402 U.S. 146 (1971)
Petitioner Perez, identified as a loan shark, made a series of loans to Miranda, who owned a butcher shop. He provided an initial advance of $1,000 repayable at $105 per week for fourteen weeks. After Miranda paid for six or eight weeks, the weekly amount rose to $130. Miranda later borrowed an additional $2,000, agreeing to $205 weekly payments that soon increased to $330.1
Miranda faced escalating demands reaching $500 and then $1,000 per week. To meet one payment, he skipped paying suppliers and eventually sold his shop. Perez threatened Miranda and his wife with violence, including hospitalization, castration, and harm from associates if payments stopped. He suggested Miranda commit crimes like theft or drug sales to obtain funds.2
After his arrest, Perez was tried by jury on charges under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Miranda, his wife, and an employee provided testimony against him, while Perez offered no defense witnesses. The jury returned a conviction, which the Court of Appeals affirmed over a dissent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to the significance of the constitutional issue raised.3
Congress had considered extensive materials on loan sharking before passing the Act. A House study reported that organized crime takes over $350 million annually from the poor through such practices and identified it as the second largest revenue source for organized crime. Additional reports from New York and the President's Commission detailed the national structure of the racket, its control by syndicates, and its impact on legitimate businesses and interstate commerce.4
Whether Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 159, 18 U.S.C. § 891 et seq., as construed and applied to petitioner, is a permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?5
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused. Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Third, those activities affecting commerce. It is with this last category that we are here concerned.6 Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.7
Yes. The established facts show that Perez engaged in extortionate credit transactions by making loans to Miranda and enforcing repayment through threats of violence.8
Perez advanced $1,000 to Miranda with weekly installments of $105 for fourteen weeks, later raising payments to $130 and then providing an additional $2,000 loan with demands escalating to $500 and finally $1,000 per week.
When Miranda could not meet the schedule, Perez threatened Miranda and his wife with hospitalization, castration, and harm from associates, while urging Miranda to steal or sell drugs to repay the debt.
These facts place Perez within the class of activities that Congress determined affect interstate commerce because loan sharking supplies organized crime with its second largest revenue source and facilitates control over legitimate businesses across state lines.9 The jury convicted Perez after hearing testimony from Miranda, his wife, and an employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Because the statute regulates the entire class of extortionate credit transactions and that class lies within the reach of federal power, no proof of interstate movement or particularized effect in Perez's individual transactions was required.10
Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is a permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce Clause as construed and applied to petitioner.11
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that the statute permits a man to be convicted without any proof of interstate movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce.12 He maintained that Congress surely has power to protect instrumentalities of commerce and prohibit misuse of its channels, yet this law reaches wholly local activity.13 Stewart reasoned that it is not enough to say loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national problem, and that any crime may have an interstate setting without thereby acquiring interstate attributes that distinguish it from other local crime.14
He concluded that the definition and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.15