Concept
Standing of the Intervenors
Younger abstention
Standing of the Intervenors
Younger v. Harris decided a second question, this one about the three plaintiffs who had joined Harris in his federal suit. Harris was being prosecuted under California's syndicalism law. Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky were not, and the Court held that whatever right Harris might have, they could not share it with him.1 This is a standing holding. Before a federal court will stop a state prosecution, the plaintiff must have a genuine controversy of his own with the State.
Dan and Hirsch said only that they wished to advocate the doctrines of the Progressive Labor Party.2 None of the three claimed that he had ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution was likely, or even that one was remotely possible. They sued solely because, in the language of their complaint, they “feel inhibited.”3
The Court did not say that plaintiffs in their position could never sue. A genuine controversy might have existed if the three had alleged that they would be prosecuted for the conduct they planned, and if the district court had found that allegation true, whether on the district attorney's admission or on other evidence.4 Feeling inhibited fell short of that. Even if true, the allegation could not bring the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin a pending state prosecution. A federal suit to stop a state prosecution is a serious matter, and persons whose only fears of prosecution are “imaginary or speculative” are not appropriate plaintiffs.5 The ordinary rule shows how serious the step is. Even a person actually charged under an unconstitutional statute normally has an adequate remedy at law, because he can raise the constitutional defense in the state proceeding.6 Plaintiffs who faced no charge at all were poorly placed to ask for more.
A concurring opinion framed the same point in Article III terms. The court below had observed that “well-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law,” but the concurrence insisted that there must still be a live controversy. No threats of prosecution of these appellees were alleged. Dan and Hirsch had alleged a desire to advocate Progressive Labor Party doctrines, but they had not asserted that their advocacy would be of the same genre as the advocacy that brought on Harris's prosecution. The concurrence therefore saw no reason to think that California had any ripe controversy with them, citing Golden v. Zwickler.7
The first question to ask about a plaintiff who invokes a vague statute and a chilling effect is whether he has been charged, arrested, or threatened. Dan and Hirsch had been none of these. Compare a leafleter whom police warn that he will be arrested if he keeps handing out handbills, and whose colleague is in fact arrested for doing so. He does not rest on a mere feeling. A threat aimed at him personally, reinforced by what happened to his colleague, is the kind of fact that suggests a likely prosecution, which was exactly what the Younger plaintiffs failed to allege. A plaintiff with only a general sense of inhibition fails at this threshold, before the merits or the question of abstention is reached.
The intervenors' claims therefore failed because they had no controversy with the State. Whether Harris's own pending prosecution should be shielded from federal interference was a separate matter. The equitable restraint that Younger formalized concerns pending criminal proceedings, since federal courts of equity were long held not to enjoin them.8 A plaintiff who faces a specific threat of enforcement but has no state prosecution pending presents a different question, and the pre-enforcement cases discussed below take it up.