Concept
Lopez and Morrison Limits
Commerce Clause
Lopez and Morrison Limits
United States v. Lopez is where the substantial-effects category met its limit. The Court held that Congress could not rely on the Commerce Clause to make it a federal crime to possess a gun in a school zone, because that possession is noneconomic, intrastate conduct that does not substantially affect interstate commerce and cannot be aggregated as economic activity. The statute regulated neither the use of the channels of interstate commerce nor an instrumentality, person, or thing in it, so the Court tested it only under the third category.1 The test for that category asks whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce, a wording Lopez chose over the looser question whether an activity merely “affects” commerce.2 Almost every commerce case the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have decided falls in this category, and that is no coincidence: the conservative Justices have worried most that statutes defended as substantial-effects regulation could obliterate the idea of a national government of limited, enumerated powers.3
The Court then applied the same category in Morrison. Christy Brzonkala, a former student at Virginia Tech, alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, assaulted and repeatedly raped her within thirty minutes of meeting them, and she invoked the civil remedy that the Violence Against Women Act gives victims of gender-motivated violence.4 The Court held that the remedy, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause.5
Morrison reviewed the statute through four factors drawn from Lopez: whether the statute regulates commerce “or any sort of economic enterprise”; whether it contains an “express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set” of cases; whether the statute or its legislative history contains “express congressional findings” about the effects on interstate commerce; and whether the link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce is attenuated.6 The Court needs factors because, in an interdependent economy, nearly every activity has some commercial origin or consequence, and the Court has not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.7 The bare claim that an effect exists therefore cannot end the inquiry. A court needs observable features that separate a substantial connection from a long chain of inferences, and each factor supplies one: the character of the activity, the statute’s own tie to commerce, the evidence Congress gathered, and the length of the chain between the activity and the market.
The four factors serve a single inquiry, whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, and they do not carry equal weight. Morrison declined to adopt “a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity,” yet it observed that, thus far, the cases had upheld regulation of intrastate activity under the effects theory only where the activity was economic in nature.8 That observation explains why the economic character of the activity comes first, and why the other factors do their work mostly where it is absent. The change the two decisions worked is also narrow. They cut back the affecting-commerce power in only one way, by subjecting congressional regulation of noneconomic activity to a specialized constraint, and Morrison itself disclaimed a categorical bar.9 In practice the constraint appears as a change in the standard of review: when the regulated activity is not commercial, the Court gives Congress less deference and independently reviews whether a substantial effect exists.10
The dissenting Justices treated the same inquiry as an empirical one. In Lopez, Justice Breyer stressed that the statute targets a particularly acute threat to education, the possession and use of life-threatening firearms in or near the classroom, and that the empirical evidence documents how incompatible guns and education are.11 In Morrison, Justice Souter maintained that whether an activity in the aggregate substantially affects commerce is a question for Congress in the first instance, and that courts review its judgment not for soundness but for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists.12 The majority and the dissents thus disagree about how much work a label like “economic” should do, and the subsections below trace that disagreement through each factor, beginning with the one that carries the most weight.
Economic Nature of Activity
The first factor asks whether the regulated activity is itself economic, and it carries the most weight. A local activity falls within the substantial-effects category only through its bearing on commerce among the several States, the subject the Clause commits to Congress.13 Lopez found the Gun-Free School Zones Act to be “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms,” and it added that the Act was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity whose scheme would be undercut unless the local conduct were regulated.14 In United States v. Morrison the Court read Lopez the same way. The petitioners and the dissent both downplayed the economic nature of the activity, but a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct was central to the decision.15
The contrast class is the set of activities Congress may reach. Lopez drew on cases upholding a wide variety of acts regulating intrastate economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, among them the surface-mining regulation in Hodel, the federal crime of loan sharking in Perez, and the civil rights law as applied to a local restaurant in McClung.16 Each regulates the conduct of a business or a market transaction. Wheat looks like the hard case, since Roscoe Filburn’s excess crop may never have reached a market. Yet Lopez described him as a farmer who raised wheat, sold part of the crop, fed part to livestock, milled part into flour for home use, and kept the rest for seed, and it said that even Wickard, perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity “in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not.”17
The line falls there because of the channel through which an economic activity reaches the market. Wheat in marketable condition overhangs the market and tends to flow into it when prices rise, and wheat grown for the grower’s own use supplies a need that purchases in the open market would otherwise meet.18 The statute in Wickard therefore restricted both the amount produced for market and the extent to which a farmer could forestall resort to the market by producing for himself, and one farmer’s contribution, trivial alone, was far from trivial when taken together with that of many others similarly situated.19 An economic activity thus connects to interstate commerce through supply, demand, and price, so the effects of the whole class can be added up as effects on a market. A gun in a school zone has no such channel. The Government offered two chains of reasoning instead, one from the costs of crime and one from national productivity, and the Court rejected both because they would let Congress “regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.”20 Justice Kennedy gave the worry its shortest form: “In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.”21 Asking whether the activity is economic answers that worry with a marker tied to the market itself. If the activity is a market activity, aggregation measures an effect on a market. If it is not, aggregation reaches commerce only through a chain of causal steps with no natural stopping point.
