goods that are intended for export but not yet in transit. Congress may tax them so long as the tax is nondiscriminatory with respect to their potential export status, meaning that it is not imposed because the goods are intended for export. A nondiscriminatory tax on all tobacco products, for example, may be applied to tobacco not yet in export transit even though the tobacco is ultimately intended for export.59 The line therefore separates a general tax that happens to reach someone who exports from a tax aimed at the export or its transit, and only the second is forbidden.
Step two is where students most often under-read the clause, because the forbidden subject includes related services as well as the goods themselves. Step three supplies the usual limit: a general tax does not become an export tax because some taxpayer later ships the taxed goods overseas.
The Origination Clause
Article I, section 7 supplies a tax-specific limit that concerns procedure, because it says which chamber must act first: “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”61 The sentence has two halves that pull in different directions. The first fixes the starting point of every revenue bill in the House. The second gives the Senate its ordinary power to change a bill, so the Senate takes part in revenue legislation by amending a House bill and not by launching one of its own. A court asked whether a statute complies must apply both halves together, and their interaction explains why this clause, unlike uniformity and apportionment, rarely decides a case.
The first half rests on a judgment about accountability. The Framers viewed the clause as a structural guardrail against excessive federal taxation, channeling primary responsibility for raising revenue to “the immediate representatives of the people” elected to the House.62 The joint dissent in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius spelled out the mechanism. Taxes have never been popular, and the Constitution requires tax increases to originate in the legislative body most accountable to the people, where legislators must weigh the need for the tax against the price they may pay at an election never more than two years off. For that reason the dissent called judicial tax-writing “particularly troubling.”63
In practice the clause adds little to that accountability. Every bill must pass both houses before it goes to the President, so no tax can become law without the House.64 And the Senate’s express power to amend “removes any special measure of House control that might exist under a system pursuant to which the lower chamber could send bills to the Senate on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”65 The clause secures the House a starting role and nothing more. Courts might still strike down a tax law that, through a slip-up or otherwise, was initially passed in the Senate, but the Supreme Court has never struck down an act of Congress for failing to comply with the requirement.66
The decided case shows the second half of the sentence at work. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. the corporation tax in the 1909 tariff act was attacked as a revenue measure that had originated in the Senate.67 The tariff bill, however, had begun in the House as a general bill for the collection of revenue. As first introduced it contained an inheritance tax, which the Senate removed in favor of the corporation tax. The Court saw no reason in the constitutional provision why a bill that had properly originated in the House could not be amended in the Senate in that manner, because the amendment was “germane to the subject-matter of the bill and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose.”68 The holding is broad, since the Senate replaced one tax with an entirely different one, and the only limit the Court applied was germaneness. Origination attaches to the bill as a whole, so once the House has begun a general revenue bill, what the Senate does to its contents is an amendment under the second half of the clause. The Court cautioned that it did not mean to hold that the journals of the two houses may be examined to invalidate an act that has been passed, signed by the presiding officers, approved by the President, and deposited with the State Department.69
On an exam, therefore, ask where the bill began and, if the Senate changed it, whether the change was germane to the bill’s subject. A revenue bill that started in the Senate is the pattern that remains open to challenge. A Senate substitution of one tax for another in a House-originated tariff bill is the pattern that survived in Flint. Like uniformity and apportionment, this clause limits only taxes, so a measure shown to be a tax must also clear it, and the next subsection turns to the limits that apply to every federal power, taxing included.
Rights-Based Limits
The grant in Article I, section 8 says what Congress may do and nothing about how Congress may treat the people it taxes.71 The limits discussed so far are tax-specific, since uniformity, apportionment, the Export Clause, and the Origination Clause attach to taxes and to nothing else. A second set attaches to every exercise of federal power, and taxes enjoy no exemption from it. A measure that passes the label, revenue, and penalty screens and satisfies every tax-specific clause can still be unlawful as applied, because the Bill of Rights restrains Congress whichever enumerated power it uses.72 The Tenth Amendment sounds like a similar restraint, but a power the Constitution delegates is not one it reserves, as the second half of this subsection explains.
An enumerated power grants authority to do a certain kind of thing, such as raising revenue. A guarantee of individual liberty marks things the government may not do to a person, whatever power it is using. If a grant could override a guarantee, Congress could escape any guarantee by choosing a power broad enough to reach around it. The Bill of Rights therefore prevails over the limited and enumerated powers of Congress.73 Classifying a measure as a tax settles which power supports it. It does not settle whether the measure, applied to a particular person, violates a right, and the statute must pass both inquiries.
Marchetti v. United States applied that principle to a federal occupational tax on illegal gamblers. A gambler who asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege could not be prosecuted for violating the tax, because registering and paying would have been self-incriminating under state and federal laws against gambling.74 The statute that collected revenue also extracted an admission, and the privilege answered that demand. The limit worked as a personal defense, and the question it resolved was individual liberty against government power.75 The First Amendment supplies a second illustration. Congress could not, consistent with that Amendment, impose an otherwise permissible federal tax only on newspaper publishers.76 The example assumes a levy that meets the taxing power’s own requirements, and it still fails because its burden is aimed at the press alone.
A different constitutional attack on the same kind of tax failed. In United States v. Kahriger the challenger invoked the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states the powers that the Constitution does not delegate to the federal government. The Supreme Court disapproved earlier language to the contrary and held that courts cannot invoke the Tenth Amendment, or their own views of the general welfare, to limit the exercise of the taxing power. The question that holding answered was federal power against state power.77 The reasoning is structural. The Tenth Amendment sorts powers into those delegated to the federal government and those left to the states, and a single power cannot sit in both groups. A valid exercise of a power that Article I, section 8 delegates to Congress is by definition not an exercise of a reserved power, so it cannot violate the Tenth Amendment.78 The taxing power also does not depend on any power to regulate, for the Federal Government “may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.”79 The logic is not peculiar to taxation; see United States v. Darby (applying the Tenth Amendment to a power delegated by the Commerce Clause).
The older decisions agree. In McCray v. United States the Court sustained a federal tax on artificially colored oleomargarine. The challengers argued that the subject lay within the exclusive domain of the states and that Congress’s real purpose was not to raise revenue but to tax out of existence a substance not harmful of itself that could lawfully be made and sold. The Court held that nothing in the Fifth and Tenth Amendments takes away the power to tax that the Constitution confers on Congress, and the only limit it conceded, beyond uniformity and for the sake of argument only, was that Congress is restrained from arbitrary impositions or from exceeding its powers in seeking to effect unwarranted ends.80 Marchetti is consistent with McCray, since the privilege protects the individual who asserts it and leaves Congress’s taxing power intact. A Tenth Amendment attack on a genuine tax therefore fails, even when the tax reaches a subject the states also regulate. The argument that remains is the one the earlier sections developed: that an exaction operating as a penalty is no tax at all.
The usual error is to treat the Tenth Amendment as an all-purpose federalism objection to a tax. It asks only whether the power was delegated, and the text of Article I, section 8 answers that question for every genuine tax, whatever the tax’s effect on a subject the states regulate.