Morrison applied the factor to the civil remedy in the Violence Against Women Act and held that “Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”22 Congress had assembled a large record on the economic harm such violence causes, and the record did not change the answer, because the economic-activity test examines the nature of what Congress regulated and not the consequences of the conduct.23 The usual exam error is to answer this question by listing the economic costs of the conduct, which treats a question about the activity as if it were the later question about effects. The same structure appears in Lopez, where the costs-of-crime argument described effects and the Court answered that the activity regulated was gun possession, which is “in no sense an economic activity.”24
Morrison stopped short of a categorical rule. The majority said it need not “adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity,” and in the same sentence noted that “thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”25 Lower courts have read that language two ways. On one reading, the absence of economic activity definitively defeats the statute. On the other, it merely suggests that the relationship to commerce is insubstantial: the court becomes much less deferential to Congress, and the government’s burden is harder to carry but not impossible.26 On that second reading, the court independently reviews the factual basis for a substantial effect and gives Congress less deference.27 Lopez also identified an alternative route for local, arguably noneconomic conduct: regulation that is an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. That route explains how Wickard survives even if home-grown wheat is viewed as noneconomic standing alone, and the sections on Raich develop it.28
The factor also explains why federal statutes aimed at commercial transactions escape Lopez. Lopez cited Perez with approval, and Perez sustained the federal crime of extortionate credit transactions even though the loan sharking in that case crossed no state line, because the crime was commercial and the Court will aggregate data to show an effect on commerce when the data are commercial.29 Lopez and Morrison therefore have little purchase when the regulated activity is “quintessentially economic.”30 Such a statute can still fail on the other factors, since even plainly economic activity must substantially affect commerce, but it does not fail at this first step.
The factor is easy to state and harder to apply, because a court must first decide which activity the statute regulates. Lopez called the possession of a gun in a local school zone “in no sense an economic activity,” yet Justice Breyer answered that the majority could not mean to look narrowly at the act of possession standing alone, since the race-based exclusion in the civil rights cases and the use of force in Perez were not themselves commercial either.31 The Court’s own cases treat business-related conduct as a unit. In Katzenbach v. McClung the Court upheld the ban on race discrimination at a local restaurant. Discrimination is not itself an economic act, but the Court applied aggregation without difficulty because the regulated person was running a business, and the majority in Lopez saw no problem with that result under its economic-activity test.32 A party who asks a court to split a unitary business activity into economic and noneconomic parts therefore meets resistance, and lower courts have rejected many such efforts.33 The labels can also slip: Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Heart of Atlanta as a channels case even though the Court there reasoned in terms of the effects of discrimination on commerce.34 How broadly a court draws the regulated class becomes central in Raich.
The dissenting Justices attacked the premise that the economic character of the activity should matter at all, and their view is the competing position and not the governing rule. In Morrison, Justice Breyer argued that the line becomes harder to draw given the Court’s own exceptions: the Court would let Congress aggregate, and so regulate, “noneconomic” activity at economic establishments, as in the motel and restaurant cases, and Lopez recognized the power to forbid noneconomically motivated discrimination at public accommodations.35 His deeper objection was textual. The Constitution gives Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States” and to make laws “necessary and proper” to implement that power, and the language says nothing about the local or economic nature of a cause that affects interstate commerce. If chemical emanations cause identical, severe commercial harm outside a State, he asked, why should it matter whether local factories or home fireplaces release them?36 He added that the rule shields state regulation only randomly, because Congress can often redraft a statute with a jurisdictional hook tied to the interstate movement of some object.37
Justice Breyer made the same point about schools in Lopez. If the line separates what is educational from what is commercial, he wrote, schools that teach basic skills serve both social and commercial purposes, one cannot easily separate the two, and American industry itself is involved in teaching.38 The Lopez majority had conceded that deciding whether an intrastate activity is commercial may sometimes produce legal uncertainty. It defended that cost by observing that, so long as Congress’s authority is limited to the enumerated powers and those powers have judicially enforceable outer limits, legislation under the Clause will always engender some uncertainty.39 On an exam, the majority’s rule governs, and the dissents show where the doctrine is soft: in how a court frames the activity regulated.
Jurisdictional Element
The second factor asks whether the statute itself demands proof of a link to interstate commerce in each case. Congress holds power to regulate commerce among the several States, so a statute whose own text requires that link has an obvious claim to fall within the grant.41 Lopez observed that § 922(q) “contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.”42 A jurisdictional element is language that makes the government establish, for each defendant or claim, a specific tie to interstate commerce, so that the law applies only where the tie exists. The school-zone statute contained nothing of the kind. The respondent was a local student at a local school, there was no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and nothing required that his possession have any concrete tie to it.43
Lopez illustrated a working element with United States v. Bass. The statute there made it a crime for a felon to “receiv[e], posses[s], or transpor[t] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm,” and the Court read the possession part to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce, both because the text was ambiguous and because Congress, unless it conveys its purpose clearly, is not taken to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.44 The result for the defendant followed from that reading. The government had shown that Bass possessed a firearm but had not shown the required connection to commerce, so the Court set aside the conviction. By construing the statute this way, the Court also reserved the question whether Congress could regulate the mere possession of firearms without more, which is the question Lopez later had to answer for a statute with no such element. Unlike the statute in Bass, § 922(q) had no express element that might limit it to a discrete set of firearm possessions with an explicit connection to interstate commerce.45
The element does two separate jobs. The first is narrowing. A statute that applies only to a gun that has moved in commerce, or to wires that carry messages across state lines, reaches a discrete set of cases that each carry an explicit connection to commerce, so its validity does not rest on an inference about how a whole class of local conduct affects the national economy.46 Morrison put the point by saying that a jurisdictional element “may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce.”47 The second job is proof. Because the connection is part of what the government must show, a defendant whose conduct lacks the tie cannot be convicted, which is how Bass ended. Without an element, the connection is assumed for every covered case, and the assumption must be defended by aggregate reasoning. Morrison drew that contrast for the civil remedy in the Violence Against Women Act. The remedy contained no jurisdictional element establishing that the cause of action was in pursuance of the commerce power, and although Lopez made clear that such an element would lend support to the argument that the remedy was tied to interstate commerce, Congress cast it over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.48
Congress writes these elements into federal criminal statutes in several forms, and each ties the case to commerce through a different fact:
- The federal wire fraud statute requires the government to prove that the wires used are in interstate commerce.49
- The racketeering statute requires an enterprise engaged in, or whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce, so a prosecutor may prove either that the enterprise was in commerce or that its activities affected it.50
- The Hobbs Act reaches robbery and extortion only where the conduct affects commerce.51
- Other provisions turn on movement across a state line, such as the offense of knowingly receiving or possessing certain stolen items that have crossed a state boundary, and the offense of crossing state lines to commit a violent crime against a spouse or intimate partner.52
The school-zone statute shows what an element changes if one imagines it redrafted. Suppose Congress limited it to a firearm that has moved in or otherwise affects interstate commerce. The prosecutor would then have to prove the movement or effect in each case, which is the case-by-case inquiry the original statute lacked.53 That kind of redrafting is exactly what the dissenting Justices had in view.
Those Justices pressed the obvious objection to treating an element as meaningful. Justice Breyer noted in Morrison that in a world where most everyday products or their component parts cross state lines, Congress will frequently be able to redraft a statute to tie the regulation to the interstate movement of some relevant object, and so reach local criminal activity or even family affairs. He asked how much would be gained if Congress reenacted the remedy as “An Act Forbidding Violence Against Women Perpetrated at Public Accommodations or by Those Who Have Moved in, or through the Use of Items that Have Moved in, Interstate Commerce.”54 He acknowledged that the possibility does not give the federal government power to regulate everything, and argued that any limit would operate randomly in terms of the interests the majority sought to protect. The history of the felon-in-possession statute lends the worry some support, because Scarborough v. United States later read the same statute to require only that the gun had passed in interstate commerce at some time, without questioning its constitutionality.55 The same dissent recognized that the Court reaffirmed Congress’s well-established and frequently exercised power to enact laws that satisfy a commerce-related jurisdictional prerequisite, such as that some item relevant to the regulated activity has at some time crossed a state line.56 The objection is the dissent’s and not the holding, but it shows why the majority’s reliance on an element has to rest on more than the ease of drafting one.
The majority nonetheless treats the element as evidence of a real tie to commerce, for two reasons. An element is not free for Congress to add: each requirement narrows the statute to the cases that carry the tie, so local cases without it fall outside the federal offense, and the government must prove the tie in every prosecution. An element also shapes how courts read a statute, because an ambiguous commerce term is read to demand a real nexus unless Congress speaks clearly, which is what happened in Bass.57
A jurisdictional element supports a statute without deciding the case either way. The Court has said that the presence of such a nexus is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for validating an exercise of the commerce power; it is a tool through which Congress attempts to confine federal law to constitutional norms, and whether a particular nexus succeeds requires the same judicial oversight applied to other regulations.58 In Jones v. United States the Court reversed a federal arson conviction because it refused to read an element requiring that the property be used in interstate commerce or in any activity affecting it so broadly as to include a private home that received interstate natural gas, secured an interstate mortgage, and was insured by an out-of-state company, since that reading risked extending the affecting-commerce rationale to unconstitutional lengths.59 Words that nearly any ordinary object could satisfy would sort no cases at all, so courts read them to require a tie that does real work. On an exam, treat the element as one factor to weigh alongside the economic character of the activity. Its absence, as in the school-zone statute and the VAWA remedy, counts against the statute, its presence supports the statute, and neither ends the analysis.
Congressional Findings
The Clause gives Congress power to regulate commerce among the several States,61 and the third factor asks whether Congress itself found that the regulated activity affects that commerce. The Court has treated the answer as evidence and never as a verdict. Lopez observed that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings about the substantial burdens an activity places on interstate commerce, but to the extent findings would let a court evaluate a legislative judgment of substantial effect that is not visible to the naked eye, they were lacking there.62 Morrison restated the factor in the same terms.63 Three propositions follow, and each rests on its own reason: findings are not required, they are helpful, and they are never dispositive.
Gonzales v. Raich confirmed the first proposition in a case where the challengers pressed the opposite argument. They insisted that Congress had made no specific finding that intrastate cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes would substantially affect the larger interstate market. The Court answered that it has never required particularized findings in order to legislate, absent a special concern such as the protection of free speech, and that the absence of such findings does not call Congress’s authority into question.64 Two dissenting opinions supply the reasons. Justice Souter wrote in Morrison that by passing legislation Congress indicates its conclusion, whether explicitly or not, that facts support its exercise of the commerce power.65 In Lopez he warned that making explicit findings dispositive in close cases would imply either judicial authority to review the wisdom of Congress’s choices or authority to require some high degree of deliberateness, and review for wisdom is the old judicial pretension discredited and abandoned in 1937.66
Findings earn their place as evidence. Raich described them as helpful in reviewing a statutory scheme, particularly when the connection to commerce is not self-evident, and said the Court will consider them when they are available.67 The mechanism is informational. Judges tend not to be familiar with the facts that make a close case close, and explicit findings may advance review by identifying the factual authority on which Congress relied.68 Where the link is obvious, as with regulation of interstate garbage hauling, findings add little; where it is obscure, as with guns near schools, they matter more.69 The help is also limited to findings that address the subject at hand. Lopez rejected the effort to import findings from earlier firearms legislation, because those enactments and findings did not speak to the subject matter of § 922(q) or its relationship to interstate commerce, and the statute broke sharply with the earlier pattern of federal firearms law.70
Findings do not decide the question. Lopez placed them inside the Court’s own independent evaluation of constitutionality, which already implied that they could not end it.71 Morrison made the point explicit: the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain Commerce Clause legislation, because whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently is “ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question.”72 The reason follows from the premise of enumerated powers. If a recital of a commerce connection ended the inquiry, Congress could define the reach of its own power by writing the recital, and the outer limits the Court enforces would disappear. Justice Souter’s Lopez dissent reached the same endpoint from the standard of review: findings report what Congress actually found and not what it could rationally find, so making them dispositive would replace rationality review with something else.73
Three decisions show how these propositions interact. In Lopez no findings addressed the subject, and the statute fell because gun possession in a school zone is noneconomic and the Government’s chains of inference could not supply the link.74 In Morrison the record was enormous: four years of hearings and specific findings in eight separate reports from Congress and its committees preceded the Violence Against Women Act.75 Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce, and the Court held the remedy invalid anyway. The findings were substantially weakened because they relied heavily on a method of reasoning the Court had already rejected as unworkable under an enumeration of powers, the but-for chain from violent crime to every attenuated effect on commerce. That chain would let Congress regulate any crime, and family law as well, since the aggregate economic effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing is also significant.76 Findings therefore cannot cure the absence of an economic nexus, because they are only as strong as the reasoning they carry. Raich sits at the other pole. The introductory sections of the Controlled Substances Act explained why Congress deemed it appropriate to reach local activities, and the parties and amici seemed to agree that the national and international market for marijuana has dimensions fully comparable to those of the class of activities regulated in Wickard.77 The contrast is instructive: in Raich the findings addressed a market in a commodity, and in Morrison they connected a noneconomic crime to the national economy through a chain with no natural stopping point.
The Morrison dissenters read the same record as grounds for deference, and their view is the competing position and not the governing rule. Justice Souter argued that whether an activity in the aggregate substantially affects commerce is a question for Congress in the first instance, because Congress’s institutional capacity for gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds a court’s, and that courts review the congressional assessment not for soundness but for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists.78 On his account the sufficiency of the evidence before Congress to provide a rational basis could not seriously be questioned, whatever disputes might attend the methodology of particular studies.79 Majority and dissent agree that findings are relevant and not dispositive. They differ over the weight an extensive record deserves: the dissent treats it as enough for rational-basis review, and the majority discounts it because of the reasoning underneath.
On an exam, a missing record is not an argument that a statute fails, and a thick record is not an argument that it stands. Treat findings as evidence, ask what they actually connect (a commodity market to its supply and demand, or a noneconomic harm to the economy through a series of steps), and give more weight to the economic nature of the regulated activity than to the size of the legislative record.
Attenuation and the Local Line
The fourth factor asks how many inferential steps lie between the regulated activity and commerce among the several States,81 and it protects most directly the line between what is truly national and what is truly local. A link is attenuated when it holds only by passing through so many causal steps that the same method could tie nearly any activity to the national economy. Lopez applied the factor to the Gun-Free School Zones Act and told the Government that, whatever the importance of education, its argument was “too attenuated.”82 The three earlier factors looked at the character of the activity, the text of the statute, and the legislative record. This one looks at the route from the activity to the market.
The Government defended the Act with two chains of reasoning. Its costs-of-crime argument tied gun possession to commerce through the economic costs of the violent crime that possession might produce.83 Its national-productivity argument ran in steps: guns in schools threaten the learning environment, a handicapped educational process yields a less productive citizenry, and a less productive citizenry weakens the Nation’s economic well-being, so Congress could rationally have concluded that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce.84 Each link may be believable, and the dissent would later argue that each could be documented. The majority’s difficulty lay in the number of links and in where they began. The possession was a local act by a local student at a local school, with no requirement of any concrete tie to interstate commerce, so the Government had to build the whole bridge to the national economy out of consequences downstream of that act.85
The Court judged each chain by asking what else it would authorize, and the Government’s own answers supplied the problem. Under the costs-of-crime reasoning, the Government admitted, Congress could regulate not only all violent crime but all activities that might lead to violent crime, however tenuously they relate to interstate commerce, and under the national-productivity reasoning Congress could regulate any activity it found related to individual economic productivity, with family law as one example.86 The mechanism follows from the structure of enumerated powers. In an interdependent economy almost any local act sends some effect toward commerce, so a test that accepts any such effect leaves the States nothing to govern.87 That is why the Court refused to “pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”88
Perez v. United States shows a link that holds. Lopez listed it among the cases sustaining regulation of intrastate economic activity,89 and Perez upheld the federal crime of extortionate credit transactions even though the loan sharking in that case crossed no state line, because the crime was commercial and the Court will aggregate data to show an effect on commerce when the data are commercial.90 The regulated activity was itself a commercial transaction, so aggregating it measured an effect on a market in one step. The school-zone statute began with a noneconomic act and reached commerce only through crime costs or educational and productivity consequences. Perez also sustained a criminal statute in a field where the States have historically been sovereign, so the traditional character of the subject cannot be what decided the two cases.91
Morrison met the same method in the Violence Against Women Act. Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce, and the Court rejected the reasoning because it seeks to follow “the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce.”92 The objection works as an argument from subsets. If the nationwide, aggregated impact of a crime on employment, production, transit, or consumption could sustain federal regulation, Congress could regulate murder or any other violence, since gender-motivated violence is a subset of all violent crime and so has lesser economic impacts than the larger class it belongs to.93 The same reasoning reaches family law, because the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant, and Congress may have seen that specter when it expressly precluded the remedy from being used in the family law context.94
From that reasoning the Court drew the structural conclusion on which the factor rests. It rejected “the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce,” because the Constitution “requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”95 The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods of interstate commerce has always been the province of the States.96 The word solely does careful work. Every local act has some aggregate effect, so an aggregate effect alone cannot mark the boundary, and the Court looked instead to whether the activity was economic and whether the statute tied each case to commerce. The findings point from the previous section returns here as well: the Court discounted Congress’s extensive record because it rested on this same chain, so a thick record cannot repair an attenuated link.97
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez explains why the traditional character of a subject bears on the inquiry. Any conduct in this interdependent world has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, the Court has not yet said the commerce power may reach so far, and if Congress attempts that extension a court must at the least ask whether national power intrudes upon an area of traditional state concern.98 Education is such an area, and proximity to schools was the very premise for making the possession a crime, which gave the Court a particular duty to see that the federal-state balance was not destroyed.99 Read with the majority, the factor tells a court how closely to examine the link to commerce, and it exempts no subject from the commerce power. The majority itself acknowledged that Congress may regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process, though that authority does not reach every aspect of local schools.100 The label also cannot do all the work, a point the Morrison dissent pressed when it observed that the local pickpocket is no less a traditional subject of state regulation than the local gender-motivated assault.101
The Lopez majority gave the stopping-point problem that same concrete form. If Congress could regulate whatever adversely affects the learning environment, it could reason a fortiori that it may regulate the educational process directly, and because what is taught has a significant effect on classroom learning, it could mandate a federal curriculum for local schools.102 The second statute above fails for that reason. The first statute’s link runs through a market.
Justice Thomas, concurring in Lopez, pressed the stopping-point objection against the doctrine itself. He observed that one can always draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce, so that an omnibus statute purporting to regulate every aspect of human existence would apparently be constitutional under the Court’s jurisprudence, because the statute in the aggregate regulates matters that substantially affect commerce.103 He also noted that at ratification “commerce” consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes,104 and he urged the Court to reconsider the substantial-effects test in an appropriate case, with an eye toward a standard that reflects the text and history of the Clause without totally rejecting more recent jurisprudence.105 That is a separate-opinion position. The majority kept the test and used the attenuation factor to control it.
Justice Breyer’s Lopez dissent defends the opposite view of the same chain. He stressed that the statute targets a particularly acute threat to the educational process, the possession and use of life-threatening firearms in or near the classroom, and that the empirical evidence documents the special way in which guns and education are incompatible.106 He argued that the negative impact on the national economy of an inability to teach basic skills seems no smaller than that of the organized crime that Perez accepted.107 The majority replied that his rationale applies equally to family law and to direct regulation of education, and that although he argued the Government’s rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he could identify no activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.108 The Morrison dissent restated the disagreement as one about institutional role: within the bounds of the rational, it argued, Congress and not the courts must remain primarily responsible for striking the state-federal balance.109 Those are dissenting views, and the governing rule is the majority’s.
Step four does the decisive work in the opinions themselves, since Lopez and Morrison were both decided by pointing to what the government’s reasoning would permit. The usual exam error is to stop at step two and call the statute valid because every link sounds plausible, when plausible links do not save a theory that has no stopping point. A second error is to answer that Congress cannot reach crime or education because they are state subjects, which ignores that Perez sustained a federal crime and that the Lopez majority accepted federal regulation of commercial activities touching schools.110